



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

Stanford University Libraries



3 6105 119 330 657





OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

***BOOKS BY
JOHN SPENCER BASSETT***

THE FEDERALIST SYSTEM


LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

THE MIDDLE GROUP OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS

THE LOST FRUITS OF WATERLOO

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY



THE BATTLE AREA IN FRANCE DURING FOUR YEARS OF WAR

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

A HISTORY

BY

JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, Ph.D., LL.D.

Professor of American History, Smith College, on the
Sydenham Clark Parsons Foundations



NEW YORK

ALFRED · A · KNOPF

MCMXIX

1000

COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY
ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc.

D570
L374
10/19/19

270287

Y9A98L1 09079AT2

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE

The participation of the United States in the great war is one of the rare historical events that give direction to the progress of the world. The self-governing states of Europe were struggling for life and the greatest republic in the world went to their assistance at the critical moment. A century ago the American people first proved that republican government can succeed in a first rate nation. It was as fitting as essential that they should have interfered to preserve it in time of danger. It is in this sense that the future historian will make up his opinion of our part in the great struggle. When the passions of the day subside, the American people will come to this view of the subject. They will not ask very closely about the errors committed in the conduct of the war, but they will wish to know what the world crisis was, how the nation as a nation met it, and how the people now living adjusted themselves to the problems growing out of the war when it was won.

It is from the standpoint of the historian that I have endeavored to tell the story of the struggle. It was not possible to omit mention of matters which have excited controversy, but earnest efforts have been made to present them with due appreciation of the motives of persons on both sides of the questions. If the story does not please the reader, let me ask him before condemnation to try to imagine how he could please all parties.

As for the sources of information, use has been made of all the materials that could be found. Public documents have been consulted as far as they were available. The special articles in the newspapers have been used freely. Probably no

PREFACE

other event has been so fully and accurately described in the daily newspapers as the world war. I have drawn on them so constantly that in ordinary cases it did not seem advisable to encumber the page with footnote citations, but to make this general acknowledgment. Particular use has been made of the files of the *New York Times* whose bound volumes appear so quickly in our public libraries and with such a good index that the writer of contemporary history cannot fail to feel his obligation to the publishers. Personal acknowledgment for aid is due to many individuals, friends and acquaintances, particularly to Hon. Frederick P. Keppel, formerly assistant-secretary of war, Colonel C. W. Weeks, of the War College, and Major W. A. Cattell, of the office of the chief of engineers. All my applications to public officials in Washington were answered with great consideration and helpfulness as far as I had a right to expect.

No writer at this time can expect to produce a completely reliable history of the war. I venture to hope that this book contains the outline facts with reasonable accuracy and that no injustice is done to any person or cause. It is a matter of regret that it was necessary to publish the book before the Senate had completed its consideration of the treaty of peace. The matter has been held in type several weeks in anticipation of that event and it is inadvisable to wait longer.

JOHN SPENCER BASSETT.

Northampton, Massachusetts,
September 19, 1919.

CONTENTS

- ✧ **CHAPTER I. EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1**
 - 1. The Economic Shock, 1
 - 2. Neutrality, 7
 - 3. Early German Propaganda, 12

- CHAPTER II. THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE, 18**
 - 1. Fixing the Status of Neutrals, 18
 - 2. The British Blockade of Germany, 23

- ✧ **CHAPTER III. GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES, 30**
 - 1. The German Propaganda, 30
 - 2. The Submarine Controversy, 39

- CHAPTER IV. AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR IN EUROPE, 1914-1917, 60**
 - 1. The General Results, 60
 - 2. The Alluring Rôle of Peace-Maker, 62
 - 3. Strengthening the National Defenses, 71
 - 4. Organizing Industrial Resources Under Fear of War, 79
 - 5. The Presidential Campaign of 1916, 82

- ✧ **CHAPTER V. THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR, 90**
 - 1. Ruthless Submarine Warfare, 90
 - 2. The Recall of Ambassadors, 97
 - 3. The President Before Congress, 101
 - 4. A State of War Declared, 107

- ✧ **CHAPTER VI. PREPARATIONS FOR WAR, 114**
 - 1. Organizing an Army, 114
 - 2. The Navy, 121
 - 3. The Machinery of War, 124

- CHAPTER VII. ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES, 131**
 - 1. The Council of National Defense, 131
 - 2. The Control of Food and Fuel, 137
 - 3. The Railroads and the Merchant Marine, 147

CONTENTS

- CHAPTER VIII. THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION, 158**
1. The Attitude of the Political Parties, 158
 2. Investigating the War Department, 164
 3. The Overman Bill, 173
 4. The Aircraft Investigations, 177
- CHAPTER IX. THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 189**
1. Crossing the Atlantic, 189
 2. Communications and Supply Depots in France, 194
 3. Training and Organizing the Army in France, 199
- CHAPTER X. LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE, 204**
1. The Western Front, 204
 2. Instruction in France, 211
 3. The Spring Drive of the German Army, 217
 4. The American Army Drawn into the Battle, 223
- CHAPTER XI. FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT, MAY TO JULY, 1918, 229**
1. The May-June German Offensive, 229
 2. The German Drive South of the Marne, 236
 3. Reducing the Rheims-Soissons Salient, 242
- CHAPTER XII. THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING, 252**
1. The Capture of St. Mihiel, 252
 2. First Phase of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, 256
 3. The Collapse in the East and in Germany, 262
 4. Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, 268
 5. Other American Units, 282
- CHAPTER XIII. NAVAL OPERATIONS, 295**
1. Naval Operations in European Waters, 298
- CHAPTER XIV. PRELIMINARIES TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, 310**
1. Early Suggestions from Germany, 310
 2. The Armistice, 319
- CHAPTER XV. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919, 333**
1. Dispatching the Peace Commission, 333
 2. The First Days in Europe, 339
 3. Organizing the Peace Conference, 343
 4. Drafting the League Covenant, 348
 5. The International Problems of the Peace Conference, 358
- INDEX, 379**

LIST OF MAPS

I. The Battle Area in France During Four Years of War	<i>Frontispiece</i>
II. The Prohibited Area Under the German Submarine Decree of February 1, 1917	FACING PAGE 106
III. The Fighting on the West Side of the Château-Thierry Salient, June, 1918 The Fighting in the July Drive of the Germans East of Château-Thierry	} 233
IV. The American Divisions in the Marne-Vesle Campaign	245
V. The Capture of the St. Mihiel Angle, September 12, 1918	254
VI. Map of the Meuse-Argonne Region	260



CHAPTER 1

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR IN THE UNITED STATES

1. *The Economic Shock*

THE people of the United States observed with intense interest the wonderful spectacle that Europe presented the last week in July, 1914. They saw a thing come to pass that most men had believed impossible. They saw the Great Powers throw aside their favorite sport of diplomatic sparring and plunge into war in deadly earnest. Their most useful emergency man, the Concert of Europe, long a guarantee of peace, was going to his funeral; but American onlookers had no time to attend the obsequies. For them greater interest was in the mobilization of vast armies, the marching of divisions in a week from factories to battlefields, and the outburst of patriotism and confidence that everybody was in the right, while above all were the strident notes of recriminating chancelleries. At a safe distance, they looked on with awe and admiration. They had never before lived through such a thrilling period, and they appropriated the excitement without dreaming that their own country, hitherto so free from great world problems, was yet to take a large part in the struggle then beginning.

X Their recall to sober things came with the realization that the turmoil beyond the Atlantic had produced a great shock in American economic life, that it had involved our diplomacy in a new and perplexing series of problems connected with neutrality, and that it forced our own citizens to take part in the controversy with the result that the extremists on one side began to quarrel with the extremists on the other, while those who tried

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

to maintain a judicious middle ground were pronounced indifferent to the calls of humanity. These early effects were disturbing, and, as the hopes of an early peace retreated, they became more serious. In fact, we seemed no sooner to solve one problem forced upon us by the war than another, and more difficult, demanded attention.

The economic shock was short lived but severe while it lasted. Its earliest manifestation was in the stock market. German financiers were warned of the approach of war by those who precipitated it and had time to sell large holdings of foreign stocks and bonds. Dealers living in *Entente* countries were taken by surprise and made frantic efforts to sell in a crashing market. The Paris *Bourse* closed on July 28, and the London Stock Exchange, after a brave struggle against the inevitable, closed its doors on the 31st. On the same day, a few hours later, the brokers gathered in the New York Stock Exchange just before it opened with the feeling that the blackest day in their history was before them. They had sold 1,300,000 shares on the 31st at a decline of from six to seventeen points. The early cables brought a flood of selling orders, and when these were poured forth on the floor regardless of price a great crash was sure to follow, with the result that many a solvent American firm would be carried away in disaster. Leading bankers and operators sought the governors of the Exchange and besought them to stay certain ruin by closing the doors. At the hour of opening the presiding officer appeared in the balcony overlooking the eager throng of traders on the floor and in impressive brevity declared the Exchange closed until further notice. Other exchanges followed the example of New York, with the result that speculative dealings were limited to the uncertain commitments of the curb brokers. Thus the speculative panic was checked in its incipency.

A more intimate, if less important, concern of the people was
[2]

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

the plight of the army of tourists caught in belligerent countries on the declaration of war. Exchanges of bills were suspended and the means of transportation were seized for the mobilization of troops, with the result that travelers were left without money or opportunity to escape to neutral countries. Nearly two hundred thousand Americans were stranded in a topsy-turvy world, without money in their pockets, and all eager to go home on the first steamer. Time and the exercise of patience, however, eventually reduced the congestion in travel, and the United States government relieved the money shortage by sending overseas \$2,750,000 in gold on the *Tennessee*, an American cruiser. Army transports were also dispatched to bring back the tourists who could not otherwise obtain passage. By these means the travelers who desired to come home were able to reach American ports by the end of the autumn.

The war had hardly begun before another cause of anxiety appeared in the heavy drain of gold to Europe. In the last ten days of July \$45,000,000 were withdrawn, and it was feared that so much would be taken that there would not be enough to support the fund reserved for the redemption of government notes in gold. Congress met the emergency by extending the Vreeland act of 1908 so as to allow the issue of an emergency fund of \$1,000,000,000 in currency. The federal reserve bank, not yet put into operation, was hurried into existence, and confidence returned when it was seen that money could easily be obtained by all who had good security to offer. The federal reserve banks went into operation on November 16. The system worked admirably in the day of crisis and proved its ability to give the country an ample and acceptable money supply.

The war brought, also, a serious disturbance to American commerce, partly through the withdrawal of British and French shipping and partly through the interruption of exports from the great manufacturing nations of Europe. Neutral ships

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

feared to take the sea, insurance rose to unheard of figures, and it seemed possible that our grain and cotton crops would have to remain unmarketed. The situation was made worse by the large quantity of foreign owned American securities which might at any time be offered in the American market in exchange for cash, which in turn would have to be sent out of the country. This state of anxiety was partly relieved when it was seen that the British fleet would be able to keep German warships off the ordinary routes of Atlantic travel, thus giving opportunity for a large portion of the British merchant marine to come and go as formerly. The American congress tried to remedy the situation further through four proposed laws, only three of which were passed.

The first was an act to admit foreign-built ships to American registry without serious restrictions. It became law on September 5, and although it necessarily acted slowly, the deep sea tonnage of the United States, which barely increased from 1913 to 1914, grew from 2,069,637 tons in 1914 to 3,522,933 in 1915. For more speedy relief the president recommended the appropriation of funds for the purchase of ships. A bill was accordingly introduced to expend \$30,000,000 for this object and to authorize the government to acquire a controlling interest in a \$10,000,000 company for operating these ships. It was defeated on the ground that the government should not conduct a steamship line in opposition to private enterprises. It was assumed that German ships, laid up in our harbors through fear of seizure by the *Entente* warships, would have been bought if the bill had passed. It became known that Great Britain held that to purchase these ships would be an unneutral act since the money paid would be used to help Germany carry on her war.

The third proposal was for the government to sell war risk insurance against loss at sea. Little objection was made in

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

congress, and a Federal Bureau of War Risk Insurance was created with a fund of \$5,000,000 advanced by the government.

The fourth measure concerned the revenues, which had declined through the shrinkage of imports. The decrease was \$10,000,000 in August, 1914, and it was thought that it would be greater in succeeding months. President Wilson asked congress to lay a special tax to make up the deficit. Opponents of the Underwood tariff, which had but recently gone into operation, wished to raise the money by revising its schedules. But the president's wish that the tariff should not be disturbed was respected and congress laid internal taxes to yield \$54,000,000, not to be collected until after December 31, 1915. The principle here followed has been adhered to by the administration in all its war finances. It involves as heavy taxes as industry will stand, levied in such a way that the tariff is not disturbed, the balance of the money needed to be obtained from loans.

As the shock to business subsided it was evident that a wave of war prosperity was beginning. Russia was not a manufacturing nation and had to buy freely elsewhere. She had lost her German source of supplies, and as her allies were overtaxed with their own war demands she turned to neutral nations for a large portion of the merchandise she needed. As for army supplies and munitions of war, she had to obtain them in vast quantities from outside her own borders. In a less degree, but still in an important sense, France and Great Britain were in need of our commodities. As soon as the machinery of intercourse was repaired, therefore, a steady stream of exports turned toward the belligerent nations. By the middle of autumn business men were convinced that the worst was passed, and six months later it was evident that the United States was at the dawn of great prosperity. Germany herself turned anxiously to us for the supplies she could purchase of no other great nation, im-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

porting them freely for a time through the ports of the adjacent neutrals.

The tide had well turned when demands began to be made on the American manufacturers for munitions of war. Some refused to enter the field, but they were few. Agents from abroad offered contracts freely and at large profits, and it required great self-control to decline them on grounds of humanity. If a manufacturer had no special machinery for the work required of him, funds would be advanced to enable him to get it. Thus munition plants sprang up like mushrooms, drawing into them troops of laborers at increased wages. Many great fortunes were amassed in a few months. It was not pleasant to reflect that we were fattening upon the misfortune of others, but it was evident that if we refused to sell munitions to those who came to buy we should act in behalf of Germany. In refusing to saddle herself with militarism Great Britain had counted upon her right to buy military supplies in neutral countries when she needed them, a right clearly accorded to her by international law. If we had reversed that rule of law in 1914, we should have committed an unneutral act and taken from her that which by moral duty we had no right to withhold. Aside from our scruples, it was pleasant to reflect that the world was coming to us for business, and on our own terms.

The war brought us an unusual opportunity in South American trade. Here was a great continent nearly lacking in manufactures. Practically all its supplies, from tooth brushes to steam engines, had to be imported. Unable to get them from Europe, it was anxious to have the United States enter and appropriate the trade. Previously the South Americans had generally distrusted us politically, and the merchants of some of the European countries had worked upon the feelings of the natives in order to make it hard for us to gain admission to the trade. Now all restrictions were swept away. Lack of ship-

[6]

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

ping proved a great obstacle, and the disappearance of British tramp steamers from the ocean not only made it difficult to answer the call upon us, but actually caused the volume of trade to drop from \$146,147,993 in 1913 to \$99,323,957 in 1915. In 1917, however, it had risen to \$259,559,458.

As the volume of orders increased and the balance of trade grew in our favor American securities, which for years had been held in large sums by European investors, began to come home in payment of accounts. Along with them came, also, a large amount of gold, until the loose coin of Europe was piled high in American vaults. When vast stocks of securities had been transferred and so much gold sent over that the transatlantic reserves were reduced to the danger point, the *Entente* allies appeared in the American markets with bonds for sale. In the beginning the administration had requested financiers not to make such loans, but as foreign necessities increased, it was impossible to continue this policy. The result was repeated bond sales, the proceeds being placed in banks to settle trade balances. Thus we ran from one success to another until we came to the dazzling summit of the financial world. All ships turned to our shores, all trade currents ran in and out of our harbors, and in American hands were the purse strings of two worlds. It was a success beyond previous power of imagination, but thoughtful Americans shuddered when they thought of the price the rest of the world paid for it.

2. Neutrality

August 4, 1914, President Wilson issued a proclamation of neutrality. He cautioned citizens to commit no act in aid of either side of the controversy. He declared the ports closed to belligerent warships, unless they came for succor, in which case they were to leave in twenty-four hours and receive coal and supplies only sufficient to take them to their nearest home

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

ports. He also reminded the people that while they had the right to sell contraband articles to a belligerent, such articles were subject to seizure if intercepted at sea.

By most people the neutrality proclamation was received as a matter of course, and it had little effect on the opinion of the average man. Such important moral principles were involved that it was impossible for Americans to refrain from taking sides in a contest which, it was evident, would shake the world to the foundation. Observing the drift and fearing that American opinion might become partisan enough to embarrass those who had to conduct the nation's diplomacy, President Wilson on August 18 issued an address urging editors, clergymen, and all other leaders of public opinion to try to promote the spirit of neutrality. So large a portion of the people were descended from the various belligerents that it was likely that strong discussion would lead to factional quarrels. In his own conduct he was studiously neutral. The president's words were well received by moderate people, but the distrust of Germany was not diminished because it was not discussed openly.

The use of wireless telegraph stations early attracted notice. It was possible for Germany to direct the operation of her scattered cruisers or lay plans to supply them from neutral ports by communications through these stations, thus making our territory a base for important acts of war. Considering this contrary to the spirit of neutrality, the president, on August 5, ordered all the wireless stations in the country to refuse to transmit any unneutral message, and he instructed the secretary of the navy to carry out the order. Directions were accordingly given by the secretary to establish a censorship, and messages from belligerents in code or cipher were prohibited. Naval officers were placed in charge of the high-power stations. The Germans protested against this action alleging discrimination in favor of Great Britain. It was afterwards agreed that the cen-

[8]

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

sorships should be relaxed, Great Britain and Germany acquiescing in the change. Code messages were allowed, but the censor insisted that the matter should be neutral. The Germans controlled the two high-power stations at Sayville, Long Island, and Tuckerton, New Jersey, but the latter was taken into government hands when it was discovered that it was operating without a license. The Marconi plant at Siasconset, on Nantucket Island, was closed by the owners in protest against the regulations of the government. The rules here made in regard to the use of wireless communication in war are important, since no precedent existed when the war began.

Late in August it was reported that twelve ships were loading supplies in American ports for German commerce destroyers operating in the middle and southern Atlantic. Several were detained by the government before they sailed, but the *Brandenburg*, a North German Lloyd steamer, sailed from Philadelphia after the British ambassador had filed a protest against her departure. The newspapers said that she carried 6,500 tons of coal and 2,800 tons of supplies. She carried large quantities of the things needed in a ship's larder, and a quick-eyed reporter declared that she had more sauerkraut on board than any other vessel had ever taken from Philadelphia to Bergen, the Norwegian port for which she cleared. Coal filled even her state-rooms and every other foot of space contained freight of some kind. Outside the Delaware breakwater she met a German cruiser and transferred her coal and supplies. The protest of the British government was promptly delivered. It served to increase the vigilance of the officials in enforcing neutrality regulations.

In his efforts to preserve neutrality President Wilson found himself in the position of umpire to pass upon charges of violation of the laws of humane warfare preferred against each side by its opponents. The Belgian government sent a commission

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

to Washington to lay before the president a protest against the wrongs of its country. The German emperor, probably with the intention of covering this damaging charge with a counter-charge, in a letter to the president formally accused his enemies of using dum dum bullets, while a similar complaint came from France directed against the Germans. To pass judgment on such conflicting allegations was difficult, and it was not probable that a verdict would have the slightest restraining effect. President Wilson sent a polite note to the kaiser in which he said:

“I am honored that you should have turned to me for an impartial judgment as the representative of a people truly disinterested as respects the present war and truly desirous of knowing and accepting the truth. You will, I am sure, not expect me to say more. Presently, I pray God very soon, this war will be over. The day of accounting will then come, when I take it for granted the nations of Europe will assemble to determine a settlement. Where wrongs have been committed, their consequences and the relative responsibility involved will be assessed.

“The nations of the world have fortunately by agreement made a plan for such a reckoning and settlement. What such a plan cannot compass the opinion of mankind, the final arbiter in all such matters, will supply. It would be unwise, it would be premature, for a single government, however fortunately separated from the present struggle, it would even be inconsistent with the neutral position of any nation which, like this, has no part in the contest, to form or express a final judgment.”

December 5 the German ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, filed a protest with the state department charging that one American firm had received an order from the British government for 20,000 riot guns and 50,000,000 buck-shot cartridges, each cartridge containing nine buck-shots. He charged that another firm had delivered 8,000,000 “mushroom bullets” to persons in Canada for use in the British army. “Mushroom bullets,” said the protest, were dum dums in reality, but so made that the soldier who fired them did not know they were dum dums. When this protest was published in the newspapers

[10]

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

the first firm publicly stated that it had never sold a riot gun or cartridges to the British government, nor to any other government. The second firm replied that the "mushroom bullet" was made for sporting purposes, that it could not be used in any foreign army rifle, and that only 109,000 had been sold, the largest sale being for 2,000. Thus the ambassador's charges, for which he had claimed the most reliable supporting evidence, proved entirely baseless.

During these days German-Americans and their friends freely accused the administration of being partial to Great Britain. They got the ear of Senator Stone, chairman of the senate committee on foreign affairs, who showed unusual readiness in listening to the complaints that reflected on the *Entente* allies. He gathered up a mass of rumors and ebullitions of sensitive minds into twenty questions which he requested the secretary of state to answer. The replies showed clearly that the charges were only vapid suspicions and made evident the complete neutrality of the government.

Evidence laid before the Overman committee of the senate in December, 1918, showed that von Bernstorff himself was not altogether free from the plotting that was proceeding in the country; but he was clever enough to conceal his part at the time, and his course was accepted as faultless. Some other diplomats, however, paid little attention to the rule of courtesy that should have led them to assume that the government knew how to make its dignity respected. A. Rustem Bey, Minister from Turkey, resented the suggestion in the newspapers that his country would massacre some of its Christian citizens if it joined the central allies, as seemed probable. In an interview he said that the daily lynchings in the United States and the memories of the "water cure" in the Philippines ought to make our people ashamed to talk about massacres in Turkey. About the same time Baron von Schoen, returning to Germany from

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Japan, where he had been minister from his country, gave an interview in which he said: "I have heard many persons in Japan say they believed war with the United States was unavoidable. There seems to be intense hatred for the United States throughout Japan." It was his evident desire to promote suspicion of the Japanese and make us believe they had hostile intentions against us. When the secretary of state informed the German ambassador that the government had taken notice of von Schoen's remarks, the offender called at the department and denied the authenticity of the interview, although it had previously been announced that he acknowledged it. The Turkish minister was given to understand that his usefulness was at an end and later he called on the president to say that he had been accorded a leave of absence. Soon afterwards he left the country and did not return. Similar offense was taken at an interview given by Sir Lionel Carden, who had been British ambassador to Mexico, returning to England through the United States. He criticized the government roundly for withdrawing its troops from Vera Cruz. The newspapers took exception to his action and the government undoubtedly felt displeasure, but as he was not accredited to the United States and was only passing through the country no official notice was taken of his criticism. These incidents only threw into relief the president's insistence on complete neutrality and showed how necessary it was to keep international partisanship out of the current of national life.

3. *Early German Propaganda*

In July, 1914, prevailing American opinion was undoubtedly for the *Entente* allies, partly on racial grounds, partly through dislike of German ideals of government, and partly because of several well remembered incidents—like the interference of a German naval commander with Dewey's operations at Manilla

[12]

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

—which showed illy concealed contempt for American fighting ability. Despite this feeling, the more thoughtful Americans desired to be fair. They were generally convinced that Germany precipitated the war for her own purposes, but they had great confidence in her fighting qualities and admiration for her efficiency. Had she elected to carry on war in a sportsmanlike manner and not broken faith in order to steal a march through Belgium, she could have maintained a fair amount of respect in the United States. She was freely accorded the status of a humane and civilized nation, and on that basis the editor of the *New York Times* on August 1, 1914, in trying to reassure those who were terrified by the shadows of coming horrors, published the following sentiments in entire good faith:

“The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are not defended is forbidden, and pillage of captured towns is prohibited. An army of occupation can seize only the cash, funds, and realizable securities that belong strictly to the state, and only the means of transport, stores, and supplies, and all movable property possessed by the state that may be used for military operations. Appliances for the transmission of news or for the transport of persons or things may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made. The citizens of a hostile nation cannot be compelled to fight against their country, and their rights cannot be declared abolished, suspended, or inadmissible in the courts of law. The poisoning of wells, discharge of projectiles from balloons, the seizing of submarine cables, and the destruction of monuments and works of art are specially interdicted. . . . All these rules were ruthlessly violated in the conduct of the Balkan wars, as the recent report of the International Commission to inquire into their causes shows. The Balkan States are not fully civilized. War provokes savagery, but a war involving the Great Powers would be fought with due restraint.”

At that time the editor had no means of knowing the depths

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

of German savagery, but his subsequent discussions made ample amends for his first error. In trusting Germany before she violated Belgium he but voiced average American opinion.

It was soon evident that our good will was especially desired in the land of the kaiser. Americans whom the outbreak of war found in Germany came home, for the most part, with stories of excellent treatment and official kindness in their days of perplexity. They had become convinced that our good will would be serviceable to the Germans. Not only were our raw materials necessary to Germany in her time of industrial isolation, but it was desirable for her to maintain the moral respect of the only great nation which was not ranged against her in battle.

In the third week of the war tales of atrocities began to come across the ocean. One Belgian town after another fell under displeasure and was made to feel the hand of a cruel master. Malines and Thermonde were burned, Louvain was sacked, its precious old library was destroyed by a people who for a century had called themselves the most devoted friends of scholarship, and the burgomaster and other leading citizens of Aerschot were executed because, it was reported, the burgomaster's son had resented the insult a drunken German officer offered to the burgomaster's daughter. August 25 a Zeppelin dropped bombs on Antwerp, killing a number of people and destroying sixty houses. Shortly afterwards a single aviator flew over Paris dropping bombs. September 21 the newspapers told about the bombardment of Rheims, and day after day continued the story until it was not too much to say that the American people were able to see this magnificent work of art hacked to pieces bit by bit.

Count von Bernstorff, the German ambassador, evidently wished to preserve the detachment becoming to a diplomat, but he was not able to keep silent before the growing wave of criti-

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

cism. He was well liked in Washington before the war began and wished to retain his popularity. When, however, his country began to be denounced as the barbarian that destroyed works of art, he took up her defense publicly. Referring to the bombs dropped on Paris he said: "Paris is the strongest fortress in the world. If art treasures in the Louvre or elsewhere in Paris were injured by attacks from airships the French would be to blame for making their capital into a fortress. Berlin is not a fortress, London is not a fortress, nor is St. Petersburg or Washington." In less than a month German aviators convinced the count that he was mistaken in regard to London.

His ill success in the rôle of apologist made it clear that it was not his vocation. The German government had already come to see it, and a more competent propagandist was selected. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg had been colonial secretary in the German cabinet before he was sent to New York to carry on an educational campaign in behalf of the cause of his country. He possessed a large range of information, had traveled in many lands, and was socially acceptable. It was thought in Berlin that he possessed the persuasion and good sense necessary for the task. In actual practice he showed inability to see the American point of view, and although he was most industrious to instruct us about his own country he made no progress because he had not first learned about ours. Indeed, he never quite forgot that the Americans are bourgeoisie or peasant by origin and he did not make the impression that he had real respect for them, who, of all people, are least likely to receive instruction from those who assume airs of superior wisdom. He also made the mistake of surrounding himself with some facile newspaper men, who, indeed, succeeded in keeping him in the public eye, but who did not have it in them to strike the moral note that his necessities demanded. In the after-war investigations evidence was published in which von Bernstorff

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

was made to declare that the educational phase of the propaganda during this autumn was the only phase worth what it cost. That it was useful in developing and sustaining German feeling among the German-Americans is perhaps true, but it is hard to see that it tended to convert to the German side any Americans who did not previously have leanings in that way.

By the end of 1914 the first effects of the war on American life were wearing off. The amazement produced by the spectacle of a world in battle was gone. The consternation over the interruption of commerce was passing into the realization that the war had brought the United States, for the time, at least, into the first place in the world of trade and finance. The neutrality proclamation had marked out the line of policy the administration was to follow in official relations. The president had shown that he was a man of persistent caution and that he would try to restrain the tendency of the people to take sides, drawing the country into unpleasant relations with one side or the other of the conflict. The people, however, had shown clearly that they did not like the German way of going into war or of conducting their campaigns after they were in. Finally, the well organized German efforts to influence public opinion in behalf of Germany had been fairly launched, but it was not yet clear that they would end in failure.

These first effects past, the business interests of the United States continued in the expanding career of prosperity, the German propaganda turned more and more from persuasion to acts of violence and degenerated into merely vicious espionage—as we shall see in the proper place—and the president, no longer chiefly concerned for the neutral deeds of the Americans, was plunged into a series of perplexing negotiations, seeking to induce the two belligerent groups to respect our rights under the rules of international law. Into the negotiations he conducted

[16]

EARLY EFFECTS OF THE WORLD WAR

with the *Entente* powers in reference to the rights of neutrals on the sea the next chapter will carry us, while that which follows will deal with the government's efforts to get Germany to use her submarines within the accepted limits of law and humanity.

CHAPTER II

THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE

1. *Fixing the Status of Neutrals*

IN the conflict now beginning it fell to the United States as the leading neutral state to stand as guardian of maritime rights at a time when each belligerent was disposed to claim all that could be found in the accepted principles of international law and a little more. The position of the government of the United States was difficult at best: it became still more perplexing as public opinion at home showed itself on one side or the other of the foreign controversy.

The situation was such that it was impossible to apply the rules of international law in their exactness; for these rules, which in ordinary times derive their strength from the support of strong non-combatant states, were now freely modified by the belligerents. For our government to demand the exact application of the rules, therefore, would place it in the position of a state that claims as a right what it does not mean to defend by force. The best we could do was to protest when rights were violated, to refer minor wrongs to some future tribunal for amicable settlement, and if a major wrong was offered to make it the ground of a declaration of war. For such an extreme step, however, nobody in the United States was prepared in 1914; and most people felt that we should use every honorable means to avoid being drawn into the war.

In 1908 the ten leading maritime nations held a conference in London to revise the rules of international law concerning naval

[18]

THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE

warfare. As Great Britain had overwhelming naval power, the conference was somewhat in the nature of an attempt to limit her use of that power. It was to the credit of the British negotiators that they made various concessions in the interest of humane principles. The result of the deliberations, the Declaration of London of 1909, was received unfavorably by the British people and was not adopted by the government. France gave it the effect of law in 1912 without formal promulgation. Germany incorporated it in prize ordinances drafted in 1912 but did not issue it as a fixed rule until August 3, 1914, two days after she declared war on Russia. The United States were the only nation that accepted and promulgated it promptly, in 1912. How little the Declaration was adjusted to the conditions of warfare in the struggle of 1914 is seen in the fact that it placed on the free list such indispensable articles as raw cotton, wool, rubber, and metallic ores.

When the war began the United States invited Great Britain to accept the Declaration of London as binding for the war, but under the circumstances Great Britain felt justified in declining the invitation. With the approval of her allies and as the war progressed she modified some of the features of the Declaration and in that form she could be said to have observed it. Her most important changes were the extension of contraband, both absolute and conditional, and a stricter construction of the doctrine of continuous voyage.

Soon after August 1, 1914, great quantities of certain articles were carried into Italy, Denmark, Holland, Norway and Sweden with the evident purpose of exporting them to Germany. The Declaration of London said that absolute contraband might, and conditional contraband might not, be seized under the principle of continuous voyage. This agreement was adopted as a compromise when it seemed that no agreement could be made; but it had no support in logic. Conditional contraband

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

is not a peculiar kind of contraband. It is as absolute as absolute contraband when it is not non-contraband. Thus, by the Declaration foodstuffs are conditional contraband. To allow them to be taken to Holland freely under continuous voyage would be to postpone the determination of the condition until after they had passed beyond the point at which they could be intercepted. Great Britain determined to apply the rule of continuous voyage to both kinds of contraband alike. She also adopted stringent rules for determining whether or not the specific voyage was continuous. Under these restrictions the trade of the United States with the neutral countries of Europe was seriously limited and considerable resentment was manifested by our exporters.

The inconvenience thus entailed was increased by the wide expansion of the use of submarine mines to impede trade. At the Hague Convention Great Britain endeavored to secure the adoption of rules limiting the use of mines to territorial waters, but Germany and Austria-Hungary led the opposition and she was out-voted. Mines were considered too useful a weapon to a small nation to be easily abandoned. When the war began Germany sowed mines around the British Isles. For two months Great Britain was content to place them merely in territorial waters and then abandoned that policy. A mine field was laid across the southern part of the North Sea in such a way as to command the entrance of the Channel. Late in October Germany scattered mines in the trade route from Liverpool to America, which caused the British government to announce, November 3, 1914, that the whole North Sea was "military area" and not safe for neutral ships that did not enter it at certain points and by the specific directions of the British authorities. A "military area" of this kind was a new thing in war, but Mr. Asquith defended it as a necessary means of meeting an emergency.

THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE

In her contraband regulations and her enforcement of continuous voyage Great Britain laid heavy restrictions on neutral trade. In making it necessary for ships bound to the ports of the northern neutrals to thread her narrow sea lanes she made it impossible for them to elude her inspection officers. Thus one restrictive measure supported the other.

Against this policy the United States protested on December 26, 1914. Ignoring for the time the extension of contraband and the creation of mine fields on the high seas, they turned to continuous voyage. Many American ships going to the northern neutrals had been carried into British ports, and some of them were declared prize while others were released after vexatious delay. This course, said our protest, was an unwarranted interference with the rights of the United States. In regard to foodstuffs, admittedly conditional contraband, it cited a ruling of Lord Salisbury in the South African war, holding that it was not sufficient to claim, in justification of seizure, that they were capable of being used by the enemy, but "it must be shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of their seizure." The British practice assumed that conditional contraband bound for such neutral ports would go into Germany, leaving the shipper to prove the contrary.

In a well written reply Sir Edward Grey, January 7, 1915, placed the British case before the American government, and incidentally before the American people, in its fundamental relations. He submitted statistics to show that the trade of the United States with the northern neutrals had not been lessened by the action of the British, but that it had, in fact, been greatly increased as compared with a similar period in 1913. In November, 1913, the value of the exports from the United States to the northern neutrals and Italy was \$8,772,000, whereas for the same month in 1914 it was \$21,018,000. It is hard to deny that these figures created a presumption that articles of the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

kind mentioned found in this channel of trade were bound to Germany.

The case of American cotton was not quite so clear. The war reduced the foreign demand for cotton and the price fell until the producers were threatened with disaster. Their dissatisfaction created feeling against the British, and the echoes of it were beginning to be heard in congress. Sir Edward Grey himself well knew the influence this matter might have on the general situation, and he tried to allay resentment by showing that the lessened exportation of American cotton was due to the decrease of cotton manufacturing on account of the war, rather than to the restrictions on exports to neutral countries. His excuse was not convincing; but the increasing demand for cotton in the *Entente* countries for making explosives served to raise the price, until it at last reached a height never expected by the most imaginative planters, and under such conditions their complaints vanished.

Sir Edward Grey's reply of January 7 was but a preliminary statement of the British position. February 10 he sent a more detailed statement, in which after repeating his arguments based on trade statistics he amplified those relating to the doctrine of continuous voyage. The contention that a neutral could not furnish a belligerent with articles that enabled him to carry on the war was, he said, an old principle. But as times changed it was natural that the means of enforcing the principle should change. Steam transportation on sea and on land had made it as easy for a belligerent to obtain supplies through the territory of a neutral as through his own ports. It was but right, therefore, that the opposing party should have the liberty of adapting his means of restraint to the changed conditions of transport. He also held that it was entirely proper for the belligerent to take a suspected ship into port in order that a sufficiently careful examination of its cargo might be made.

THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE

These two notes summed up the British position at that stage of the war. Before the second was sent Germany had taken action which threw a strong argument into the hands of the British and gave the controversy a turn from which it did not recover. January 26 she took over all the corn, wheat, and flour in the empire and appointed officials to distribute it to the people. She also ordered the municipalities to set aside "suitable supplies of preserved meat." Subsequently she directed that imported food be used solely by civilians. She evidently intended to meet the argument the British were sure to advance that there was added reason for the detention of foodstuffs, since all the supplies in Germany were to be applied to the support of the war and the industries contributory to it. Sir Edward Grey said: "However much goods may be imported for civil use it is by the military they will be consumed if military exigencies require it, especially now that the German Government have taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country."

February 9 the American steamer *Wilhelmina* laden with foodstuffs and bound for Hamburg, came into Falmouth, England, under stress of weather. She was seized and it seemed that the case would afford an opportunity to test the British contention that foodstuffs bound for Germany were contraband. Great interest in the decision of the prize court was aroused in the United States. But the case progressed slowly and long before it was decided the international controversy had taken on other complications. The *Wilhelmina* seems to have been sent out by friends of Germany in New York in the hope that Great Britain would decide it so as to offend the United States.

2. The British Blockade of Germany

By February, 1915, everybody knew that the war was a life and death struggle between Great Britain and her allies on one side and Germany and her allies on the other. In this desper-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

ate struggle the most strenuous methods were to be used. The sea power of Britain had been carefully nourished through many years. Now, in the time of her supreme need, she was likely to make it serve her to the limit of its capacity. It was sea power that enabled her to extend the doctrines of contraband and continuous voyage beyond previously accepted limits, and it was sea power that enabled her to expand the doctrine of blockade by establishing what she called a "cordon blockade." Her defense for this step, however, was not in logic but in the ancient doctrine of retaliation.

February 4, 1915, Germany established a "war zone" about the British Isles in which she would sink all enemy ships, "even if it may not be possible always to save their crews and passengers." She declared that neutral ships would be "exposed to danger" in this area, partly because Great Britain had ordered her merchant ships to hoist neutral flags in moments of grave peril and partly because of the "hazards of naval warfare." The British government denied that its ships had been ordered to use neutral flags. The only color of truth in the charge was the use of the American flag by two Cunarders in British waters to escape submarines when those instruments of destruction first began to strike at their prey.

The reply to this decree was the blockade of German ports announced to the American government March 13, 1915. Since the Germans had struck at the food supply of the British Isles by establishing the war zone, the British in retaliation for this and other acts would deprive Germany of foreign commodities by establishing a blockade. It is true the British blockade was not regular in form. Nor was it according to international law for Germany to create the war zone. The British did not attempt to justify their blockade by international law. It was their avowed purpose to cut off all trade with Germany, going in or coming out, by means of a cordon of ships across seas re-

THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE

mote from the German ports. The order-in-council in which their will was proclaimed, in the spirit of the famous order-in-council of November 1, 1807, required all ships bound to German ports to unload in a British port unless given a passport to proceed, and all ships leaving German ports were to enter British ports and unload there. The order also declared neutral ports blockaded so far as contraband goods were concerned that were believed bound for Germany. It was a very drastic order and left neutral nations no hope of sending anything to Germany that could be construed as contraband of war. One important article only was not included. Although public opinion in Great Britain demanded that raw cotton should not be admitted to Germany by any avenue whatever, the government, evidently unwilling to press American opinion to an extreme limit, excepted it from the excluded articles. It was evident that much cotton was reaching Germany through neutral territory; and so great was the outcry in Great Britain that on August 20 the government was forced to make raw cotton absolute contraband.

In the long and at times acrid correspondence that now followed between London and Washington the United States conceded the regularity of the new type of blockade set up by Great Britain, that is, the blockade by cordon of ships on the high seas, provided the cordon was effective. But they stoutly resisted the contention that a blockade could be established against goods passing through neutral territory. They stood on the old principle of international law that neutral ships carrying neutral goods between neutral ports cannot be stopped. The British replied that they themselves stood on the old principle that goods carried on a neutral ship for use in the armed struggle of an opposing belligerent were liable to seizure. Thus the British gave an old principle of international law a new and liberal interpretation, while the Americans stood by the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

letter of the old law. In the existing struggle each belligerent was stretching international law as far as he dared, and a neutral that held for old principles was always facing the question: "What are you going to do about it?" To dispute the contention of the British beyond insisting on our rights would have made us participants in the war, and on the side of Germany, a thing which, in view of events to be mentioned later, was unthinkable.

The only course left us, short of acquiescence in Britain's position, which would have been throwing away rights plainly guaranteed by international law, was to make firm protest and await the day when we could bring the controversy before a competent diplomatic court. Secretary Lansing's note of October 21, 1915, written in the later stages of a protracted correspondence, had this kind of procedure in mind. It pronounced the British blockade, as carried out, "ineffective, illegal, and indefensive" and pledged the United States to continue to defend the "integrity of neutral rights which have received the sanction of the civilized world."

While the president directed this correspondence he was annoyed by criticisms of several kinds. American merchants, manufacturers, and shippers were impatient at the delays and interruptions of business through British action and complained because the government did not obtain relief. Persons whose ships had been seized in England complained because he did not hurry the British prize courts to some kind of action. Pro-Germans in our own country openly jeered at the administration alleging that it was under British influence. At the same time Count von Bernstorff, German ambassador, persistently called attention to the blockade, which we admitted was illegal. He was not always polite in his remarks to the president as when he closed a note of February 13, 1915, by expressing the hope

[26]

THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE

“that the American Government will stand on its rights in this matter.” However, the *Lusitania* incident, occurring early in May, put the ambassador on the defensive, and thereafter he had little opportunity to try to bully the president into a war against the *Entente* allies.

The reader will get an idea of the nature of the controversy with Great Britain by examining the so-called “Packers’ Cases,” which were long before the public. By July 12, 1915, thirty-six ships loaded with American owned meat valued at \$14,000,000, had been seized under the British order-in-council of March 11 and were awaiting disposal by the prize courts. September 16 a decision was given in regard to three of the ships in which most of the cargoes were declared contraband or conditional contraband, destined for Germany through Copenhagen. It was proved that the cargoes were thirteen times as great as similar cargoes previously imported in the same time into Holland. It was also shown that in the cargoes were hundreds of thousands of cases of tinned meat. As Denmark does not import meat in tins in ordinary times and as tinned meats of the kinds here found are generally used in the armies and navies of to-day, it was a fair inference that the cargo was seized when on its way to the German armed forces. To the court and the British people it was clear that such commodities could be seized under the general theory of contraband.

Secretary Lansing’s reply took up the argument from exports as well as the definition of legal principles. It was not fair, he said, to pay too much attention to the increased volume of exports as expressed in returns in money, partly because of the sharp rise in prices and partly because the war, by depriving Denmark of her other sources of supply, threw her into dependence upon the United States and an increased volume of exports to that country was to be expected. He did not under-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

take to show, as he might have shown with fair approximateness by figures, in how much each of these countervailing factors entered into the problem.

The secretary was more at home in dealing with legal arguments and he made out a strong case on that score. Nothing was clearer, he said, than the principle that a neutral nation could not be blockaded under international law, and this principle was violated in the British practice. Furthermore, it was not correct to say that the German ports were effectively blockaded, since ships left them continually for journeys across the Baltic Sea. As a blockade was not to be respected unless it was effective, this point was well taken. The secretary maintained his argument with ability. He never gave up his attempt to hold Great Britain to a stricter interpretation of international law, and if our government had not been drawn into the war eventually a long negotiation for adjustment would probably have followed the end of the war.

Although the British government was sincere in saying that it regretted to restrict neutral trade and that it would not make the burden heavier than necessary, it did not hesitate to go to extreme lengths in devising means of cutting off trade with Germany. December 23, 1915, it extended the provisions of its "Trading-with-Enemy Act" to neutrals whom the king might desire included. Under this law was prepared what was known as "the blacklist," a list of firms and shipping companies, many of them domiciled in the United States, with whom British subjects were forbidden to trade. The proceedings were especially hard on the listed ship owners; who were thus denied the right to buy bunker coal from British firms, and as such firms controlled the coal supply in a great many ports, it became difficult for the owners to carry on business.

There were in the United States many business men of such strong German leaning that for all effective purposes they were

THE BELLIGERENTS AND NEUTRAL TRADE

enemy firms to Great Britain. Despite this fact, to have our citizens placed on a blacklist was very distasteful to Americans, and congress took steps looking toward retaliation. A section of the revenue act of September 8, 1916, provided that when a belligerent thus discriminated against Americans the president might withhold clearance from one or more vessels of the belligerent in question until redress was obtained, or he might deny to the vessels of the belligerent the privileges that were denied to the "blacklisted" ships.

Here the matter rested, except for the exchange of diplomatic notes that led to nothing. For the time American feeling against Great Britain was strong, but the continued wrongs we sustained from Germany were even more resented, and the feeling against the British had no opportunity to develop normally. It disappeared, so far as this matter was concerned, when we prepared a blacklist of our own after we entered the war. In fact, our entrance into the war wiped out many grievances against the violaters of maritime rights that seemed to be well fortified in international law. When we ourselves were also concerned with defeating Germany and her allies, we limited trade with the northern neutrals as serenely as Great Britain had limited it before 1917; we had a "blacklist" of our own, and we sent our navy to help keep the cordon blockade of the North Sea side by side with the navies of Britain and France.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

1. *The German Propaganda*

To grant freedom of residence, business, and instruction to a citizen of another nation has long been a practice among civilized states. It rests upon the basis of courtesy and reciprocal advantages. Ordinarily this courtesy is extended by a belligerent state to the citizens of its enemy who happen to be in its borders when war begins. In this respect the practice of international law has been growing continually more generous. But the courtesy is not to be abused. It is only intended to give the enemy alien the status of a guest in the house of another, subject to all the laws of courtesy.

Germans were freely received in the United States before the war, as all strangers are received. They were welcomed in any phase of business or professional life they chose to follow. After the World War began evidence was uncovered of a well planned campaign that had been going on for some years to establish German influence over American opinion. Germany is the only nation, so far as we know, that has used its official agents to obtain such an end. By establishing exchange professors with American universities, by presenting Germanic libraries and buildings, and by granting pensions to influential men of Germanic birth in the United States the German government endeavored to establish an influence over American opinion in order that the United States might prove of advantage to her in the world struggle to which she had long looked forward. For a foreign power to set out to build up in our midst an influ-

[30]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

ence that will modify the freedom of our future is intolerable. It saps the spirit of nationality, weakens the respect of other nations, and brings uncertainty into domestic political action. Generally it is a thing that happens to small states. That Germany should attempt to inflict it upon the United States is an evidence of her slight esteem of our national spirit.

The earliest manifestation of the German propaganda in our country was the campaign of education that followed the arrival of Dr. Dernburg in the early weeks of the war. It was intended to reach the intellectual classes, through whom, it was expected, an impression would be made on the people in general. Subsequent revelations have shown that large sums of money were placed at the disposal of Dr. Dernburg and those who carried on the work after his departure, that plans were made, to buy several old and influential newspapers, that one newspaper was actually purchased, and that help was extended to many already published under German influence. Looking back to these efforts, it appears that they had no other effect than to turn the minds of a large majority of Americans against their authors. It was evident that Germany proceeded on the theory that the democracy of America was mentally immature and could not see the plans made to ensnare it. It was an error easily made by a privileged class whose ideas of a democracy grow out of their observation of the mental character of their own much schooled and abashed peasantry. In comparison with the ordinary methods used in American party contests the German propaganda was a clumsy affair. It showed that its authors did not understand the minds of the politically experienced Americans.

The only notable success of the propagandists was with a portion of the German-Americans. No way has been found for determining how large a proportion of this class was drawn over to the German side of the general controversy at the time.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

The leaders talked about having the support of 15,000,000 German-Americans, but the claim was exaggerated. In 1910 there were in the United States only 8,282,618 persons who were born in Germany or born in the United States with at least one parent born in Germany. They lived for the most part in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey and in the East and West North Central divisions of states. In some states they had obtained the enactment of laws for teaching German in the primary schools, they had a vigorous German-language press, and they attended churches in which service and sermons were in German. Their tendency to preserve themselves as a German island in the midst of American life was so clear that it set them off from any other group of our foreign population.

The agitation to arouse these people in behalf of Germany soon took a political form. By threatening to turn the elections as they chose they created a fear among party leaders. By denouncing Great Britain they played for the support of Irish-Americans. They were led by several men of political influence, the most prominent being Congressman Richard Bartholdt, of Missouri. They also got the sympathy of Senator Stone, of the same state, chairman of the senate foreign relations committee, and on January 8, 1915, he addressed to the secretary of state, as we have seen, a letter naming twenty ways in which it was charged that the government favored the *Entente* allies. Secretary Bryan replied January 20, giving most of his attention to the trade in munitions. He summed up the position of the government in the following words:

“Those in this country who sympathize with Germany and Austria-Hungary appear to assume that some obligation rests upon this government in the performance of its neutral duty to prevent all trade in contraband, and thus to equalize the difference due to the relative naval strength of the belligerents. No such obligation exists: it would be an unneutral act, an act of partiality on the part of this govern-
[32]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

ment, to adopt such a policy if the executive had the power to do so. If Germany and Austria-Hungary cannot import contraband from this country it is not, because of that fact, the duty of the United States to close its markets to the allies."

The secretary's answer appeared sound to all but the pro-Germans. They could not see that it would be an unneutral act if the United States undertook to change international law during the war and deny the allies a right that had always existed under that law. The friends of Germany also complained because, while the shipment of munitions went forward, Germany could not obtain the relatively smaller favor of coal and supplies for the few ships of war she still had on the seas. The answer was that it was against international law to allow a belligerent warship to obtain coal and supplies in a neutral port for carrying on operations.

March 1, 1915, Dr. Karl Buenz, managing director of the Hamburg-American Steamship Co. in New York, was arrested with some of the other officials of the company, on a charge of obtaining clearance papers for vessels taking coal and supplies to warships by false assertions. A trial followed, resulting in the conviction of the officials, who, in fact, hardly denied the charges. Dr. Buenz and two associates were sentenced to serve eighteen months and another for twelve months in a federal prison. Dr. Buenz, however, was permitted to remain in his own home for a time on account of alleged ill health. In 1918 the public was shocked to learn that he was living in New York in great comfort, receiving visits from his friends, returning them in some cases, attending dinners and walking and riding through the streets. A quick examination revealed that his health was good and he was sent to the federal prison in Atlanta at once.

Information obtained in this trial showed that a comprehensive plan had been made by the German government before

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

war was declared by which the German merchant ships in our harbors were organized into a unit under direction of the home war office, with the purpose of sending them to sea in aid of German cruisers. This action virtually made the port of New York a base of German operations in violation of neutrality. It was shown that twelve ships had thus been loaded with the purpose of taking naval supplies out of the borders of the United States, but that only one had eluded the vigilance of the customs officers and the active watchfulness of the allied cruisers. It was also shown in the trial that Captain Karl Boy-ed, German naval attaché, was at the head of these operations. He had opened offices in New York, deposited great sums in the New York banks, and was directing a large force of secret agents. It was eventually discovered that his efforts extended much further than the equipment of ships for succor of German commerce destroyers.

Another phase of Boy-ed's activity was the issue of fraudulent passports. Some of them were for the use of German reservists who could not otherwise escape through the cordon of British ships that held the entrance to the North Sea. Others were used by persons who were sent out as spies in allied countries. These passport frauds were flagrant violations of neutrality. He persuaded Americans to obtain passports on the ground that they were going abroad on personal business, and then to sell them to agents of the German government. Many complaints came from Europe alleging the existence of these papers in the hands of pro-Germans.

Such disclosures had no effect on the actions of the propagandists. Gathering a number of delegates from German-American, Irish-American and other societies of "hyphenated Americans," together with some persons of native stock who supported Germany, they held a meeting in Washington on January 30, 1915, and organized the American Independence

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Union. The president was Congressman Richard Bartholdt; and three other members of the national house of representatives, Andrew J. Barchfield and Stephen G. Porter, of Pennsylvania, and George O. Lobeck, of Nebraska, gave him their support. The organization announced that its object was to liberate the United States from "commercial, financial, and political subservience to foreign powers." The organization declared for an embargo on munitions and free commerce in non-contraband goods as defined by international law. It promised political support to candidates who eliminated "undue foreign influence from official life." Despite these high sounding professions of neutrality the Independence Union was chiefly founded by two groups of people whose only reason for existence as groups was to promote the interests of foreign governments. Its influence was not great, nor did it have the terrorizing effect on congress that had been expected by its founders.

During this year, 1915, occurred a series of events criminal in nature designed to destroy munition plants or to prevent in other ways the exportation of munitions. Fires and explosions destroyed several large plants, entailing the loss of many millions of dollars, bombs were discovered in the holds of ships carrying supplies to the allies, and other evidences were found of intention to employ any means to impede the trade in munitions. While it was difficult to prove that spies were responsible for all these acts of destruction, it was clear that so many casualties operating for the benefit of one power could not have been due to accident. The destruction of the *Lusitania*, which happened in the midst of this series of "accidents," was of such a violent and reckless nature that the people of the United States easily came to believe its authors capable of anything that was bad.

At the same time it became known that German agents were trying to create strikes of American workmen in the munition

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

plants. In several notable cases they succeeded in their efforts, although the strikers went to work again in a short time, usually with an increase of wages. Mr. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, announced in the newspapers that he had frequently been urged by German agents to lend his assistance in promoting strikes. Other evidence was produced to show that labor leaders had been offered bribes to get them to aid in this process. This phase of the matter came to a head when on December 28, 1915, the government indicted several men of prominence on the charge that they had been concerned in a conspiracy against American foreign commerce. They were mostly officers of the Labor's National Peace Council, a recently established affair with strong German sympathy. One of the men indicted was Franz von Rintelen, who had posed in the country as a friend of the kaiser and was at the time under arrest in England charged with being a spy. The indictments served for a time to check this phase of propaganda.

Late in 1915, however, affairs were as bad as ever, and it was becoming plain that German and Austrian officials were definitely promoting the attacks on munition plants. In fact, the espionage system had become so well organized that it could not remain invisible. The government had been well convinced that the law was being violated, but it did not dare take open action until its proofs were complete, lest in making charges that could not be established the agitators should be furnished an opportunity to allege persecution.

The specific evidence that was lacking was discovered when on August 30 the British authorities arrested at Falmouth, James F. J. Archibald, an American citizen traveling on a neutral ship to Vienna by way of Amsterdam. On his person was found a letter from the Austrian ambassador, Dr. Dumba, to the Austrian foreign minister, Baron Burian, describing plans for strikes in

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

American munition plants by which it was thought that "we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which, in the opinion of the German Military Attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the expenditure of money involved." The writer asked for authority to proceed with the plans and suggested that he be informed by wireless telegraph. When this document reached the United States the president caused a prompt demand to be made for the recall of Dr. Dumba because of "his admitted intent and purpose . . . to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States." Dr. Dumba, to escape humiliation, asked to be allowed to depart on a leave of absence, but the president did not consider such a mode of withdrawal sufficiently striking under the circumstances and denied the request. Then the Austro-Hungarian government formally recalled their ambassador, who set sail for a neutral port in Europe after the British government had granted a safe conduct through the region patrolled by their navy. The departure of this meddling diplomat occasioned great satisfaction in the United States, where pro-German espionage had excited much feeling.

Still greater relief was felt when in the following December the government demanded the recall of Captain von Papen, the military attaché, and Captain Boy-ed, the naval attaché, of the German government on the ground that they were not acceptable to our government. It was not quite possible to convict them of participation in acts of espionage, but their names were continually connected with such transactions. When the German government demanded the charges against the officers the president refused to give them, which was within his right; and the kaiser was forced to recall them. A military or naval attaché in a foreign country has the status of guest and he may be excluded by the host whenever it is deemed de-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

sirable. As these men were departing the grand jury in New York brought in a true bill of indictment against Paul Koenig, a high official of the Hamburg-American Steamship Co., charging him with being prominent in plots to send agents from the territory of the United States to Canada to destroy canals, bridges, and other property. On trial he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.

Many things suggested that neutrality was violated more frequently than appeared to the public eye, and this opinion was confirmed from time to time as new plots were revealed. A deep impression was made by the announcement that the New York office formerly occupied by von Papen and then in charge of his former secretary, Wolf von Igel, had been raided and a quantity of incriminating papers taken. The information on which this step was taken came from London, where Major von der Goltz, who had formerly been in the United States, but was now held under sentence of death as a spy, had made a confession to save his life. His testimony enabled the American government to arrest von Igel, who, surprised in his office, did not have time to destroy a large mass of papers relating to the transactions of many months. The German embassy in Washington made formal demand for these papers and insisted that the government give them up without making copies or photographs. They were claimed as a part of the embassy's archives. The government replied that as the office was rented and conducted as a private affair it could not plead immunity under diplomatic character, and that the offense with which von Igel was charged was committed a year before he joined the embassy staff. In this way it met the contention that von Igel had the benefit of protection. The authorities also declared that they could not admit that all the papers were the property of the embassy, but if the ambassador would designate those he considered official they would be delivered to him. Needless to

[38]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

say, he did not accept the invitation. The von der Goltz disclosures and the seizure of von Igel's papers not only resulted in several indictments for espionage, but they made it evident that the system which had become so offensive existed under the wing of the German embassy in Washington. No demand was made for the recall of the ambassador, who then had his hands full of the negotiations growing out of the German submarine campaign.

2. *The Submarine Controversy*

International law as accepted in 1914 provided that when a belligerent cruiser intercepted the merchant ship of an enemy she might seize and send it into her own ports where it was subject to condemnation by the courts. The same rule existed with reference to neutral ships carrying contraband or violating blockade. In each case it was provided that non-combatants, whether enemy subjects or neutrals, should be treated with humanity. If it was found necessary to destroy the captured ship the non-combatant crew or passengers must be put ashore in safety. If they could not be thus landed, the ship must not be destroyed.

When submarines came into use they were expected to conform to these rules. The Hague Conferences made no exception in their favor. Germany, however, contended that submarines were new instruments of warfare and not under old rules, and that to require them to put captured crews ashore might defeat the use of these boats. As her grand fleet was reduced to inactivity by the superior British and French navies, she formed great expectations from her submarines and insisted on being allowed to use them as she thought fit. The plain answer to her contention is that submarines, like other new instruments of warfare, should be used in accordance with the rules of international law, or not used at all. Her position was likely to bring her into opposition to neutral nations, who could not

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

be expected to acquiesce in a doctrine which seriously lessened the rights of their citizens on the high seas.

It was February 4, 1915, that the German authorities, having decided upon the course they intended to follow, issued the order establishing a war zone around the British Isles. They declared that they acted in retaliation for measures adopted by Great Britain, particularly for her attempt to starve the whole population of Germany into submission. They announced that they would sink enemy ships regardless of the safety of the crews; and they warned neutrals against traveling on enemy ships. The new order was to go into operation on February 18, 1915. It was received in the United States with a feeling of horror on the part of all but the pro-Germans.

February 10 the state department warned Germany of the effects her proposed action would have upon the amicable relations with the United States and announced that she would be held to "strict accountability" if an American ship was destroyed or American lives were lost in the execution of the proposed order. Our protest only brought out a reiteration of the German position.

The situation was now most interesting. Great Britain had undertaken to cut off German trade in foodstuffs and in many other articles. The *Wilhelmina* case was still unsettled, and it was understood that it would test the legality of the British claim that food going into Germany directly was contraband. The British contention as to continuous voyage had not yet reached its highest point, but Germany resisted it as firmly as she resisted the claim that foodstuffs were contraband. She also resisted the British attempt to make the North Sea a war zone, mined and dangerous to neutral shipping. It was the very essence of her controversy with us that we should resist what she considered British infractions of international law, and she seems to have thought that by bringing pressure to bear

[40]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

she would either force us into a quarrel with her adversaries, or make us drive them from the stand they had taken. The British government defended its position on foodstuffs and continuous voyage as logical interpretations of accepted principles of international law, and justified the closing of the North Sea with mines as proper retaliation for Germany's sowing with mines the approaches to Liverpool.

The United States had not accepted the British contention in either of these three points. They were still negotiating in regard to them, and it was probably too soon to say that they would not succeed in the negotiations. But if they failed eventually it was open to them to protest and leave the dispute for settlement on the basis of compensation at the end of the war. They might well consider this the advisable course, as loss of property was the main feature of our embarrassment. In fact, Great Britain seemed to invite such action by letting it be known that under certain circumstances she would pay for cargoes seized. The course Germany adopted put American lives in jeopardy as well as property, and it was not to be expected that we should defer the adjustment of such a grievance until the end of the war.

Germany might have put her case in words like these: "You stand on the letter of the law in reference to the scale of munitions: why do you not stand on the letter of the law in reference to the doctrine of contraband and trade with neutral countries?" To which the American answer might have been: "We stand equally for the law in reference to contraband and trade with neutrals, and we shall yet make Great Britain pay for violating it; but if you sink our ships without warning and endanger American lives we shall hold you responsible for an immediate settlement." And the reply of Germany was that she did not consider us really neutral. She did agree, however, while still declaring that she would sink munition ships, that her submarine

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

commanders would not use violence against American merchantmen, "so far as these can be recognized."

Probably no one in the country thought that the German submarine warfare could proceed without the destruction of American ships and American lives. The weeks following February 18, when the submarine decree went into operation, saw great anxiety in the United States. Each day's journals were scanned for news of the first blow that would make it necessary to take sharp action. Early in March it became known that the sailing vessel, *William P. Frye*, with a cargo of wheat from Seattle to Great Britain, was sunk in the South Atlantic by the raider *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* on the ground that the wheat was contraband. To make the insult worse the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* proceeded to Newport News, where she was interned, thus herself bringing the first intelligence of the destruction of the *Frye*. No life was lost, however, and as Germany promised to indemnify the owners for their loss the incident did not produce the expected crisis. As day after day passed without another sinking relief began to be felt. Could it mean that after all Germany would not sink an American ship deliberately or destroy an American life?

March 28 these doubts were resolved when it was known that the *Falaba*, a British passenger ship sunk on that day in St. George's channel, had carried an American, Leon C. Thrasher, who was among the lost. The submarine commander gave the captain of the *Falaba* five minutes to abandon ship and began to fire before all the life boats were launched. Under international law Thrasher had a right to expect that the *Falaba*, if intercepted by a German cruiser, would be seized and neutral passengers put on shore. He was traveling in a proper capacity, being on his return to his employment as an engineer on the Gold Coast of Africa. There was no question of carrying munitions in this case, as the ship was outward bound. She was

[42]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

sunk because she violated what was, in fact, a submarine blockade. Protest to Germany was made and an argumentative reply was received in due time.

Public opinion did not form itself very quickly, probably because Thrasher was on a British ship and his death could not be taken for a deliberate attack on an American. May 1, however, the American ship *Gulflight* was torpedoed by a submarine off the Scilly Isles and without warning. The ship did not sink, but the captain died of heart failure induced by the shock and two sailors were drowned. Here at last our flag had been fired upon and the lives of our citizens had been taken. It was a clear case, although it had not happened until the seventy-third day after the order of February 4 went into effect. President Wilson ordered a careful inquiry into the facts preparatory to making demands upon Germany. Before the investigation was ended a more impressive attack had been made and a horror perpetrated which produced a storm of indignation throughout the United States.

The *Lusitania* was the pride of the Cunard line, being vast, luxurious, and very swift. She had made several trips across the Atlantic in defiance, as was said, of the efforts of the Germans to destroy her, eluding her foes by her speed. It was supposed that the Germans were keenly trying to strike her. When she was about to sail from New York on May 1, 1915, an advertisement appeared in the New York papers over the signature of the German embassy warning travelers that they were at their own risk if they traveled by British ships in the waters around the British Isles. This warning was slightly esteemed, although some persons canceled their sailings at the last moment. Most of her passengers went aboard with a gay scorn of the advertisement, treating it as a joke. The ship carried 1250 passengers and 667 crew. She was not armed but carried in her hold 4200 cases of cartridges for small-arms, 1271

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

empty shrapnel cases, a small quantity of contraband, besides a large amount of foodstuff. On May 7, while off the southern tip of Ireland she was struck without warning by two torpedoes fired by a German submarine. In eighteen minutes she had sunk, taking down with her 1153 persons, men, women, and children, of whom 114 were citizens of the United States. Among the victims were some men of great prominence in literature, art, and business. This demoniacal work of militarism showed the people of the United States for the first time that the country was actually threatened with war. It was regarded with firmness. No one wanted war, but if it must come it would not be shirked.

The destruction of the *Lusitania* gave great concern to the German government also, although it was received with an outburst of joy by the mass of the German people. The leaders of that country realized that the moral shock it produced throughout the world would bring them discredit, and they strove hard to modify resentment by giving assurances of good intention. A circular had been issued by the foreign office, before the *Lusitania* was sunk, in which assurance was given that the orders to German ships of war were for the attack of those vessels only which had committed an act justifying attack. If a neutral vessel came to harm from submarines, said the circular, the government would promptly recognize its responsibility and make amends.

The tone of caution in the circular may indicate an attempt to soften the shock of a blow known to be impending. Once the blow had fallen, however, there was not the slightest attempt to apologize. On the contrary, the German government on May 8 issued an official statement justifying the incident. It claimed that the *Lusitania* was armed—an assertion abundantly disproved by good evidence—and charged that she carried large quantities of munitions. May 10 Count von [44]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Bernstorff repeated these charges in a note transmitted to the department of state. He added, also, that Germany had offered to give up the submarine warfare if Great Britain would give up her plan to starve Germany. A specific denial of the last assertion was promptly made by the British government.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the German note was the opening sentence, in which the writer extended the sympathy of his country to the country of the victims of the torpedoes. "The German government desires to express its deepest sympathy at the loss of lives on board of the *Lusitania*," said the German ambassador. It will be many years before Americans can think calmly about the loss of women and little children on the *Lusitania*, but that their murderers should have tendered sympathy to the relatives of the sufferers was nothing short of insult. It did not make matters better that while the count extended sympathy the Germans were in an ecstasy of delight that vengeance had fallen on the people who made munitions of war to be used against Germans. Their satisfaction was expressed in the production of a medal representing death at a wicket selling to wealthy American citizens tickets for the doomed ship.

The horror of the catastrophe impressed the country more than its illegality, as is shown by comparing the feeling aroused with the way in which the people took the attack on the *Gulflight*, which was an American vessel attacked without warning, while the *Lusitania* was not an American ship. Of the first of the two attacks the *New York Times* speaking editorially said that it was to be assumed that the submarine commander looking through a dense fog took the *Gulflight* for a belligerent ship. When the evidence came it showed that the attack was delivered on a clear day and that the ship flew a large American flag with other plain evidences of nationality. The editor dismissed the subject—it was May 4, two days after it was known that the ship

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

had been destroyed—with the assurance that there was “not the slightest reason for a rupture of the friendly relations between Germany and the United States” and he was confident that Germany would apologize and make reparation. Evidently this representative newspaper wished to prevent an outburst of war feeling.

All this moderation was swept away in an instant when the news came on May 7. Germany stood revealed, said the same editor, in a garb she had not hitherto been suspected of wearing. She had shown her intention of carrying on war “in disregard of the laws of God and man” and it was for our government to demand that her procedure should not involve the sacrifice of American lives and property. This did not necessarily mean war. There were other ways of punishing Germany and quite as effective. The columns of every paper that was not openly pro-German was full of utterances equally strong. From that time on Germany had to fight to maintain the least respect in fair American opinion.

In the face of this adverse opinion all eyes turned to President Wilson. In the negotiations with Great Britain and Germany on matters of trade he had tried to keep an even course between the two sides. We must not forget that the American tradition before 1914 was to champion peace and to decry war as a species of madness. The president shared this view with his fellow citizens and did not turn from it easily. Most other calm Americans did not think we should lightly take sides in a controversy which could only bring us great sacrifices and which in its origin concerned us but little. Had Germany not set our rights at defiance, we should probably have remained of this opinion. The *Lusitania* incident in connection with what followed became good evidence that she would continue to treat us with contempt; but in May, 1915, it was not yet apparent that she would continue her course, and a majority of our people

[46]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

felt that every proper effort should be made to bring her to reason. It was in accordance with this hope that the president adopted a policy that displeased the more impetuous and won him such praise from the avowed friends of Germany that he was charged with pro-German feelings.

His first public utterance after the *Lusitania* was destroyed was on May 10, at Philadelphia, at a meeting arranged by the mayor, a German sympathizer, to give words of admonition to 4000 newly naturalized citizens. In the presence of these and 11,000 other auditors he made a speech which caused much comment. It was a general plea for peace and seems to have been intended to quiet the mind of the people in a moment of extraordinary excitement. But the following sentiment, which was probably not meant to foreshadow his action in regard to the *Lusitania* incident, aroused much criticism:

“America must have this consciousness, that on all sides it touches elbows and touches heart with all the nations of mankind. The example of America must be a special example; the example of America must be the example, not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world; and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight; there is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right.”

The words “too proud to fight” offended many people. They seemed to range the speaker with the pacifists. Yet many persons and newspapers took his speech as an indication that he would not heedlessly carry the country to war and were pleased.

May 14 these speculations were entirely discredited when his first *Lusitania* note was given to the public. It began with a notice of the German attacks on the *Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulfight*, and *Lusitania*, “a series of events which the Government of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement.” To a careful restatement of our position in ref-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

erence to the use of submarines it added the following observations:

“American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

“There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission.”

The president declared that the government of the United States confidently expected the German government to disavow and make reparation for the injuries complained of and to take immediate action against their recurrence. He closed by saying that the United States would not “omit any word or act” necessary to maintain the rights of its citizens and to safeguard “free exercise and enjoyment” of those rights. The note was signed by Secretary of State Bryan.

The high ground of right taken appealed to the best opinion
[48]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

of the country and the reply of the German government was awaited with great interest. Would it concede our position, or would it throw down the gauntlet and challenge us to war? It came on May 28, and was an evasion of President Wilson's concise but courteous demands. The attacks on the *Gulflight*, by submarine, and the *Cushing*, by airplane, were disavowed in principle and reparation was promised if investigation showed they had come to grief through no fault of their own. Both these vessels were American. The note treated the *Falaba* and *Lusitania* cases, referring to belligerent ships, in quite another manner, showing that it was not intended to concede that such ships were immune from submarine attack. The loss of an American life on the first was deplored, but the destruction of the vessels was justified, in the case of the *Falaba* on the ground that she attempted to escape, and in the case of the *Lusitania* on the grounds that she was built and controlled by the British government, as an auxiliary cruiser, had transported troops from Canada, carried a large amount of ammunition, and had guns, with expert gunners to serve them. Assuming that the president had not considered these facts, the German government requested him to take them under consideration in the hope that he would modify his position in regard to the *Lusitania*. It placed the responsibility for the loss of life squarely on the Cunard Company, which it pronounced negligent of its duty in allowing passengers to go aboard a ship so liable to destruction.

This note, which the editor of the *New York Times* pronounced "trivial and evasive," was disappointing to the people of the United States. They had expected that Germany would see in the situation a necessity for deciding whether she would, or would not, have war with the United States. The easy manner with which she referred the question to further discussion was irritating. It was later explained on the ground that Ger-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

many did not know the real state of feeling in this country, and for the failure Secretary Bryan was held responsible. In a conversation with Dr. Dumba, the Austrian ambassador, he had given impression that the American note was only intended to allay public excitement and did not express the true purpose of the administration. When the matter came to the attention of President Wilson he caused the ambassador to be informed of the error, and a correction was cabled to Vienna and Berlin. The exact content of Mr. Bryan's communication to the ambassador has not been made public.

Count von Bernstorff, the German ambassador, was an astute man and must have known the state of opinion around him. He evidently realized that matters were approaching a crisis, and on June 1 he informed the administration that investigation of the attacks on the *Cushing* and *Gulflight* were unwarranted and that reparation would be made. He also got permission to send a special messenger to Germany to lay before his government information about the situation which he said he could not well send by cable.

The messenger had probably reached Berlin, when, on June 9, President Wilson's second *Lusitania* note was sent to Germany. It was a calm reiteration of the position taken in the first note and contained the solemn assurance that the government of the United States had officially inspected the ill-starred ship before she sailed and was in a position to assert that she was not armed, did not carry troops, and had no other kinds of ammunition on board than a peaceful merchantman might carry under international law. This note, it was remarked, pleased all but the jingoes. Those who wished an ultimatum sent to Germany were disappointed; but the mass of sober people were satisfied to have the American side continually presented to Berlin in unyielding and serious terms, until it finally entered the Teutonic mind that a grave matter was in hand.

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

As this note went forward Secretary Bryan sent his resignation to the president. In a statement published at the same time he said he differed from the president in two important respects. He believed that since we had treaties with many states pledging ourselves not to go to war for one year after a grievance with a particular state had arisen, we should not now make war with Germany until a similar time elapsed. It was true that Germany had not accepted such a treaty, but she had endorsed the principle and Mr. Bryan held that we ought not to depart from the ideal we had set up. He also urged that American citizens should not be allowed to imperil the peace of the country by traveling on ships that carried munitions. He announced that he intended to make speeches in behalf of pacifism, but he found so much popular opposition to such a program that he was forced to give up the design.

The German Admiralty was now strongly entrenched in the favor of the imperial government and would not hear of relaxing their plan for reducing Great Britain through starvation. A month passed before the second note was answered, and the reply, July 8, but repeated the former evasions. The only new feature was a suggestion that American citizens might travel as freely as necessary if a number of neutral ships were placed under the American flag and were well marked with distinct emblems, the number of vessels to be determined by Germany and the United States. The reply ignored the American contention that American citizens had the right to travel on any peaceful ship, declaring "the Imperial Government is unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the mere fact of their presence on board."

As if to emphasize their position the Berlin government on July 12 voluntarily acknowledged that the *Nebraskan*, an American vessel damaged on May 25, was the victim of a German submarine attack and offered to make reparation. The

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

communication was hardly digested in the public mind when, on July 17, the Cunarder *Orduna* arrived in New York reporting that she had been attacked on her way across the Atlantic and had barely escaped a torpedo fired without warning by a submarine. She had 227 passengers on board, 21 of whom were Americans. The incident demonstrated that our long drawn out controversy was in nowise settled.

More than two months had now passed since the *Lusitania* went down with 114 Americans, men, women, and children on board, killed in defiance of the accepted rules of law. Two explicit and diplomatically courteous notes had been delivered demanding disavowal, reparation, and the assurance that such an incident would not be repeated, and Germany had shown no disposition to comply with the demand. The great body of our people had lost patience with her conduct and few even of the pro-German Americans could defend her position. Dr. Dernburg himself saw that his work was futile and sailed for Copenhagen on June 12. He left behind him a nation that was rapidly coming to hate the word "German," although it still hoped a way would be found to avoid war.

President Wilson had also come to understand the German position, and his reply to that government, the third *Lusitania* note, had a tone of finality. It repeated with emphasis the former arguments based on law and humanity, declared that the compromise suggested by Germany was not acceptable, and closed with the following declaration:

"The very value which this Government sets upon the long and unbroken friendship between the people and the Government of the United States and the people and Government of the German nation impels it to press very solemnly upon the Imperial German Government the necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of those rights must be regarded by the

[52]

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly."

This note, dispatched July 21, was followed by a period of moderation on the part of the submarines. They gave warning before opening fire and allowed time for crew and passengers to leave the doomed ships, thus proving the correctness of the American contention that the submarine can carry on war in accordance with international law. Although Germany had not replied to the third note, this apparent change of conduct seemed to indicate that she had profited by the warning, and we were content.

Then suddenly came news that on August 18 the British liner *Arabic*, bound for New York with 180 passengers, 29 of whom were Americans, had been torpedoed without warning and had sunk in eleven minutes, two of the 44 drowned persons being Americans. For an instant the country believed that the final blow which was to bring war had been struck. Then something happened that had not happened in any other similar incident. The German ambassador in Washington, of his own accord and before a note could be prepared for Germany, requested the president to wait for information from Germany before making up his mind and added that if American lives had been lost it was contrary to the "intentions" of the German government. From Berlin came information also that the chancellor had intimated that instructions had been issued to submarine commanders to refrain from sinking merchantmen without allowing crews and passengers an opportunity to escape. Further evidence that Germany was making an effort to meet our wishes came when, on August 27, Count von Bernstorff called on Secretary Lansing and announced that before the *Arabic* was sunk the German government had transmitted through him the following assurance: "Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of non-com-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

batants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.”

The German ambassador was now thoroughly aroused to the gravity of the situation and worked hard for an adjustment of the *Arabic* incident on the principle just announced. The best concession he got from his government was the excuse that the commander of the submarine had thought that the *Arabic* was about to ram his vessel and fired his torpedo in self-defense. Under renewed pressure and on the explicit assurance of the officers of the ship that no motion was made to attack the submarine, the German government was brought on October 5, 1915, to make disavowal and apology for the attack on the *Arabic* and to offer indemnity for the American lives lost. At the same time assurance was given that such strict orders had been issued that a similar incident could not occur in the future. Thus terminated in a diplomatic success eight months of as tedious and patient negotiation as our government has conducted. For although no direct redress was made for the lives lost on the *Lusitania*, it was a distinct victory to force Germany to yield her main point as far as it applied to the future.

For a few days the American people believed the submarine controversy was settled. They were rudely awakened from their conviction when, on November 7, 1915, the Italian liner *Ancona* was shelled and finally sunk by a torpedo off the coast of Tunis with a loss of over 200 persons, nine of whom were Americans. The submarine displayed an Austrian flag and it was supposed at first that German submarines had assumed this emblem to escape the charge of violating the recent agreement. But the avowals of the Austro-Hungarian government left no doubt on the point. The case was unusually harsh; for the torpedo was fired while the ship's deck was filled with panic-stricken people who had just been subjected to bombardment.

The disappointment of the government was expressed in a sharp note to Austria. The conduct of the submarine com-

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

mander was denounced as "wanton slaughter of defenseless non-combatants," and demand was made that he be punished and reparation and apology be made for his deed. The brusqueness of this note was in striking contrast with the patient formal politeness of the notes to Germany. It was understood in Vienna, where our recent demand for the recall of Dr. Dumba on September 8 had left much irritation. Equally brusque was the reply which evaded the issue and attempted to open a discussion of facts alleged in the American note. A second note from Secretary Lansing was less harsh than the first and brought a complete surrender from the Austrians. They promised to punish the commander of the submarine for violating his instructions and to pay indemnity for the American lives lost. Thus both Germany and Austria-Hungary had promised that crew and passengers of a merchantman should be placed in boats before their ship was sunk, and several weeks of comparative quiet followed. It seemed that American diplomacy had won a real victory in behalf of humane practices.

In the breathing-spell that followed Secretary Lansing attempted to improve the situation by getting the *Entente* allies to cease arming their merchantmen, provided Germany would use her submarines under the rules of cruiser warfare. It was January 18, 1916, when Secretary Lansing opened this subject in a series of notes to the Washington representatives of the *Entente* powers. In supporting the notes the secretary of state said:

"I may add that my Government is impressed with the reasonableness of the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare and the defensive weakness of undersea craft, should be held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral as well as by a belligerent Government and is seriously considering instructing its officials accordingly."

To these suggestions the allies replied in identic memoranda

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

on March 23, 1916, declining to leave human life, without guarantees, "to the mercy of an enemy who, in circumstances of this kind, as in many others, has shown himself to be both faithless and lawless." The following day the *Sussex* was sunk by a submarine, confirming the position taken by the allies. Whether or not this revival of submarine warfare in its worst form modified the intention of the administration is impossible to determine. But the armament problem was settled in a note issued on April 7 to the satisfaction of the *Entente* allies, as we shall see below. It was agreed that armed merchantmen were to be allowed in our ports when the authorities were convinced that the guns were to be used for defense only; and the presence of guns on a merchantman at sea was not to be taken as evidence that it was a warship.

In congress the arming of merchant ships was viewed with great interest. Many members who had no sympathy with Germany feared that we were drifting toward war and thought that American citizens should not travel in such a way as to imperil our foreign relations. There was little doubt that if the matter had come to a vote a majority would have declared for warning citizens to avoid munition ships. Two sets of resolutions with that intent now appeared, one introduced into the senate by Gore, of Oklahoma, and the other into the house by McLemore, of Texas, both of whom were democrats. If the resolutions passed, the hands of the president would be tied, so far as negotiations were concerned. For a week in the latter part of February the situation was such as to alarm the thoughtful leaders, but by hard work the two sets of resolutions were tabled,¹ in order that the situation might not be withdrawn from the president's hands.

The next stage in the submarine controversy was the destruction of the *Sussex*, March 24, 1916. She was a channel steamer

¹ At the last moment the Gore resolutions were radically changed by Gore himself and were tabled, the author voting "aye."

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

plying between Dieppe and Folkestone, a route generally left open for non-combatants, and not used, it is believed, for transporting troops to the continent. The *Sussex* was not armed and had never carried troops. The attack was without warning and the result was the death or injury of eighty of her passengers, among them several American citizens.

To the American inquiry for information the German government replied that at the time and place indicated a submarine torpedoed without warning what the submarine commander believed a British warship, and a drawing of the victim ship made by the commander from memory was submitted. It represented a vessel of different construction from the *Sussex*. It was reported also that this was the only submarine action that could possibly be construed as the attack to which reference was made. The German government expressed itself, in case a mutual agreement could not be made, as ready "to permit the facts to be ascertained" by a mixed tribunal under the Hague Convention.

Secretary Lansing's answer was the most outspoken note in the long series he forwarded up to this time to the diplomats at Berlin. Re-stating our position and recounting the story of our grievances he declared that if the Germans did not abandon their "present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels" the United States would be forced to suspend diplomatic relations, a kind of statement that should have been made much earlier. Its force was understood in Berlin whence came on May 4, 1916, a communication in which was the following definite assurance:

"The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German navy forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area de-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

clared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance."

This act of surrender was somewhat qualified by the declaration that Germany expected, in return for her concessions, that the United States government would demand and insist that Great Britain give up her blockade of German ports and her doctrine of continuous voyage by which Germany's trade through neutral countries was inhibited. Should these expected steps not prove successful, said the note, "the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision." No assurance had been given by our government warranting Germany in saying that her concession was contingent on such steps as were here indicated; and this addendum was purely gratuitous. To it Secretary Lansing on May 8 made the following reply:

"The Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

From May 4, 1916, when the German promise was given, to February 1, 1917, when ruthless submarine warfare was inaugurated, was nine months. Within that period American ships were generally free from submarine attacks. The cases that arose were not serious infractions of the German promise, and we seemed to be assured that the imperial government was trying to comply with the rules of cruiser warfare. Events that came later made it probable that it was merely getting ready for a more violent defiance of those rules.

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

Here comes to a pause the long series of protests by which the United States sought to induce Germany to respect law and humanity in the use of the submarine. Here ends, also, the series of evasive replies in which the imperial government resisted our demands as much as it dared, and tried to get us to make its enemies relax their measures of restraint. It wished us to force Great Britain to modify her blockade, to relinquish her broad interpretation of the doctrine of continuous voyage, to give up her peculiar kind of blockade, to abandon her plan for starving the people of Germany into submission, and to deprive her merchantmen of the right to arm in self-defense. It also sought to force us to cut off the current of supplies of warlike materials that ran from our factories to the battlefields of France and Russia. Some of these measures we should have gladly carried into effect of our own motion; for they were in keeping with older interpretations of international law; but we would do none of them on the basis of a bargain with Germany. As Secretary Lansing said in his note of May 8, 1916, our rights were "absolute, not relative," and throughout the course of the tedious negotiation no word had been spoken by which they were diminished.

Germany's methods of warfare, however, did much to weaken her influence in this country. British trade restrictions were not popular in the United States, and a large majority of the people had a genuine hope that their government would not be brought into the war. They did not like many things Germany had done in Belgium and in other areas of her land warfare, but they would never have fought on that ground. By her submarine attacks without warning she overtopped this dissatisfaction with British orders-in-council and built up a solid mass of real hatred for a nation that continued to take American lives.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR IN EUROPE, 1914-1917

1. *The General Results*

WHEN the war began few Americans thought that the United States were to be drawn into it. It was not our war. It arose out of long-established rivalries, inextricably related with a series of international congresses with which we had nothing to do. We looked at the broad Atlantic Ocean and were thankful that it was a safe barrier against the madness that raged beyond it. We were to learn that the ocean was no longer a barrier and that the last great international congress had been held in whose deliberations we could have no part.

The spectacle which the contending nations presented to our eyes could not fail to impress on us certain defects in our own national life. First of all, it showed how unprepared we were to meet a serious attack from a strong nation, and the desire to remedy the deficiency was slowly but steadily formed in the popular mind. It also showed how loosely adjusted was our governmental machinery. When we saw the French, Germans, and British bringing every national force into its proper relation to the task that was laid upon the state, we could but ask what would happen if our loosely united government were forced to conduct a similar struggle. Yet the day came, and speedily, in which, in time of trial, the nation rose to the emergency before it quite as well as the nations of Europe. Finally, many men felt that party strife was so great in the United States that we could not make the united efforts that

[60]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

a great war demands. But under the shadow of the struggle in Europe party strife took a lower pitch and disappeared altogether for the time we were actually at war.

To understand the development of such ideals as these it is well to remember what kind of man was at the head of the government. By education and experience President Wilson is a scholar. His particular knowledge is in the field of history and government, and it gives him that habit of viewing politics in the long sweeps of human experience which we are apt to deem idealism. We have had few presidents who were as able as he to bring to bear on present day problems the philosophy of the past. Conscious that he runs ahead of the judgment of contemporaries he seems to distrust the practical statesman. It is his nature to make his own standards and to proceed by his own judgment.

Nevertheless, he has not shown himself a mere theorist. While still a college professor he expressed his ideal of politics in these words: "Speculative politics treats men and situations as they are supposed to be; practical politics treats them (upon no general plan, but in detail) as they are found to be at the moment of actual contact."¹ In the conduct of affairs he shows a willingness to follow the high expediency which Edmund Burke praised. He has not, like some other presidents, thrown away the support of his party through being superior to it. The democrats had proved themselves hard to lead before his day: he gave them party cohesion for the first time since the days of James Buchanan. When the war in Europe began he was popular with his own party and not unpopular with his opponents. As it progressed he grew in popularity, despite the criticisms made by the more ardent champions of the allies. During our own participation in the war he became very popular with a large majority of the people. In both

¹ Wilson, Woodrow, *Mere Literature and Other Essays* (1896), p. 158.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

of these periods he was the maker of ideals for the American people.

A good illustration of his political ability is the way in which he dealt with Mr. Bryan, whose long established supremacy in the party might have brought trouble to a less tactful president. The most prying eye has not discovered any friction between these two men, not even when they were so far apart in their views that Mr. Bryan felt that he could not remain in the cabinet. We know little about the president's method in dealing with his first secretary of state, but the results seem to show that he sincerely liked and trusted him. Something must be said, also, for Mr. Bryan, who has usually inspired his friends with great loyalty. He gave to the administration his candid support, and when he withdrew from it he did not try to lessen its prestige. Perhaps if Mr. Bryan's political philosophy had been as good as his personal relations with his party he would have long since reached the presidency. His strong influence in his party and his sincere support of the administration were among the president's best assets.

2. The Alluring Rôle of Peace-Maker

When the United States won their short war against Spain in 1898, editors, clergymen, and other representative men said freely that we had become a "world power." In fact a stride had been taken away from isolation; but it is doubtful if it proved as great as had been foretold. We acquired some distant possessions which to-day many persons do not esteem valuable to us. We were soon building the Panama Canal to facilitate the defense of the Pacific Coast. It was a period of material expansion. During the past four years there has been an equally large amount of expansion, but of a spiritual nature.

Its first manifestation was in the opinion, often heard in the beginning of the war, that eventually the United States through
[62]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

mediation would become the peace-maker in Europe. It was merely an assumption, but it raised the national spirit. It was supported by the fact that our diplomatic representatives in the capitals on each side of the contest freely took over the affairs of belligerent states.¹ For thirty-two weeks the United States had a right to consider themselves the common friend of nations. When the people realized this fact, they were perceptibly lifted out of their old sense of isolation. To go farther and see themselves peace-makers was not a wide stretch of the imagination.

August 5, 1914, four days after fighting began, the president, acting under Article III of the Hague Convention, informed the rulers of France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary that he would be glad "to act in the interest of peace" whenever any of these powers should see fit to accept his services. The offer was received with formal thanks.

Just after the battle of the Marne Mr. Oscar Straus, a member of the International Tribunal of the Hague, went to Washington from New York, visited Secretary Bryan, who hurriedly interviewed the representatives of the warring nations, among them Count von Bernstorff—who had made a hasty journey from New York to attend the secretary. After some hours Mr. Straus and the German ambassador returned to New York on the same train. At the same time the air became full of rumors of attempted peace negotiations at the instigation of Germany. Sifted down it seems that von Bernstorff indirectly caused Mr.

¹ Ambassador W. H. Page, in London, took over the German, Austrian, and Turkish interests; Ambassador Herrick, in Paris, took the same interests and the Serbian also; Ambassador Marye, in Petrograd, represented Germany and Austria; Ambassador Gerard, in Berlin, Great Britain, Japan, and Serbia; Ambassador Penfield, in Vienna, Great Britain, France, and Japan; Ambassador Morgenthau, in Constantinople, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Serbia, and Switzerland; and Minister Volpicka, in Bucharest, Rumania, took under his charge the interests of Germany and Austria in Serbia. Minister Brand Whitlock took over the interests of Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Japan, Serbia, and Denmark, in Belgium, while Ambassador Guthrie, in Tokio, represented Germany and Austria.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Bryan to know that Germany would be willing to make peace on terms favorable to herself. It was reported that when Mr. Walter Hines Page, American ambassador in London, mentioned this matter to Sir Edward Grey he was told that Great Britain would not consider making peace unless Belgian damages were paid and compensation was made for the violation of Belgian neutrality. When Ambassador Gerard, in Berlin, brought the matter to the attention of the German chancellor he was informed that the war was forced on the central allies and that they would not make peace unless guaranteed against "future attacks."¹ It had been a part of the German program to take Paris with a rush and so end the war in the west. Although Paris was not taken they seem to have got President Wilson to sound their opponents, in order that they might see if anything in the replies indicated that the *Entente* allies were in a compliant mood. In the steady grind which the fighting now assumed nothing was said for a long time about peace-making; but it was understood that President Wilson would be the mediator when the end finally came.

Probably a great many Americans overestimated the advantages to the United States from acting as peace-maker in the world's greatest war. At any rate they discussed it in such terms as to suggest that the prospect pleased because it appealed to their idea of national importance. The friends of Germany in our midst, and even von Bernstorff himself, did not hesitate to urge favorable conduct toward Germany, lest at last Germany would not accept us as mediators. How much the argument had weight is not known; but there is reason to believe that President Wilson's readiness to promote peace rested solely on his sense of humanity.

In the months that followed various philanthropic organizations took steps looking to peace through the efforts of the gov-

¹ *New York Times*, Sept. 8, 10, 1914.

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

ernment. Their members thought it was the mission of the United States to allay the storm in Europe. Perhaps the most notable was a proposed Congress of Neutral Nations, to be in session continuously in behalf of peace. The scheme was prepared at the International Peace Congress at San Francisco, ^{for} Dr. David Starr Jordan, president. It assumed that the leading rôle in the proposed congress would be taken by the United States. President Wilson caused the congress to know that he would not repeat his offer of mediation until he had reason to believe that the belligerents desired it.

Late in 1915 Mr. Henry Ford, wealthy philanthropist of Detroit, announced a commission to go to Europe "to get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas." He chartered a ship and sailed on December 4 with a party of well meaning guests who had little idea of the magnitude of the task they had assumed. Mr. Ford seems to have thought that the only thing necessary was to give every government an opportunity to say that it had fought as long as it wished, whereupon by common consent all would suspend their combats and go home. He was too practical to hold this view after arriving on the other side of the ocean and seeing what the world war was. He abandoned his scheme and his party came home ingloriously. The ridicule with which the newspapers overwhelmed it served to take the edge off our too enthusiastic pacifism. We came to see that human nature was what it had ever been and that enthusiasm could not change it over-night. But all the time the concept widened that as a nation we had a vital interest in the struggle and were concerned with its settlement.

December 12, 1916, the central allies determined to make a public offer of peace. In an identic note they offered to begin peace negotiations which they declared would be on a basis of justice to all the states. The note was written in such terms of self-assurance that if accepted the *Entente* allies would have ad-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

mitted their defeat. It contained no specific terms, but Count von Bernstorff let it be known informally that they would include the evacuation of France, the surrender of Belgium, the restoration of the German colonies, and the recognition of Poland and Lithuania as free states. Up to this time the Germans had failed to accomplish their original purpose of forcing their opponents to make a quick and humiliating peace with heavy indemnities, and on that basis they had lost the war. But they had been able to convince their own people that they were fighting a defensive struggle, and on that basis they would have been able to say they had won the war, if the terms suggested by Bernstorff had been accepted by the allies. It was very important to the ruling class in Germany that the German people should not deem the war a German defeat.

When this note appeared President Wilson was about to issue an address to the belligerent nations. He was not turned from his purpose, and the contemplated address was made public on December 18, with a clause explaining that he acted without reference to the identic note. He requested the belligerents to state the precise terms on which they would make peace, hoping that a comparison of views would lead to an understanding. He disclaimed the intention of offering mediation, and he expressed the hope that the war could be ended and steps taken to form a league which would preserve perpetual peace.

In reply Germany offered to appoint delegates to a peace congress, which was not what the president had suggested, and her allies followed in the same tone. The *Entente* powers replied in a joint note dated January 10, 1917. Reviewing the methods of warfare employed by their enemies from the outbreak of the war, they protested "against the assimilation established in the American note between the two groups of belligerents," and justly described the acts of inhumanity committed by the Germans. They declared that "their objects in [66]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

the war will not be made known in detail with all the equitable compensations and indemnities for damages suffered until the hour of negotiations." But they mentioned certain territorial readjustments as known of all people who loved justice. Among them were the restoration of Belgium, Montenegro, and Serbia, with indemnities, the evacuation of France, Russia, and Rumania with reparation, and the reorganization of Europe on a stable basis in which national and economic factors should be given due weight. In a well written note to the secretary of state Mr. Balfour, British foreign secretary, gave further statement of the views of the *Entente*. He said that a durable peace could not be expected until Germany was defeated. Three things, he said, were necessary to safeguard the future: international unrest, due to German plotting, must be remedied, as far as possible; the unscrupulous and aggressive methods of the Germans must fall into perpetual discredit in Germany itself; and some international force must be created to see that international law and treaties to restrain war were executed. With this note the first move of the president to promote peace in Europe came to an end.

Mr. Balfour's third safeguard of the future looked to a league of nations, which President Wilson had recommended in his address. January 22, 1917, the president amplified his argument in the first of his great addresses on that subject. Perhaps no American president ever before deliberately set out to turn so sharply the course of American history. It was comparable to the decision of Lincoln to resort to war in order to preserve the union; but Lincoln's action was forced upon him by circumstances, though none the less splendid. Wilson's act was not necessary in the same way to the present welfare of the nation, but it was tremendously important in future relations. Concisely summed up this speech made before the senate, contained the following propositions:

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

1. The struggle then raging would leave the world in such a situation that the United States would be called upon to render it a great service, and it was proper to declare the conditions upon which they would render it. "That service," he continued, "is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world." The end of the war could not long be deferred, and before it came he wished to lay before the people the conditions under which they would be asked to support a League for Peace.

2. We were greatly interested in the terms of the peace that must soon be made, since, to have our support in the future the treaty must be a treaty that will win the approval of mankind. "We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards when it may be too late."

3. While the United States would not oppose any peace terms that might be adopted by the present belligerents, they had the same interest in them as the belligerents themselves if there should be a common guarantee of the peace when made. And this guarantee must be supported by such a combination of major force that no nation or group of nations would be strong enough to defy it.

4. "The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? . . . There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."

5. Statesmen on each side of the present struggle have de-

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

clared that they are not fighting to crush their opponents, and I shall attempt to explain what these assurances mean, as we, on this side of the water, understand them. "They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. . . . Only a peace between equals can last. . . . Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the people themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights."

6. "No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." To illustrate, there should be a "united, independent, and autonomous Poland," and dependent peoples should have their lives, freedom of worship, and industrial welfare guaranteed to them.

7. As far as possible free access to the sea should be secured to every great people. If it cannot be gained by territorial grants it should be acquired by the cession of guaranteed and neutralized rights of way.

8. "The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and coöperation." This means "the free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations" on the high seas. It involves the limitation of naval armaments, which, in turn, requires the limitation of land armament. These questions "are difficult and delicate," and "they must be faced with the utmost

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace can not be had without concession and sacrifice." Statesmen have planned for war and the nations have adjusted themselves to the plan: they should now plan for peace and the nations will adjust themselves to that plan also.

In presenting these propositions President Wilson said: "Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great government, and I feel confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say. May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? . . . I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful."

The address of January 22 was made before the senate of the United States, at a time when there was a great deal of speculation about the future relations of our government to the war. The announcement that the president would address the senate brought a large audience to the senate chamber. The speech was heard with profound attention and many of his hearers pronounced it a history-making utterance. Upon the country at large it also made a deep impression. Men and women everywhere had been asking: "Cannot something be done to stop such madness as this war?" Individual pacifists had replied, "League of peace"; but they had no weight of au-

[70]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

thority. At last a man spoke who had authority. He called on the country to support him.

The response to the suggestion of a league was not unfavorable. The moment was tense, Germany was about to launch ruthless submarine warfare, and we were soon to be in the war ourselves. But the people in general took the president's suggestion well. The high moral sentiment in it impressed the average man. Its one unaccepted feature was the expression, "peace without victory," which displeased the large number of people who believed that the war should result in crushing Germany.

This expression led some people to charge President Wilson with pro-German feelings. It had, in fact, been his fortune to be charged by the partisans of each side with leaning to the other. His negotiations with Great Britain in regard to restrictions on trade and with Germany in regard to her use of submarines were enough to make him suspect each group of the belligerents. His attitude is best explained by remembering that, like many another thoughtful man, he was originally a philosophical pacifist. He was not a non-resister, but he had confidence in the philosophy of peace founded on enlightenment and good will. It was on this basis that he could appreciate the position of each belligerent, and for this reason he discounted the righteous wrath of those who placed the punishment of Germany before remodeling of future international relations.

3. Strengthening the National Defenses

When the war began in Europe the total strength of the regular army of the United States was 85,965 officers and men, not including 5,733 Philippine scouts. It contained 31 regiments of infantry, 15 regiments of cavalry, and 6 regiments of field artillery, making a total of 54,380 officers and men. This

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

caliber. It was estimated that the government arsenals could not manufacture more than 500 guns a year even if they worked three shifts. The store of ammunition for the guns on hand was supposed to be adequate, amounting to about 580,000 rounds, or 915 for each gun; but the experience of the European belligerents showed that in ordinary heavy fighting the whole stock would be used up in two days. The machine guns that were serviceable numbered one thousand, but these were of the Gatling and Colt models which the war office in 1914 rejected as obsolete, in favor of the Vickers gun, of London, which in turn the British were about to reject in favor of the Lewis gun, of the United States. It was reported that only 125 machine guns were manufactured for the government in the year ending June 30, 1914. The allotment was four guns to each regiment. In other respects the equipment was unequal to the demands that would be made in modern warfare. Army officers who knew beforehand on what scale the Europeans were prepared to stage their combat, had given fair warning of the inadequacy of our preparations; but congress and the public, accustomed to see the treasury made the object of heedless greed by various interests, took the requests as overstatements. It took the European war to open the eyes of the country at large to the deficiency.

The indifference of the people to army expansion was due to a great extent to their impatience with the excessive cost of military defense in our country as compared with the cost abroad. In time of peace the average cost of maintaining a soldier in Germany was \$210, in Russia \$294, in France \$330, in Great Britain \$522, and in the United States \$1049. The system of volunteer service makes the government a competitor in the labor market for enlistments and forces it to give pay and support at what is relatively high cost. While there was no feeling against treating the soldier well there was a general feeling

[74]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

that a large army was too expensive for the national treasury.

In 1914 the navy of the United States was in a better state of readiness for war than the army. Public opinion recognized it as the first line of defense, and its success in the war against Spain was so evident that congress treated it generously for a while. After a few years, however, came a reaction, and it became harder to get congress to keep up the building program which naval experts thought adequate. It is likely that the example of the Anglo-German rivalry in navy building, then become a serious burden to each of those nations, served to weaken the enthusiasm of the American people for a process which, well launched, would lead them to similar experiences.

The relative strength of the navy placed it in third rank among the navies of the world, the first place going to Great Britain and the second to Germany, with whom we had nearly equal position in battleships but an inferior position in cruisers and destroyers. The personnel of the navy was excellent, and the confidence it inspired on the part of the public went far toward neutralizing a widespread distrust of the secretary of the navy. The outbreak of the war put the navy on its mettle, and its state of readiness for service, if called upon, was not doubted. There was, however, a tendency to suspend naval development for a while in order to allow future construction to profit by the experience of the war then being fought. There was particularly a desire to know what would be the efficiency of the submarine against warships and how valuable the giant battleships would prove in actual conflict.

In the latter part of 1914 an active propaganda was begun in the United States to arouse public opinion to the point of demanding that congress strengthen the army and navy. To carry it on the National Security League was organized December 1, 1914. Mr. A. P. Gardner, congressman from Massachusetts, was the leading spirit of this organization and sought

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

to carry it forward by introducing into the house a resolution authorizing a commission to inquire into the state of efficiency of the army and navy. The movement gained such headway that President Wilson sought to check it, on the ground that an inquiry by a commission would have a bad effect abroad. He did not object to an inquiry by a committee of congress and sent a special message to congress, December 8, reminding it that our traditional policy was that the country should not become an armed camp. He declared for a well trained militia, an army large enough to contain all who wished to volunteer for the defense of the country, and a strong navy. He said: "We shall not alter our attitude toward [the subject] because some among us are nervous and excited. . . . The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defense. We are not unmindful of the great responsibility resting upon us. We shall learn and profit by the lesson of every experience and every new circumstance; and what is needed will be adequately done."

At that time nothing had occurred to make it seem probable that we should have to use force to maintain the respect of either group of belligerents. Six months later the *Lusitania* had been sunk and Germany was obstinately refusing to promise not to repeat the insult. The president then took a more positive position calling upon the departments of war and navy for detailed reports on the state of the army and navy. November 4, 1915, in an address before the Manhattan Club in New York he announced that the time had come to increase the defensive strength of the nation and to adopt a wider system of training the citizens into soldiers. His annual message, which followed a month later, made defense its central feature. He recommended the increase of the standing army to 142,000 officers and men and the creation of a continental army of 400,000 men to be called into training at the rate of 34,000 a year for [76]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

two months each year for three years and then to pass into a reserve corps for three years more. He also suggested that additional federal aid be extended to the organized militia.

President Wilson's change of view reflected a very active popular interest in what had now come to be known as "preparedness," and two plans went before congress, one known as the "Hay bill," from the name of the chairman of the house committee on military affairs, and the other as the "Chamberlain bill" from the name of the chairman of the senate committee on military affairs. The president's proposal for a continental army lessened the influence of the state militia and a warm debate ensued. At length a bill was passed, embodying most of the features of the Hay bill. It provided for a regular army of about 186,000 officers and men, to be increased in time of actual war and a federalized national guard to be enlarged until it contained 800 men for each senator and representative in congress, in all 424,800. Discharged members of the regular army and the national guard were to pass into reserve bodies. Provision was made for an officers reserve corps and for a reserve officers training corps at colleges and universities. The national defense act of 1916 was the most important defense legislation of our history up to the time of its enactment.

Secretary of War Garrison supported the continental army to which the president gave his approval in his message to congress. But when the president adopted the Hay bill the secretary took the action as repudiation and resigned. He thought, and many others with him, that the body of partially trained men who constituted the second line of the army should be directly under the authority of the national government and not primarily a body of state militia. Strong dissent to this view existed in congress and the country, and the president changed sides when he found that the country was against him.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

The year 1915 brought a similar enlargement of the attitude of the administration on the question of navy building. July 21, the day on which he sent the third and last *Lusitania* note to Germany, the president addressed a letter to the secretary of the navy directing him to authorize the experts in the department to prepare a comprehensive plan for the development of the navy. In compliance with this order Secretary Daniels was able to announce on October 19, 1915, a five-year program involving the construction of 10 dreadnoughts, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 destroyers, 15 fleet submarines, 85 coast submarines, and various other ships, the whole to cost \$502,-482,214.

This program was recommended to congress by the president. In the house it encountered opposition on the ground that it was well to await the experience of the nations then at war before embarking on a great undertaking like that proposed. A bill was introduced into the house, therefore, which gave emphasis to battle cruisers. It involved an appropriation of \$241,449,151, and the secretary of the navy accepted the idea. After strong opposition by house republicans and a small number of democrats from Northeastern states the house adopted this bill by a narrow majority. While it was in the senate President Wilson came out strongly for his original plan, the secretary of the navy now turning back to his support. The senate proved of the same way of thinking and passed a bill for the original program of the secretary but with the change that it was to be completed in three, instead of five, years. The house acquiesced by a vote of 283 to 51. Into the bill the house introduced an item appropriating \$11,000,000 for a plant to manufacture armor plate, despite the opposition of certain iron interests.

President Wilson's course has often created the impression on persons who do not know him that he is undecided and de-

[78]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

pendent on public opinion. His attitude toward the problem of national defense in 1914, 1915, and 1916 gives us an opportunity to see to what an extent the opinion is well founded. In the first of these years he held the traditional view of his party, opposition to militarism in every form and an unwillingness to allow the world crisis to sweep the United States into a radical change of policy. The *Lusitania* affair and the persistent defense of it by Germany convinced him that we needed a strong army and navy to defend ourselves in war, unless Germany gave up her pretensions. It was no accident that he ordered the experts to prepare a plan for a great navy on July 21, the day he sent Germany his final *Lusitania* note. When this plan was about to be diminished by his own party in congress, the secretary of the navy himself being of the number of weak hearted supporters, he came into the situation with the greatest determination and turned back the tide. It was, also, a part of his character that he did this without alienating the good will of his secretary or ruffling the feelings of his party. He achieved his object quietly and stirred up no enmities.

4. Organizing Industrial Resources under Fear of War

The reversal of our traditional policy in regard to the army and navy was only the most striking feature of our changing attitude toward defense. There existed a general demand that the energies of the country should be brought into better governmental control in the presence of an impending crisis. The seeds of this policy, so unlike the ideas of Jefferson, were sown many years before when it was demanded that various forms of industry should be brought under government control in order to prevent powerful individuals and groups of individuals from exploiting them to obtain their own advantage. Many contributory forces operated to develop a strong pressure on congress: the war emergency but gave the movement its op-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

portunity and in President Wilson it found an able leader.

It should not, however, be considered as an American movement solely. It was stronger in Europe than in the United States, where the governments, the organized wills of the people, had overthrown private activities in many fields. With the production of food, clothing, and most other things taken over by the governments, with the means of communication in public hands, and with labor mobilized by the government for a single end it was not strange that men should think that the time had come in our own country to give additional strength to society's power of self-direction. The resulting process was strongest in the United States in 1917, but it began in 1916, in the wake of the movement for stronger efforts to provide for the national defense.

One feature of the new movement was the bill to provide for a merchant marine under government ownership. Many suggestions had been made in the past decades for subsidies to ships in the South American trade, but they were always rejected, it being against the desires of the people to help enrich privately owned companies. In August, 1914, while consternation reigned over the shipping situation, Mr. Alexander introduced a bill into the house, with the approval of the president, organizing a shipping company of which the government was to own the controlling stock and appropriating \$30,000,000 to aid the company in building or purchasing ships to be operated in trade with foreign countries. The bill did not pass in that session, but in the following session the president urged that it become law. At first justified as an emergency measure, it was now supported as a means of developing trade with the states south of us. It encountered severe opposition from financial interests. Although they had long urged the establishment of transportation lines with South America, they preferred to do without them rather than have the government enter the

[80]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

field as owner. Some of the democrats in congress also opposed it on theoretical grounds. The bill was at last defeated by a filibuster in the last days of the short session that ended March 3, 1915.

The measure was revived in January, 1916, at the request of the president, who modified it to obtain the entire support of his own party. The new bill created a board appointed by the president with wide authority over the merchant marine in general. It authorized the board to spend \$50,000,000 to buy or construct ships which might be leased to private corporations or individuals or to create a company to operate them, if no leases could be made. In the house committee the bill was amended to make the board cease to function five years after the end of the European war, and this change, with others obtained the support of all but two democrats. The bill was at length carried through the senate by a full party vote and was signed by the president on September 7, 1916.

Another step toward organizing industrial resources was provided for in the Hay act which authorized the expenditure of \$20,000,000 for the erection of factories for making nitrates to be used in the manufacture of explosives. This appropriation was made because the United States, dependent on foreign source for its nitrates, were likely to be handicapped in a war with a nation that would cut their sea trade. The execution of the act was left to the president, who appointed a committee to determine the best and cheapest means of proceeding. After a careful investigation they were unable to recommend any positive steps until better processes of reduction were developed.

More progress was achieved in carrying out a clause in the Hay act creating a board on the mobilization of industries necessary for the conduct of war. The secretary of war was directed to institute such a board, with the duty of making a

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

complete survey of all the plants in the country that would seem essential to the war. Data collected were to be tabulated and arrangements made for shifting peace-time production into war-time production as rapidly and easily as possible. The survey made under this act was not the only survey made in anticipation of war. In other departments than the war department similar information was gathered and tabulated in order to call out, when needed, all the resources of the country, both as to products and skilled labor. The impulse for these preparations undoubtedly came from abroad, where the belligerent nations in general had made very careful efforts to classify and bring into use their utmost resources of war.

5. The Presidential Campaign of 1916

The complete story of this campaign cannot be introduced here, but its bearing on the slowly forming war purpose of the United States must be described. The re-nomination of President Wilson by the democrats was a foregone conclusion. He had not only led his party successfully, but he had won the confidence of a large body of independents and was stronger than his party. His notes protesting against the submarine policy of the Germans had been written in the best spirit, and they had obtained, for the time, at least, the recognition of our contention by Germany. They kept the country out of war, said the president's friends, and it was hard to gainsay them. His support of a policy of national defense in the army and navy acts of 1916 showed that he would fight if he thought it necessary. He asked the country, therefore, to approve a course that was neither too quick nor too slow. Under the circumstances it was a popular appeal.

The republicans began the campaign by reuniting their party, rent in twain in 1912 by the Roosevelt defection, although they could not completely mend the fracture. They nominated Mr.

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

Charles E. Hughes, who had been a foe to machine politics while governor of New York, and it was supposed that the progressives would support him heartily. He did not get the full progressive support, partly because he was by temperament too cold for men who were used to the ardor of a Roosevelt, and partly because he seemed to place himself with confidence in the hands of the leaders of the old faction.

On our relation to the war the platforms of the two parties differed little. Each pledged its party to maintain the rights of Americans at home and abroad and each demanded a vigorous policy of defense, although neither would specify how much the army and navy should be increased. Into the democratic platform went a plank announcing that the time had come for the United States to join with other nations "in any feasible association . . . to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highways of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations." This sentiment could have been interpreted as referring to the British restrictions on commerce or to the German submarine warfare, or to both.

To the country at large the party platforms seemed of less importance than the votes of the German-Americans. These people were supposed to be well organized and numerous. Active leaders kept their cause before the public, until it seemed that they would have the deciding voice in the campaign. So large a part did they play in the campaign that they demand ample mention in this story.

In the first place we must remember that a great change came over the Germans after 1871. Confident of their position in Europe they formed an ambition to spread Germanism (*Deutschthum*) throughout the world. Looking abroad they found Anglo-Saxon culture and power planted in many parts of the world and it became an obsession with them that Germany was destined to build up Germanism on the ruins of Anglo-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Saxon ideals. In German purpose there was no place for two great ideals living side by side in peace. It was in the development of this purpose that the Educational Alliance for the Preservation of German Culture in Foreign Lands (*Allgemeiner Deutsche Schulverein zur Erhaltung des Deustchthums im Auslande*) was organized in Germany in 1881. It became a strong center of German propaganda in all the world outside of Germany.

In the United States the Germans formed many social clubs from an early period in their residence in the country. It was in keeping with a German tradition that goes back to ancient days. About 1850 began a wave of superior German immigration, most of the arrivals being persons connected with the unsuccessful revolution of 1848. These persons were ardently German and reproached the older residents for allowing their *Kultur* to become "dry" while they boasted that theirs was "green." It was probably under their influence that various national German societies began to be formed, the *Sängerbund* in 1849, the *Turnverein* in 1850, and the *Deutsch-amerikanischer Lehrerbund* (the German-American Teachers' Association) in 1870. About the end of the century came a movement to consolidate these societies into one grand organization on a federated plan. Local societies were asked to unite first into state organizations with the view that these larger groups should be drawn into a great whole. Thus was organized in 1901 the National German-American Alliance. The general purpose was the promotion of Germanism. Specifically it announced that it wished to increase the spirit of German unity, to oppose "nativistic influences," to cultivate relations between the United States and Germany, to have the German language taught in the public schools, to induce recently arrived Germans to become naturalized and exercise their right to vote, to oppose Sunday laws and prohibition, and to spread German *kultur* by means

[84]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

of lectures, schools, gymnastics, and other forms of activity. In 1909 the Alliance claimed a membership of "about 1,500,000."¹

We have in the United States many organizations of persons of distinct racial origin, but few of them have tried to oppose becoming American. To the Germans who joined the Alliance nativism, which they were so keen to destroy, seemed but a weak form of English culture. They looked upon themselves as waging war against Anglo-Saxonism. They brought into our own country a phase of a world struggle that was of no intrinsic importance to us, and whether we would or not we had to take account of the intrusion. Professor Kuehnemann, who lectured many times on this subject in the colleges and universities as well as before the German-American societies, expressed the average German view of the movement when he said: "The Germans in America can offer the Fatherland no greater evidence of faithfulness than by working to the end of keeping America aloof from England."²

Specifically, the leaders gave themselves to fighting prohibition and securing the admission of German language teaching into the public schools. Although it is well known that prohibition has been generally opposed in New England outside of one state there, it was denounced as puritanical, that is, essentially English; and it was considered distinctly German to try to defeat it. The attempts to have German taught in the schools, even in the primary grades, generally succeeded where there was a large German element in the population.

It would be unjust to say that the German-Americans were not loyal to the United States. Left alone they would have accepted Americanism as other foreign elements of our population accept it. But a strife was raging in Germany to set

¹ Faust, A. B., *The German Element in the United States*, II, 198.

² Ohlinger, G., *Their True Faith and Allegiance* (1916), p. 42.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

German *kultur* above all other forms of civilization, and leaders were found to bring the strife into our country. The people to whom they appealed were not proof against the arguments made to them. The president of the Alliance, after the war began in Europe, is reported to have spoken at Milwaukee in these words: "We have long suffered the preachment that 'you Germans must allow yourselves to be assimilated, you must merge in the American people'; but no one will ever find us prepared to descend to an inferior culture. No! We have made it our aim to elevate the others to our level. . . . We will not allow our two thousand year culture to be trodden down in this land. Many are giving our German culture to this land of their children, but that is possible only if we stand together and conquer that dark spirit of muckerdom and prohibition, just as Siegfried slew the dragon."¹

Under such leadership the German-Americans apparently became very active as soon as Germany was at war. It is probable that their leaders exaggerated the purpose of their followers in order to heighten their own political power. They got several societies established to gather up the various forms of sentiments opposed to the *Entente* allies, most of them directed by prominent leaders in the Alliance. One of them was called the American Independence Union. Its president was German born and its object was "true and purposeful independence of Great Britain and the observance of genuine neutrality by the prohibition of the export of munitions."

In the senate in April, 1916, Senator Husting, of Wisconsin, described the efforts the American Embargo Conference, another of these societies, had made to influence his vote on the munitions question. He produced 1000 identical letters signed by different persons urging him to vote against the export of munitions. He also read a circular letter from this society,

¹ *Ibid*, 68.

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

sent out with one of these letters, and saying: "We are sending you with this letter some letters addressed to Senator Husting. They are ready to be dated and signed and should then be placed in separate envelopes and mailed as personal letters." In April, while the president was trying to settle the *Sussex* incident, Senator Husting received over 200,000 telegrams urging him to vote against war. They were all in one of seven forms. In one form the word "participated" was used where it was evidently intended to say "precipitated" into war; but this error reappeared faithfully in all the telegrams in that form. Other senators declared that they had received large numbers of similar telegrams. The method here used to put pressure on a senator was not new in American politics, but it has rarely been employed so extensively and at such heavy expense.

The presidential campaign had not opened when it began to be said that the German-Americans would not vote for the reelection of President Wilson. The information was given out so ostentatiously that one suspected that it was to be construed as a threat. The reason for the opposition of these citizens, it was alleged, was the course of the president in regard to the war.

In Mr. Hughes the republican leaders seem to have thought that they had the opportunity to obtain this large vote, most of which had formerly been democratic. Their candidate, taken from the supreme bench, had not been identified with politics nor with the controversies connected with neutrality. They hoped the German-Americans would accept him as a man of judicial mind who would be truly neutral. As the canvass opened, however, it was evident that the leaders of that group of voters did not want a man who was truly neutral. They demanded that Mr. Hughes avow sentiments that would have been pro-German. To comply would have been fatal to any candidate. The situation was probably very unpleasant for Mr.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Hughes. In trying to avoid displeasing the pro-Germans he gave some other people the impression that he was vacillating.

In his speech accepting the nomination of his party President Wilson revealed his position on the German-American vote in plain words, saying:

“The passions and intrigues of certain active groups and combinations of men among us who were born under foreign flags injected the poison of disloyalty into our own most critical affairs, laid violent hands upon many of our industries and subjected us to the shame of divisions of sentiment and purpose in which America was condemned and forgotten. It is part of the business of this year of reckoning and settlement to speak plainly and act with unmistakable purpose in rebuke of these things, in order that they may be forever hereafter impossible. I am the candidate of a party, but I am above all things else an American citizen. I neither seek the favor nor fear the displeasure of that small alien element among us which puts loyalty to any foreign power before loyalty to the United States.”

Late in the campaign it became evident that the republican candidate was losing strength by not speaking more frankly on the war, and he showed more vigor. But he was already committed so far to the course he had pursued that he lost the support of that large body of independents who were watching to see what kind of an executive he was going to make. His defeat was attributed to several causes, but probably the most important was the feeling that a man who handled so inconclusively the situation raised by the threats of the German-American leaders was not the man to conduct the affairs of the country in the crisis then at hand.

As to the influence of the German-Americans in the actual voting, it is probable that it was much less than had been expected. The movement was more noisy than strong, due chiefly to the abundance of funds it had for propaganda. It has not been possible to prove that any of these funds came from the

[88]

AMERICAN IDEALS AS AFFECTED BY THE WAR

German government; but it is evident that the ambassador and his circle of friends were in close relation with the whole movement. Dr. Albert, who was the leader of the propaganda after the departure of Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-ed, writing after the election, expressed the fears of his friends over the result of the election in these words: "Some even fear that Wilson, who is regarded as revengeful, will pay back Germany by renewed strict measures for the intervention of many German-American circles on behalf of Hughes, and for the alleged influencing by Germany of the German-Americans, although as a matter of fact this was not done."¹ At its face value this statement means that the German-Americans threw their influence for Hughes but were not able to elect him.

¹This letter, dated Nov. 16, 1916, was found among von Papen's papers that fell into British hands when General Allenby captured Nazareth. See *New York Times*, Dec. 17, 1918, p. 3.

CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

1. *Ruthless Submarine Warfare*

THE reader will remember that the result of the long series of efforts of the government of the United States to induce Germany to employ her submarines in accordance with the rules of cruiser warfare was a promise, made May 4, 1916, just after the sinking of the channel boat *Sussex*, that merchant vessels "shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance." It is true the promise was somewhat dimmed by the assertion of the German government that it would expect the United States to see that the *Entente* allies abandoned their restriction on neutral trade, which we had continually held to be against international law. In closing this announcement it said: "Should the steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve to itself complete liberty of decision."

Secretary Lansing promptly replied that his government could not admit that the rights of American citizens at the hands of Germany were to be held subject to the conduct of some other state. He added: "Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative." Here the dispute rested for nearly nine months. The few breaches of her promise which occurred were disavowed or explained in such a

[90]

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

way as to make it probable that she was trying to keep her agreement in good faith. During this interval she showed no signs of reverting to the threat she had placed at the end of her acceptance. But there it remained, and late in January, 1917, while the inhabitants of the warring nations were debating the meaning of the phrase, "peace without victory," it flared up again and brought with it the crisis of war.

It is too early to know just why Germany decided to add the United States to her enemies. That she expected us to resent her forthcoming decree is most probable. Her ambassador, von Bernstorff, was opposed to it and gave his government full warning of the consequences. Why should she have deliberately chosen war with us? Two reasons seem evident.

First, her internal situation was pressing. The war had lasted two and a half years, five times as long as the Germans had been told it would last. German manhood was wearing itself out against the walls that stood firmly in the east and in the west. For many years it had been a favorite idea in Germany that England could be starved into submission when her navy was bottled up or destroyed. Disappointed in this hope, the people turned to the submarine, whose possibilities they exaggerated. It was undoubtedly a formidable weapon and it had not at that time been used to the utmost. Thus, with the war dragging along without victory, with the belief that the long cherished blow could be dealt to England if only sentiment were thrown aside, it was easy for the German people to conclude that self-preservation demanded that the step be taken.

At the same time, Germany felt contempt for a nation that was habitually unprepared for war. The belief was a corollary to the long implanted German idea that Germany was unconquerable. She believed that our lack of trained officers was a fatal obstacle to the organization of a competent army. And even if such an army was raised it could not be carried

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

across the seas in numbers sufficient to make it formidable. The worst to be feared from us, she thought, was our loans and our supplies, which could hardly do her more harm than they had already done. American resistance, therefore, was dismissed as a thing inconvenient but endurable.

It has been said that the military party forced unrestricted submarine warfare on the German government. That Admiral von Tirpitz, head of the navy, was urgent in this cause is certain; but it is evident that the great majority of the people shared his view. Neither they nor he had any fine sense of humanity in regard to sinking ships without giving crews or passengers a chance for their lives. The only resistance to him and them was made by the civil administration, where diplomacy was still regarded a weapon of service in the cause of the state; and von Tirpitz and the grand wave of public wrath swept away all the objections of the civil administration.

In the United States little warning was received to prepare the public for the changed aspect of affairs in Germany. Consternation fell on us, therefore, when on the 31st of January, 1917, the German ambassador presented the decision of his government. Since the enemy still persisted, said the ambassador, in the attempts to starve Germany into submission and since they had rejected the recent well meant overtures of the central allies for peace, Germany had decided to use all her weapons of offense in an unrestricted manner, believing that the severest measure would hasten the end of the war and save the lives of many brave soldiers and sailors on each side of the conflict. Beginning with February 1, the day following this unexpected announcement, a new war zone would be established around the British Isles, along the coast of France, and in that part of the Mediterranean that led to the ports of France and Italy. Any ship found within this zone, belligerent or neutral, would be sunk without regard to life or property. A reason-

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

able time was allowed for ships already at sea to escape out of the danger zone and ships then in hostile ports were promised immunity if they sailed before February 5 and took the most direct courses for unforbidden waters. The new war zone extended four hundred miles west of Ireland and ran south to a point nine hundred miles west of Bordeaux. The eastern half of the North Sea was left open, and the same was true of a narrow strip on the northern coast of Spain and of an irregular area in the Mediterranean along the eastern coast of the same country. Through this interior sea, from a point near the Balearic Isles, a lane of safety, twenty miles wide, was laid out to the shores of Greece, which, a neutral state, could not be cut off from the outside world. The forbidden area here defined was dedicated to the submarine.

For Americans who wished to visit England one ship a week was to be permitted to pass through the war zone in safety, provided she sailed along the fiftieth parallel to Falmouth, in Cornwall, arrived on Sunday, and departed on Wednesday. She must have on each of her sides three alternate red and white stripes a meter wide, and at each mast must fly a large flag in white and red checks. To complete the acknowledgment of German dictation such a ship was required to show a certificate from the United States government that she carried no contraband according to the German list of contraband. In transmitting these terms, so contrary to international law, the ambassador expressed the hope "that the United States may view the new situation from the lofty heights of impartiality and assist, on their part, to prevent further misery and avoidable sacrifice of human life." When the note was published there was hardly an American citizen who did not burn with indignation at the thought that a foreign government could assume that we would submit to such shameful treatment. Germany has said much about the limitations Great Britain has put on the free-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

dom of the seas, but her edict of January 31, was far more stringent than any British order-in-council issued within a century and a quarter; and its acceptance by the United States would have been the admission of inferiority.

The course now before the president was very plain. April 18, 1916, in regard to the *Sussex*, he had informed Germany that he would suspend diplomatic intercourse if she continued unrestricted warfare. Germany had then replied that she would follow international law, and it was not necessary to carry out our threat. Now she had suddenly withdrawn her promise and was doing on a large scale what we had formerly objected to on a small scale. Therefore, in accordance with the warning of April 18, the president ordered the recall of Ambassador Gerard from Berlin, sent Ambassador von Bernstorff his passports, and informed him that diplomatic intercourse was suspended. On the same day, February 3, he informed congress of what he had done and submitted his reasons. He said he could not believe that Germany would carry out her threat but that he would again address congress if his "inveterate confidence" in her "sobriety and prudent foresight" should prove unfounded. In closing his address he said:

"We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are the sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it; and we purpose nothing more than the reasonable defense of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand true alike in thought and in action to the immemorial principles of our people which I sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago,—seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty and justice and an unmolested life. These are the bases of peace, not war. God grant we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of willful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany!"

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

These words expressed the feeling of the great majority of the American people; for while a few impetuous ones had desired the government to go into the war after the *Lusitania* was sunk, the great majority had hesitated. The struggle in Europe was bloodier and more expensive than the world had thought possible when it began, and it was dragging the greatest nations into bankruptcy and destroying their best fruits of civilization. So far as could then be seen the conflict was reduced to the simple terms of Germany against the rest of Europe. If she won, a great central empire would be founded with the prospect that it would dominate Europe and imperil the safety of the Americas. The arrogant tone in which she assumed to dictate our use of the seas was an indication of what would happen in the future, if we now submitted to her pretensions. The editor of the *New York Times*, on February 3, 1917, expressed the general sentiment then prevalent when he said:

“Do we know what a German victory means for us here in the United States? We know it with full entirety and conviction. It means either that we buy freedom from molestation by perpetual poltroonery, or that within a few years we shall be engaged in a new war for independence against an incomparably more formidable foe. And for that war, unless we adopted a permanent policy of non-resistance, we should be compelled to begin instant preparations.”

In view of the state of public feeling described by this editor it was natural that the American senate on February 7, by a vote of 78 to 5, passed a resolution approving the course of the president. The minority included three republicans; Gronna, La Follette, and Works; and two democrats, Vardaman and Kirby. The resolution was introduced by Senator Stone, chairman of the senate committee on foreign relations, who, however, was not entirely convinced that the president should have acted before Germany committed an overt act. Some of those who voted “aye” were not convinced that the action taken was neces-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

sary, but they did not vote in the negative lest such a vote should be construed as disapproval of the general policy of the administration.

Outside of Washington there was a similar division of opinion, although the great majority were in support of the step taken by President Wilson. One of the surprises of the situation was the action of many of the German-language newspapers who now came out for a national policy. The Louisville *Anzeiger* said: "Every German-American who has become a citizen of this country knows which flag he must follow in this hour. The loyalty of German-Americans towards the country of their adoption has been proved often enough." The Philadelphia *Morgen Gazette* said: "Our duty as American citizens makes it absolutely necessary for us to be loyal to the country that we swore allegiance to—the United States of America." The editors of nearly every foreign newspaper in that city met and adopted resolutions assuring the president of their support. In New York five hundred representatives of German, Austrian, and Hungarian societies met and pledged loyalty to the American flag, whatever the issue, but asked the president "to make every effort to preserve peace." Expressions like these were well made good on European battle-fields a year and a half later, where the "hyphenated-Americans" laid down their lives as freely as any others who wore the American uniform. These results but showed how much of mere assumption for political effect had been in the claims so freely made in the campaign of 1916.

But some German-Americans and many pacifists were less cordial. The chairman of the aggressive German-American Alliance sent a call to his friends throughout the country, urging them to hold peace meetings and demand of congress a referendum on the question of peace or war. Mr. Bryan, the most conspicuous pacifist, called on the people to bestir them-

[96]

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

selves in order to keep the country out of the war that had already cost so much in life and treasure. The people, he said, did not want to see their sons fighting under the banners of European monarchs and dying "on European soil in settlement of European quarrels." He urged those who agreed with him to telegraph the president, senators, and congressmen in accordance with his views. "A few cents now," he exclaimed, "may save many dollars in taxation and possibly a son!" This agitation had no influence on the course of the president, who after much patient endeavor to induce Germany to take a course which made peace possible had been forced to take a stand that made war inevitable.

2. The Recall of Ambassadors

Meanwhile Ambassador von Bernstorff had received his passport on February 3 and permission had been obtained from British and French authorities to allow him safe passage through blockaded seas. February 14 he sailed from New York on a Danish ship accompanied by 148 persons, embassy officials and prominent Germans who were allowed to accompany him; and after a short delay at Halifax, where there was much examination of baggage by British officials, the party proceeded without incident to Copenhagen, and thence to Berlin. At the moment of departure the ambassador gained somewhat in the esteem, if not in the good will, of the people. He had tried to preserve a good understanding between his country and ours, and it was believed that he was opposed to the new submarine policy. He was in the United States for a definite purpose and had failed to accomplish it. He was going home to report his failure, and it was not likely that his superiors would understand that they had given him an impossible task. Thus it happened that he went away with his head high, like a good sportsman who had lost, and we waved him *bon voyage*.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Months later investigation made it evident that he was connected in an official capacity with the system of German propaganda and espionage, and public opinion turned against him again.

Meanwhile, the American ambassador in Berlin, Mr. James W. Gerard, encountered difficulties in withdrawing from Germany. He had spent two and half trying years at his post since the war began, endeavoring to make the Germans understand the American attitude toward the struggle and caring at the same time for the interests of Great Britain, Serbia, Rumania, and Japan. Many things in his interesting book, "My Four Years in Germany," show in what slight esteem the German government held the United States. His efforts to shake their self-satisfaction were in vain. They believed that President Wilson, elected on a platform of peace, would not fight; and they were surprised and chagrined to learn that he had broken off intercourse. Their treatment of the departing American ambassador illustrates their agitated state of mind.

It was not until February 5 that Mr. Gerard received the dispatch directing him to close his embassy. He called at once at the foreign office and demanded his passports. Assured that they would be sent him he proceeded with his preparations for departure. On the afternoon of the 6th, when they had not arrived, he received a call from a representative of the foreign office, who said they were not sent because the German government did not know what had happened to von Bernstorff and because it was reported that the German ships had been confiscated in the United States. We have already seen that the German ambassador was given every courtesy in connection with his return to Germany. No German ships of commerce had been seized, but the crews on the Hamburg-American and the North German Lloyd lines had been listed and ordered to remain on their ships. This was done because they had begun to go ashore and conceal themselves among the population.

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

False reports had reached Berlin that they were being arrested.

When Ambassador Gerard was told that his passports were withheld he asked why the government did not get the Swiss minister to cable to Washington for definite information. The answer was: "Well, you know the Swiss are not used to cabling."¹ The trivial nature of the reply suggests that his detention was part of a deeper plan, and this idea is supported by the further conduct of the officials. They submitted to him nine additional articles supplementary to our existing treaty with Germany, asking him to sign them or get them signed and saying that if they were not signed it would be difficult for Americans, and especially American correspondents, to leave Germany. The purport of the articles was that the citizens of one of the two nations should be undisturbed in their personal and property rights in the other nation, that they should not be interned, and their property should not be confiscated or in any other way alienated without their consent. As many more Germans were in the United States than Americans in Germany, the provisions of these articles were preponderatingly in favor of Germany. It is evident that they were specifically designed to make it impossible for the United States in event of war to take over the German ships in our ports.

Mr. Gerard was not so simple as to swallow the bait offered him. Before reading the articles he assured his visitor that he had no authority to sign them, since he was no longer an accredited agent for transacting business with Germany. When he had examined them and come to realize that a threat was implied, he became very indignant. "After your threat to keep Americans here," he said, "and after reading this document, even if I had authority to sign it, I would stay here until hell freezes over before I would put my name to such a paper."²

¹ Gerard, J. W., *My Four Years in Germany*, 378.

² Gerard, J. W., *Ibid*, 382.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

The American newspaper men in Berlin assured him that they would cheerfully support him in his defiance of the Germans. February 9, four days after he had demanded his passports, after a despatch had come through from the *New York Times* saying that von Bernstorff was treated with all due courtesy and no ships had been confiscated, Mr. Gerard was informed that he might leave Berlin on the following day. Availing himself of the permission he departed on the 10th and arrived in Switzerland the next morning, returning to the United States by way of France, Spain, and Cuba. The German government did not give up its efforts to get the United States to accept the nine additional articles but submitted them to Secretary Lansing through the Swiss minister in Washington. The secretary not only refused to consider them, but said that the recent violations of American rights by the submarines had destroyed the mutuality of our treaties with Germany and it was a question in the mind of the government if the treaties themselves were not thereby invalidated.

The singular ineptness of the German diplomats in dealing with the United States is probably explained by the inability of the ruling class to understand a democratic nation. They gave to us the same kind of disdain they gave to the Social Democrats in their own country, and they seem to have thought that we should accept it as submissively. They dangled before the eyes of the administration in Washington the glittering bauble of peacemaker of the world and seem to have thought that for that empty honor we would sacrifice our rights on the seas. They had pretended to think we should not resist the decree of January 31, 1917. If they had respected the United States as they respected other great nations, they could hardly have thought that we should fall in with the transparent trick by which they sought to save their ships and other property in the war that seemed imminent. They understood the psychology

[100]

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

of a country like Turkey, as the event showed; but they did not know how to foretell what a self-governing people would do in an emergency. Their failure to understand the people of the United States appears especially in the proposal that only one ship a week could go through the barred zone and that must wear a badge of its dishonor. Nothing could more have inflamed American feeling than to be told that we should adorn our ships with stripes at the behest of Germany and raise a checkered flag that looked like the trousers of a harlequin, unless it was the attempt to hold Mr. Gerard in his place until an advantageous treaty had been twisted out of him.

3. The President before Congress

President Wilson said in his address to congress, February 3, that he could not believe that the German government would do what it threatened to do. He probably intended to leave an opening for yielding; but the pacifists in the United States found ground for hope in the suggestion. Two days after it was delivered Georg Barthelme, Washington correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette*, began sending dispatches to his paper urging it to influence the German government to make explanations about the method of executing the submarine decree and to modify the one-ship-a-week feature. The best people of the United States, he said, were praying for peace, and he declared that his proposals were supported by a man of the highest influence in the country. His dispatches were passed by the secretary of the navy, and he appeared so frequently in the corridors of the department of state that the impression was created that he was a welcome visitor there. February 12 the *Boston Herald* alluded to the affair and precipitated a warm newspaper discussion in which it was freely charged that Ex-Secretary Bryan and a group of senators and congressmen of pacifistic tendency were striving to get Germany to take steps looking to-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

ward the resumption of negotiations, and that Barthelme was their intermediary. The correspondent of the *Gazette* denied such a connection and said that he alone was responsible for what he had done.

The whole affair annoyed the president, who feared it would be a fog the issue between the two countries. On the 10th of the month the Swiss minister, Ritter, submitted to Secretary Lansing a request from Germany that the president would indicate the means by which the submarine warfare could be conducted so as to be acceptable to him. President Wilson realized that a renewal of the discussion that had dragged along from the *Lusitania* to the *Sussex* incidents would only give the pacifists the opportunity to plead for delay, and he nipped their hopes in the bud by causing Minister Ritter to know that he would not renew negotiations unless Germany repealed the decree of January 31. When it became known that Barthelme was about to be appointed attaché at the Swiss legation, and to remain in Washington, he was informed that he would not be acceptable in that capacity and promptly made arrangements to leave with von Bernstorff.

Meanwhile the country was waiting for an overt act on the part of the submarines, which the president had declared could alone convince him that Germany meant to defy the rights of the United States. February 3 the *Housatonic*, an American vessel carrying contraband, was sunk off the Scilly Isles, but the crew in boats were towed by the submarine into safety and the case could not be construed as the expected overt act. In other ways it seemed that Germany was making an effort to spare American ships the full force of her blows. On the 13th of the month 34 neutral vessels had been sunk and only one of them was American. But the fear of being sunk detained many American ships in port and they were unwilling to go out until they were armed for defense. So effective was this fear that

[102]

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

the newspapers began to complain that Germany by her decree had blockaded our ports as effectively as if she had placed men of war before them.

February 26, President Wilson went before congress to ask for authority to arm merchant ships. He desired to give our shipowners the assurance that they could send their vessels to sea with the support of their government, he foresaw that the long expected overt act might happen at any moment, and in view of the approaching end of the congress he wished to be able to act promptly in any emergency that might arise. He declared that the situation was "fraught with the gravest possibilities and dangers."

In the house a bill was introduced on the same day granting all the president asked and allowing him \$100,000,000 with which to pay the expenses that might arise. Before it was debated news came that the liner *Laconia* had been sunk by a torpedo on the 25th with the result that two American women were killed. The overt act, long expected, was now at hand. The *Laconia* with a large list of passengers had been sunk at night in rough seas and without warning 150 miles from the shore. In principle the act differed in nothing from the sinking of the *Lusitania* or the *Sussex*. To allow it to pass without notice was to abandon our contention and to submit to any future insult that might be offered. The action of the president placed the responsibility upon congress, and in order that it might be clearly defined a bill embodying his request was offered in the house by the chairman of the committee on foreign affairs, Mr. Flood.

Against the general policy of the administration two groups had been acting. One was composed of the regular republicans, led by Senator Lodge in one house and Representative Mann in the other. They had frequently criticized the president for pursuing a vacillating policy and for usurping the powers of

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

congress, criticisms which his patience with Germany and his strong willed leadership in his party had a tendency to promote. The other group was composed of persons opposed to war itself, partly because they were pacifists, partly because they had pro-German feelings, and partly through traditional opposition to "entangling alliances." There were a few democrats in the second group, but most of the members of that party could be carried for any administration measure by the exercise of party discipline. By all his opponents the president's direction of affairs in the crisis was regarded with suspicion, and a caucus of republican senators, on February 23, decided to conduct a filibuster to prevent the enactment of necessary measures and thus force the president to call an extra session of the next congress, the sixty-fifth.

This was the political situation when congress took up Mr. Flood's bill, the substance of which was to authorize the president to establish armed neutrality and employ "other instrumentalities and methods" to protect American ships at sea. The second part of this grant was opposed by the republicans generally as giving the executive too much power, and when this clause had been struck out they accepted the bill in good faith. It passed the house on March 1 by a vote of 403 to 13, the minority containing 9 republicans, 3 democrats and 1 socialist, and all of them but the socialist were from the West. Mr. Cooper, ranking republican member of the foreign committee, offered an amendment to prohibit the arming of munition ships, but it was lost by a vote of 295 to 124. In the senate Mr. Lodge came to the defense of the bill as amended and carried most of his fellow republicans with him. But the more ardent opponents of war, led by Senator La Follette, of Wisconsin, continued the filibuster until the end of the session, hardening themselves to a most violent storm of denunciation in and out of the chamber.

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

While the debate was proceeding the press announced an intercepted dispatch from Dr. Alfred Zimmerman, the German minister of foreign affairs, to the German minister in Mexico, the obvious intention of which was to draw Mexico into war with the United States, if war began between them and Germany. This dispatch was as follows:

“On the first of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavor to keep neutral with the United States of America. If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico. That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory of New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

“You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan, suggesting adherence at once to the plan, and at the same time to offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.”

In itself the notion that Mexico would expose herself to American attacks in order to come to the aid of Germany, who could give her no aid by land or sea, was worthy of an amateur diplomat. But it revealed the deep-seated hostility of Germany and suggested that she had long nursed a similar feeling in Mexico. Coming just then, it created a deep impression in the country and had a marked influence over the vote of congress on armed neutrality.

Nothing, however, could shake the opposition of Senator La Follette. With him were Senators Norris, Works, Clapp, Cummins, Kenyon, and Gronna, all republicans. When it was evi-


OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

dent that the filibuster would succeed 46 democratic and 30 republican senators signed a statement of their desire to vote for the bill, if it could have been brought to a vote, and had the protest placed upon the records to show that they stood with the president. Senators Stone, Lane, Kirby, O'Gorman, and Vardaman, democrats, joined the filibusterers in refusing to vote for this resolution. President Wilson, who has often shown that he can give a sharp and cutting blow when driven into a corner, came back with a manifesto setting forth the whole situation. "More than 500 of the 531 members of the two houses were ready and anxious to act," he said; "the House of Representatives had acted by an overwhelming majority; but the Senate was unable because a little group of 11 Senators had determined that it should not. . . . The Senate of the United States is the only legislative body in the world which cannot act when its majority is ready for action. A little group of wilful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great government of the United States helpless and contemptible. . . . The only remedy is that the rules of the Senate shall be so altered that it can act." At the special session that followed the senate changed its rules so that closure can be applied by a two-third vote of the members.

The outburst of scorn that fell upon the "wilful" senators overwhelmed them and gave the president confidence to proceed to arm the merchantmen without the assent of congress. He had previously expressed his belief that he had the power without such a vote. He called on the attorney-general for his opinion on the point and was answered in the affirmative. Accordingly, on March 9 it was announced that the government would place guns and gunners on the merchant ships. At the same time an extra session of congress was called for April 16.

To all these things the Germans opposed a scornful indifference. The ruthless use of the submarines, they said, would

[106]



Reproduced by permission of the War Volumes,
published by the New York Times Co. ©

**THE PROHIBITED AREA UNDER THE GERMAN SUBMARINE DECREE OF
FEBRUARY 1, 1917**

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

not be abandoned and American ships would be sunk as quickly as others if they were encountered. That only two had been destroyed up to this time was merely good luck. In fact, with armed ships now on the seas it was idle to expect that peace could be preserved. When an armed ship met a submarine and fired in self-defense an act of war would be committed.

4. A State of War Declared

March 18 the long period of indecision came to an end, when the news reached Washington that three American steamers had been sunk with fifteen men lost. All that had been feared in this country, all that had been threatened in Germany, had come to pass. From February 1 to March 18, six and a half weeks, Germany had an avenue of retreat. It was now evident to everybody that she would not use it. The feeling of the country was perhaps best expressed in a phrase of Elihu Root's. "Germany is making war on us," he said on March 20, "and we are all waiting to see whether we are to take it lying down. It is either war or it is submission to oppression. My diagnosis of the situation is that the President wants to hear from the people. Let us answer to his want and tell him that the American people do not want him to discuss, not to plan, not to talk about what is going to be done, but to act."¹

On March 21 the state of public opinion was more than evident, it was loudly vocal; and the president would hesitate no longer. He summoned congress forthwith in extra session on April 2, two weeks earlier than the date set in his first proclamation, "to receive a communication by the Executive on grave questions of national policy which should be taken immediately under consideration."

That the country was on the verge of war nobody could doubt.

¹ Speeches before Union League Club, New York, March 20, 1917. *New York Times*, March 21, 1917.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Mass-meetings in many cities passed patriotic resolutions. In Washington the war and navy departments were busy perfecting plans of action. The navy called for an increase in its personnel, the council of national defense, organized in anticipation of war, held important meetings, and heads of industry in hundreds of cities placed their resources at the disposal of the government.

Speculation was lively as to the kind of service the United States could render the allies. At first the disposition was to predict that our aid would be chiefly financial, with an army large enough to defend our own shores and with an active navy on duty in whatever seas the submarines infested. The secretary of war, said rumor, favored an army of 500,000 men, which seemed large to a people whose army had long been less than 100,000. All were agreed that we should lend money freely. It was even suggested that we ought to advance a billion dollars. When congress assembled great crowds of patriotic citizens went to Washington to witness the realization of their hopes. A determined group of pacifists went along also, to make a last demonstration against a declaration of war.

It was 8:30 in the evening of April 2 when the president appeared in the hall of the house of representatives to address congress. He had been conducted thither by mounted cavalymen to protect him from annoyance by the pacifists, who had vainly tried to man the steps of the capitol to demonstrate against his entrance. Received with cheers he proceeded to deliver an address which sent a thrill throughout the country. After reviewing the events and motives that led to strained relations with Germany and declaring that armed neutrality had proved no remedy, he said:

“With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I
[108]

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war."

The speaker then proceeded to mention some of the things we should have to do in order to carry out a declaration of war; as the extension of financial aid to the allied opponents of Germany, the organization and mobilization of the industries of the country to support war, the equipment of the navy in the amplest manner, the enlargement of the national army by at least half a million men at once with other similar increases as training progressed, these forces to be raised in his opinion, "upon the principle of universal liability to service," and the voting of adequate revenues for defraying the expenses of war. He ventured, also, to say that the financial burden of the war should be borne by taxation, to as large an extent as possible, in order to avoid inflation that must arise through contracting large loans.

Turning to the objects for which we were to fight he said:

"My own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course by the unhappy events of the last two months, and I do not believe that the thought of the nation has been altered or clouded by them. I have exactly the same things in mind now that I had in mind when I addressed the Senate on the twenty-second of January last; the same that I had in mind when I addressed the Congress of the third of February and on the twenty-sixth of February. Our object now, as then, is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments backed by organized force which is controlled wholly by their will, not by the will of their people. We have seen the last of neutrality in such circumstances. We are at the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states."

He protested that he had no quarrel with the German people: it was with the ruling German autocracy that he joined issue. That autocracy had shown its innate hostility to us by conducting persistent efforts to disturb our interior social and political life and especially by attempting to stir up Mexico to attack us at our very doors. It was evident that it would "act against our peace and security at its convenience." And this led him to declare:

"We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe of liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the (ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples) the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish aims to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them. . . .

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

“It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.”

During the two months that had intervened between February 1 and April 2 the newspapers had frequently discussed our reasons for war. Sometimes it was the violation of American rights at sea, sometimes espionage and propaganda, and sometimes the open avowal that our sale of munitions to the *Entente* allies had enraged Germany so much that she was sure to turn against us as soon as she had opportunity, so that it behooved us to fight while we were assured of help from her other enemies. By many people the last named motive was considered the best. Perhaps few persons in the country had conceived the motive that the president placed uppermost. That Germany was the foe of democracy we all knew, that her triumph would result in a vast empire threatening liberal government in the rest of the world was well understood. But it is to President Wilson that we owe the idea that the United States should in utter seriousness stake their resources to give every people the opportunity to be governed in a democratic way. Had he rested the declaration of war on the other motives mentioned he would have satisfied the people. But he went a step further than the people had gone and placed at the front a motive that would not only appeal to the people of the United States but to the people of every nation. It took some time for this fact to enter the minds of all peoples, but the time came when the idea was accepted by the people in many countries. Its sponsor then became the most influential man in the world.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

President Wilson could hardly have taken this stand if the Russian revolution had not occurred eighteen days before he made his address; for it would have been difficult to proclaim a crusade for democracy while one of the chief armies on our side was led by the tsar. The moment was opportune. Russia was still in the hands of the conservative republicans and seemed destined to be a bulwark of opposition to Germany on the east. Her espousal of democracy left Germany the great stronghold of autocracy in the world. It was not a mere stroke of fancy to proclaim union of liberal nations to end once for all a system which was truly described as the enemy of democracy wherever it existed.

When the president ended his address on April 2, 1917, the joint session of congress was terminated, and in each house a joint resolution was introduced declaring that a state of war existed "between the United States and the Imperial German Government" and that the president was authorized to use the power and resources of the nation "to carry on war against the Imperial German Government." The resolution passed the senate on April 4 with six votes against it and the house on April 6 with fifty adverse votes.¹ In a proclamation issued on the sixth the president announced that a state of war existed with "the Imperial German Government," called on the citizens to support the war in every possible way, and announced many regulations by which alien enemies were to be allowed to remain in the United States. Thus came to an end on April 6, 1917, the long period of anxiety for president and people during which they saw the country gradually drawn into the maelstrom of war. But we went in on the highest ground we could take, to make the world safe for democracy.

Austria-Hungary had not taken part in the ruthless sub-

¹Of the six senators 3 were democrats and 3 republicans. Of the 50 representatives 16 were democrats, 32 republicans, 1 a socialist, and 1 an independent.

THE UNITED STATES DRAWN INTO THE GREAT WAR

marine warfare, although she supported the course of her ally. She had recalled Dr. Dumba on request in the autumn of 1915 leaving the embassy in the hands of a *chargé d'affaires*. A year later she decided to send an ambassador, and Count Tarnowski arrived in Washington in that capacity just as von Bernstorff was being handed his passports. Two days after we declared war on Germany he asked for his passports and departed without having been accorded a formal reception by the American government. It was not until December 7, 1917, that we declared war against his country. At that time a great German army had been thrown against Italy on the Austrian front and the tide of victory was barely turned by the united efforts of Italy and her allies. It was to hearten the Italians that we now formally ranged ourselves among the declared foes of Austria-Hungary.

No declaration of war was made against Turkey and Bulgaria, although they were allies of Germany. Turkey was thought to be drifting away from Germany and it was held that a declaration of war against her would serve to throw her into a stronger dependence on that country. Bulgaria was not in a position to place troops on the western battle-front or submarines in the paths of commerce; and as she had long been especially friendly to the United States it was thought unwise to announce formal hostility. She did not suspend diplomatic intercourse with our government through the course of the war; and it is probable that by maintaining the outward tokens of friendship with her we were able to contribute materially to her impulse to make a separate peace in 1918, a step that had great influence on the general situation.

CHAPTER VI

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

1. *Organizing an Army*

HARDLY a man in the United States to-day but has been struck with wonder and admiration by the success with which the nation raised and equipped a vast army. That the most unmilitary people in the world should in less than two years organize an army of nearly four millions was as little expected by ourselves as by our foes. It was equally astonishing that the army should be completely furnished with the various kinds of complicated and skillfully designed materials of war, together with a gigantic system of transportation across the ocean and in France. Nevertheless these things were done with little friction and few mistakes. They were done with sacrifice but also with great joy in the doing. It was a pleasure to see the national spirit of achieving aroused, organizing and carrying forward with the precision of a well adjusted machine.

Much of the success was due to the vivid example Europe gave us at the time. For two and a half years we had been taught in a grim school all the lessons of warfare that the rest of the world had learned in years of training and waiting. We were, therefore, able to begin where other states left off. We only had to ask: "What are the experiences of other warring nations?" and having the answer to profit by it. It was in keeping with the American habit that we also sought to improve upon the methods other states had developed.

Fortunately, we were able to begin the task of mobilization

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

with the harmonious coöperation of Great Britain and France. Although we did not become their allies formally, we became their partners, and they put freely at our disposal all they had learned in the war. A British mission, headed by Arthur J. Balfour, the British foreign secretary, sailed from a British port on April 11, five days after war was declared, and arrived at Halifax on the 20th, whence they proceeded to Washington. On the 24th a French mission, headed by M. Viviani, former premier of France, and containing General Joffre, the commander of the French armies in the earliest months of the war, arrived at Hampton Roads and proceeded to Washington on the president's yacht, the *Mayflower*. Together these missions visited the tomb of Washington and laid tributes on it. Their leaders were received on the floors of the houses of congress and Mr. Balfour made a notable speech before the house of representatives. Shortly afterwards an Italian mission arrived, headed by the Prince of Udine, and other missions came still later.

One of the objects was to obtain financial help for a struggle which had already become so severe that the nations of Europe could not carry it alone. To Great Britain we lent \$200,000,000 on April 25. Congress had passed a law on the 24th authorizing the issue of \$7,000,000,000 in bonds, of which \$3,000,000,000 were to go to foreign countries at war with Germany. France and Italy made prompt application for a portion, and were gratified, and Belgian, Russian, and Rumanian loans were also made. By July 1 over \$1,000,000,000 had been lent, and this sum was largely increased before the end of the war. The borrowing nations paid us the same interest that the government of the United States paid on its own bonds, although they were paying a higher rate of interest for money borrowed in Europe. This generous policy was adopted deliberately; for the borrowing nations had long been carrying

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the weight of war, England and France lending freely to their allies, and they were nearly at the limit of their financial strength. The proceeds of these loans were for the most part deposited in the banks of this country and used to pay for materials of war that was purchased here.

The second object of the French and British missions was to lay before us the situation abroad and to convince our government of the need of an American army in France at the earliest possible time. The gravity of the situation had not been made apparent on this side of the Atlantic while we were still at peace with Germany. Troops were needed for their own fighting ability, for the assistance they would give to an exhausted nation, and to make the French and Italians realize that our participation in the struggle was to have its full effect on the field of battle as well as in financial and naval matters.

A third object was to bring technical assistance to our army. Both missions contained trained experts on military and naval matters with the knowledge of the newest methods. These experts went into conferences with American experts, showing us all they knew and helping to give our organization the right turn from the first. Without their direct aid we could not have had an army of nearly four million men in a little more than a year, nor could we have constructed it on such excellent models in a greater time.

Meanwhile, active preparations were being made for the mobilization of armies. The act of June 3, 1916, which had authorized an army of 175,000, officers and men, was clearly unequal to the occasion, although it had been considered adequate by most people when passed. As it happened, its most valuable features were the provisions it made for developing the machinery of organization with the result that the regulations of 1917, made to meet the emergency, had but to develop the system already adopted in a general way.

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

The law of 1916 had trusted to volunteering which was soon seen to be inadequate. But the principle of voluntary service was so well fixed in the minds of the people that congress, despite the recommendation of the president, proceeded to consider a bill to raise an army of volunteers. When it seemed that this bill would pass the house the president intervened. He considered volunteering too slow for the times. His interference was resented by some members, who thought that a president should not have a strong influence in lawmaking. But President Wilson, as the chief executive, conceived it his duty to use all his power to turn the action of government into the right channels and the committee adopted his ideas. Speaker Clark took strong ground for volunteering and was supported by House Leader Kitchin. Chairman Dent, democrat, of the house military committee, was so strongly opposed to a great army that he refused to defend the bill as it came from the committee, and the labor devolved upon Julius Kahn, of California, a German by birth, who was the ranking republican member of the committee. He proved an able advocate of the president's plan and carried the bill through the house by a decisive vote. It was amended in the senate after a short debate, and was finally passed and signed by the president on May 18, 1917.

The act provided that the president might raise the regular army to 287,000 men by enlistment, that he might take into the service of the United States all the members of the national guard and the national guard reserve, and that he might raise by selective draft an additional force of 500,000 men, or as many of them as he saw fit to call, and at a later time another force of 500,000. He was authorized to enroll all the men in the country between the ages of 21 and 31, out of whom he might draft those whom he desired to call into the army. By procla-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

mation he fixed June 5 as the day for enrolling the men of draft age.

As soon as war began the newspapers began to discuss a proposition for raising a volunteer division to be placed under the command of ex-President Roosevelt, somewhat after the manner in which the "Rough Riders" were organized in the Spanish war. In fact, Mr. Roosevelt himself seems to have had such a step in mind when he said, in a speech at the Union League Club, New York, on March 20: "We can perfectly well send an expeditionary force abroad now to fight in the trenches or fight in the Balkan peninsula, wherever it is desired. We can get that expeditionary force, if we choose to, within four or five months into the trenches, and it will mean everything for the morale of France, of Belgium, of the allies generally." From that time to the passage of the army bill two months later, the papers were full of arguments for and against sending the proposed division. The matter perforce took on a political character, and for the sake of harmony a clause was put in the act of May 18, allowing the president at his discretion to send four volunteer divisions abroad as soon as they could be raised. In signing the bill President Wilson let it be known that he did not intend to avail himself of this permission. No one doubted the courage of Mr. Roosevelt, but it was evident that to appoint a civilian to the honorable post of leading the first expedition on the battlefields of Europe would have a bad effect on the trained army officers. It was decided early in the war that political generals should not be appointed, and it was one of the distinct services of the administration that it held to this resolution throughout the struggle.

The Roosevelt discussion derived much force from the appeals General Joffre, of the French Mission, made for immediate help to cheer the dispirited Frenchmen. So great was the popular feeling on the subject that the administration felt constrained

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

to meet and allay it by ordering to France immediately a division of regulars under General John J. Pershing. The force began to embark quite secretly on June 13 and the first convoy arrived at "a port in France" in due time without mishap. General Pershing, already arrived in Europe, placed his troops in training camps at once. He took command of the arrangements which now began to be made for the reception and training of other units soon to arrive.

The appearance of American soldiers in France was the occasion of great demonstrations of popular joy. Comparatively few Europeans visit the United States which seem farther away from them than Europe seems from the average American. When these people saw before them, therefore, the soldiers of the great republic, larger and richer than France and the United Kingdom combined, and as yet unscarred by war, they took courage and strengthened their own efforts.

The enrolment of men between the ages of 21 and 31 under the act of May 18 resulted in the listing of 9,586,508 men. The law had provided for liberal exemptions, among them state and federal officials, ministers of religion, members of churches that forbade taking up arms, artisans employed in munition works and in industries essential to the war, persons physically and mentally unfit for service, and men on whom other persons depended for support. To administer this feature of the law exemption boards were formed and for several weeks they were busy arranging the enrolled men in classes according as they were exempt or not exempt.

The draft occurred on July 20 in Washington. The country had been divided into 4557 districts and the enrolled men in each district had been given serial numbers by local boards. A series of these numbers each enclosed in a gelatin capsule was placed in a glass bowl in Washington and when one was drawn out the men having the corresponding number in each of the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

districts was called to service, subject to the action of the exemption boards. In this way the draft was made quickly and without a suggestion of unfairness.

To provide places for training it was necessary to construct sixteen cantonments, with barracks, hospitals, storage houses, and various other necessary buildings. This vast work had to be done from the very beginning, even to the purchase of the sites of the camps and the provision of water supplies and sewerage systems. It was a triumph of construction that it was so far advanced that the first of the drafted men could be received on September 5. During the course of the war the number of training camps was largely increased, and there existed for the various kinds of training as many as thirty-seven when the armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.

Under the act of May 18 the president called on the authorities directing the draft to assemble 687,000 men for training as rapidly as they could be received after September 5, and by the end of the year 480,000 had been mustered in. But the National Army, as this body was called, was not the only measure of the recruiting zeal of the country; for the two other services had been increased largely under the act of congress. The Regular Army now included 10,250 officers and 475,000 enlisted men, and the National Guard contained 16,031 officers and 400,900 enlisted men. With a considerable number of reserve officers and men the entire army at the end of 1917 contained 110,856 officers and 1,428,650 men. April 1 it had contained 9,524 officers and 110,856 men.

To train officers for these troops was a large undertaking. It was so great that German authorities had confidently predicted that however great our armies they could never be efficient because we could not develop the officers to command them. Experience proved that the prophecy was erroneous. From the West Point graduates and from the trained men of

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

the regular army came enough excellent men to form a safe nucleus for the commands first called out. In the summer of 1916 an officers' training camp for business men was conducted at Plattsburg, New York,¹ the result of the efforts of Major-General Leonard Wood. A large number of business men attended and took the course of intensive training offered them. With the declaration of war in 1917 this camp was revived on an enlarged scale and other similar officers' camps were established. By the end of summer, 1917, a large corps of trained men were ready for appointment to the lower grades of commissioned officers. Their personnel was high and their experiences in civil life brought them into an unusual state of sympathy with the men they led. To keep the soldier informed of the latest advances in tactics officers from the French and British armies were distributed at the instruction camps of the army. They gave lessons to the non-commissioned officers, in order that they, in turn, might instruct their own men. The training in all branches was very hard and it was most effective in the time available.

2. *The Navy*

Meanwhile, the navy was undergoing a similar process of expansion. The naval defense act of August 29, 1916, authorized a three year program of construction with sixty-six new ships of various kinds and an increase of personnel to 87,000 in the navy and 17,400 in the marine corps. Like the army act of the same year it contained a number of farsighted measures that rounded out its various parts and gave opportunity to expand them to suit the demands of war. These important details were promptly worked out by officials in the two depart-

¹ In 1913 training camps under the direction of the army were established for college students at Gettysburg, Pa., and Monterey, Cal. In 1914 and 1915 similar camps were held elsewhere. In 1916 the training camp for business men was held at Plattsburg, N. Y. This camp gave its name to many others—and to the expression, "the Plattsburg idea."

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

ments, and it was to the credit of the officials above them that no impediments were placed in the way of their execution.

When he became secretary of the navy Mr. Josephus Daniels had seen little experience that indicated that he would fill the position satisfactorily. Soon after appointment he made some decisions of administration, trivial in themselves, which gave his enemies the opportunity to cover him with ridicule. When the war drew near he had lived through the worst of this storm, but he was still a small navy man. Following the lead of the president he changed his attitude on that point early in 1916, supported the demand that resulted in the act of August 29, and when it was passed gave full liberty to the technical experts to carry it out. As the political head of the navy during the war he made no mistakes and gained the approval of most of the men who had formerly found him unsatisfactory. A more pertinacious man might have proved less responsive to the rapid change of sentiment that swept over the country.

Actual experience had shown that the strongest demand on the navy was for destroyers and other small craft to operate against submarines, and next in order were fast cruisers to convoy transports. In the beginning of our preparations it was not expected that we should send a large army to France, and the efforts of the navy naturally looked to the checking of submarine warfare. While the act of 1916 had provided for the construction of vessels of all classes, the department felt justified in hurrying forward the work on the destroyers. It developed, also, a large motor-boat 80 or 110 feet long, armed with three-inch guns and known as a submarine chaser. It was capable of dealing with the German submarine and could be built quickly and at comparatively small expense. In December, 1917, work was proceeding on 135 of these chasers and contracts had been let for 200 more. At the same time the construction of destroyers was pressed as rapidly as the over-

[122]

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

strained resources of the country permitted. Congress supported these efforts with ample appropriations.

The navy was called upon to supply guns and gun crews for arming merchant ships, and the result was a depletion of the trained men on the public vessels. To repair the deficiency and to man the new craft purchased and constructed, training schools for gunners, radio men, electrical engineers, and other technical men were established. At the same time it was necessary to create training schools for a large number of commissioned officers. Ensign schools were established at some of the universities and by intensive instruction young officers were turned out in the necessary numbers. One of the notable results of the military and naval education of men in this war is the demonstration of the efficiency of hard and concentrated study of one subject for a brief period.

In the nine weeks between the German proclamation of ruthless warfare and our entrance into the war the navy had ample time to prepare for immediate action. In anticipation of war Rear Admiral Sims was sent abroad "as special representative and observer." He had risen to high rank in the navy through the perfection of the system of target practice which placed our gunners among the most skillful of the world. As soon as congress acted he made arrangements with British and French naval authorities for efficient coöperation on our part. Immediately a number of destroyers were dispatched to Queenstown to operate under his command. They arrived in a state of complete readiness for war and won the admiration of the British for their businesslike training and the promptness with which they took up the work mapped out for them on the lanes of communication infested by submarines. Rear Admiral Sims was made a vice admiral and given command of all the naval ships of the United States in European waters. It took away some of the satisfaction in this achievement felt at home when it was

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

learned that the Germans knew of the departure and destination of the destroyers four days before the vessels arrived and sowed mines in their path, fortunately without fatal results. The incident served to make the American authorities more careful about shipping intelligence. Their decision to place the navy unreservedly in the war was already taken and gradually most of the fighting fleet was sent across the Atlantic. The heavy ships took station by the side of the British and French high seas fleets waiting for the appearance of the Germans on the North Sea, but the destroyers and submarine chasers continued to patrol the region off the west coast of Europe.

3. The Machinery of War

During the period in which Europe carried on the war without our assistance, many improvements were made in the machinery with which war is conducted. In this respect the Germans, who had made the subject their chief study, had taken the lead. Their peculiar facility in science had enabled them to bring to bear a greatly developed mechanical skill upon the problem of making improved artillery. When the war opened they surprised the world by attacking the great concrete forts in Belgium with mammoth cannon which quickly reduced the fortifications to heaps of rubbish. No one had dreamed that such cannon were in existence. They also possessed an abundance of machine guns and had a land transport service equipped with automobile trucks for more than a million men. In light field artillery they were surpassed by the French, whose famous 75's proved a better implement of defense than any light gun the Germans used in the war. All this material can only be manufactured slowly and at great expense, and the nation that had an abundance of it in the beginning had a distinct advantage over its opponent.

By April 6, 1917, most of this advantage had been overcome

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

through the previous miscalculations of the Germans or the more inventive talents of their opponents. For example, the Germans had expected much from Zeppelins and had given great efforts to their development. Experience proved that Zeppelins were hard to manage in ordinary weather and that they were so vulnerable by airplanes that they could not be counted on. As an instrument of war they were failures. The Germans also first used gas to kill their enemies, but the French and British were soon able to compete on even terms in its development. The same was true in regard to hand grenades and some other things. In the invention of the tanks by the British a hit was scored on the Germans that they did not succeed in returning. In regard to the airplane, which was better developed by the French in the beginning than by any other nation, all the contestants did what they could to use and improve it; and both the French, British, and Germans attained great efficiency in using it. To provide these things in the quantities needed in intensive fighting by the army of two millions which we set out to equip was a gigantic task.

When we entered the war our manufacturers had been making certain kinds of munitions for the allies. It was stated authoritatively that they were making the greater part of the ammunition for British and French sidearms and light artillery; and they had furnished many rifles and some machine guns to the British government. But their activities did not include the larger types of artillery, nor airplanes, gas, and tanks.

The most immediate problem of this kind was to obtain rifles. The government was using the Springfield rifle, the latest model of which was considered better than the Enfield, which the British used, and better than either the French or German rifles. But the government armories had not been constructed to produce rifles at the rate that would supply an army of more than a million. Furthermore there was not time to

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

enlarge the armories, and if new buildings and machinery could have been extemporized in a week, it would take months more to gather and train the expert machinists who were needed to make the rifles. There was probably not a good machinist in the country who was not already employed at high wages and most of them were in plants whose products were essential to the war. To develop new armories, therefore, in time to supply the drafted men with rifles was impossible. The army met the problem successfully, partly through luck and partly through the resourcefulness of the ordnance bureau. In the spring of 1917, one of the large American firms had completed its contract to supply Enfield rifles to the British government. Its machinery and tools were on hand, but they could not be used on Springfield rifles. Many of its workmen were still employed by the firm or could be brought back to their old places. The army experts found a way to change the bore of the Enfield rifle to use the Springfield ammunition, with the result that rifles were turned out with only a short delay in quantities that overcame the lack of Springfields.

The early manufacture of heavy artillery, field guns, and mortars was not attempted. Experts declared that it would take seven years to carry a distinctly American field piece through the various stages of development, from making the design to the testing and from testing to a supply in quantities sufficient to equip an army. Under the circumstances we were fortunate to get an offer from the French government to make the famous French 75 and the 155 milimeter guns in any numbers we needed. During the early years of the war the French and British had established large artillery plants, but their own armies were now supplied and they had surplus capacity which they could place at our disposal. It was decided to accept their offer, and the result was satisfactory. In fact, it is difficult to see how we could have equipped Pershing's

[126]

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

army with artillery in time for the campaign of 1918 if it had not been for the coöperation of the allies. The French 75's were of especial service, and in the hands of the American artillerists they were most efficient.

In regard to machine guns our experience was not so happy. The few arms of this kind we had were of old models which no one would have thought of supplying to the army. Moreover, the ordinance experts were not satisfied with either of the machine guns used in Europe, and in the autumn of 1916 American manufacturers had been authorized to make models with an idea of adopting a better type in May, 1917. The result of the test, held a month after we were in the war, was to adopt the Browning gun, which is considered the best machine gun in use. It was expected that the manufacturers could procure machinery, establish buildings, and turn out guns in large quantities by March, 1918, which would be as early as we could begin to send the new army abroad. Meanwhile, foreign guns were purchased and sent to the training camps for the instruction schools there. We shall see later in what manner this program was delayed.

In aircraft production even greater obstacles were encountered. The airplane was an American invention but in this country it was only a sporting apparatus, and the same thing was largely true in Great Britain. But the militaristic nations of Europe seized upon it as an implement of warfare and developed it into an important part of the service by August, 1914. They developed it much more rapidly in the two years that followed. When we entered the war the process of improvement was still going on. Supremacy in the air was an important feature of any battle or campaign. The *Entente* allies looked to us to create airplanes in such numbers that they could bomb the enemy's battle lines into surrender, if need be. It was one of those big things that Americans have been accus-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

tomed to do to the astonishment of other peoples. The war department caught at the idea, congress became enthusiastic and appropriated \$640,000,000 for aircraft construction for the army, and the people were filled with admiration when it was known that 11,500 combat planes had been ordered, to say nothing of a large number of training planes.

Neither army nor congress probably realized the difficulties to be encountered. We had no factories that could turn out combat planes. To get 11,500 of them by the summer of 1918 would demand standardized construction of both engines and planes. The factories in France and Great Britain were running at capacity for their own governments. Their engines and planes were made by hand and the French work was done in the metric system. It was agreed that American workmen could not work with advantage in reproducing the British and French machines, and it was decided to make an American engine and an American plane, if possible. An Aircraft Production Board was organized under the Council of National Defense, with Howard E. Coffin as chairman, and it took up the problems of standardization. October 1 the board was given official status in an act of congress. The actual manufacture of the planes was under the supervision of the signal corps of the army.

The first care of the board was to obtain an engine that would serve in any kind of airplane. Early in the war such engines were comparatively small. By 1916 they had developed to 100 horse power. In 1917 the ordinary type was of 250 horse power. By calling in experts from the automobile factories the board designed an engine with a capacity of 400 horse power when built in the twelve-cylinder type and capable of attaining 465 horse power. Only one foreign engine, the Rolls-Royce, was then capable of such a feat. A model of this new engine was tested in Washington on July 3, 1917, and was pronounced a success by all the experts who saw it. It was named the Lib-

[128]

PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

erty Motor in allusion to the national birthday. Arrangements were made to have it manufactured in some of the leading automobile factories and 22,500 of the motors were ordered for the army and navy. As actual construction was about to begin changes in the model began to be made, in order to bring the engine as near to perfection as possible, with the result that many delays occurred before the Liberty Motor was ready for actual service.

By 1917 airplanes had developed into distinct types, all of which were needed in our army. Simplest of all were the primary and secondary training planes, generally of the outgrown early types. This type was the only plane our American factories were making when we entered the war. The combat planes were of two kinds. One was a heavy and comparatively slow plane used for observation of the enemy's lines, taking photographs, and dropping bombs. It flew from 3000 to 5000 feet above the earth and carried two or more persons. A second kind was a light but very fast one-man plane used to scout for similar planes of the enemy or to chase enemy planes. Such planes would fly from 15,000 to 20,000 feet above the earth; and they were considered the acme of airplane construction. It is necessary to keep these types of airplanes in mind if we are to understand the controversy that ensued a year later.

A moment's reflection was enough to show that for the first year of the war our own factories could not produce the combat airplanes we should need. Orders were accordingly given for 6,100 planes to be manufactured in France. But in order to get the French firms to take the order it was necessary to send 7,000 American machinists to France to liberate French machinists working in automobile factories there, so that they might be put on the airplane work. This order was not given until our experts had visited the battle fronts in France and inspected the various kinds of planes, action which took time.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

After certain decisions had been made reasons were discovered for changing the decisions, which also took time. The American people passed through the last months of 1917 without knowing of these delays. It was a great shock to them to learn later that their expectations of fleets of aircraft early in the spring of 1918 were not to be realized.

To train airmen the signal corps established instruction camps in the United States and in France. To the first went the volunteers for ground instruction and the first steps in flying. The advanced training was given in France, where a great aviation school was established at Issodun. The first instructors were borrowed from Europe or from the Canadian schools.

To prepare the plans for the equipment of the army on the new basis and to supervise the process after orders had been given threw a great responsibility on the army. Moreover, it came at a time when the relatively small number of trained officers in the regular army were in the greatest demand to organize and train the new army, to construct camps at home and abroad, and to do many other things that were essential to success. Various bureaus were in keen competition to obtain the services of the best men in the army. It was inevitable that some positions were filled by men who had not the greatest ability for the work at hand. These considerations should have weight in enabling us to decide how well the army performed the task thrown upon it. Under the circumstances its record is good.

CHAPTER VII

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

1. *The Council of National Defense*

THE army appropriations' act of August 29, 1916, provided for the creation of a Council of National Defense composed of the heads of the departments of war, navy, interior, agriculture, commerce, and labor. War was not expected at that time, but it was a possibility, and it was believed expedient to create the council "for the coördination of industries and resources for the national security and welfare." The organization of resources in Germany at the beginning of the war and the steps taken in the same direction in Great Britain and France after the war began were ample reasons why we should not continue in the old haphazard way.

The act also authorized the establishment of an Advisory Commission nominated by the council and appointed by the president of the United States to assist the council in its special investigations. In pursuance of this idea the following persons were appointed on the commission:

Daniel Williard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, to have charge of transportation and communication;

Howard E. Coffin, a consulting engineer with experience in the construction of automobile engines, to have charge of munitions, manufacturing, including standardization, and industrial relations;

Julius Rosenwald, president of the Sears-Roebuck Company, of Chicago, to have charge of Supplies, including clothing;

Bernard M. Baruch, a highly esteemed business man of New York, to have charge of minerals, metals, and raw materials;

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Dr. Hollis Godfrey, president of the Drexel Institute, Philadelphia, and a noted engineer, to have charge of engineering and education;

Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, to have charge of labor, including the conservation of the health and the welfare of workers; and

Dr. Franklin H. Martin, regent and general secretary of the American Society of Surgeons, to have charge of medicine and surgery, including general sanitation.

This body did a great deal of work in selecting persons and creating boards for various kinds of technical service. The act of August 29 provided for the formation of such subordinate committees as the council should see fit to create. Thus it was able to map out a large program and to find the means of carrying it out. Many great committees in the general field of industrial support of the war sprang out of its activity.

One of the pleasant reflections on the work of the council of national defense is its success in obtaining the coöperation of the best representative American business men. In the political contests preceding the war much had occurred to arouse the suspicions of the people against the directors of large business enterprises and the contempt of the large business men for the obligations of government. The people only saw that the large business man was acquiring great wealth under governmental protection, and they demanded laws to restrict his actions. To the business man this opposition was only a muddling of economic laws. He was trying to seize the wonderful opportunities of the greatest unified trade area of the world and he resented the efforts of inexperienced men to interfere with him. Much bitterness had grown up on each side.

The emergency of war, however, brought sober judgment. It was evident to the average man that unity of action in every industry that supported the war was essential. It was not possible to win if we proceeded under the old system of go as you please. The production and use of food must be unified and

[132]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

directed. The same was true of copper, nitrates, clothing, coal, tobacco, petroleum, and a hundred other things. It was also evident that the persons who could direct these unified groups successfully were persons experienced in directing large industrial associations. As the president, therefore, began to appoint large business men to the important committees under the council of national defense, cautiously at first, lest he should be embarrassed by an upflare of popular distrust, his action was generally applauded. Eventually he called to his assistance the most powerful "trust magnates," giving them the widest authority, and aroused no protest from that portion of his own party to whom the trusts and "Wall Street" had formerly been the personification of political inequality.

The process also benefited the souls of the business men. The gist of their contentions had long been that they be allowed to manage their great enterprises under the laws of competition, although it was well known that they were so powerful that no competitor could withstand them. Now that the country was at war they could but see that competition must fail in many important kinds of business. They accepted price fixing in such matters and tried to help the government in its attempt to make the new system work.

It must not be supposed, however, that complete reasonableness prevailed in the industrial world. Outside the sphere of activity of the interests just mentioned was abundant opportunity for the profiteers. It was hard to regulate the small manufacturers, since they were numerous. It was also hard to control the men who sold the many small things the government must buy under the title "supplies." On these opportunities the shrewd men fattened as they always fatten in the time of war.

Probably the most notable abuse of the day was hawking about government contracts. This practice was facilitated by

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the adoption of the cost plus system of buying, which allowed the contractor who had in himself no adequate means of carrying out a contract that he obtained in haste from a bureau already overcrowded with business to re-award his contract with a profit to a responsible firm who had not had the address to get recognition in the first bidding. The cost plus system also allowed the contractor to buy his materials at liberal prices and had a tendency to promote increases in prices and wages. The effect of the system was generally bad.

The duties of the council of national defense fall in two large tasks. Acting with the advisory commission, it was to devise the machinery by which the government got its supplies and to see that the economic processes of the country acted in a regular manner. The second task was to prevent waste, to get the people to give up luxuries and leisure, and to organize the morale of the country for war.

In carrying out its duties the council organized many committees, boards, and sections. The most important was the War Industries Board, which eventually took over most of the functions of the advisory commission and completely supplanted the general munitions board, one of the early creations of the council. It acted as a clearing-house for the war industry needs of the government. For example, Mr. Baruch, one of the members, gave his attention to the acquisition and distribution of raw materials. He thus controlled vast natural resources and allotted them to enterprises that most needed them, and without discrimination or hoarding. Another important function, priority assignments in the distribution of products, was exercised through Judge R. S. Lovett, another of its members. By this means the council kept industries functioning in a normal way. By refusing to assign products to manufacturers who had defied the rules of the board it could discipline those who were disposed to break up the system. No manufacturer or mining com-
[134]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

pany would defy the board; for the result would be the withdrawal of coal or ore or other indispensable raw material. In discussing the work of the war industries board the chairman said: "This country has three great necessities for making modern war—men, metal, and machinery. We must make them all available now."

Another important offshoot of the council of national defense was the committee on labor, of which Samuel Gompers was chairman. Associated with him were some of the leading officials of labor organizations as well as some of the more prominent employers of labor. Probably never before had so many of the best representatives of these two opposing interests come together in harmonious efforts to reach the same ends. The scope of the work of the committee is indicated in the fact that it created sub-committees on mediation and conciliation, wages and hours, women in industry, welfare work, information and statistics, and the press. It also had sectional committees on industrial safety, sanitation, vocational education, housing, recreation, correlation of agencies covering welfare activities, public education in health matters, public coöperation through federal, state, and municipal activities, and standard guides for employers. There were ten divisional committees on such subjects as ventilation, accident prevention, and industrial diseases and poisons. Some of the committees were very large, and a number of trained people were brought together in these organizations.

Besides the committee on labor there was a general medical board composed of thirty-eight prominent physicians, with Dr. Franklin H. Martin for chairman. Under it were organized committees and sub-committees on hygiene and sanitation, tuberculosis, alcohol, drug addiction, public health nursing, medical research, medical statistics, state activities and examinations, medical schools, hospitals, surgical methods, dentistry, mobiliz-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

ing dental activities, dental research, dental and oral hygiene, legislation affecting medicine, legislation affecting dentistry, shell shock cardio-vascular impairments, and ophthalmology. There was, also, an allied committee on the standardization of medical and chemical supplies with sub-committees on chemistry, contagious diseases, dentistry, dermatology, general pathology, genito-urinary, gynecology, hospital administration, internal medicine, laryngology and rhinology, neurology, nursing, obstetrics, ophthalmology, orthopedic surgery, pharmacy, physiology, surgery, surgical pathology, and the X-ray. There were also some committees dealing with the work of the committee itself, as the committees on legislation, and publicity.

Other subjects than labor and medicine were not so minutely classified. Thus there were single committees or sub-committees with the following titles: commercial economy board, committee on shipping, committee on women's defense work, committee on inland water transportation, section on coöperation with states, committee on coal production, committee on engineering and education, sub-committee on universities and colleges, sub-committee on secondary and normal schools, and a highways transport committee, with a single director of steel supply. The combined membership of all the committees, sub-committees, and sections was much more than four hundred.

The council of national defense and its ramification of subordinate organs was an attempt in an emergency to mobilize the scientific and industrial strength of the nation. In one of the older countries of Europe this process would have been carried on as a part of the government's ordinary preparations for war. In our country the emergency came to science and industry as it came to the manhood of the nation, calling them suddenly into service. And science and industry responded promptly and vigorously. It was notable that these committees and sub-committees gave their services without cost, the act providing

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

that they should not be paid. It should be recorded in the history of this great war that while manufacturers, wage earners, and nearly every man who had something to sell to the government were remunerated handsomely, the men who had trained minds were asked to give them to the government without charge and complied ungrudgingly.

May 2 and 3, 1917, a national defense conference was in session in Washington, attended by representatives from 47 states, among them 12 governors. After much discussion it recommended that a state council of defense be appointed in each state from persons in civil life. June 11 it was announced that 45 states had organized such councils, and the other three soon followed. In some states the council was created by statute with definite powers and liberal appropriations for expenses. There were local defense councils in most of the important cities. All acted in coöperation with the council of national defense, receiving suggestions from it and trying to bring their labors into a common method and purpose. One of the chief efforts was to promote food raising and food economy. In some states the council became active in restraining persons who showed too great sympathy with Germany and her allies.

2. The Control of Food and Fuel

In ordinary times Great Britain and France are forced to import a portion of their food supply. In 1917, with more than 6,000,000 of their workers in the battle armies a still greater portion had to be obtained outside of their own countries. Our own stock of grain was sufficient for our domestic use, with some to spare, but we were now as one with our partners in the war, and it was necessary for us to think of them as much as of ourselves. The situation demanded that we increase production as much as possible, avoid waste, and use substitutes for wheat to a certain extent, so that our friends in Europe might

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

have enough of that article to form the basis of their bread, which was mixed with substitutes even more than ours.

To obtain these ends the council of national defense on April 11, five days after the war was accepted by congress, created a committee on food supply and prices with Herbert C. Hoover at its head. May 20 the president added to Mr. Hoover's power in naming him food commissioner. This remarkable man won early success as a mining engineer in our Western states and in Australia and China. In August, 1914, he was in London, representing extensive business interests. Made chairman of the committee to aid American tourists he acquitted himself so well that he was placed at the head of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, where he became a world figure in a few weeks. Good judgment and administrative ability carried him successfully through the difficult task of helping the Belgians without arousing the opposition of the Germans. Forced out of Belgium when we entered the war, he was the man to whom all America turned to direct the use of our food in the wisest possible manner.

The history of our food regulation in the war falls into two categories. The first was concerned with the successful appeal to the people. "Food will win the war!" became a general motto. Professional men and women, business men, actors and actresses, teachers and their pupils, women of leisure and little children, people of all classes turned into gardeners. Boards of trade became sponsors for amateur raisers of potatoes, railroad companies became propagandists for food production along their lines, and patriotic citizens converted their lawns into fields. The actual product was probably not as large as the producers expected; but the efforts made served to fix the minds of the people on the importance of food in the crisis then at hand.

The second part of Mr. Hoover's work was to administer a
[138]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

law which congress was about to pass to prevent hoarding and procure effective distribution of food. This act, with a preliminary act, was signed by the president on August 10, 1917, after long debate in congress. The preliminary act gave the secretary of agriculture the power to investigate the production and distribution of foodstuffs and to compel persons and corporations to submit their books to examination by government agents. Mr. Hoover had nothing to do with this act. The second, known as the food control act, provided for the appointment of a food administrator and enacted a series of rules under which he should administer his office. As food administrator Mr. Hoover became the executor of this act. The history of the passage of the food control bill presents an interesting view of the political situation in the summer of 1917. The bill encountered opposition from the farmers because by making it unlawful for anybody to hoard or speculate in food it prevented the farmers from holding their products for high prices, something that was forbidden to few others. But the bill was supported by the labor unions, who, while they were concerned to raise their own wages, were equally anxious to keep down the prices of food. Representatives from rural sections formed an opposing *bloc*, the spirit of which was expressed in an amendment offered by a congressman from Iowa placing shoes and clothing under the same kind of control as food, but the amendment was ruled out of order; and under the urging of the president and through the conviction that some kind of food control was necessary the bill passed the house by a vote of 365 to 5.

In the senate it met more strenuous objections. Although it was reported favorably from the committee on agriculture, Senator Gore, of Oklahoma, the chairman, gave it his most earnest opposition. He declared that the bill confiscated farm products and was unconstitutional and that it was unwise to interfere with the ordinary processes of business, since it was by

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

maintaining healthy business conditions that the country derived the financial strength necessary to carry on the war. He also objected to the creation of a food administrator with absolute power over the people's food supply. Senator Sherman, of Illinois, said that there were "more fool ideas wrapped up in this food bill than have ever been put on paper before in any American Congress." He charged that union labor was behind the bill and declared: "Organized labor controls legislation in this Administration as it did in the last. It dictates to Senators while the farmers are unorganized." Despite such utterances by the more impetuous members the bill passed the senate with some amendments by a vote of 81 to 6.

It went to a conference committee where important modifications were made through the influence of the president. As finally enacted it sought to protect the farmer by authorizing the president, in an emergency and when such a step was necessary to stimulate production, to fix a minimum price of wheat not less than two dollars a bushel. It contained strict features against hoarding, monopolizing, and discriminating; and it gave the president extraordinary emergency power. If he thought it necessary he could purchase and sell wheat, flour, meal, beans, and potatoes; he could seize and operate any factory or plant in which necessary foodstuffs were produced; and he could fix the prices of coal and coke.

The passage of this bill gave the supporters of prohibition an opportunity which they did not fail to utilize. They placed in the bill while on its passage through the house an amendment prohibiting the manufacture of intoxicating liquors during the war and empowering the president to seize existing stocks of distilled spirits. In the senate the amendment was modified by allowing the president to limit or prohibit the manufacture of beer and wines, but otherwise it was made unlawful to manufacture intoxicating liquors. As many of the prohibitionists

[140]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

represented farmer constituencies, the concession to them in this respect modified their opposition to the restriction of the prices of foodstuffs. The introduction of the amendment into the bill was a distinct gain for the prohibition forces and went a long way toward their final triumph in the adoption of the eighteenth amendment in 1919.

In general, Mr. Wilson showed great ability in carrying his measures through congress, probably because he usually voiced the desires of the people. He did not hesitate to assume leadership, and some of the senators chafed because they had to accept it or fly into the face of public opinion. While the food bill was before them they attempted to put a curb upon his power. By a vote of 53 to 31 an amendment was carried creating a joint committee of ten members with large powers to direct the executive war expenditures. In a letter to Chairman Lever, of the house committee on agriculture, the president entered a protest against the attempt to limit his action, saying:

"The constant supervision of executive action which it contemplates would amount to nothing less than an assumption on the part of the legislative body of the executive work of the administration. There is a very ominous precedent in our history which shows how such a supervision would operate. I refer to the committee on the conduct of the war constituted by the Congress during the administration of Mr. Lincoln. It was the cause of constant and distressing harassment, and rendered Mr. Lincoln's task all but impossible. . . . The responsibility rests upon the administration. There are abundant existing means of investigation and of the effective enforcement of that responsibility. I sincerely hope that upon the reconsideration of this matter both Houses of Congress will see that my objections rest upon indisputable grounds and that I could only interpret the final adoption of section 23 as arising from a lack of confidence in myself."¹

The protest had the desired effect and the amendment disappeared when the bill was in conference.

¹ *Official Bulletin*, July 24, 1917, p. 4.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Under this bill Mr. Hoover was formally named national food administrator and he proceeded to take over, under the president, the large powers it conferred. Under the same act were also appointed state food commissioners under the direction of the national food administrator. An intricate system of city and county supervisors was appointed to serve under them and to operate federal food licenses issued to retail and wholesale merchants and to millers and other producers of foodstuffs.

The national food administrator proceeded to announce his policy, which he had already worked out from his experience as food commissioner on the original basis. The features were: 1. Prohibit without permission the storage of wheat by mills grinding more than 100 barrels a day and request the grain exchanges to suspend speculative dealings in wheat. Thus it would be impossible to hold wheat for a rise in price. 2. On behalf of the government buy all the wheat offered at a fair price, even the whole crop if necessary. The government would sell its purchases without profit above cost of handling to the domestic millers or to foreign purchasers, sending abroad as much as we could spare from our own necessities. It could do this more easily by making an arrangement with European nations by which the United States purchased for them all their supplies bought in this country. Thus as buyer for its own army and navy and for foreign governments, it was in a position to take a large portion of the wheat crop in direct dealings. If necessary, it was willing to take the balance and resell to private purchasers in order to keep the price steady. Under this system the speculator could not hold wheat and the producer would have no reason for holding it. The crop of 1917 was thus purchased at \$2.20 a bushel. Mr. Hoover was able to announce that he had come to an amicable agreement with the leading millers for selling flour at a fair advance on the price of wheat.

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

To carry out this policy President Wilson appointed a national fair price committee with President Harry A. Garfield, of Williams College, for chairman, and some of the leading business men of the country as members. The food administration organized a wheat-purchasing division, a grain division with agents at various terminals, and a milling division with subdivisions territorially arranged. For buying and selling grain a Food Administration Grain Corporation was formed with \$50,000,000 capital stock. The fair price committee, it should be said, fixed the price of all kinds of food, and of coal as well. It was not a definite part of the food administration, but it was an important aid to it.

The arrangements here described applied to the crop of 1917, just being harvested when the food control act was passed. The question then arose: Would the farmers plant all the wheat and other grain the country could produce in 1918 if there was uncertainty about the price at which it would be sold? Mr. Hoover met the question with a bold plan. He offered to take, on behalf of the government, all the wheat that could be raised and to pay \$2.00 a bushel for it. If the war continued until the harvest of 1918 was disposed of, he said, his plan would involve no loss, since he would sell the wheat for what he gave for it. But if peace came before the crop was sold and if prices dropped as a consequence, the government would find itself forced to take over wheat at prices higher than the market. On such a transaction the loss might be \$400,000,000. Nevertheless, he felt that it was worth while to take the risk; for he saw no other way of ensuring an ample supply of grain in the fall and winter of 1918-1919. And on this basis the price of wheat, at more than \$2.00 a bushel, was high enough to induce the farmers to plant an immense crop with a yield 41.1 per cent. larger than the yield of 1917.

The same reason existed for the regulation of fuel as food,

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

and the council of national defense dealt with it in the same way. It early created a committee on coal production, with F. S. Peabody of Chicago, as chairman. June 29 the committee announced a tentative agreement with the mine operators fixing the price of bituminous coal at the mine at \$3.00 a ton for what is known as run of the mine, and next day reductions were announced in the price of anthracite. This arrangement was repudiated by the secretary of war, who considered the prices excessive.

The question was closely related to the question of railroad control. For one thing, it was asserted that dealers kept coal cars loaded in order to accentuate the scarcity of coal and thus raise the price. The federal trade commission declared that the coal industry was paralyzing the other industries of the country and that it was itself handicapped by the failure of transportation. The commission concluded: "The coal problem cannot be worked out as long as the railroads are allowed to divide and allot traffic; to lay embargoes without regard to their immediate effect on industry, or the systematic distribution of coal; to give priority to the movement of high-freight rate commodities; and to use the device of the 'long haul.'" It recommended that the railroads be pooled under government control.

Nothing was done immediately, probably because coal was included in the Lever food bill then going through its long course in congress. That act passed, however, President Wilson on August 23 appointed Harry A. Garfield, president of Williams College, fuel administrator, to carry into effect the powers conferred by the act of August 10. In the order announcing the appointment the price of anthracite coal was fixed at from four to five dollars a ton at the mine, and it was announced that the profits of jobbers should not exceed thirty cents a ton to the west and twenty cents to the east of Buffalo.

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

A day earlier the president had fixed the price of soft coal for the entire nation.

The uncertainty as to prices throughout the summer had led many people to defer ordering coal in large quantities, and orders now began to come in rapidly, throwing a vast amount of coal traffic on the railroads, already overtaxed by the demands of other kinds of shipments. So great was the congestion that the president, in December, took the railroads into government hands for the remainder of the war. Frantic efforts were made to send coal to the points most in need, but with factories, domestic consumers, and shipping demanding it in unusual quantities the situation became steadily worse, until in January, with the thermometer ranging far below the freezing point, conditions became little less than desperate. Thirty-seven ships bound for France with supplies essential to military operations were held in New York harbor by lack of coal. All kinds of business places were running on a hand-to-mouth basis as regards fuel, and the severe weather made it impossible to get the full quota of coal trains from the mines to the consumers.

Fuel Administrator Garfield sought escape from his embarrassments by adopting the most drastic measure of war economy employed in this country during the war. January 16 he issued an order closing all manufacturing plants for five days, beginning the 18th, and directing that such establishments be closed on each Monday thereafter up to and including Monday, March 25, 1918. The order was to apply to the region east of the Mississippi, from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. It was not to apply to residences, munition plants, public offices, hotels, and some other necessary places of business. The object was to close down for fifteen days most of the factories of the country, private offices, places of amusement, and most of the stores—except food shops, which were to open half the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

day. It was estimated that 30,000,000 tons of coal would thus be saved, which would bring the demand to a normal condition.

No doubt this drastic action was necessary, but it was announced with such suddenness that it was misunderstood. The newspapers in general had supported the government in its efforts to tide over the disagreeable features of the economic situation, and they would have done so now had they been prepared for what was coming. But struck without warning they suspected inefficiency, and at first they did not try to stem the tide of criticism from the inconvenienced business men. President Wilson himself came to the aid of his fuel administrator, assuming responsibility for the unpopular order and pointing out why it was necessary. "This war," he said, "calls for many sacrifices, and sacrifices of the sort called for by this order are infinitely less than sacrifices of life which might otherwise be involved. It is absolutely necessary to get the ships away, it is absolutely necessary to relieve the congestion at the ports and upon the railways, it is absolutely necessary to move great quantities of food, and it is absolutely necessary that our people should be warmed in their homes, if nowhere else; and halfway measures would not have accomplished the desired ends. . . . I have every confidence that the result of action of this sort will justify it and that the people of the country will loyally and patriotically respond to the necessities of this kind as they have to every other sacrifice involved in the war. We are upon a war footing, and I am confident that the people of the United States are willing to observe the same sort of discipline that might be involved in the actual conflict itself."

Reflection brought good judgment, the days of embargo were soon gone, the thirty-seven detained ships took on their coal supplies and sailed away to France with their cargoes, and the people found that their enforced holiday had not done them injury. In the first hours of excitement much was said about the [146]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

hardship that was inflicted on the wage earners; but there was little real suffering to be expected from fifteen days closing down in ten weeks at a time when wages were at the highest level the country had known in its history.

After passing this initial trial the fuel administration found its task easier, but to mine and distribute the necessary quantity of coal required constant care. By fixing prices and insisting on the accumulation of the winter's store in the months of summer much was done against the approach of cold weather in the autumn of 1918. An unusually mild winter served to help the situation, and the country came through what was considered a perplexing situation without serious inconvenience.

To create the machinery for distributing food and fuel in a country as large as ours at the direction of one intelligent will is a great achievement of good sense over that inherent individualism that has ever been one of our national characteristics. Perhaps it could not have been done without the restraint that military necessity put upon the minds of the people. But to do it under any conditions was a triumph of self-government. It demanded the coöperation of capital and labor, producer and consumer, educated man and uneducated man, and many other classes who had hitherto found themselves in mutual opposition. Best of all, it was carried out with the least suggestion of authority, its real basis being the good will of the people.

3. The Railroads and the Merchant Marine

To nationalize the means of transportation and communication of information has long been within the purpose of a portion of the American people. When the world war began very little had been done toward the realization of this purpose. Railroads had been brought under fairly definite control, so that rates could be fixed by the government, and many conditions had been prescribed for the operation of the roads. At-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

tempts to get the government to take over telegraph and telephone lines had resulted in failure and the suggestion of the president that the government build and operate merchant ships to develop the trade with South America had also been rejected by the people. When the war began congress was on the point of creating the federal trade commission with powers of investigation and publicity over large corporations similar to those of the original interstate commerce commission over the railroads. Nationalization of industry, therefore, had gone no further than to establish strong control over the railroads and weak oversight over the trusts. So far as trusts were concerned, they fell, in the period with which we are dealing, under the general regulations of industries in relation to the war needs of the country. But railroads, shipping, and telegraphs and telephones were destined to come under national control, at least for the time being, in a most explicit manner.

For railroads, as for so many other things, the story begins with the council of national defense, which assigned to Mr. Daniel Williard, one of the advisory commission, the oversight of transportation and communication interests. As president of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad he was in harmonious relation with the railroad officials and he was successful in his efforts to induce the railroads to place their services at the disposal of the government in order to win the war. His relation to them was merely advisory, but he reported in July that they responded to every suggestion of the government as truly as if they were under direct governmental control.

April 11 the railroads took steps to form a non-competing organization among themselves entirely at the disposal of the government for the duration of the war. They created a committee of five, denominated the railroads' war board, with Mr. Fairfax Harrison, president of the Southern Railway, as chairman. A number of subordinate committees and boards were
[148]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

created to conduct the specific duties of the board. The roads were called upon to do a gigantic work. Already at full capacity of service on account of the great activity of American industry they had to move in addition a vast amount of material for constructing camps and cantonments, to transport over a million soldiers, some of them twice or three times, and to move from place to place a vast quantity of army supplies and munitions. The only way they could hope to do it was to get more service out of their equipment than they had got out of it in the past. It was impossible to increase facilities, since all the equipment that could be manufactured was sent to Europe to supply the want of the allies.

The only course open was to get more service out of the existing plants by better and more careful operation. The war board, therefore, gave up competition. There was no need of preserving it, since every road had all it could do in any event. By operating all the trunk lines as one system, by discontinuing trains that duplicated one another on parallel lines, and by sending cars wherever they were needed, loaded each way, if possible, many economies were effected. Mr. Fairfax Harrison pointed out that although only 1.8 per cent. more cars were in operation in May, 1917, than in May, 1916, there was nevertheless an increase of 16.1 per cent. in amount of freight carried. Concentration of energy was also promoted by the enactment of a law, August 10, 1917, to allow the president or his agent to decide on priority of shipment. Mr. Wilson promptly appointed Judge Robert S. Lovett administrator of priority shipments.

Despite all these efforts the freight situation grew worse daily. Private shippers complained of delays, business was embarrassed, and no hope existed that matters would become better. In fact, they grew daily worse as winter approached; for it brought demands for increased coal movements and the ever

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

enlarging military needs of the government made it necessary to transport rapidly increasing stores of public property. Mr. Fairfax Harrison's war board exerted its entire strength, but it could not solve the problem. The truth is, the railroads had established harmonious action between themselves, but they were not operating as one system. Parallel lines still distributed the freight between themselves, or carried it around great elbows at expense of time, coal, and engines. At length on December 26 the president of the United States concluded that the existing system had broken down and gave notice that on the following day he would take all the railroads of the country into government control and operation. Accordingly, on the 27th the secretary of the treasury, Mr. W. G. McAdoo, was appointed director-general of railroads, with authority to operate them as he saw fit. At the same time President Wilson announced that he would go before congress to ask for authority to continue the operation of the roads until the end of the war. In an act dated March 21, 1918, this authority was granted and the railroads found themselves in the hands of the government until the end of the war.

Much has been said to the advantage or disadvantage of government control of the railroads as an economic measure. Those who favor such a policy theoretically have had no difficulty to find evidence of the success of the experiment made in December, 1917. Those who hold contrary theories have discovered facts and reasons for saying that the experiment has failed.

It is, however, as a war measure that the order to take over the roads should be judged. President Wilson gave the following reasons for his order of December 27:

"The Government of the United States is the only great government now engaged in the war which has not already assumed control of this sort. It was thought to be in the spirit of American institutions to
[150]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

attempt to do everything that was necessary through private management, and if zeal and ability and patriotic motive could have accomplished the necessary unification of administration, it would certainly have been accomplished. But no zeal or ability could overcome insuperable obstacles, and I have deemed it my duty to recognize that fact in all candor now that it is demonstrated and to use without reserve the great authority reposed in me. A great national necessity dictated the action, and I was, therefore, not at liberty to abstain from it."

Summing up the results of his control at the end of a year Director-General McAdoo could point out that no stringency of operation had occurred under his control, that the railroads had in the meantime carried a greatly larger volume of freight than in the trying year of 1917, and that they had moved in addition to their other traffic 6,496,150 soldiers. There were remarkably few accidents to troop trains, which were kept moving steadily at about 20 miles an hour, the soldiers being carried in coaches with a degree of comfort unknown in the moving of European armies.

When government control was established the roads were embarrassed by demands from the employees looking to increases of wages by more than a billion dollars. It was such an unpleasant prospect that the roads themselves may well have wished to turn it over to the government. Mr. McAdoo appointed committees of employers and employees to investigate the living conditions of the workers. His critics have said that he placed himself at the disposal of the laborers; but it is not clear that he yielded further than was necessary to show that the new administration of the roads was disposed to meet them in a fair way. At any rate, he obtained their confidence, which, in view of the military necessities, was an important gain. To improve the situation he appointed a director of labor, naming W. S. Carter, president of the Brotherhood of Railway Engineers and Firemen, for the post, and giving him equal standing with the heads of other administrative divisions. A Railroad

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Wage Commission, headed by Franklin K. Lane, secretary of the interior, was appointed on January 18, 1918, to investigate the general wage situation of the employees as affected by the high cost of living. Its report, made after careful examination, reviewed the increases of wages in 1916 and 1917 under the old régime and said under date of April 30, 1918:

"These advances were not in any way uniform, either as to employments, or as to amounts, or as to roads, so that one class of labor benefited much more than another on the same road, and as between roads, there was the greatest divergence. The situation has been dealt with as pressure made necessary, and naturally those who, by organization or through force of competition, could exert most pressure fared best. Things came to a head just before the Government took over the railroads. Another three months of private management and we would have seen much more extensive concessions in wages, or there would have followed an unfortunate series of labor disturbances. The Government, therefore, has now to meet what would have come about in the natural course. . . .

"It has been a somewhat popular impression that railroad employees were among the most highly paid workers, but figures, gathered from the railroads, dispose of this belief; 51% of all employees during December, 1917, received \$75.00 per month or less, and 80% received \$100.00 per month or less. Even among the locomotive engineers, commonly spoken of as highly paid, a preponderating number received less than \$170.00 per month, and this compensation they have obtained by the most compact and complete organization, handled with a full appreciation of all strategic values. Between the grades receiving from \$150.00 to \$250.00 per month, there is included less than 3% of all the employees (excluding officials), and these aggregate less than 60,000 men out of a grand total of 2,000,000."

On the basis of this report liberal advances of wages were made, and according to a previous agreement they were retroactive. During the first year of operation under governmental control the wage advances aggregated between \$600,000,000 and \$700,000,000. In referring to these advances Mr. McAdoo [152]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

said that they were not adopted merely to adjust wages to the high cost of living but "to find a just and equitable basis which would outlive the war and which would give a living wage and decent working condition to every railroad employee." By withdrawing opposition to unions the employees were generally unionized, and the principle of an eight-hour day was given general recognition. In these ways the period of government control of railroads, however short it may prove to be, must be reckoned an important phase of the employees' struggle to increase their hold on the situation.¹

It should be remembered that the course of railroad labor was but a part of a tendency general to labor in this period of war necessity. The mediators of the department of labor intervened in 421 disputes between December 15, 1916, and October 15, 1917, as compared with 167 in the same period for the year preceding; and 366 of the cases occurred between April 15, and October 15, 1917, that is after the United States was in the war. To avoid serious interference with government work several boards of adjustment were formed through the government initiative. August 10 the council of national defense announced that it would create a labor-adjustment commission representing the government, the employees, and the employers. The scheme was not carried into effect, probably because it was too far-reaching. But a board was created to adjust disputes under the supervision of the shipping board. It was labor's opportunity, and more than one of the great branches of government work felt that it was better to yield to the demands it made than to precipitate controversies whose effects could not be foreseen.

However important it was to organize and operate the railroads without a hitch, it was equally necessary to provide ships to take troops and supplies to Europe. The realization of this

¹ Statement of Director-General McAdoo before the Interstate Commerce Committee of the U. S. Senate, Jan. 3, 1919.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

necessity resulted in a great shipbuilding program which absorbed a large portion of the nation's industrial energy. The center of the system that took it in charge was the United States Shipping Board, established under the shipping act of September 7, 1916, and organized in the succeeding January with William Denman, of California, as chairman. As originally planned the board was to carry on a moderate development of our merchant marine, and it was empowered to buy or build ships and operate them through the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which the government set up in business with a capital stock of \$50,000,000. When created the corporation was expected to act chiefly as a means of developing trade with South America. The heavy losses of ships by the submarines was likely to create a stringency in shipping facilities after the war, and the United States, no longer able to depend on the merchant ships of other nations, would be at a serious disadvantage unless vessels of their own were provided; and for such provision no reliance was so safe as direct action by the government.

When a state of war was declared on April 6, 1917, it was doubly necessary to provide ships. We needed them to take our part in the war as well as to repair the damages done by ruthless submarine warfare. A great shipbuilding program was, therefore, outlined, and the shipping board assumed its execution. The natural consequence was to enlarge the capital stock of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. It became \$750,000,000 in June and in October it had risen to \$1,934,000,000, its capital stock being the amount expended for the ships it intended to own and operate. November 15, 1917, it was announced that the boards' construction program called for 1200 ships with dead weight tonnage of 7,500,000.

A more immediate source of increased shipping was the interned German and Austrian ships which promptly passed into the hands of the shipping board as soon as a state of war was
[154]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

recognized. They numbered 105 steamships, some of them of great size. Just before leaving them their former possessors had damaged their machinery by smashing engine cylinders or throwing overboard parts that connected the power with the propelling machinery. Expert draughtsmen were assigned the task of making plans for restoring the damaged parts and Chairman Denman announced that within five months all the seized ships would be in service. On examination it was discovered that some of the ships or their machinery had been built in British yards and that duplicates of the original drawing could be obtained. By this means 660,000 tons of the enemy's cargo space were in our service by the end of the year 1917.¹

Another source of shipping was the requisitioning of ships under construction in American yards. October 15 the Emergency Corporation commandeered all the vessels under construction of 2500 tons or more, thus gaining possession of more than 400 vessels with aggregate tonnage of more than 3,000,000 dead weight. Most of the ships taken had been ordered by foreign shipowners, chiefly British and Norwegian; for the price of construction in American yards had been so high that our own business men did not care to venture into the enterprise. At the time when these ships were requisitioned notice was given that in the future all ships above 2500 tons must be built for government account.

The new ships of the Emergency Fleet Corporation were standardized. If of steel they were usually of 8,000 tons, strongly built and void of luxuries. To expedite construction they were built on the "fabricated" system. This means that the standard parts were prepared in quantity in various factories and sent to the shipbuilding yards, where the work became largely a matter of assembling them. The government

¹ The broken cylinders of the German engines were mended by electric welding following plans of naval officers. It was the first time electric welding was used on so large a scale.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

established great ship building yards under the Emergency Corporation, the most important being at Hog Island, near Philadelphia.

In the early weeks of the war much was said about constructing wooden ships. Cheapness and quick construction were the advantages of the plan. To convert a growing forest into a fleet of vessels in the brief space of a year appealed to the American sense of enterprise. The idea was popular and Chairman Denman, who hailed from the Pacific Coast, where lumber was still abundant, gave it his strong support. He did not consider that the construction of wooden ships, once extensively followed in the United States, was now nearly discontinued. Experienced ship carpenters in large numbers were demanded for his scheme, and they were not to be had.

The manager of the Emergency Fleet Corporation was Major-General Goethals, whose vigorous work on the Panama Canal seemed to recommend him as the best man for carrying through the great shipbuilding program. He was too practical to expect much from wooden ships, and let it be known that he depended mainly on steel construction. Thereupon arose protests from the friends of wooden ships. Charges were made that the steel interests had undue influence with the Corporation and soon the echoes of the controversy filled the country and the shipbuilding program was imperiled. The situation cleared up when Goethals resigned on July 24 and Denman was asked to resign. The president appointed Edward N. Hurley to the vacant chairmanship of the shipping board and placed Rear Admiral W. L. Capps at the head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. It was announced that all the ships would be built that could be built, whatever the material. As a matter of fact, wooden ships continued to be ordered, and concrete ships, also, but the main reliance was steel. From July 1, 1917, to October 1, 1918, the total number of seagoing ships [156]

ORGANIZING THE NATIONAL RESOURCES

constructed in the United States was 384 steel ships with an aggregate tonnage of 1,547,824 and 289 wooden ships with an aggregate tonnage of 504,108. For the last three months of this period, when the shipbuilding industry was nearly at its highest capacity, the average monthly construction was, for steel ships 44 with a total tonnage of 171,949 and for wooden ships 96.3 with a total tonnage of 168,036.

In building ships, as in operating the railroads, controlling food, and distributing fuel, private effort proved too weak for the strong burden placed upon the American people by the war. That the government was able to assume the task and carry it through with satisfactory results was a fortunate circumstance. It was done with serious misgivings on the part of persons who esteemed individualistic effort more than government control. Also, it was accompanied by extravagant expenditure, by costly experiments, and perhaps by over-manning the machinery of production. For example, the cost plus plan of letting contracts was probably greatly abused both in the prices paid for materials and in the attitude taken toward wages. But the method adopted had the merit of obtaining results quickly, at a time when moments were more precious than dollars.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

1. *The Attitude of the Political Parties*

WHEN the World War began in Europe the people of the United States were in the midst of a severe struggle in which the more democratic element of society was trying to lessen the influence of great corporations in government. The struggle had begun during the administration of President Roosevelt, who tried in vain to commit the republican party to the reform movement expressed in his anti-trust program and in his policy of establishing government control over railroads and corporations engaged in interstate trade. President Taft, who succeeded him, did not continue the same policy, although he was elected on a Roosevelt platform. Thereupon occurred the breach in the republican party which enabled the democrats to carry the election of 1912, President Wilson coming into power.

The democrats had been committed to an anti-trust policy before President Roosevelt took it up during his presidency. They were less extreme, however, than the progressives in 1912, although more liberal than the Taft section of the republican party. Their program of action had the general support of the progressive members of congress, who could not afford to refuse to support a reform merely because it was offered to them by the democrats. The president's first effort was to pass a bill for a lower tariff, which was safely disposed of in a special session that met in 1913. In the same session the bill to create the federal reserve bank was introduced and carried nearly to

[158]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

its completion, which occurred in the regular session. It was passed in its particular form in order to give the country a sound and elastic currency without placing it under the control of the great banks and bankers. In the regular session the president opened a campaign to restrict the action of the trusts. Five measures were announced under his sanction, popularly called the "Five Brothers," which were to deal with trusts in one way or another. One of these measures got through congress, but in a modified form. It created a Federal Trade Commission, with powers over corporations somewhat like the powers the Interstate Commerce Commission had over railroads by the act of 1887. Three others were combined into the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, enlarging and securing the power of the act of 1890, defining trusts in such a way that labor combinations are not included, and prohibiting interlocking directorates under certain conditions. The demand for federal regulation of the issue of railroad bonds, after passing the house by a vote of 325 to 12, was postponed indefinitely because it necessitated readjustment of railroad finances that could not be made under the conditions existing during the World War.

This large program was carried through congress with the support of the democrats, who were in control of each house, the support of the progressives in general, and the support of a portion of the republicans. At each step it was promoted actively by the president. It had such large majorities on the final votes that the country was led to form a high opinion of the president's ability as a political leader. It detracts nothing from that leadership, however, to say that President Wilson's success was built on the work of President Roosevelt, who during his second term had assumed a great amount of odium in shaking up the conservatives in his party. Roosevelt's methods of fighting, however, were in strong contrast with Wilson's. The first man fought with "a big stick," bruising

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

heads and leaving rankling wounds behind him. The other fought with more subtle means. Always a regular party man, yielding his preference when he had to yield, but holding out for his main contention, he usually got his way in the end, or nearly got it. His success raised his prestige to a high point.

His Mexican policy was less popular in the country. Starting with the assumption that Huerta was a murderer and that the United States should not take a murderer's red hand, he was led by natural steps into an unpleasant acceptance of Mexican disdain. But he had his way: he got Huerta out of Mexico. Perhaps it was worth his while to accept the insulting attitude of that country in order to show Mexicans that they cannot use murder as a political argument and retain the respect of the rest of the world. Mexico's jibes were perhaps inspired by Germany's friendship. The Mexicans themselves knew that we should not resent them when we must be free to maintain a stiff attitude in regard to submarine attacks. President Wilson's patience with Mexico was criticized in this country, especially by those whose property in Mexico was threatened or damaged. But most of our citizens did not have his patience with the insults of an irritating little neighbor. Some day, it seems, the United States will have to determine their policy of dealing with unneighborly Mexicans. Let us hope it can be done when we have no other foreign complications on our hands.

At the outset the president's strictly neutral position had the approval of the whole country. In a few months pro-German and pro-ally factions were formed and under their urging public opinion took a less neutral tone. President Roosevelt eventually appeared as pro-ally advocate, expressing himself so openly that it produced the impression of political partisanship. When the president undertook to force Germany to disavow the sinking of the *Lusitania* and failed in the attempt the opponents said there had been too much arguing and that stern words and a

[160]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

short choice ought to have been our policy. They repeated their assertions when other ships were sunk with the loss of American citizens. But when the president obtained an apparent victory in the negotiations following the sinking of the *Sussex* their criticisms were lessened.

When he finally began to come around to a more defiant policy he found a strong opposition in congress, and it was composed of men of all parties. This situation lasted up to the very eve of war. In February, 1917, after the decree for ruthless submarine war had been issued, and when the resolutions to warn Americans against traveling on ships carrying munitions were before congress, a number of members of the house called on the president to urge him to support the resolutions. "We told the President," said Speaker Clark, one of the callers, "that the warning resolutions would carry two to one, if we ever got a chance to vote." The earnest efforts of President Wilson as a leader of his party were necessary in order to get the resolutions tabled. Among those who favored them were many republicans and progressives.

When congress met in extra session on April 2 all but a few of the opponents of war had given way, and of these few some also were democrats and some were republicans. Senator Stone in explaining his vote against the war resolutions said: "I am against a declaration of war, but when it is declared I will be a war eagle, and no matter what opinions a man might have about the need for war, any other opinion would be contemptible, and no American could contemplate it." Two other democratic senators, Lane and Vardaman, and three republicans, Norris, Gronna, and La Follette, voted against the resolutions. In the house the vote was 373 to 50, most of the negative votes coming from the West and Middle West. Among them was the vote of Mr. Kitchin, of North Carolina, the democratic floor leader, an avowed pacifist.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

On the question of organizing the house party lines were drawn as usual, the democrats carrying the election of Mr. Champ Clark by 217 votes against 205 for Mr. James R. Mann. They had the votes of the six "independents," obtained by promises of committee assignments. In anticipation of this result Mr. Lenroot, a Wisconsin republican, said: "No Republican in the House or Senate has been consulted upon the gravest question that the country has had for more than half a century. But if you on the other side do organize this house, I say to you that in the days to come there will be no partisanship on the Republican side in dealing with the situation." So far as the house was concerned this promise was well kept. In the senate, as we shall see, the administration encountered much opposition before the war was over, opposition in which members of each party shared. Most of the democratic participants were men who had been in opposition habitually; but among the republicans were some of the men whom the public had a right to expect to find acting in a generous spirit.

Under the American system of government the president has come to have immense power in ordinary times. As the only officer except the vice-president elected by the people he has become a kind of prime minister as well as a chief executive. He gets additional power from the fact that he leads his own party. By appealing to the people over the heads of the members he can force congress to do things which the people wish done. President Jackson and President Roosevelt both showed what can be done in this way by a strong and skilful politician in the office of president. Mr. Wilson is no less able as a man than either of these other chief executives. He won his position of preëminence by carrying through his economic and anti-trust program in the first years of his administration. The able manner in which he followed the development of the war spirit up to the acceptance of war by the nation but heightened his

[162]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

influence with the great mass of the people. Into his hands, therefore, already so much strengthened, the necessity of the hour threw the immense powers of a president of the United States in time of war.

He never shrank from the task visibly. The responsibility was his and he accepted it. He planned the war measures, he took steps to carry them out. So far as is known, he did not call others into counsel before he determined what he would do. Although he had the support of the republicans in his great war measures, he did not ask their advice beforehand. We are to-day too close to it in time to determine how well this policy was chosen. It is enough to discuss its practical effects. It produced smoldering discontent in the opposition party, who saw their opponents getting the political credit for the policy to which they had been as loyal as the democrats. The situation was such that a reaction was to be expected as soon as it could be had without incurring the charge of disloyalty to the cause of national defense.

The first manifestation of this spirit came when congress was slowly debating the food control bill in May, 1917. The president was trying to hasten their action in the face of great unwillingness on the part of the senators. The country was impatient for action; for it was important that the bill should pass before the coming crop was harvested. Stung by popular criticism the senate held a secret session in which, by common report, the administration was dealt with very frankly. It was charged that the president did not take congress into his confidence but presented to it imperfectly prepared measures. May 19 the president replied in a statement characterizing his plans in general terms and declaring that it was absolutely necessary that he should have power to carry them out. The senate was not appeased by the explanation and late in July, as we have seen (page 141), added an amendment to the food control bill pro-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

viding for a joint committee on the conduct of the war. Against this step President Wilson made such a strong protest that the clause was stricken out when the bill was in conference. In this contest he had the sympathy of the public, who were not likely to tolerate interference in the conduct of the war for what they considered the expression of senatorial sensitiveness. Some of the senators, however, retained their opposition to the president's leadership. They thought he ignored too much the military affairs committee of the senate, which they had come to consider as endowed with some executive functions. The president seems to have held that the committee was only advisory to the senate in its law-making functions. Between these two views no common ground lay, and the result was a series of irritating and unpleasant investigations.

2. Investigating the War Department

When we entered the war the army of the United States, including the portion of the national guard already called into the service of the nation, numbered 212,034 officers and men. At the end of 1917 it contained 1,539,506 officers and men. The sudden increase in numbers made it necessary to provide a vast quantity of new material. In the army appropriations bill for the fiscal year 1918 the amount set aside for ordnance was \$3,200,000,000. This ordnance, as well as the vast supplies of clothing, equipment, and other articles needed in a modern army, had to be purchased in a market already taxed to its greatest capacity. It was necessary for us to satisfy our wants without cutting down the supplies our manufacturers were sending to our European partners in the struggle.

Some idea of the task that was thrown upon the department may be seen in the situation in the quartermaster-general's division, which had to supply food, clothing, and the many things known as "supplies" for the new army. The appropriation bill
[164]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

making available the necessary funds did not pass until June 15, four months before the army would need winter clothing and blankets. Within this brief period contracts had to be placed for cloth, which had to be woven and dyed according to government specifications, and the uniforms had to be manufactured and distributed to the camps. In some cases new factories had to be built to fill the orders. While the division was trying to obtain this great quantity of supplies it was itself undergoing a reorganization. Its own personnel grew in a year from 347 to 6,431, the great majority of whom were persons taken from civil life who had to be obtained in the best manner possible. It was natural that a certain amount of inefficiency inhered in a new organization trying to carry so heavy a burden.

Late in the autumn the public began to hear of the lack of supplies in the cantonments. Not realizing under what difficulties the war department had worked they became hostile. When congress met in December the matter was taken up by some of the senators who had been most pronounced in the preceding summer for the appointment of the joint-committee on the conduct of the war. Senator Wadsworth, of New York, republican, announced that he had visited the camps at Spartanburg, Yaphank, Camp Meade, and Camp Fulton and found in each a shortage in arms, artillery, machine guns, blankets, and winter clothing. He declared that some soldiers were drilling with wooden guns while whole battalions of machine gunners had never seen a machine gun. The senate military affairs committee had a meeting immediately and voted unanimously to investigate the whole matter. On the same day Senator Lodge, republican also, moved that the fuel and sugar situation be investigated. The senate accepted the motion and referred the investigation to the committee on manufactures, whose chairman was Senator Reed, of Missouri, democrat, who had led the fight six months earlier against the appointment of a food con-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

troller. Describing these steps the press reported that other investigating committees would be appointed, dealing with all the important features of the work of the administration. It was believed that the senate, disappointed that a committee on the conduct of the war was not made a feature of the food bill of the preceding summer, was now trying to reach the same ends in another way.

The military affairs committee began to take evidence the day following, questioning first General Crozier, head of the ordnance department. He told of the difficulty in getting munitions. Manufacturers could not supply them until they enlarged their plants and they would not borrow the money to make the enlargement until written contracts were signed by the government. No such contracts could be made until the appropriations were made, but the act for this purpose was not passed until June 15, two months and nine days after we entered the war, while the money voted by the act was not available until October. The manufacturers, he said, had burnt their fingers once, in dealing with foreign governments, and they were careful not to burn them again. The shortage, he thought, had not affected the army in France, which had obtained artillery from France and Great Britain, but there was a lack of artillery for training the army in the United States.

Asked why we did not make the artillery, he replied that there was not time. It would take seven years, he declared, to make the designs for a modern heavy gun, test it, correct its inequalities, and begin to turn it out in necessary quantity. The government had, he said, 700,000 Springfield rifles when it entered the war, which were not surpassed by any rifle in the world. Government armories could make 1200 a day working two shifts and it would take a long time to increase their capacity. Under the circumstances the Enfield rifle, used by the British, was changed so as to use the American ammunition,

[166]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

and three American factories that had been making it were set to work with a capacity of 3000 a day. Since that time the capacity of the plants had been improved so that the present output was 5000. He admitted that up to March, 1917, private firms had been making 10,000 a day for foreign governments, but added that they had allowed their employees to leave them before the United States government was ready to place orders after congress had made appropriations. Some members of the committee seemed to think that the war department should have paid these employees wages to keep them together until the government was ready to make contracts. When the manufacturers of the modified Enfield rifles were called before the committee they declared that rifle fifty per cent. better than the British Enfield, which, they said, the British would not have taken had there been time to make another model.

General Crozier startled the committee when he told them about the machine gun situation. When we entered the war the army had a small number of these instruments, purchased for use in Mexico. In the preceding year the ordnance department had taken up the question of machine guns. Not satisfied with the model then in use a competition for a new gun was set for May, 1917, giving the firms making them opportunity to design and construct complete specimens ready for testing. The result was the adoption of the Browning machine gun in two kinds, light and heavy, which, it was confidently asserted, was the best made. When the selection was made we had entered the war. Every factory in the country was busy on contracts already accepted, and the only arrangements that could be made was for delivery beginning in April, 1918. Abundant funds had been appropriated for machine guns in 1916, and it struck the committee as extraordinary that a year and nine months must elapse before tangible results were obtained. General Crozier admitted with some hesitation that

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

he had favored purchasing one of the machine guns already being made, by which means a sufficient supply might have been obtained for the training of soldiers at least. Asked who took the responsibility of delaying in order to obtain the better gun, he replied "the secretary of war." He said, however, that no serious results had ensued. When our army went abroad in 1917 we obtained from the French government machine guns enough for its equipment, of the light Cauchat and the heavier Hotchkiss types, and this could be done without loss to the French because in the beginning of the war the French had created works for a large number of such weapons and now, their greatest want being supplied, there was surplus capacity which could be placed at our disposal. The witness was certain we should have the Brownings in quantity production by the time our soldiers were ready for oversea service. He could hardly have thought, however, that a large force would be thrown across during the summer; for when asked how many machine guns would be needed for an army of a million men he replied from 70,000 to 80,000, a number that he could not have expected to see in use within so short a time.

Later Col. Isaac Lewis, inventor of the Lewis gun, used by the British army, testified that he had offered his gun to the government free of royalties but that it had been refused. To many it seemed strange that the war department should reject a gun that was good enough for the British, in order to experiment in the hope of obtaining a better gun. There were hints of a feud in the war department of which the Lewis gun had been made a victim.

From the ordnance bureau the committee turned to the quartermaster's department to investigate the alleged lack of winter clothing in the training camps. The quartermaster-general declared that contracts for winter clothing and blankets had been let as soon as possible after congress passed the appropriations.

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

The shortage, he said, from six per cent. in some camps to forty-eight per cent. in others, was chiefly due to the difficulties of transportation and not to delay or mistakes in making the contracts. The secretary of war on December 19 announced that all deficiencies of this kind had been remedied in all the camps but Camp Sevier, in South Carolina.

In completing their investigation the senate committee called before them the secretary of war himself, January 10, 1918. Mr. Baker had been hit upon by the senatorial critics as the weak spot in the administration. A brilliant student at the Johns Hopkins University he became a lawyer, went into politics as a reformer, supported Tom Johnson in his fight for municipal reforms in Cleveland, and drew upon himself the opposition of the politicians to whom reform seemed to indicate too vivid an imagination. He held with the reformers that war is madness and before 1917 would, probably, have supported any plan for permanent peace which was reasonably conceived. He was never a pacifist, although some people called him one, and from the day we declared that war existed he gave all his energy to its prosecution. Short of stature, youthful in appearance, and somewhat easy in his manner he did not impress the casual observer as a man of dominating will. Time was to show that he possessed infinite industry, good judgment in selecting men, and great ability in handling himself in a difficult situation. He had the additional advantage of being a good speaker and was able to rise to the broadest views of the problems in which some of his critics became lost in details. He found the war office operating under an old system of technical and semi-technical officials, and, like his predecessors left it intact. Under war pressure the system required much remodeling to make it work, but he performed the task successfully while undergoing a grueling storm of abuse from persons who should have been more considerate of his difficulties.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Before the committee the secretary began with a formal statement of the achievements of the department. Other witnesses had been forced to bring out the mistakes of the department: Mr. Baker in the beginning set over against their testimony a resumé of its successes. It displayed a large volume of excellent work, and although he described it with great confidence it was not possible to deny that he was right in saying it was a remarkable record under the circumstances. Under a severe cross-examination he stood firmly by his statements, admitting that mistakes had been made but saying that he corrected them as soon as discovered. When asked what the committee could do to remedy the situation, he said he could point to nothing, because he no sooner thought of a thing needing correction than he corrected it. As to the shortage of clothing, and some kinds of munitions, he said that it had existed but by this time had been repaired, and that no soldier had gone to France without a full equipment or would go there without it. His tone of confidence seems to have given offense to Senator Wadsworth, who said: "I believe that the facts are that the United States faces one of the greatest crises in its history because of the shortage of artillery." The secretary could only say: "Our initial rush needs, I repeat, have been met. Every man in France has full equipment. Every man who goes will be well supplied. Production in this country is increasing at satisfactory pace." We know now that the secretary was relying on French artillery. Under the circumstances it did not matter where we got the artillery, if it was only at hand. It was abundantly proved that from our entering the war to the time we threw our troops into it in great numbers was not long enough to allow us, or any other nation, to manufacture what we needed of artillery of any type. In regard to artillery the department did what it was criticized for not doing in regard to machine guns, got them from the best available source.

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

After the investigation had gone on for more than a month, and the country was becoming discouraged by the publication of alleged failures, the senate committee was ready to come to concrete action. Senator Chamberlain, chairman, first showed what was intended by introducing on his own account a bill to create a minister of munitions. A few days later he made a speech at a dinner in New York in which he announced that the committee would report a bill for a war cabinet. In making the announcement, January 19, 1918, he said: "Let me say that the military establishment of America has fallen down. There is no use to be optimistic about a thing that does not exist. It has almost stopped functioning, my friends. Why? Because of inefficiency in every bureau and in every department of the government of the United States. We are trying to work it out."

This statement, as exaggerated as it was unjust, revealed the kind of leadership that the opposition group of senators had adopted. It was too severe for the administration to pass unnoticed. Against it President Wilson issued a statement, January 21, in which were the following earnest words:

"As a matter of fact, the war department has performed a task of unparalleled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency. There have been delays and disappointments and partial miscarriages of plan, all of which have been drawn into the foreground and exaggerated by the investigations which have been in progress since the congress assembled—investigations which drew indispensable officials of department constantly away from their work and officers from their commands and contributed a great deal to such delay and confusion as had inevitably arisen. But compared with what has been accomplished, these things, much as they are to be regretted, are insignificant, and no mistake has been made which has been repeated. Nothing helpful or likely to speed or facilitate the war tasks of the government has come out of such criticism and investigation. . . .

"My association and constant conference with the secretary of war

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

have taught me to regard him as one of the ablest public officials I have ever known. The country will soon learn whether he or his critics understand the business in hand."

The president was right in pronouncing the efforts of the committee a move against his entire administration. If Mr. Baker had been discredited—and taking the conduct of the war out of the department would have amounted to that—President Wilson's administration would have been placed before the country in the light of a failure. It is not surprising that he prepared to resist stoutly.

It was now more than a month since announcement had been made that the senate would investigate all the parts of the war program of the government. Various other inquiries had, in fact, been instituted. One of them was aimed at Mr. Hoover's office with particular reference to the shortage of sugar in the Eastern States. It broke down quickly when it appeared that it rested on the failure of the transportation system and was inspired by the rivalry between the beet sugar interests of the West and the cane sugar men of the East. Another was aimed at the naval administration, but nothing could be found to charge against the conduct of the naval war. Still another was begun on the shipbuilding efforts of the government. A senate committee called before it Mr. Hurley, chairman of the shipping board. His straightforward answers soon satisfied its members that progress was satisfactory, and the session ended by the committee asking if there was anything it could do to help the board in its work. These inquiries were quickly disposed of, while the sessions of the senate military affairs committee dragged along, the newspapers filled with the evidence they revealed.

While they were proceeding the secretary of war announced the creation of a war council within the department, composed of five important heads of bureaus, including the quartermaster-

[172]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

general and the chief of ordnance, and the members were relieved of routine work. The secretary then appointed Major-General Goethals acting-quartermaster-general, which went far to reassure the public. As for the rest, the president stood by his secretary, whom he believed unfairly attacked. It is one of his faculties that he gets good results out of the machinery of government by the simple process of letting it function.

3. The Overman Bill

The introduction of the war cabinet bill did not make a deep impression on the country, although it was supported by some leading newspapers. It was opposed by the president, since its passage would amount to a vote of want of confidence. Nobody thought such a measure could reach an advanced stage in either house without becoming an out and out party matter, with the ultimate result that it would fail of enactment and leave bitter feelings behind it. Under the circumstances it was probably unwise to urge it upon congress, and its effect upon public opinion could not fail to be unfortunate.

February 1, 1918, the president invited eleven democratic senators to the White House and told them he was firmly opposed to the two bills. He said, also, that the organization of the war department was satisfactory, that the work done was fundamental but it had not yet reached the stage at which visible results could be expected. He also spoke of his own plans to strengthen the work of the department and explained the bad effects of the present discussion on the friends and enemies of the country in Europe. Several of the senators were converted by his arguments, but others resented his attempt to influence the action of the lawmakers. The returning senators, however, admitted that the two bills would be defeated.

Then the president took a bold step. He prepared a bill providing that he, as commander-in-chief of the army and

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

"President Wilson walks the tight-rope—it reaches across the sea with its wreck and dead—he holds in his hands the richest treasure ever lodged in the keeping of one man since God said, 'Let there be light.' The treasure is our very life, our liberty, our institutions, our homes, our firesides, our all.

"Gentlemen, let me plead with you, with all Americans—do not shake the rope. Do not badger him. Do not heckle him. Do not annoy him. He will make the journey safely over this ocean of flood and peril. Keep silence. Hold your tongues."

In closing the speaker said: "You critics, I can stand you upon each other's shoulders, and Wilson will tower above you all like Washington's monument towers above the foundation in which its granite base is laid." His speech was greeted with an outburst of applause from the galleries, despite the rule of the senate to the contrary.

The Overman Bill was 83 days in the hands of the senate. It passed the house 15 days after the vote in the senate, with one day's debate and only two votes in the negative. It thus appears that the opposition to the administration was more strongly rooted in the upper house. The composition of that opposition is best shown by a vote on an amendment, since party discipline played a considerable part in the final vote. Let us take Senator Hoke Smith's amendment to except from the bill the federal reserve board, on which the vote was 10 democrats and 27 republicans in the affirmative and 34 democrats and 7 republicans in the negative. The 10 democrats were: Chamberlain (Oregon), Gore (Oklahoma), Hardwick (Georgia), Hitchcock (Nebraska), King (Utah), Reed (Missouri), Smith (Georgia), Thomas (Colorado), Underwood (Alabama), and Vardaman (Mississippi), all Western and Southern members. At least two of them were known for men of illiberal views, and another was known as a capable but legally minded publicist. Most of the others may be placed in that class of over-sensitive and emotional defenders of legal forms which survives in our political

[176]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

life as a memorial of the mediocre eighteen-forties. It is impossible to analyze the republican opposition so clearly. Some of them undoubtedly belong in the class just mentioned, but so much was party feeling present that it is best to attempt no close analysis.

Most of the ten democrats mentioned continued to protest against some of the president's powers, and there were always republican senators supporting them. But the Overman bill brought out their strongest expression of opposition. The majority of the two houses accepted the idea that the situation demanded a strong hand and were willing to allow the president all he asked, knowing that the public would demand a full account of his use of extraordinary authority.

4. The Aircraft Investigations

In January, 1918, while other parts of the war program were being investigated, doubts began to be entertained about the progress of the aircraft program, and Howard E. Coffin, chairman of the aircraft production board, and Brigadier-General George O. Squier, head of the signal corps in the army, were called before the senate military affairs committee. Nothing startling was revealed and the committee turned its attention to other things.

It is impossible to absolve from blame those who conducted the aircraft work of the administration, but justice demands that the unexpected obstacles they encountered in the winter of 1917-1918 should be mentioned. For one thing, the unusually cold weather made it difficult to obtain in the Northwestern forests the supply of spruce necessary for the planes. Then followed strikes of lumbermen, promoted, it was believed, by German sympathizers, so that it was finally necessary to entrust this business to soldiers. Moreover, the work of manufacture had begun with the idea that emphasis would be laid upon the fast,

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

single-seated scout plane, but during the winter word came from General Pershing that fast two-seated machines would be the chief need in 1918, and it became necessary to change the type of plane. These delays were particularly disconcerting in view of the exaggerated hopes an unwise policy of advertising had raised in the preceding summer.

February 20 one combat plane, a de Haviland, was completed, crated, delivered to transportation company and started to France. On the strength of this achievement the secretary of war gave out the following statement: "The first American built battle planes are to-day en route to France. This first shipment, though in itself not large, marks the final overcoming of many difficulties met in building up a new and intricate industry." However much we sympathize with Mr. Baker's impulse to give encouragement to an impatient public, we must admit that his statement was misleading. He was to hear it repeated many times to his disadvantage. It was later learned that the statement had been prepared by a subordinate and signed by the secretary.

About the middle of March clearing weather in France warned the world that active operations were soon to be resumed. The part our own troops would take in them and their state of readiness became interesting speculations in the United States. Again the newspapers took up the subject of airplanes. About this time it became known that Gutzon Borglum had informed the president that the air program was 74 per cent. behind schedule. A few days later Mr. Wilson appointed a committee, with H. Snowden Marshall as chairman, to find out what was the matter with aircraft production and to suggest remedies. At the same time the senate military affairs committee began to hold secret sessions on the same subject.

March 21 began the great German drive, sweeping away a large sector of the British lines. Town after town fell and

[178]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

on the 25th Bapaume, a long contested supply base, was lost with large quantities of stores. On this day, when anxiety filled every mind, Major-General Wood, just returned from France, was before the committee. Although the hearing was secret, much of his testimony was given to the press, which received it in the nature of a "round robin." He said the French and British were disappointed at the slowness of our preparations and especially with the delay in building ships and aircraft, and that they had counted on us to make up for the submarine losses. He added that we should have from 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 troops in France by the end of 1918 with additional forces training to raise the total to 5,000,000.

General Wood also said, according to the report given out, that not one American built airplane was in use in France. It was the practice, he said, for the French airmen on each side of the American sector to give air protection to our soldiers, but if the planes happened to be on duty elsewhere our men were exposed to attack and sometimes the enemy flew so low that the Americans fired at them with rifles. There were, he reported, 1000 fliers with the American forces, but they were supplied with French planes, although American built machines were in use by the British airmen.

It should be noted here that the opposition stressed the lack of American built planes, although at other times they complained that the authorities had not purchased foreign planes freely. General Wood's criticism made an appeal to American pride, but it was precisely to American pride that the aircraft authorities had appealed when they decided to get well ready and throw an immense number of airships into the war with characteristic American bigness.

Next day, March 26, the matter was taken up in the senate by the same group that had generally opposed the administration most outspokenly. Senator Lodge spoke particularly of the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

shipping situation, saying that only two ships of the American program had been constructed, whereas the country had been led to believe there were 36. Senator New declared that instead of having the 12,000 airplanes promised by July 1, next, we should have just 37. It was hard to gainsay these statements, as they appeared on the surface; and the defenders of the administration were reduced to silence.

On the evening of the same day Chairman Hurley, of the Shipping Board, in a speech in New York replied specifically to the charges brought forward by Senator Lodge. From his statement the following undubitable facts can be gathered: When we found ourselves in the war there was not a yard in the United States that would take an order for ships, all available capacity being taken by the navy and by private business. It was, therefore, necessary to build new yards or get owners to enlarge old yards. It was also necessary to collect trained workmen and technical experts. In April, 1917, there were in the country 37 yards for building steel ships with 162 ways and 24 yards for wooden ships with 73 ways. Through new construction there were now—less than a year later—completed or under construction, 67 yards for steel ships with 398 ways and 81 yards for wooden ships with 322 ways. When entirely complete these yards would contain berths for building 521 more ships than Sir Eric Geddes stated that England has at the present time.

When Senator Lodge said we had turned out only two American ships he referred to vessels whose keels were laid under the shipping board. In order to standardize and hasten construction the government requisitioned a large number of ships still building. A great many were under foreign contract, but the owners did not object to our proceedings. Good sense pointed to the necessity of finishing these ships first, both because it was the shortest road to results and because it was neces-

[180]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

sary to empty the ways before other keels could be laid. March 1, 1918, the steel tonnage contracted for was 8,205,708, of which 3,045,408 tons were for requisitioned ships. Of this total 2,121,568 tons, or 28 per cent., had been completed. Mr. Hurley struck a popular note when he said:

“If we had been content with doing the job in a small way we might have built a few more yards and added a little to our capacity. A few ships might have been finished more quickly; but it was the spirit and will of America to do the job in a big way, and the judgment of the country will be vindicated by the results when all these new ways are completed and turning out ships.”

Mr. Hurley's defense laid the criticisms of the shipbuilding program. Soon after it was delivered Charles M. Schwab became head of the Emergency Fleet Corporation and his reputation for efficiency gave the public added confidence. When on May 6th it was announced that a ship of 5,500 tons, the *Tuckahoe*, was launched in Camden, New Jersey, with her engines in place 27 days and 3 hours after her keel was laid, enthusiasm took the place of anxiety and clear skies opened for the shipbuilding board.

For the aircraft board, however, much trouble was still in store. To the aid of the senate military affairs committee, whose chairman, Senator Chamberlain, never ceased to refer to the imperfections of aircraft plans, now came the irritating assertions of Mr. Gutzon Borglum. This gentleman was an artist with an interest in aeronautics, and he had some kind of invention in mind out of which he expected to make a fortune. He was excitable by temperament and too imaginative to be logical. Late in 1917 he got the idea that the aircraft program was going wrong through the efforts of the contractors. November 22, 1917, he wrote a letter to Mr. Tumulty, the president's private secretary, in which he revealed his fears. This led President Wilson to write asking him to point out as specifically

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

as possible the weaknesses of the aviation work. He wrote a letter in reply, and January 2 the president wrote again asking Borglum to go to Washington, lay the matter before the secretary of war, and by his own investigation discover the facts in the case, promising him every facility for his efforts. The president's letter indicates that he was merely trying to satisfy the artist of the truth in the matter, but Borglum saw in it an appointment to the position of the president's personal investigator. He arrived in Washington, took an office in the war department, gave it up in a few days claiming that his efforts were blocked from the beginning, and carried on his researches in a private office by sending for persons who would talk to him. He ended by sending President Wilson a report, charging that a conspiracy had been formed by profiteers to absorb large portions of the \$640,000,000 appropriated for aviation. The substance of his findings was made public. As the report itself was not made public, there were those who thought that the president had appointed an investigator who found out more than he was expected to find, and for that reason the result was suppressed.

This was the state of affairs when General Wood made his statement to the senate military committee and when senators opened their batteries for another attack on the administration. Borglum was summoned to Washington and went before the committee in secret session. He told them, said the report, that he could name men who "participated in profiteering, or worse," but "he could not reveal names until he had talked with those men and ascertained if they were willing to come before the committee as witnesses." The committee was evidently disappointed but agreed to wait until he felt at liberty to talk. Meanwhile, it was said that Borglum was interviewing the men upon whom he counted. Then President Wilson published his letters to Borglum, showing that the latter had never been ap-
[182]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

pointed a personal investigator. Along with them Borglum published letters in reply, so full of unsupported assertion that they caused some of his supporters to doubt. Next the house committee on military affairs looked into his charges and declared that there was nothing in them, republicans and democrats joining in the opinion. Finally, on May 10, a long statement was published by Kenyon W. Mix, Jr., alleging that Borglum had tried to get him to help form a company to manufacture airplanes, urging his connection with the president as his contribution to the enterprise. The Mix charges were violently repudiated by Borglum, and they were, in fact, never substantiated; but the violence with which Borglum denounced them disqualified him for a fair witness. He said he was the victim of a plot, formed by Secretary Baker, Brigadier-General Deeds, of the signal service, and other officials to discredit his report. He did not produce the slightest testimony to support the conspiracy charge. Senator Chamberlain, however, was thoroughly satisfied that the aircraft situation was bad and announced that the investigation would proceed.

Meanwhile, the president took two steps which went far to clarify the situation. April 24 he appointed John D. Ryan, president of the Anaconda Copper Company, director of aircraft production for the army, succeeding Howard E. Coffin. He also appointed Brigadier-General Kenly, just back from the army in France, head of a new division of military aeronautics, assuming most of the aircraft duties that had fallen on Major-General Squier. In the hands of such men, thought the public, the development of airplanes would be safe. The second step of the president was to make a formal request to the attorney-general of the United States, asking him to look into the charge of conspiracy and bring criminal suits if necessary. He said he wished no guilty man spared. At the same time he was careful to let it be known that he did not wish these proceedings

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

to interfere with the plans of either house of congress to probe as far as they saw fit into the delay in aircraft construction. May 16 he appointed Mr. Charles E. Hughes, former supreme court justice, technically as an assistant to the attorney-general, but in reality an official investigator of the whole aircraft situation, requesting him to make a thorough examination and report whether or not criminal proceedings should be taken.

The appointment of Mr. Hughes brought a feeling of relief to the public, who had already begun to distrust the judgment of Senator Chamberlain. And although the senate military affairs committee proceeded with its work and made a report on August 22, which followed its old lines of condemnation, there was a general opinion that the country should wait for the report of Mr. Hughes. The report was submitted to the president October 31, 1918, and a long summary of it was published in the newspapers on November 1. The investigation had been very thorough and covered a period of twenty-two weeks. As many as 250 witnesses were examined and 17,000 pages of testimony were taken.

It showed that although the aircraft production board was authorized by congress to direct the aircraft program, by an executive order of the war department the actual work was placed in the hands of the signal corps, whose head was Major-General Squier. Under him was an equipment division with Edward A. Deeds as chief, formerly connected with the National Cash Register Company, of Dayton, Ohio, and more recently associated with several enterprises in that city. After his appointment to the post he was made a major and later on promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Deeds and the assistants he gathered around him knew little or nothing about aircraft technique, and they had placed themselves largely in the hands of automobile manufacturers. They were criticized [184]

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

because they "failed to produce an organization which was adapted to meet the exigency."

Referring to the delays that had occurred the report mentioned: lack of efficient organization; confusion between the aircraft board's jurisdiction and that of the signal corps; changes in the liberty motor; repeated alterations in the design of the types of airplanes; and the obstacles placed in the way of regular construction by labor in some of the factories, a part of it due, probably, to alien enemies. It gave high praise to the liberty motor for observation and bombing planes and said that the British air ministry had given similar testimony.

With respect to the charge that a large part of the \$640,000,000 appropriated by congress had been dissipated in wasteful contracts, it was brought out that two of the airplanes ordered, the Bristol fighters and a standard J-1 training planes, had proved unsatisfactory and were condemned after a great deal of money had been spent on them. On the Bristol plane the estimated loss was \$6,500,000 and on the standard J-1 the loss after deducting possible salvage would be \$19,500,000, a total of \$26,000,000. A great deal of the money appropriated had not yet been spent, although it was all "obligated." A large part of it was necessarily spent for purposes other than the purchase of airplanes and engines, such as advances to manufacturers for plants and tools, expenses of establishing a plantation of 110,000 acres of castor beans for lubricating oil, and the expenses of stimulating inventions. On planes and engines during the first year \$474,900,000 had been "obligated" and \$155,500,000 actually paid out. But the latter sum included nearly \$50,000,000 spent in overseas manufactures, advances to domestic manufacturers and experimental work. The money that had actually gone into the pockets of that class of men who could be suspected of skillfully abstracting it from

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the treasury without giving value received, if they had been so disposed, was not more than \$106,700,000, all of which was spent for contracts made in open daylight.

The cost plus system of letting contracts was criticized as extravagant, but the report showed that the profits on the fixed price system were equally large. For example, one firm would have made profits equal to \$6,100,000 on the de Haviland 4's had it not been found necessary to change the plan and thus make a new contract. This profit was estimated under the cost plus system. Another company would have a profit of \$5,375,000 on an order for 5,000 liberty motors. Under a revised contract the same company was allowed \$4000 for each of these motors, which yielded it a profit of \$1000 on each motor.

Investigation showed that Major Deeds, in the early part of his connection with the signal corps, had used his official position to get an aviation school established at Dayton on land in which his former business partners were interested and that two other officials of the corps had been in positions to pass on the satisfactory nature of work done in factories in which they were financially interested. The report recommended that they should be tried by court martial for violating a rule of the military code. The conduct of Major Deeds was especially condemned. Later on he was tried by court martial and acquitted of unlawful intent or of profiting by any of the actions complained of.¹ The Hughes report threw an important sidelight on the origin of many of the rumors circulated about the aircraft scandals, so-called, when it called attention to the fact that many complaints had grown out of the statements of persons and firms who failed to get contracts. There was in certain circles an impression that the expenditure of the large sum for aircraft offered rare opportunities to men who knew how to

¹ Two others, Lt. Col. Vincent and Lt. Col. Mixer, were pardoned by the president on the recommendation of the attorney-general.

THE WAR POLICIES OF THE ADMINISTRATION

seize them, and the report indicated that those who tried to improve them were many.

Along with the publication of these findings the attorney-general gave out statistics of the production of aircraft up to October 11, showing that at last the days of doubt had passed. In the United States 9,674 airplanes and 24,672 engines had been delivered to the proper officials. Of the American made planes 3,572 were for elementary training and 1,046 for advanced training, leaving 4,056 for service in the field. At the same time 3,129 planes had been obtained abroad, with engines. It is true we still lacked much in attaining the large number of airplanes that the senate military affairs committee insisted we should have, i.e., from 20,000 to 50,000. But the manufacturing capacity developed was considerable and increasing continually and men who knew felt confident that the army would have all the planes it needed in the spring offensive expected in 1919.

Of all the tasks assumed by the war department in the beginning of our war the aircraft program was most difficult. It meant the development of a large technical personnel from the bottom and the collection and training of an army of expert artisans, all brought together at a time when unemployed expert ability was exceedingly hard to find. So delicate and complex a machine as this might be wholly unfit merely through having some slight deficiency in almost any part. It is doubtful if the many persons who allowed themselves to be plunged into despair over delays had any idea of the obstacles that had to be overcome, not the least of which was the necessity of working all the time to carry the task forward while some of the highest officials of the government and some of the most widely read newspapers poured out scorn.

The services of Mr. John D. Ryan and Brigadier-General Kenly in carrying forward the work on airplanes were highly

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

valuable. They were so much appreciated that on August 27, 1918, Mr. Ryan was made second assistant secretary of war with oversight over aircraft production. The change was only an elevation in rank, for he had the same power over aircraft before the promotion as after it. Mr. Ryan succeeded Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, who went to France to have charge of war office duties.

In the report of the senate military affairs committee submitted August 22, 1918, was much emphatic language condemning the war department for not having as many airplanes of American make in France as had been promised in the summer of 1917. On the same day was published a letter from Howard E. Coffin, for a year the head of the aircraft production board, saying that the board had nothing to do with technical matters, which were left entirely to the army officers, along with the making of contracts. Mr. Coffin also said that the aircraft programs of army and navy stood in similar relations to the board. He implied that since the navy program went forward smoothly, the blame for the delay was not the board's but the army's. This may be literally true, but we shall fail to do justice if we do not remember that it was an easier task to build airplanes, or flying boats, for the navy than to build the very fast and light types of airplanes for the army. The seaplane was comparatively slow and was not expected to have combats in the air, being designed in the main to spy out lurking submarines. The army planes were continually being improved as to speed and carrying capacity. The scout plane that was merely as fast as its opponent had to be discarded. Under these circumstances there is much reason for Americans to feel that the builders of their aircraft showed no lack of American spirit and skill in what they did to establish their great industry in a little more than seventeen months.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

1. *Crossing the Atlantic*

THE problems connected with the mobilization of industry and administration of the war department have too long turned our attention from the actual course of events in France where the soldiers under General Pershing, the American Expeditionary Force in France, were already passing through the preliminary stages of a career of service that added greatly to the glory of American arms. It is necessary to remember that whatever we think about the progress of events in the United States, nothing occurred to mar the steady and normal development of this force. Secretary Baker, in his report for 1917, calls attention to the fact that the determination to supply clothing and other necessary articles to the force in France was in some degree responsible for the temporary shortage of such supplies in the training camps in the United States. To place the army of two millions in France was a great achievement, but equally great was the system of transportation and distribution of materials of every kind that enabled the army to perform the service demanded. When we entered the war it was generally assumed that we should not be able to send a large army to France and that our aid to our friends abroad would consist chiefly in loans, the freest opportunity to procure munitions and supplies, and the support of the American navy in restraint of the submarines. Interviews with members of the French and British missions that arrived in Washington in April convinced

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the president that we ought to send troops for the effect they would have on the spirits of the allied people, and the first division under Pershing was dispatched. At the same time steps were taken to raise a great army. The act of May 18, 1917, authorized the president to receive volunteers for the regular army until it reached the number of 488,218 officers and men, to call into service the national guard which when fully recruited would contain 470,177 officers and men, and to draft into a national army by a selective process two installments of 500,000 men each. If all these means were used the result would be an army of nearly 2,000,000 men.

At the time the law was passed few persons thought it would be used to the extent of its meaning. In fact, the situation in Europe was so favorable to the allies that it was easy to believe that no large army from our side of the Atlantic would be needed to finish the German resistance. March 12 Russia broke into a revolution, three days later the czar abdicated, and the republican government that succeeded to power was anti-Teutonic. It was believed that the Russian armies would now pass into the hands of officers untainted with treason, and, supplied and encouraged by an honest government, become a force strong in proportion to its size. At the same time the German army on the Somme River executed an extensive retreat to safer lines farther east and seemed disposed to assume the defensive for the rest of the war.

✓ Six months later these hopes had declined. The Russians had failed to rally to the call of their military leaders, a campaign inaugurated in Galicia as a desperate means of arousing national spirit had ended in failure, the lines had been beaten in by the Teutons, who advanced along the coast and took Riga, and at last, November 7, Lenine and Trotsky had firmly seated themselves in power and had begun to negotiate for peace with the Teutonic allies. December 6 they signed an armistice and
[190]

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

March 3, 1918, accepted the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The conviction was thus slowly borne in upon us that the United States would have to take the place of Russia in the war and that all their efforts would be demanded to prevent a German victory.

This changing opinion seems to be indicated by the figures for the transportation of troops to Europe. By the statement of the secretary of war given out July 1, 1918, the movement of American soldiers across the ocean was as follows: in 1917—May, 1,718; June, 12,261; July, 12,988; August, 18,323; September, 32,523; October, 38,259; November, 23,016; December, 48,840; 1918—January, 46,776; February, 48,027; March, 83,811; April, 117,212; May, 244,345; June, 276,372; July, 297,000; August, 283,000; September, 258,000; and October, 159,000.¹ The conviction that Russia would be completely lost to the *Entente* must have been formed about October. About that time the seized German ships began to be placed in a condition for use, about that time the national guard units began to be ready for transportation to Europe; and about that time American engineers in France began to make extensive plans for landing large bodies of American troops. It seems probable that all these considerations entered into the decision of the government late in 1917 to hurry up transportation of troops.

At the end of the year 187,916 soldiers and 7,579 marines had been embarked for France, an average of nearly 28,000 a month. The number was so inadequate for the emergency that arrangements were made to get three of the fast British liners and four smaller troop-ships for the service. At the same time an additional number of repaired German ships and some new ships were available. The result is shown in the figures just given. The number of troops transported during

¹ July 1, 1918, marines to the number of 14,644 had been embarked. The figures here given up to July 1, were given out by the secretary of war in *New York Nation*, July 13, 1918. For later dates I have followed the secretary's report, 1918, p. 9.—J. S. B.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the months of December to February average about 48,000 a month. Still these were not enough to meet the demand. The Germans were moving their army from the Russian front to Northern France and an earnest call came to us for assistance. It was then agreed that Great Britain would lend us ships that had been used in feeding her people, placing her own citizens on short rations in order to carry out the agreement, we promising to load the ships, send them back to Europe and hasten back as rapidly as possible for new loadings. Under these circumstances the numbers transported increased rapidly. It was an achievement startling to the government itself that in the four months, May to August, 1,121,703 men were embarked. When the armistice was signed on November 11 we had sent to Europe 2,045,169 men, about half of whom had gone over in our own ships, and of the others far the larger portion had gone in British vessels. Along with them went the vast quantities of supplies and equipment that are necessary to fit out and maintain a modern army. It was a stupendous achievement and transcended the limits of what the world thought possible early in 1917.

In the beginning the army had to develop its troops and cargo transport service, and at a time when to obtain new shipping was exceedingly difficult. By chartering a few American merchant vessels it had in service at the end of June, 1917, seven troop ships with deadweight tonnage of 46,000 tons and six cargo ships with deadweight tonnage of 48,000. The repaired German ships went to the army largely, yielding it 460,000 tons in the fall of 1917. It also received 300,000 tons from the taking over of the Dutch ships in the spring of 1918, while another large addition was made by chartering Scandinavian and Japanese ships later in the year. But the most serviceable assistance, said the secretary of war, came from the war trade board, "which by drastic restriction of non-essential imports [192]

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

made possible the release of large amounts of shipping from the import trades." November 1, 1918, the army had in service a fleet of its own of 431 ships with deadweight tonnage of 3,004,445. In its fleet were 39 troop ships, 38 animal transports, 18 refrigerator ships, 4 tankers, and 228 cargo ships. At this time it had the use of 16 allied troop ships of about 150,000 tons and 160,000 tons of loaned British cargo ships.

With this large number of ships at sea it was a thing of good fortune that the loss from torpedoes was only 142,000 tons and from other causes only 58,000 tons. No American troop transport was lost on its eastward voyage, and of the whole number of men embarked for the scene of action only 732 were lost at sea. For this excellent record of safety in crossing the credit is due to the American and British navies whose destroyers and cruisers furnished convoys. When we consider the threats of the Germans to destroy our army in transit this small loss seems astonishing. Next to starving Great Britain into surrender the destruction of the American army *en route* was the largest demand on the submarine. It was answered in such a way that one can say that the submarine risk proved the slightest war risk our soldiers had to encounter.

That spirit of standardization which characterizes the operations of industry in the United States entered into the direction of the troop ships during the spring and summer of 1918. To load a number of ships, assemble them at the point at which they took up convoy, unload them on the other side of the Atlantic, and bring them back under convoy became a regular movement as steady as the swing of the pendulum. From February 1 to November 1, 1918, the average turn-around of all the troop transports was less than 40 days. A group of faster ships averaged less than 30 days. Two of the greatest ships, the *Leviathan*, formerly the *Vaterland*, and the *Mount Vernon*, formerly the *Kronprinzessen Cecelie*, averaged less than 27

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

days, while two fast American ships, the *Great Northern* and the *Northern Pacific*, averaged 25 and 26 days respectively and each made a turn-around in 19 days. The secretary of war estimated that during the summer the *Leviathan* carried to Europe an average of 400 men a day. These achievements, he added, were much better than had been obtained by commercial ships. They were the result of well organized efforts, in which loading, unloading, departure, speed and return were all directed by unified and capable control.

2. *Communications and Supply Depots in France*

To transport the troops and the vast quantities of supplies they needed from seacoast to battle front in France demanded equal thought and even better organization. The first consideration was to select the ports of debarkation. The long established course of trade had developed several great ports on the northern coast of France and in them were the only adequate harbor facilities, as docks, ships' berths, warehouses, and channels and basins for a large number of vessels. These ports had been turned over to Great Britain for the use of her forces early in the war and were now crowded with the transport and cargo ships that supplied the British army in France.

To these ports led the largest railroad systems. The German invasion had pushed against these systems until they left a restricted area through Northern France. It was an area of danger, full of British supply depots, hospitals, training camps and rest stations, all connected by an intricate network of railroads. Even if the northern ports could be made to accommodate the armies of another great power, the incoming forces would have to be taken into the interior across this overcrowded area. The existing railroads could not carry the traffic, and if new roads were constructed they would have to be built direct through the mesh of existing roads, causing delays

[194]

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

in operation that could not well be permitted. Thus, both the ports and railroads of northern France were dedicated to the British army and it was for the United States to look for another means of reaching the front.

In the same way the choice of the part of the battle front we were to defend was limited. It would assuredly not be well to remove the British from the area in which they were already placed and which they had so well defended. The mere difficulty of supplying them elsewhere was a good reason why they should continue to defend the part of the line nearest the channel. Probably by the same reason it would be better to allow the French to guard the part of the line south of the British. In doing so they stood before Paris, their capital, and the vital central part of their country. It seemed necessary, therefore, to assign the soldiers of the United States to a position in the line east of the angle it made when it turned around the defenses of Verdun. This plan was interfered with by the pressure on the French during the great offensive of 1918, with the result that some of the American divisions were thrown into the battle with the French and British at their sides; but even under these extraordinary conditions the concentration in the east proceeded steadily, and it was in this region, as we shall see later, that the Americans took up their chief work in carrying out the pre-arranged program.

Turning to the western coast of France General Pershing was left to use the port of Brest, in the extreme peninsula of Brittany, St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, La Pallice, the port of the ancient town of La Rochelle, and Bordeaux, near the mouth of the Gironne.¹ From these ports railroads led into the interior of France, but they were not in the best condition, and it was seen that alterations or repairs would have to be made

¹ For landing troops our chief reliance was Brest, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux. For supplies it was Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, and La Pallice, supplemented later on by Marseilles, Brest, and some small ports.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

before they would serve our purpose. The ports also were inadequate to the service that would be required of them. Their docks were small and already crowded with the French business which the use of the northern ports by the British had forced southward.

General Pershing lost little time in remodeling these facilities. American engineers were summoned to his aid, most of them drawn from private life, since there was immediate demand in the field for the small number of army engineers we had. The French placed at our disposal whatever they had of timber, cement, and structural iron, but their supplies were limited and it was necessary eventually to take from the United States the greater portion of such materials. The French turned over to us docks with 67 ship berths. We built others, 10 at Bassens, near Bordeaux, and two at Brest, and had 28 others under construction or projected when the armistice was signed. We also built lighter docks with 10 berths, near Bordeaux, besides nearly a hundred lighters and derrick barges.

Brest became the chief port of debarkation for the troopships. Of the two millions of men we sent to France practically half were landed at that port. Many of the others went to England, whence they arrived in France over the already overcrowded British lines of communication. Some of these men went into their earliest training in connection with British units in France, and some of them, when the war ended, were still serving in the northern parts of the battle front. Others landed at St. Nazaire or Bordeaux, whence they were sent to the western front through the southern part of France. To make Brest more available we deepened the channel, built cantonments, hospitals, and many miles of side tracks for railroads. St. Nazaire, also, was greatly improved in its port facilities, and the French railroad that led into the interior up to the battle front [196]

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

was placed entirely in our hands and operated entirely by our army as an American road. The American army's service of supply constructed 957 miles of standard gauge railroad in France. The only original line was on a double-track cut off near Nevers 5.41 miles long. The remainder was in terminals, yards, and multiple tracks of the French roads. The magnitude of the changes worked out in these respects, as General Pershing pointed out, made a deep impression on our own soldiers. They recognized in them the strength of their own government and kept it in mind as they went into the trenches. It was, also, a powerful demonstration to our allies, and even to our enemies, that we had come to Europe to perform a great task in a thoroughgoing way.

It was not well to take the great stores of supplies up to the immediate battle area. This was partly because one did not know where the divisions would be called upon to fight and if the supplies were placed in one area and the army moved to another it would be inconvenient to send the supplies after them. Prudence demanded, also, that the reserved stores should not be where they could be easily reached by the aircraft of the enemy or where some sudden drive of hostile forces should bring them into the region of contested battle. It must be remembered, also, that the battle zone was not a narrow strip of country. Behind the trenches for many miles was a region filled with moving units, going into the front trenches and coming back to rest areas. It was advisable to locate the food and munitions reserves outside of this area at some point convenient both to the debarkation forces and to the units that had to distribute them to the men who actually used them. The storage region selected was in the Loire valley in a triangle formed by lines connecting the towns of Tours, Chateauroux, and Bourges, a triangular area about seventy miles

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

on the longest and forty-five on the shortest side. It is about 120 miles south of Paris. From it railroads led directly into the battle zone.

The improvements at one of the designated ports—it seems to have been Brest—were described by a newspaper correspondent in a manner which indicated great admiration for the achievement of the army engineers. From the rank of a second-class port it was raised until it could be pronounced the equal of Hamburg. Berths were constructed for 40 large ships or 60 small ships, and vast concrete warehouses were built. The intricate system of side tracks contained 228 miles of tracks, and there was space for 2500 incoming cars and for an equal number of outgoing cars, besides track storage for 3200 cars. It was said in March, 1918, that 172 American built locomotives had been assembled in this port and plans were made for assembling 1100 more. There was, also, a large remount station for army mules, the veterinarians of which, following the French practice, performed an operation which took away the mule's bray; for it was never safe to have a mule braying close to the enemy's trenches. Regiment of stevedores, in general negroes from the United States, were lodged at these ports to unload the swift coming and going cargo ships.¹

This system of storage and distribution was not too great for the large amount of freight that was to be carried across the Atlantic and sent up to the battle area. When the armistice was signed 5,153,000 tons of cargo had been delivered in France, 95 per cent. of which was carried in American ships. It was to the credit of the navy that only 79,000 tons were lost at sea. In the cargoes transported were 1145 locomotives of the 100-ton type, 350 being shipped set up on their own wheels. To accommodate them large ore ships that had been in the

¹ General Pershing mentions their names in his short summary of the events of the war (Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1918, p. 69). See, also, the *New York Times*, March 10, 13, 17, and 18, 1918.

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Cuban trade were used with special hatches, so constructed that the engines could be run off the ships to tracks on the docks under their own steam. When the war ended more than 2000 standard gauge locomotives were ordered and were being delivered in France set up for use at the rate of 200 a month. To carry the army's supplies 17,000 standard-gauge freight cars were sent to France and 34,433 motor trucks, while horses and mules went across the ocean to the number of 54,000. When the armistice was signed transportation facilities had been increased to their greatest effectiveness and the stream of commodities in transit was greater than ever before.

3. Training and Organizing the Army in France

The training camps in the United States were designed to give the soldiers the instruction necessary to the formation of large units of organization. Most of the camps turned out divisions proficient in the ordinary forms of drill and tactics, each with its component units taught to serve in its particular kind of service. The division emerged from the training camp as a division and went to France in that capacity. The regulars took numbers running upward from one, the national guard took numbers running upward from twenty-six, and the national army, that is, the men drafted after war began, took numbers running upward from seventy-six. Of the first kind of troops eight divisions were sent to France, numbered first to eighth; of the second kind the divisions numbered from twenty-six to forty-second; and of the national army the divisions were numbered from seventy-six to ninety-three. In all there were thirty-five combat divisions and six depot divisions.

The organization of the division included four regiments of 3000 men each. In the regiment were three battalions with four companies of 250 men in each battalion. In the division was a brigade of artillery, consisting of three regiments, a ma-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

chine-gun battalion, a trench-motor battery, and various other units, as engineers, military police, and medical units. The total strength of the division was about 28,000 men. Its most notable characteristic, as compared with the division of other nations, was its great strength in artillery and machine-guns, a condition made necessary by the peculiar methods of fighting on the western front, where the heaviest kind of barrages from field artillery supported by continuous fire of larger guns against the back areas of the enemy lines was essential to any successful attack.

Above the division was the corps and above that was the field army. It was originally intended, according to the announcement of the war department, to have six divisions in a corps, but the plan was changed to meet the demands of the moment. Of the forty divisions that arrived in France it was necessary to use the infantry personnel of ten for replacements. The remaining thirty divisions were organized in three armies of three corps each. In bringing the divisions together into a corps it was necessary to add to the numbers that made up the divisions a large number of troops for replacement, for serving along the lines of communication, for forwarding supplies of various kinds, and for other similar purposes. These men were known as corps troops and numbered about 30,000. A similar supplementary body served with an army and were known as army troops. The whole number of American troops sent to Europe, including a regiment and some sanitary units with the Italian army and a small force at Murmansk, in Russia, was 2,053,347. In this force were 1,338,169 combattant troops. The newspapers announced that the three-line system of holding the trenches would be used, that is, two divisions would hold the first line, two others the second, and two others the third.¹

¹ These statements are taken, in general, from reports of official statements published in the *New York Times*, March 8, 1:1; July 14, I, 1:8; and December 1, 1918, IV, 1:1. See also General Pershing's report in the *Annual Report of the secretary of war*, 1918, p. 81.

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

This organization was evolved slowly and it was adopted on the basis of a careful study of the experience of the French and British armies. As compared with the armies of our neighbors, our divisions and corps were stronger, with the result that our line seemed to have a more solid quality. Firm and well founded lines were necessary to meet the great attacks of enemy artillery and infantry. There is, also, some satisfaction in the thought that solid strength expressed that which we wish to have the world consider our national characteristic.

The training in France is described by General Pershing as follows: "Our purpose was to prepare an integral American force which should be able to take the offensive in every respect. Accordingly the development of a self-reliant infantry by thorough drill in the use of the rifle and in the tactics of open warfare was always uppermost. The plan of training after arrival in France allowed a division one month for acclimatization and instruction in small units from battalions down, a second month in quiet trench sectors by battalion, and a third month after it came out of the trenches when it should be trained as a complete division in war of movement."

Although the training of officers in the United States was intense and as modern as possible, there were always the newest tricks to be learned, and on that account special schools were established in France. Elementary training schools for officers were also established there in order to realize the democratic principle on which the American army is based. To them were sent steadily those privates and non-commissioned officers who were adjudged worthy of being trained as commissioned officers. There were, also, training schools for non-commissioned officers, and various kinds of technical branches of the service. Langres was the center of a large number of these schools, and at Saumur was the artillery school. The town of Issoudun contained an immense aviation school, with the neces-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

sary aerodromes, training grounds and mechanical shops. French and British officers were freely lent for instruction.

In his report on the campaign in France General Pershing made special acknowledgment of the aid we received from France in supplying some of the most important kinds of material, as artillery, airplanes, and tanks, things which we were not able to construct for months after we entered the war. From this source we received artillery equipment consisting of 75's and 155's for thirty divisions. Without this assistance we should have been seriously handicapped for, although we began the manufacture of artillery promptly, few had been finished and delivered in France at the end of the war except 109 of the 75's. In acknowledging his obligations to the French and British, General Pershing said in his report of operations:

“Coöperation among the Allies has at all times been most cordial. A far greater effort has been put forth by the allied armies and staffs to assist us than could have been expected. The French government and army have always stood ready to furnish us with supplies, equipment, and transportation and to aid us in every way. In the towns and hamlets wherever our troops have been stationed or billeted the French people have everywhere received them more as relatives and intimate friends than as soldiers of a foreign army. For these things words are quite inadequate to express our gratitude. There can be no doubt that the relations growing out of our associations here assure a permanent friendship between the two peoples. Although we have not been so intimately associated with the people of Great Britain, yet their troops and ours when thrown together have always warmly fraternized. The reception of those of our forces who have passed through England and of those who have been stationed there has always been enthusiastic. Altogether it has been deeply impressed upon us that the ties of language and blood bring the British and ourselves together completely and inseparably.”¹

It is but just to add that the happy relations that existed be-

¹ Report of the secretary of war, 1918, p. 81.

THE AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

tween the French and British armies on the one side and the army of the United States on the other was in a great measure due to the good sense and tact of General Pershing himself and the officers who served under him. They realized that they entered the war without experience in large military operations and were willing to take advice from those who knew. They kept down national jealousy and were willing to take minor parts until they were able to play a large rôle. When the lessons had been learned they showed the stuff of good soldiers by fighting in such a way that their associates were bound to respect them. It was in this spirit as well as in the good will of the French and British that the harmony between all the forces and peoples found its basis.

CHAPTER X

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

1. *The Western Front*

WHEN the armies of the United States began to take part in the world war the armies of the allies in France had been swaying back and forth in northeastern France from the North Sea to the Swiss border for nearly three years. The story of the war during these long months does not belong to this narrative, but we shall understand better the events of the period during which we were involved if we keep in mind the general character of parts played by others before we came to their assistance. We came into a game that was already more than two-thirds played out to the end. Our method of fighting was already determined for us. The part we had to take was cut out for us. We could change nothing, not even if we had wished to change. We could only make our efforts fit into the general plan.

We must remember, also, that all that happened in the war before we came into it had a profound influence on the final result. For nearly four years before our army fought a battle France, Great Britain, and Belgium in the West, and Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Roumania in the East, together with a large number of British soldiers in the Turkish Empire had been gradually spending themselves in the important work of wearing down the strength of the enemy. Our part was to do what we could to break down the remaining force of an already badly shattered combination of allies. We did that task well, but we

[204]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

could not have succeeded so well and so quickly if the way had not been prepared by the sacrifices of others.

When Germany violated her pledges to respect the neutrality of Belgium she expected little resistance from that country. She intended to sweep onward to Paris, throttle the French government, and turn against Russia, whose mobilization was expected to be too slow to prove a serious menace to her eastern front before the Germans turned against it in overwhelming force. The game was planned for fine playing and it would go awry if the machine was checked at any important point. Three checks were, in fact, imposed on it. The Russians mobilized more quickly than Germany had thought possible, and she was not able to bring the full strength of her armies to bear on other parts of the theater of war. The British threw a small but very effective force before her armies in Belgium and spent them freely in delaying the movement against Paris. Even more important, Belgium rose as a man against her, disputed every Belgian bridge and hillside position, and forced her to fight for every mile from Liége to the French border. France had expected the blow to be delivered on the old Franco-German boundary, and her defenses had been prepared chiefly in that quarter. Thither she began to send her hastily mobilized troops. Seeing that they were being flanked through Belgium, it was necessary to shift these troops farther west in order to place them across the path of the invader. The help of the Belgian and British forces gave her some precious days in which to make this move, although it was not sufficient to enable her and her allies to drive back the wave of invasion until it had penetrated beyond the Marne River. It was September 5 when the retreat before the Germans stopped and September 6 when General Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, opened the battle of the Marne, which was to decide that Paris was safe. The Germans had to fall back to the region north of the Aisne River,

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

where they were able to establish a line of defense which, with slight changes, was to mark through four years the southern limit of their progress.

After fortifying their southern line the Germans poured troops against northern Belgium, largely unprotected because their opponents had been straining every effort in checking the advance on Paris. The fresh troops who were continually marching into Belgium were now thrown against the region north of Brussels. Antwerp was taken on October 9 and the Belgian coast was seized. Here again the French and their allies concentrated troops as rapidly as possible. They were able to bring up enough men to save from the hands of the invaders a small northwestern corner of Belgium, although the Germans took Ostend and the port of Zeebrugge, important to them because the channels were deep enough to permit the use of the interior harbors as submarine bases. In the course of their march westward lay the ancient and rich town of Ypres. They attacked it furiously on October 20, but the defenders opposed a heroic resistance and again the Teutonic wave was broken. As the battle of the Marne broke their design to reach Paris, so the battle of Ypres in October, 1914, broke up their second great move, which was directed toward the seizure of the channel ports through which France would have to maintain communication with Great Britain. Thus came to naught the German scheme of crushing France through Belgium.

The result of the campaign was to establish the western battle line from the sea at Nieuport to the Swiss border. It ran a little east of Ypres, and somewhat west of Lille and Douai, to a point about twelve miles north of the Aisne. Thence it turned eastward, keeping about the same distance north of that river to a point east of Berry-au-Bac, where it crossed the upper course of the Aisne and reached a point northeast of Rheims—but near enough for the German guns to reduce that ancient

[206]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

city to ruins—and thence it swept again eastward to and through the Argonne Forest. East of this place was the great fortress of Verdun, which the Germans were never to take. Around its defenses went their line in a great arc until it reached the stronghold of St. Mihiel to the south, which the Germans held. Their line was pressed back east of the place, however, until the sharp angle of St. Mihiel was made. From this point the line passed along the Lorraine and Alsatian borders to the boundaries of Switzerland, which were reached east of the strong fortress of Belfort. Along this line and a little to each side of it were to be concentrated the woes of an enraged world.

When the advance of the Germans was checked the allies had only half accomplished their work. It was now necessary to drive out the invaders, and it was for that end that the *Entente* allies spent themselves for more than three years. In 1915 they could do little more in France than hold their own. Time was necessary for Great Britain to assemble and train an army equal to the task imposed upon her. It was needed, also, for both Great Britain and France to manufacture the immense quantity of ammunition and ordnance that new conditions of warfare demanded. In this respect, Germany had the advantage; for she had foreseen that great use would be made of artillery in her projected war and had provided a vastly superior quantity. But even she did not realize that she would have to fight four years in the trenches on a line several hundred miles long, and it was necessary for her, also, to enlarge her gun factories. She made violent lunges at her opponents at various points along the western front, notably a severe attack at Ypres, but the lines before her did not break. She also made a victorious campaign in Russian Poland, but the Russians only drew back and did not surrender. A large part of the German army was thus needed to guard this frontier. In the same year the British made severe attacks on the Germans at Neuve Chapelle

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

and south of La Bassée, but they could not break through into the back areas and the western line was not seriously disturbed. They were content then to assume the defensive, while the preparations for still greater efforts went on.

In 1916 the Germans felt able to make an offensive that would penetrate the line in the west and enable them to force France to make peace. The point selected was Verdun against which was concentrated an hitherto unheard of artillery force, supported by heavy columns of assault. Their preparations were carefully concealed and the attack opened on February 21, several weeks before it was thought that the spring campaign would begin. The deluge of shells of all kinds that rained on the outer forts of this position was greater than either army had before seen and was expected to blow defenses and defenders into atoms. The French had learned to construct protection from such intense fire, but in this case they were badly prepared and suffered severely. But throughout the French army ran the phrase, "They shall not pass," and when Joffre ordered division after division into the roaring furnace the soldiers did not flinch. They were always on hand to meet the massed attacks that succeeded the intense bombardments and punished their opponents most severely. The first days of the battle resulted in gains for the Germans, but time brought reënforcements and the interior defenses were held against all attacks. After 140 days of useless assaults the Germans gave up their battle at this point. They grew careless of their security, and when the French made counterattacks in October and December, they were driven back from all the ground they had gained. The endurance of the French soldiers at Verdun will probably survive in the memory of man as the most heroic large-scale achievement in French military history.

Meanwhile, the British, on the northern end of the line of battle, had been preparing for a great offensive. It would have

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

been well to have delivered it while the French were sore pressed at Verdun but the army was not ready. While the British had kept their navy at a high state of efficiency, little attention had been paid to the army. When the war began the navy took the seas in excellent style, shut up the German battle fleet in German harbors, and quickly harried out and destroyed the fast cruising squadrons that were rash enough to remain at sea operating against allied shipping. A British army large enough to meet the need of the time had to be raised out of the untrained population. The people, clinging to their traditional policy, tried to raise it on a voluntary basis; and while they succeeded to a remarkable extent in bringing out a great number of fighting men, they did not throw their entire resources of man power into the war as promptly as was necessary. Also it took time to train the men after they volunteered, and it took a great many weeks to build the factories and supply the artillery for such an army. It was not until July 1, 1916, that the British felt able to assume the offensive. On that day they opened a great attack along the Somme river. By this time the German thrust at Verdun had passed into its period of relaxation and the German divisions that had been punished so heavily there had recovered from the shock. The British attack, therefore, was met with great firmness; and although it was delivered with the greatest courage and skill and pressed back the German line in the first days, it was eventually halted without decisive results. In the battle of the Somme the British introduced tanks and used them with good effect. They were developed by British officers on the basis of an American farm tractor.

The opening of the year 1917 found the two sides tired but determined. Germany considered herself the victor so far and in view of public opinion among her people it would have been impossible to have made peace on any other basis than victory of some kind. Her opponents dared not end the war with

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Germany victorious in any sense. Realizing this situation Germany decided to use her submarines without regard to the principles of humanity, thinking she could thus break the will of Great Britain. She only succeeded in fortifying it, and at the same time she brought the United States into the war. The Russian revolution, which at first seemed a severe blow to her, was brought at last to serve her ends but not for a year after it began. If she could have thrown the troops from her Russian line into the western fighting in 1917 when the United States were far from ready for the struggle, the result might have been in her favor.

On the western front affairs were not favorable to her interest. The British and French had accumulated a vast reserve of guns and ammunition during the winter, they had built an intricate system of railroads behind their trenches for moving their great guns, and it seemed certain that when they opened fire from such well prepared positions the opposite lines would be enveloped and destroyed. Their object, it must be remembered, was not so much to drive back their foes as to destroy them.

The Germans did not wait to take the punishment so carefully prepared. February 17 they began to retire on the Ancre, a few days later they were withdrawing in front of Bapaume, and then the movement was extended to the whole Arras-Somme region. They went back a short distance at a time, covering their movements with light artillery and machine guns. About the middle of March the retreat had extended to a front of nearly 85 miles. A strong series of trenches with well constructed dugouts had been prepared in the rear and named The Hindenburg Line. The retreating forces got safely behind it, relinquishing a devastated area of 600 square miles from Arras to Soissons.

This move disarranged the plans of the British and French
[210]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

for only a brief period. The fighting went on vigorously both north and east of the angle at Soissons. Around Ypres, Lens, and along the Chemin des Dames the allies fought brilliant battles, taking important portions of territory and capturing many prisoners. But there was no decisive shaking of the German position. The kaiser continued to utter defiance, saying the Hindenburg Line was impregnable and his enemies would break their power against it. The allies consoled themselves that they were wearing down the German army and they believed that in another year, with the aid of the United States, the line would at last crack, enabling a victorious army to dictate peace in the midst of Germany's best cities.

2. Instruction in France

In 1917 many Americans thought that it would be advisable for the United States to assemble a division of untrained men under the command of an untrained soldier and throw it into the battle cauldron of France with the object of helping the allies. Looking back at the past two years we may see how immature was this project. It took nine months to drill our regulars, just from the Mexican border, until they were considered fit for the work in the French trenches. A division of Rough Riders in France could hardly have been made useful in a shorter period. The demand was for soldiers thoroughly trained in specialized methods and they were needed in great numbers.

The general staff of the army, looking at the matter in a purely military way, took the view just indicated. They wished the government to make large and powerful preparations, train an army in the United States, where the supply problem would be easier than in Europe, and where the men themselves would be better satisfied, and this done send the army to

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

France for its last training. In taking this position they only adopted the plan Great Britain had employed in solving a similar problem.

On the other hand, was the suggestion that opinion in France was in dire need of stimulation. The Germans predicted that the United States would never get into the war, and there were Frenchmen who held the same view. General Joffre, then in America as a member of the French commission, brought this view to the attention of President Wilson and urged that a force, if only a small one, be sent to France, as a demonstration of our willingness and ability to aid. Members of the British commission supported the view, and on May 18, 1917, the president, on the same day that he signed the bill for the selective draft and announced that he would not organize the Roosevelt division of volunteers, gave an order that a division of regulars be sent to France as early as possible. General Pershing was appointed to the command, and June 8 he landed at Liverpool with his staff and proceeded to Paris, where he arrived on the 13th. He immediately began making preparation for landing the 1st division, the first detachment of which came into port at St. Nazaire on the 26th under command of Major-General W. L. Sibert. The last detachment was landed on July 28. The division was broken up into smaller units and distributed in several camps, where it received training under French officers. Its artillery brigade was supplied with the French 75's and quickly mastered the technique of that weapon.

Late in October the division, still in small units and under French commanders, was sent into the trenches southeast of Nancy, on the quiet Lorraine front. The regiments went into the trenches by battalions, each serving a tour of several days and then withdrawing to billets. It was in this division on October 23 that a gun of the sixth field artillery, battery C, fired the first shot from an American fighting force into the ene-
[212]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

mies' lines. November 3 the Germans threw a barrage beyond the advanced post and took 11 prisoners. The Americans then rallied and beat off their assailants. Other similar adventures occurred in the rainy weeks that followed. January 15 the units were assembled and the division, now serving as a distinct command, was moved to a more active sector, twelve miles northwest of Toul. The Germans showed little disposition to break its line but they were able to inflict considerable loss upon it. The position was opposite the high ground east of St. Mihiel and was under direct observation of the enemy's artillery, which was so well placed that it could not be dislodged. The best the Americans could do was to try to reduce their losses as much as possible by careful concealment. One of them described their situation by saying: "It was like sitting at the foot of the stairs and having the fellow at the top throw rocks at you from behind a curtain." The division lost in this sector in two and a half months 56 killed, 150 wounded, 127 gassed, and 19 missing, a total of 352. Early in April it was moved to the scene of more active fighting in order to meet the great offensive in Picardy.

The statistics given out by Secretary Baker in July, 1918, show that the first division was about all the troops sent to France by the end of July, 1917 (page 191). By the end of the year 142,253 had followed. Many of them were engineering troops for the various kinds of labor that was to be done in preparation for the troops who were to come later on a vast scale; but among them were three divisions which, after being used for various kinds of necessary service at the ports of debarkation, went into training in the lines before the spring of 1918. They were the 2nd division, containing the 5th and 6th regiments of marines, and the 9th and 23d regiments of regular infantry, the 26th division, composed of national guard regiments from New England, and the 42d, or Rainbow Divi-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

sion, taken from the national guard of twenty-six states and the District of Columbia. These three divisions went through training similar to that of the first division and at the end of March, 1918, General Pershing pronounced them "equal to any demands of battle action." On March 17 these four divisions seem to have been located as follows:

On the Toul sector, ten miles east of the angle of St. Mihiel, near the village of Seicheprey. Here served the 1st division on March 17.

On the Aisne east of Soissons and twenty miles west of Rheims along the Chemin des Dames, near the village of Chavignon. Here served the 26th division on March 19.

On the line east of Rheims and north of Chalons, near the villages of Le Mesnil and Tahure.

On the Lunéville sector, thirteen miles east of the town of that name, at Badonvillier, in Lorraine.¹

Other sectors were established during the spring as the American divisions became more numerous. One was in the Vosges Mountains opposite Colmar, in Alsace. Another was opposite Mulhouse, also in Alsace and near the Swiss border. Another was on the heights of the Meuse, southeast of Verdun, which was often spoken of as the sector in the Woivre region. Another sector was created in the Vosges and was occupied in the early summer. After the American divisions began to go into the line of active battle to aid the French in holding back the great German drives of 1918 the sectors west of Verdun changed frequently. East of that fortress they were quieter and seem to have been used for newly arrived divisions.

The first experience of the American soldiers in actual war-

¹ Military Expert in the *New York Times*, March 17, V, p. 1. The official reports in the newspapers do not always use the same terms in describing what appears to be the same sector. Further confusion arises from the evident quick shifting of units from sector to sectors. It is, probably, not until detailed reports are published that we can be sure of the exact location of the specific divisions at any particular time.

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

fare came in the raids into No Man's Land, between the two lines of battle. To crawl at night up to the listening posts in front of the enemy's position in order to obtain information, to seize the occupants of the post if occasion offered, to meet and kill or capture, or at least to drive off an enemy's scouting party, to cut the enemy's wire entanglements—to do any of these things was to acquire training, to become indifferent to mud and danger, and to learn how to take care of oneself in emergencies. These nightly expeditions brought a large number of soldiers into the experience of this peculiar kind of warfare, the like of which had never been seen in Europe before this war began.

As the American soldiers became accustomed to night raiding their raids took on a more serious nature. They were carried out by a larger number of men and resulted frequently in encounters in which several casualties occurred. March 4 in the Lunéville sector the Germans made a strong attack on the Americans and were driven back after some sharp fighting. Their action prompted their opponents to retaliate on the 10th in three large raids planned for simultaneous delivery against points close together. After a heavy bombardment had leveled the German first line trenches the Americans went forward. They found the first line abandoned and went as far as the second line, 600 yards in the rear, before they were ordered back to their own lines. Some of these trenches, it was reported a few days later, were held permanently, thus making the action at Badonvilliers the first sustained advance of the Americans, although it was not the first fighting that may be called a battle.

A few days later raiding began north of St. Mihiel, where on the 14th the Germans were repulsed in a strong raid with a loss of 64 killed and at least 10 wounded. The attacking party reached the American trenches and captured prisoners and

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

killed some of the defenders, but the intruders were quickly driven out.

About the same time, April 11, the Germans made an attack on Apremont at the east of the very tip of the St. Mihiel angle. After a heavy bombardment they went forward in numbers estimated at from 300 to 800 and took possession of the American first and second line trenches. Their opponents had withdrawn before the artillery but now rallied. They placed a barrage behind the Germans and charged upon them, inflicting so much damage on those who had reached the trenches that the occupants were glad to escape to their own lines.

A week later, April 20, occurred an action too important to be called a raid, which we may take for the first battle fought by the soldiers of the United States in France. Seven miles east of Apremont the battle line ran by the village of Seicheprey, leaving it on the American side of the line. Half a mile east it passed over the heights of Remière, mostly in our hands. This position from the village to beyond the heights on the morning of Saturday, the 20th, was brought under a fierce bombardment by the Germans. Later in the forenoon the artillery fire lifted on the heights and a large party of Germans crept up the slope under cover of a heavy mist, surprised the Americans in their outposts, and passed on to the top of the heights, whence they held the village under fire of their machine guns. The defenders of the village had been forced to the cellars during the bombardment, but they now came out and fought hard in hand-to-hand encounters as the Germans swarmed up around them. Twice in the afternoon their friends organized relief columns, but the artillery fire of the Germans made it impossible to reach the village, whence the defenders were forced at last to retreat during the night. But on Sunday morning the Americans organized a strong counterattack and drove the Germans back to their trenches. Enemy accounts had it that the retreat

[216]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

was voluntary after all the objects of the raids had been accomplished and 183 prisoners had been taken. They pronounced the affair a German victory and the German newspapers had much to say about the clever way in which the Americans had been taught a lesson. French and American accounts stated that the retirement was forced by the bayonet and that the Germans left more than 300 dead, with a number of prisoners behind them. After some delay the American authorities confirmed the enemy statement of the capture of prisoners, but claimed that less than 12 of our men had been killed and about 20 had been wounded. While the battle of Seicheprey can hardly be called an American victory, it was not a defeat, and it afforded an opportunity to show the strength of our troops in counterattack. It created in the 26th division, New England men, a fierce desire to meet the Germans in a field where the element of surprise was not present. When it was fought the days of trench training were about past for the 26th division, which, like the other divisions that had been for some months in France, was soon to be drawn into large scale fighting.

3. The Spring Drive of the German Army

March 10, 1918, the *New York Times* published the following appeal from a high military authority in France: "I appreciate, as all France does, how much America has done. But you are a people without limitations in either conception or execution. You can accomplish the impossible when you set yourselves to it. You must do that now. It is not enough that your soldiers are fighting and shedding their blood at our sides; not enough that you are moving splendidly with your limitless resources in men and material. You must do better still. You must come with all your might and speed." These words were inspired by the realization that Germany was rapidly transferring troops from the Russian front to France. The

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

situation had become serious, and the advent of spring weather warned the allies that the attack was due. Day after day it was expected and did not arrive. Then one began to wonder if the Germans would strike at all. March 20th it was reported that government officials in Washington had come to the conclusion that no attack would be delivered by the Germans. The next day the storm broke with terrific force.

At this time the battle-line ran from Nieuport, on the Belgian coast, in a direction nearly due southward. It passed east by a short distance from Ypres, Armentières, and Arras, then bent slightly westward until it approached Marcoing, five miles south of Cambrai, and passing on in a southeasterly direction passed two miles west of St. Quentin, and one mile west of La Fère, until it turned eastward in a sharp angle 18 miles south of that town and proceeded with the old line established a few miles north of the Aisne River. From Nieuport to the Aisne the line was about 125 miles long. The Belgians held it on the north for about 20 miles. The British held the next section from Ypres to a point 10 miles south of St. Quentin, a distance of nearly 100 miles. To the southward were the French, who also held the continuation of the line along the Aisne valley and thence to the Swiss border.

The plan of the Germans for their spring offensive was to strike at the junction of the British and French sections; but it was first necessary for them to push back the British salient in front of Cambrai, lest it be used by the British to turn their flank when they advanced further south. The Cambrai salient flattened and the St. Quentin sector broken, they would pour through the gap, roll the British back northward, capture Amiens, the center of the British railroad system behind the allied line, and reduce the British army to the defensive along the northern coast of France. This done they could swing past the broken end of the French lines, seize Paris, and force France

[218]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

to her knees. The plan seemed simple and easy, and General Hindenburg, the German commander, announced that he would be in Paris by April 1. His superior force and its excellent morale gave him the assurance that he could fulfil his boast, and his armies shared his confidence.

At the point attacked the British line was held by the third army under General Sir Julian Byng, the fifth army under General Gough, and the fourth army under General Rawlinson. The Germans came upon them after a brief but withering artillery fire on March 21. A heavy mist hung over the low plain of the Somme, concealing their approach until they were on the British lines. Byng's army held firm, but the men under Gough were overwhelmed and broken. The Germans were in waves ten ranks deep and in some parts of their line the waves were only 100 yards apart. They were trained to advance a given distance, halt, and allow the line behind to pass through. The operation was repeated with the second and succeeding lines, so that the waves were not thrown into confusion as they proceeded. The British poured rifle and machine gun fire into the heavy waves but did not stop the advance. The British lines were held with 5000 men to the mile: the Germans attacked with from three to four times as many. Their light artillery was moved forward as they advanced and served with telling effect. Their supporting troops were handled with ability and when a local success occurred at a given point there were generally men at hand to move into the advanced position and outflank the defenders on each side.

The days from March 21 to April 1 brought sore trials to the harrassed British. Outnumbered as they were they clung tenaciously to every point that could be defended, holding it until the enemy got around behind, and then falling back. Fighting by day and retreating by night they managed to keep their line formation. The third army swung back slowly with Arras as

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

a pivot. Reënforcements were rushed forward and gradually the resistance hardened in front of Amiens and onwards to Montdidier. March 30 a new line had been established along this front and it was held against the onrush of the enemy. The result of the attack was that the great angle which had formerly had its point near La Fère had been moved westward until the point was near Montdidier, but the junction between the British and French forces was not broken, and the railroad passing through Amiens was intact.

The next week the Germans delivered powerful blows at the defenses of Amiens. The British beat them off to the north of the city, the French withstood them to the south, although the line was bent back until it was within two miles of the Amiens-Paris railroad. Reënforcements arrived just in time to prevent further progress in that region. For a day the world caught breath and then breathed easily as it became evident that the imperiled line had been made so strong that it could not be taken. The week was very rainy and it is probable that the allies owed their safety to the muddy roads which made it difficult for the Germans to bring up guns and supplies in large quantities. At the end of eighteen days the great drive had come to a halt, and Hindenburg was still fifty miles from Paris.

Meanwhile, the disaster of March had forced the allies to accept unity of military command. Those who understood the situation best had long known that the allies suffered from division of leadership. In the autumn of 1917 President Wilson, through Colonel House, urged that a single commander be appointed for all the armies operating against the Germans in France. The French favored the suggestion and Mr. Lloyd George was of the same opinion; but the hint that such a thing was possible brought out a strong protest in Great Britain and those who wished unity had to content themselves with creating an allied war council at Versailles to make plans for

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

the larger features of the fighting. It was not equal to the March emergency, where quick sharp blows had to be given in parrying the powerful strokes of a capable and united foe. This necessity was now admitted even by the British public, and when President Wilson renewed his suggestion it was accepted. March 28 General Ferdinand Foch became commander of the allied armies in France and General Pershing promptly placed the American forces at his disposal (page 224).

Foch was well known as a capable military man, and his appointment gave general satisfaction. He soon showed that he did not expect to turn aside at once the fury of the Germans. It was his policy to allow them to come as they would, meet them with the minimum number of troops needed to withstand them, and thus save his reserves for the day when he could drive home with a staggering thrust at a weakened enemy. The result showed that his plan was well made.

The Somme drive lasted from March 21 to April 1, and the supplementary movement to surround Amiens lasted until the 8th. Then the fighting shifted to the north, breaking against the British line from La Bassée to Ypres. The objective was probably Hazebrouck, 15 miles west of Armientières, with which it was connected by rail. Hazebrouck was connected by railroad with Dunkirk, 25 miles to the north, with Calais, 40 miles to the northwest, and with Boulogne, 45 miles to the west. If it was taken by the Germans confusion would be produced in the British communications.

Von Hindenburg concentrated a large army against the northern section of the British line, while he was pressing the southern section before Amiens. April 8 he opened a withering artillery attack between La Bassée and Ypres and followed it with massed infantry charges, as in the March offensive before St. Quentin. After four days of this terrific hammering the British lines were bent back nearly ten miles on a triangu-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

lar front twenty miles at the base. Day after day the tired troops beat off their foes, only to be met by fresh columns. The seriousness of the situation was seen in the following appeal from General Haig, the British commander-in-chief, to his army. In a general order he said:

“Three weeks ago to-day the enemy began his terrific attacks against us on a fifty mile front. His objects are to separate us from the French, to take the channel ports, and to destroy the British Army. In spite of throwing already 106 divisions into the battle, and enduring the most reckless sacrifice of human life, he has made little progress toward his goals. We owe this to the determined fighting and self-sacrifice of our troops. Words fail me to express the admiration which I feel for the splendid resistance offered by all ranks of our army under the most trying circumstances.

“Many among us are now tired. To those I would say that Victory will belong to the side that holds out longest. The French army is moving rapidly and in great force to our support. There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man. There must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment.”

The British were, indeed, in a difficult position. With vast hordes pressing on them they stood at bay with their backs against the high ground that runs westward from Ypres to Hazebrouck, fighting off the assailants at first one place and then another, always striking and always receiving the severest blows. On the tenth day of the battle, when Ypres was almost taken and when the Germans were but four and a half miles from Hazebrouck heavy French reënforcements arrived and went into line of battle. The Germans made one last massed attempt to smother their opponent at the village of Givenchy, where French and British waited side by side. Rising to the tops of the trenches the defenders thrust back the assaulting

[222]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

columns with terrible slaughter. Then the fighting shifted to the region east and southeast of Ypres, where the Germans seemed to have the city in their grasp. After hard fighting they were again repulsed. April 29, when the struggle around Ypres had gone on three weeks, the Germans made one grand assault and were thrown back in murderous slaughter. They then concluded that they could not pass this way and turned their attacks to other fields. For five weeks the brunt of the struggle fell on the British, who stood the punishment with splendid fortitude. It then shifted to the South, where it spent itself against the trenches of the Frenchmen.

4. The American Army Drawn into the Battle

The violent blows of the Germans in March and April, 1918, caused great uneasiness in allied circles. Von Hindenburg was fighting against time. He wished to finish the war before the troops from the United States could arrive in numbers large enough to have a material effect on the situation. His evident purpose made it clear that we should use every ounce of energy we possessed to hurry forward with assistance. Mr. Charles H. Grasty, one of the soundest of the American correspondents in France, wrote that the situation in that country would be safe if 1,000,000 fresh American troops were behind the allied lines. They could be used as reserves, even if not fully trained, while Foch threw the veteran armies into the attack. A French military critic sent us this advice: "Scrap before shipping every pound that takes tonnage and is not necessary to the killing of Germans. Send the most infantry by the shortest route to the hottest corner. No matter what flag they fight under, so long as it is an allied flag."

March 28, 1918, our morning papers contained the following message from Mr. Lloyd George to the people of the United States:

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

"We are at the crisis of the war. Attacked by an immense superiority of German troops, our army has been forced to retire. The retirement has been carried out methodically before the pressure of a steady succession of fresh German reserves, which are suffering enormous losses. The situation is being faced with splendid courage and resolution. The dogged pluck of our troops has for the moment checked the ceaseless onrush of the enemy, and the French have now joined in the struggle. But this battle, the greatest and most momentous in the history of the world, is only just beginning. Throughout it French and British are buoyed up with the knowledge that the great Republic to the West will neglect no effort which can hasten its troops and its ships to Europe. In war, time is vital. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of getting American reinforcements across the Atlantic in the shortest possible space of time."

At this time Mr. Hurley, chairman of the shipping board, was in London. He made an arrangement with the British authorities by which a number of large passenger ships were withdrawn from the supply service of Great Britain and placed at our disposal for the transportation of troops. The result is seen in the numbers of troops carried over in the succeeding months: March, 83,811; April, 117,212; May, 244,345; and June, 276,372.

On the day Mr. Lloyd George's appeal was published in our papers General Pershing visited General Foch and put the American army unreservedly at the disposal of the supreme commander. His words, as reported in the Paris press, are memorable. "I come to say to you," runs the report, "that the American people would hold it a great honor for our troops were they engaged in the present battle. I ask it of you in my name and in that of the American people. There is at this moment no other question than that of fighting. Infantry, artillery, aviation—all that we have are yours to dispose of as you will. Others are coming which are as numerous as will be necessary. I have come to say to you that the American

[224]

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

people would be proud to be engaged in the greatest battle in history." These simple words, so worthy of the best traditions of chivalry, electrified the tired soldiers facing the German armies. For a year they had heard the promises of American assistance. General Pershing's action left no ground for doubt as to our intention. Without a suggestion of boasting and with no hint of our immense reserve power he presented the nation as a modest candidate for the honor of serving the common cause.

Two days later it was known in Paris that American forces had left their training areas and started for the plains of Picardy, where the German pressure was greatest. They went forward singing "Over there." The country people cheered them along the roads, and other columns of Americans who met them on the journey gave them the characteristic greeting, "Eat 'em up!"

The good impression made by this action was strengthened when it was announced on April 1 that for the time freshly arrived American troops would be brigaded with British and French regiments and placed in the trenches for training, so that they might learn actual war in the shortest possible time. The willingness of the Americans to split their brigades and divisions and place themselves under foreign commanders was an act of abnegation that any military man could appreciate.¹

If anything else was needed to convince the world that we were entirely dedicated to the war, it was found in the speech of President Wilson in Baltimore on April 6, 1918. Calling the people to their supreme effort he demanded: "Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and

¹This practice was given up by order of General Foch about the middle of June. He held that there were then so many trained American divisions in France that there was no longer an advantage in brigading American regiments with the French or British.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

cast every selfish dominion down in the dust." Thus, by offering our all to General Foch, by moving our trained divisions into the battle lines, by placing our untrained regiments in foreign brigades, and by preaching the doctrines of force to the utmost the United States took place in the great army that was to check and rout the hosts of Germany.

Late in March it became known that some Americans had already been drawn into the great battle and had acquitted themselves in a very creditable manner. When the British lines gave way before St. Quentin on the 27th of March a battalion of the 11th regiment of American engineers was constructing a bridge for a corps supply railroad over the Somme just behind the lines. Finding themselves caught in the battle, with German troops coming up on each side of them, they dropped their tools, took up arms, and occupied defensive positions. Instead of saving themselves in retreat they withstood the enemy during the day, fell back at night, and repeated the process day by day. Their leader took charge of an infantry regiment and led it in the severe and confused fighting that ensued. They destroyed important material dumps at Chaulnes, fell back with the British to Moreuil and there laid out and constructed a system of trenches which they defended until they were ordered back to a position near Warfusee-Abancourt, extending to the north side of the Bois de Toislaw. This position they held with great bravery from March 27 to April 3, until ordered to Abbeville for recuperation. On March 30 they fought bravely by the side of the British cavalry. Their conduct won the commendation of General Rawlinson, commanding the British army in which they served, and was acclaimed in the British and French newspapers.

About the time the 11th engineers completed this retreat Marshal Foch gave orders for the 1st division of United States troops to turn over their trenches in the Toul sector and move

LEARNING THE WAR GAME IN FRANCE

to the Picardy front. The transfer was completed on April 18, when the division, after marching 300 miles, went into camp at Beauvais, 20 miles from the battle line at Montdidier. On the 25th it was moved to the front at a point three miles west of Montdidier. The position was a slight salient in the German lines and it was nearly the most advanced point they held toward the Amiens-Paris railroad. The front line trenches around the salient were about a mile and a half long.

Here the division remained for more than a month watching the enemy in front of it. Then the commander, Major-General Bullard, decided to attack and press in the salient. With careful preparations the design was carried out successfully on May 28. Early in the morning a heavy bombardment was poured on the German defenses, which drove the occupants to the dugouts. At 6:30 A. M. the troops went over the top behind a carefully laid barrage which advanced with mechanical precision at the rate of fifty-five yards a minute. The column was composed of the 28th regiment, led by Colonel Ely and a battalion of the 26th regiment led by Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and was well supplied with food, water, and entrenching tools. In three-quarters of an hour the town was occupied and a new line was begun 600 yards beyond the German first line trenches. Engineers hastily constructed wire defenses and the signal men laid down telephone wires to maintain communication with the rear. The Germans made two counterattacks on the 28th and another on the 29th, all of which were repulsed with great success. In these operations the Germans lost more than 1300 men killed and wounded and 242 taken prisoners, while the Americans lost 199 killed, 652 wounded, 200 gassed, and 16 missing. The affair at Cantigny was small in comparison with many others that occurred daily, but it attracted attention in many quarters because it was considered a test of American military prowess. The French com-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

munique which mentioned it called it a "brilliant" performance. The London *Evening News* said: "Bravo, the Young Americans! Nothing in to-day's battle narrative from the front is more exhilarating than the account of their fight at Cantigny. It was clean-cut from beginning to end."

The 1st division served in this sector from April 25 to July 7, holding the trenches against a continuous lively cannonading. There were frequent raids in which the men gave good account of themselves, as was shown by their total losses for the period, which reached 5390 killed, wounded, gassed, and missing. It is an indication of their manner of fighting that the missing were only 65. When the division was placed before Cantigny it seemed that they were in the most dangerous part of the great line of battle. The Somme drive was beginning to break its force and it was expected that the foe would soon renew his efforts to reach the Amiens railroad. At this post of honor did the men from the United States enter the great battle.

CHAPTER XI

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT, MAY TO JULY, 1918

1. *The May-June German Offensive*

THE German offensive campaign of 1918 consisted of four great drives at the allied lines, two of which have been considered in the preceding chapter. The first was in the center, towards Amiens, the second was in the north, towards Hazebrouck, the third and fourth were in the south, towards the Marne river, down whose valley, it was believed von Hindenburg wished to lead his armies to Paris. After these attacks had been made and checked the Germans lost the initiative to Marshal Foch, and from that time until the armistice was signed on November 11 the Germans were in more or less steady retreat. This chapter deals with the movement to the Marne and across it—the third and fourth drives—and with the countermovement by which the advance was checked and finally turned back. It was the lot of the troops of the United States to come into the campaign at its most critical stage and take an important part in association with the French in throwing back the invaders.

The third drive began on May 27, 1918. Suddenly the line protecting the northern edge of the Aisne Valley, from a point north of Soissons to the Rheims angle, broke into fury. The Chemin des Dames, a part of this line, was carried by the Germans, who penetrated the Franco-British line a distance of five miles on a front of twenty miles. Next day the Aisne was crossed and the Vesle was reached at Fismes. On the 29th the Vesle defenses were carried away and the line was established for a distance of thirty miles from three to five miles south of

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the river. On the 30th the salient was deepened by five miles on a front twenty miles long. The tired French and British divisions were weakened by losses and retired as slowly as possible in the face of an enemy that always pressed on in overwhelming numbers. The heavy fighting in Picardy and around Ypres had drawn the mass of Foch's army into that region, and some days were necessary before it could come to the aid of the retreating allies. How little prepared they were for the blow at this point is shown by the fact that three British divisions that had borne the brunt of the retreat of March on the Somme front and suffered severely had been sent to the Chemin des Dames sector to recuperate. If Foch had expected an attack at this point he would not have held the place with such troops.

On the 31st of May the Germans appeared along the north bank of the Marne east of Château-Thierry. The thin line of *poilus* tried to hold the bridges and failing destroyed them as they took position on the south bank. Here the advance came to a halt on the south. But on the same day it swung westward with a great sidewise movement that widened the salient by eight miles on a front thirty-eight miles long. June 1 the line again swung westward, moving for six miles, passing well beyond the road that ran from Soissons to Château-Thierry. On this day the interval that kept the Germans from the town itself was wiped out and the outskirts of the place were occupied. June 2 the German line moved three miles further west and then came to a standstill. Heavy allied reënforcements had arrived on the western side of the great salient and against them the Germans made no more progress.

At this time the line ran from Rheims southwesterly to the Marne near Chatillon, then seven miles along the river to the outskirts of Château-Thierry, westerly and thence northwesterly to the old line, passing eight miles west of Soissons, which the Germans took on the 29th. This line was about eighty miles

[230]

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

long. It marked the most extensive gain of territory made by the Germans in France after the great drive toward Paris in 1914. When it began they were sixty-five miles from Paris: when it ended they were only thirty-nine miles from it, and the nearest point to the city was on the line about seven miles west of Château-Thierry, near the village of Bouresches. The Marne makes a sharp bend to the south at Château-Thierry, and it was at this point that the line left the north bank of the river, running first about four miles due west, slightly south of the road to Paris and then veering to the northwest near the village of Le Thiolet. It was in this region that the troops of the United States entered the battle line.

The 2d and 3d divisions were selected for this service.

The 2d was composed of the 5th and 6th regiments of marines and the 9th and 23d regiments of regular infantry, with the ordinary complements of artillery, engineers, sanitary units, and supply troops. The division was in intensive training, preparatory to going into the trenches in Picardy when danger developed on the Marne. Ordered to that front it took its place on June 1 by the side of the French before the village of Bourresches, northwest of Château-Thierry. Riding forward in great French camions over the crowded roads the infantrymen sang an old army song with a refrain that ran, "And they couldn't beat the infantry in a hundred thousand years!" a song that our regulars have sung on many a campaign on our Western plains. The French villagers who saw them pass did not understand the song, but they caught the gleam of determination in their faces and cheered as they passed.


The 3d division moved forward at the same time, taking position on June 1 south of the Marne from Château-Thierry to Jaulgonne. Its machine-gun battalion had just been motorized and reached Château-Thierry on May 31. The French, exhausted by four days steady fighting, were falling back slowly

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

before the German vanguard units which had outrun their main columns. Some of the Germans had penetrated the town, which lies mostly on the north bank of the river. The machine-gunners and a battalion of French colonials attacked promptly and on the afternoon of the 31st drove the intruders back across the bridges to the northern edge of the town, where the retreating French formed a temporary line. The Americans then placed themselves in such a position as to command the bridges. June 1 in the darkness the enemy again entered the northern town and drove the French troops back on the bridges. The Americans placed their guns so well that they held back the Germans, allowed the French to cross the river, and when all were in safety blew up the bridges and killed a number of the enemy whom they had allowed to come upon them. The conduct of this machine-gun battalion was another illustration of the clear-cut method of the American fighters, and it reassured those who were anxious to see how the Americans would meet the kaiser's veterans.


Northwest of Château-Thierry the French line on June 1 was thin and tired when the 2d division came into support behind it. The 9th regiment marching ahead was placed to the southeast of the road from Paris to Château-Thierry, about four miles from the latter place. The 6th marines came next to them, northwest of the road, and beyond them a battalion of the 5th marines. Then came a French unit and beyond it was the 23d regiment of infantry, which arrived later than the other units of the 2d division. It had gone forward as the reserve regiment of the division, but at the moment of its arrival behind the lines news came of a break in the French lines at Colombes and it was thrown in to stem the tide. It found prompt opportunity to be of service. In line before Veully de Poterie on the same day, June 1, it received and repulsed two strong attacks and the next day charged and drove back the

[232]



Reproduced by permission of
The World's Work ©

**THE FIGHTING ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE CHATEAU-THIERRY SALIENT,
JUNE, 1918**



Reproduced by permission of
The World's Work ©

**THE FIGHTING IN THE JULY DRIVE OF THE GERMANS EAST OF
CHATEAU-THIERRY**

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

German lines in a well delivered counter-blow. On June 4 it was returned to its position on the right flank of the 2d division. At this time, June 5, our front covered twelve miles, the regulars holding the right half, lying on both sides of the Paris road, and the marines lying west of them in front of Bouresches and Belleau Woods.

June 2 the marines had their first encounter. They had been drawn up behind the exhausted French line, which had reached the limit of endurance. In the late afternoon the Germans threw forward two columns of troops against the left flank, driving back the French in front of the marines. At 300 yards the attacking columns paused a few seconds and just at this instant the American fire opened on their well formed ranks, rifles and machine guns doing great damage. The columns reeled, as if paralyzed and then broke and fled. As they fell back the artillery opened on them with deadly effect. It was a small affair, but it was neatly done and the French officers who saw it congratulated marines and infantry for their excellent work. The following words from the letter of a machine-gunner in this action will give an idea of how the Americans felt in their first battles:

“I always thought it was rather a fearful thing to take a human life, but I felt a savage thrill of joy and I could hardly wait for the Germans to get close enough. And they came arrogant, confident in their power, to within 300 yards. . . . But it was good to jam down on the trigger, to feel her kick, to look out ahead, hand on the controlling wheel, and see the Heinies fall like wheat under the mower. They were brave enough, but they didn't have a chance. The poor devils didn't know they were facing the Marines—Americans.”¹

During the night the French filtered through the American lines in great numbers. On the morning of the 3d they had withdrawn entirely and the supporting American line found

¹ Catlin, A. W., *With the Help of God and a Few Marines*, p. 95.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

itself the first line, face to face with the enemy, who, however, did not attack at once, thus giving the Americans time to organize their line. They placed the 23d infantry, brought up on the 4th, just north of the Paris road, so that the right half of their line was held by the two infantry regiments. Some French troops came up on the left. The result was that the marines now held a front of four kilometers, that is, 2.44 miles. At the northern end of this line was Hill 165, on which the enemy had placed batteries that annoyed our line. A vigorous attack was made against it on the 5th by a combined force of Americans and French, with the result that the place was taken in good style and the line was carried forward nearly a mile. It was also thrown eastward so that it bent around the western edge of Belleau Wood at a distance of from 100 to 500 yards.

This position, destined to become famous in the annals of the American Marines, was a typical French forest, without undergrowth, but so thickly set with small trees that it was impossible to see more than 20 feet through the wood. The surface was uneven and there were many gullies and outcropping boulders. The wood was about a mile and a quarter long, from north to south, and three-quarters of a mile wide. It was known that the Germans were in it in force, but whether they intended to use it as a jumping-off place for an attack or as a position of defense it was impossible to say.

Under the circumstances it was decided to force the fighting, and two columns of marines were thrown against the woods at 5 P. M. on June 6, one along the western edge and one at the southern end. The first was met by a very heavy fire and was driven back with severe losses. The second reached the wood successfully and fought through the lower end for a distance of a mile, driving the occupants before them. On the same afternoon a column of marines was thrown against the village of Bouresches, 400 yards east of the woods, and took it in good

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

style, thus making safe the right flank of the troops in the woods. The fight was continued from the south end and the Germans were slowly pressed back in costly hand-to-hand encounters. Rushing machine gun nests, throwing hand grenades from shell-holes, and taking pot-shots at the machine-gunners from behind whatever tree or stone offered protection were now the methods forced upon the marines. They were to become well known tactics to many other American units before the war came to an end. On the 7th and 8th the marines slowly pushed forward from the south, but with a great loss of their own men. On the 9th the commanders realized that the sacrifice was too great and withdrew the fighting line to send over a deluge of shells from 200 guns, 75's and 155's, which after many hours left the woods stripped of foliage and swept of most of its defenders. The marines now went forward again, driving back the Germans who had managed to hold out in protected positions, taking prisoners, and slaying many of the enemy. It was not until the 11th that the woods were fairly mopped up, but even then something remained to be done for a week longer. June 18 the marines made a vicious thrust northward and took the approaches to the town of Torcy, from which the enemy had annoyed their left flank. The place was taken in stiff hand-to-hand fighting after a bombardment of thirteen hours, with 311 prisoners and 700 Germans killed.

July 1 the village of Vaux was captured. It lay north of the Paris road and its high ground dominated the approaches to Château-Thierry on the north. The line before Vaux was held by the 23d and 9th regular regiments, and the assault was entrusted to them. It was executed in excellent style after a heavy barrage had been laid down by the American artillery, which for the first time in this battle were present in force. Shortly afterwards the 2d division was withdrawn to a rest area. In the month's fighting it had suffered severely and

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

needed time to train replacement troops. It had taken more than 1400 prisoners and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

In the attack of the marines on Belleau Wood was displayed the best kind of personal courage. Perhaps it was not the best kind of tactics to make the attack before the Germans had been subjected to concentrated artillery fire; but the attack was a revelation of the daring and steadiness of the soldiers from the Western world. It was a clear way of showing the French and British soldiers that the Americans were dependable brothers in arms. General Degoutte, under whom the 2d division served, expressed his appreciation of the valor it displayed by ordering that Belleau Wood should henceforth be known as the "Bois de la Brigade de Marine." The German intelligence service bore witness of the excellent impression the fighting of the division created upon the enemy. In a captured report by an officer of that service occurred the following: "The 2d American division may be considered a very good division, perhaps even an assault division. The various attacks of the two regiments upon Belleau Wood were executed with dash and intrepidity. The moral effect of our fire was not able seriously to check the advance of the infantry. The nerves of the Americans are not yet worn out."

2. *The German Drive South of the Marne*

When the 2d division checked the German advance at the point of the Château-Thierry angle, thus stopping the progress toward Paris in a direct line, the great drive turned westward along the line running north of Torcy. This line, as we have seen, reached the old east and west line near Soissons, whence it turned sharply westward towards Montdidier. In the angle made by this turn was the forest of Compègne. The Germans made a determined effort to take the forest in the second week of June, striking in at Villers-Cotterets on the

[236]

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

southern leg of the angle and along the Aisne on the northern leg. If they could crush this angle they would widen the Marne salient on its western side and gain a broad sweep toward Paris. Foch foresaw the movement and concentrated troops to meet it. The forest region was favorable to defense and the Germans gave up the attack after losing heavily in a week of hard fighting. They then decided to turn elsewhere. This move had an important bearing on the result; for it drew a large part of Foch's army to this particular region. We shall soon see what use was made of it. The Germans had become so used to delivering sharp blows with impunity that they seem to have thought that wherever they struck Foch must send all his force scurrying off to that region to meet the new danger. They did not take into account that he might at last assume the offensive himself and deliver a great blow at one of these quiet sectors while they were striking at another.

After the failure before the forest of Compègne there ensued four full weeks of relaxation. No one doubted that it would end suddenly in a furious onslaught on some unexpected point—but where? It could hardly fall on one of the points already engaged, where the defenses recently built up were still strong. Military observers were inclined to predict, said the newspapers, that it would fall somewhere in the north. Having the interior lines the Germans could move their forces to that region more quickly than the French, who would have to transport them along roads well beyond the zone immediately behind the battle line, thus describing a wide arc in comparison with the route to be taken by the forces within the arc. In view of these considerations there was a well defined feeling that the next drive would strike the sector around Albert, north of the Amiens sector.

As the July days passed without the expected attack the allies began to wonder if it was going to be delivered. Judging

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

by the intervals between preceding attacks it was overdue on the tenth of the month, and still there were no signs that it was imminent. Cautious men, however, took no comfort from this fact; for they reflected that all the German attacks had occurred without preliminary signs of unusual battle. The extraordinary artillery force that was thrown into the attack when it did come would perhaps account for the longer interval of preparation.

It broke with great fury on the night of July 14, and the region involved was the part of the line from Château-Thierry to the eastern side of the angle at Rheims. The plan was to get south of the Marne, wipe out the Rheims salient, and capture Chalons, to be followed, perhaps, by a swing around the capital on its southeastern side. To cross the river it was necessary to cover the southern bank with an intense barrage of artillery fire in a belt of country three or four miles wide, under cover of which troops could be thrown across in numbers sufficient to sweep the back country when the barrage lifted. To make this part of the work complete, many long range guns were used, some of them carrying projectiles as much as twenty miles; and with these pieces the back areas were so hotly punished that it was difficult to bring up troops to meet the expected dash of infantry. All these guns fired high explosive shells with deadly effect.

The section of the Marne selected for crossing was the part extending from near Château-Thierry on the west to Dormans, a distance of fifteen miles. The bombardment equaled in intensity the artillery attack that opened the battle of March 21. Under cover of the attack 13 divisions of picked troops were thrown across the river during the night and sent forward behind a lifting barrage at dawn. The object was to take Montigny the first day and then drive on eastward to Epernay. At the same time a terrific attack was made on the army of
[238]

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

General Gouraud, east of Rheims. It was hoped that the forces pressing on the eastern line might arrive in the neighborhood of Chalons and so force the French to withdraw from Rheims. To lose that position would not be a great calamity in itself, since it was but an angle thrust forward into enemy territory; but its fall would have great moral influence, both in France and in Germany.

The 3d division held a line from Château-Thierry to Jaulgonne on the south bank of the Marne. Using canvas boats and pontoons the enemy, under cover of the barrage, transferred 15,000 picked men, among them the 10th Guard division, to the south bank in the early morning. Ten points were selected for the crossing, but most of the force crossed near Fossoy and Mezy. Forming a line they charged the Americans behind a lifting barrage, driving some of them back as much as three miles. In this attack the 38th regiment distinguished itself by its firm resistance. Despite the heavy barrage, it held its place and drove back the forces that tried to cross on its front, shooting holes in the canvas boats, so that they sank with the occupants, and driving into the water the luckless ones who had crossed. Meanwhile, troops had crossed on each flank, but the regiment threw out protecting columns and with three sides engaged, bravely defended its position against two divisions and took 600 prisoners. General Pershing said that in doing this the regiment "wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals."

About noon the supporting lines were moved forward, against the advice of the French officers, and the advanced German lines were driven back to the river in brilliant charges by the Americans. Without the aid of their artillery on the north bank and without means of crossing they were slaughtered by the American field guns, machine guns, and rifles. By midnight no Germans remained on the south bank in front of the American

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

lines. It was estimated that 5000 were killed, and the number taken prisoners was reported at 1100.

The line on the American right was held by French divisions. Against them came on the 15th a heavy German column most of which had crossed at Courtemont. Under the influence of the shock of their terrible bombardment they reached a line running through St. Agnan, the Bois de Condé, and Comblizy. Against this line the right flank of the American section charged in the afternoon of the 15th, acting in conjunction with the French. The troops issued from the Bois de Condé and swept forward on a line five miles long, pushing back the Germans for one mile and capturing the towns of Chezy and Montlevon. In this action they took 345 prisoners. On this day, the 15th, the Germans crossed the Marne still farther east on a long stretch, establishing themselves on the south bank from a point south of Chatillon to Comblizy. North of the river they pressed back the French with heavy attacking columns until they had gained about four miles on an average from Rheims to the American lines at Glandy.

On the 16th the same pressure continued, but it was less successful. The French had come up in force. They held the mountain south of Rheims but gave ground about two miles along the Marne, and generally maintained their positions from the river to St. Agnan, which changed hands several times. Farther west the Americans made a strong thrust at Courtemont and drove the Germans across the river at this place. A strong force of Americans was reported fighting in coöperation with the French at the point where the line crossed the Marne, which was the most severely contested part of the Rheims-Château-Thierry line on this day.

On the 17th, the third day of the drive, the western end of the line was not shaken. An advance of one and a half miles was

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

made along the Marne in the direction of Epernay. The mountain south of Rheims was not taken. Next day the Germans concentrated on the direct road to Epernay but made no progress in spite of heavy losses, remaining at the close of the day a full seven miles from Epernay. It was the limit of their advance in this quarter, or in any quarter; for on this day, the 18th, Marshal Foch struck them in another section with his crushing counterattack, which caused them to hesitate a day and then put them on the defensive. From that day to the end of the war they did not have another important success.

Meanwhile, they had been trying hard to break the allied line east of Rheims. They attacked there on a general front of several miles, but their hardest blow fell at Prunay, about seven miles southeast of Rheims. This section was under the command of General Gouraud, of whom his soldiers said that he fought as much with his one arm as other generals fought with two. He had expected the attack around Prunay and was ready for it. Through the four days of the fighting along the Marne his lines were under the heaviest kind of attack at Prunay, but they did not give way. The Germans made a small dent, about four miles wide and three deep and that was all they had to show for losses that were little less than appalling. In the section under command of General Gouraud served the American 42d, or Rainbow, division, some units of which were thrown into the battle.

As for the American troops who fought on the Château-Thierry sector, they acquitted themselves with great credit. It was estimated that the enemy had suffered 60,000 casualties at the hands of these Americans. In their prompt counterattack on the fifteenth they had shown a new way of meeting a massed German offensive. This movement was undertaken on the responsibility of General Dickman, commanding the Americans.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

When he reported his intention to the French general who was his superior he was advised to wait, as a counterattack was not necessary. His reply was as follows:

“We regret being unable on this occasion to follow the counsel of our masters, the French; but the American flag has been forced to retire. This is unendurable, and none of our soldiers would understand their not being asked to do whatever is necessary to remedy a situation which is humiliating to us and unacceptable to our country’s honor. We are going to counter-attack.”¹

A London correspondent referring to the incident said that it caused great rejoicing and a little surprise in British military circles. Reports of French bravery, he added, were an old story, “but every demonstration of American efficiency brings a fresh outburst of enthusiasm.” In France the incident was equally praised. It was the common opinion of Europe when we entered the war that the fighting spirit was low in the United States. Wealth, love of peace, and the lack of a ruling class from which officers could be developed seemed to most Europeans insuperable obstacles to the creation of a good army. It took action like that at Jaulgonne to overcome this opinion. In breaking it down we won confidence immediately, which was of great value in future operations. We encouraged our own men, and we exercised an opposite effect over the minds of the enemy.

3. *Reducing the Rheims-Soissons Salient*

The operations of July 17, 1918, demonstrated General Hindenburg’s inability to crush the sides of the Rheims salient. In his furious efforts against it he drew off his best divisions from the western side of the great salient he had made late in May. To Marshal Foch, waiting for the time when the Germans

¹ *New York Times*, July 17, 1918, p. 1.

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

should have spent their strength the moment was opportune. There is reason to believe that he had tried to create the impression that his reserves were used up. At any rate on the night of the 17th the German line from the region of Soissons to Château-Thierry was weakly held and entirely off its guard. Over against it Foch had massed a strong attacking force in the forest areas around Villers-Cotterets. Moving these troops quietly into line during the night of July 17 he prepared to attack at dawn.

The front extended from the village of Vaux, near Château-Thierry, to Fontenoy, on the north side of the Aisne River, a distance of thirty miles. It ran about five miles west of Soissons, in enemy hands; and one of Foch's objects was to recover this city. In this line were three American divisions, the 26th, at the extreme south and with a French division on its left. At the northern end were the 1st and 2d divisions in what was considered "the place of honor in the thrust." The 42d, or Rainbow, division, was then being moved from the region of Prunay and a few days later it went into line in relief of the 26th. The 3d division was in the same position south of the Marne it had defended so well on the fifteenth, and the 4th division was in support. General Pershing had renewed his offer of aid to Marshal Foch, and as the troop movement from the United States was now ample, he brought up several of his better trained divisions to use as relief for the divisions first thrown into line. The troops assembled for this attack were commanded by General Mangin.

At dawn on the 18th the French and American divisions began their attack. They advanced without artillery preparation, in order to make the surprise more complete, and had only the protection of a rolling barrage from their 75's. They took the Germans wholly by surprise and forced them back from the first lines. Bringing up field artillery they promptly organized


OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

another forward movement and again advanced. By nightfall the enemy had brought up reënforcements and offered stout resistance; but his losses had been severe. The upper half of the line attacked had been driven in to a depth of six miles on a front of fourteen. The lower part, which was the pivot of the movement, had gone forward from two to three miles. The next day, the 19th, the attack was continued with an advance of two miles in the region of Soissons. On the 20th the same progress was reported in the northern portion of the line, the southern portion marking time. At the end of this day the whole line was about two miles west of the highway from Château-Thierry to Soissons, the most important line of communication for the Germans in the southern part of the salient. On the 21st the allies went forward across this road throughout most of its course, thus forcing the evacuation of the northern part of Château-Thierry, which had been held by the Germans since the beginning of June.

It did not take the German commander long to realize how serious a blow Foch's counterattack was, and he lost no time in slipping out of the awkward position in which it placed him. Had he waited two days longer trying to parry the thrust he would perhaps have been overwhelmed with disaster. As it was, two days were enough to convince him that he must retreat. On the night of the 19th he initiated his retrograde movement by beginning to withdraw his hard-pressed troops from the south bank of the Marne. By the night of the 21st the re-crossing was completed, the French following close behind him.

Thus came to an end the fifth German drive six days after it began, and the end found the Germans in a grave situation. In terrific fighting von Hindenburg had lost heavily and was back north of the Marne with his chief line of supplies cut and his army threatened with disaster. He did not underestimate the
[244]





THE AMERICAN DIVISIONS IN THE MARNE-VESLE CAMPAIGN

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

situation, and it was only by excellent generalship that he escaped from the salient with unbroken ranks. In an effort to close the top of the salient the French were beating against his lines in their northern parts. He brought up reserves in large numbers, built up his resistance, and held back the smashing French charges until he could place behind the Vesle the troops who were fighting for their lives at the bottom of the salient. For the German soldier it was hold fast on the side of the salient and cover the withdrawal of heavy artillery at its bottom. That the retreat was made so well was due to the skillful use of machine guns. These instruments of death at favorable places held back the pursuers while the main army moved slowly northward. The process involved an expensive sacrifice on the part of the machine-gunners, but it served General von Hindenburg well.

In the beginning of Foch's counterstroke the most important position was given to the 1st and 2d American divisions. Placed a little south of the Soissons region with the famous French Moroccan division between them—the 1st being nearest Soissons—they advanced against the most critical part of the German line, carrying it back five miles the first day and attaining their third objective. The 2d division took Beau Repaire farm and Vierzy in a rapid advance and by the end of the second day was in position before Tigny. The 1st division advanced with a French division on its left and gained steadily throughout the first day. On the second it went still farther, despite the heavy reënforcements brought up against it. The third day it stood before Berzy-le-Sec, assigned as an objective to the French division on the left; but as that division had been held up the 1st was asked to take the place, which was important because it commanded the Soissons-Oulchy-le-Château railroad. Major-General Summerall, commanding the 1st, attacked promptly on July 20. He met stout resistance in

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

which there was close hand-to-hand fighting, and at nightfall was still outside of the village. The time had now arrived for the relief of the division, and the Moroccan division on his right was already withdrawing according to the same arrangement. But the 2d division refused to be relieved until Berzyle-Sec was taken and permission was given to remain at the front. On the morning of the 21st Summerall paraded his men in full view of the enemy under heavy fire and led them forward into the town, capturing or routing all its garrison. On the same day his first brigade overran the highway from Soissons to Château-Thierry. This done the 1st division was relieved. The two American divisions serving in this part of the line captured 7000 prisoners and 100 pieces of artillery in this offensive. Both suffered heavy losses and had to be withdrawn to quiet sectors to absorb their replacing units.

On the southern end of the line of advance the 26th division went forward more slowly, since it was at the pivot of the entire movement. It was not the purpose of Marshal Foch to smash the lower part of the salient too far before he had drawn in the top part of its sides. The 26th, therefore, was ordered forward by slow advances. It accomplished all that was required, taking the towns of Belleau and Torcy that lay in its path. On the 20th it was near the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway and on the 21st it crossed that important artery of communication. It pursued the retiring Germans in a northeasterly direction to Trugny and Epieds and was relieved on the 24th and sent into rest areas.

At this time General Pershing was bringing up his best divisions as rapidly as possible, relieving one with another as they pressed the retreating Germans. They all followed the line marked out by the 26th, pressing northeasterly into the center of the collapsing salient. It was the 42d, the Rainbow Division, that relieved the 26th. It pressed on vigorously and

[246]

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

fought a severe fight in the Forêt de Fère with an unusually strong nest of machine guns. The 3d and 4th divisions had in the meanwhile been fighting their way forward in the same kind of battle on the east of the 26th and 42d. They reached the Ourcq River on the 27th, thus completing the first stage of the German expulsion from the salient.

The point to which the western half of this retiring movement converged was the town of Fère-en-Tardenois on the Ourcq, from which seven roads radiated. Despite the heavy attacks of the Americans, the Germans stood stoutly before it, until they removed their heavy guns from the Dormans section of the Marne. Then with their light artillery moving before them and protected on the rear by their nests of machine guns, they got away as fast as they could. The Americans followed so rapidly that they crossed the Ourcq at Sergy and Serigny close behind their opponents and seized and held a range of hill three miles north of the stream.

At Sergy the Germans brought their artillery to bear and drove the Americans out of the town, and the Prussian Guards, who had been driven out, returned. The Americans, not fearing German artillery when the German troops were in the town, now entered it and fought the occupants with the bayonet until they took the place. It had become tradition with the Americans that the Germans would not withstand American bayonets. The Prussians gone the German artillery again drove out the Americans, to be followed by the arrival of the Prussians a second time. This process was repeated until the town had changed hands nine times. At last, as the Prussians were rallying for their fifth return, the American artillery got into position, placed a barrage where it protected the town, and thus enabled the occupants to hold on until they had constructed works of defense from which they could not be driven. When this affair took place, however, the world had become used to

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

deeds of great heroism from the American soldiers, and the struggle for Sergy attracted little more attention than similar struggles by French or British soldiers.

The American divisions were now concentrated in that part of the advance that embraced the defenses around Fère-en-Tardenois. They were pressing forward so vigorously that they threatened the retreat of their foes, who sent against them the 4th Prussian Guard division, with orders to drive the Americans into the Ourcq. It was the boast of the 4th Guard that they had never failed to carry out an order, and they delivered their attack with the greatest courage, charging with the bayonet and refusing to retreat or surrender. In two days of the bitterest fighting of this division we took only 11 Germans, although we slew many. A Prussian company of 150 men decided to die rather than retreat and made good its decision, except for seven exhausted survivors who were brought in after they had used up their ammunition. It was the men of the Rainbow Division against whom the 4th Guard measured swords and were defeated.

In the Meunière Woods, also north of the Ourcq, the 32d division, composed of national guard troops from Michigan and Wisconsin, met the 200th Jaeger and the 216th reserve divisions of Germans, charging them on July 30 six times without success, being far outnumbered. The next day the 32d renewed the attack with the aid of large caliber artillery and drove the two divisions back in a gallant charge that swept away the supporting infantry lines. The machine-gunners, however, refused to leave their posts and were shot at their guns. As our lines advanced two companies of Germans got in the rear in a clearing and opened fire when some of the Americans turned and annihilated them in a few minutes. In parts of this wood the Jaegers had a machine-gun nest every sixty yards and many machine guns were in trees.

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

While these strenuous efforts were being made to hold and take the wooded hills north of the Ourcq, Marshal Foch brought up a strong body of troops on the northwest and delivered a blow there on August 1 which yielded an advance of four miles at the deepest point and placed the allies in a position to turn the German right at Fère-en-Tardenois. Next day the forward movement was carried three miles further, which caused the line to fall back at Fère and that in turn enabled the allies to press forward three miles on the east of Fere. From this point there was a race of the Germans to get behind the Vesle, the American divisions in the center pushing them as fast as they could and reaching Fismes on August 3, before the Teutons could get there and close the gates. The Germans had been able to carry away most of their heavy artillery and many of their light guns and supplies of various kinds; but their retreat was so hastened by the turning movement of the allies that they burned or abandoned vast stores of all kinds. The turning movement on the west was made possible by the arrival of British units, which enabled General Mangin to operate with superior force.

The allies now rushed up their artillery to the Vesle, whose crossings they held at some places. On the hills that looked down over the valley from the north the German artillery lines were established. While the public waited to see the fighting resumed and the Germans pressed back to the Aisne, the scene of battle shifted to another field and quiet fell over the Vesle line, along which three American divisions remained among those who kept watch. They were the 4th, 28th, and 77th, the last named having just been put into the line. The operations in the center of the angle had been well conducted by American troops, and much credit was due to their able commander, Major-General Robert L. Bullard.

The sixteen days of fighting in the salient left the Germans no

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

reason to doubt that the tide had turned against them. General Foch, to whom was awarded the baton of a marshal of France for the reduction of the Marne salient, was determined to leave them no opportunity to recover their sense of self-confidence. As they were straining every effort to get guns in place to hold back the men of the Vesle lines, the storm suddenly burst on them in the Amiens sector, taking them entirely by surprise. At dawn on August 8 General Haig's army began its memorable battle to recover the territory it had lost in the drive inaugurated by the Germans on March 21, 1918. In coöperation with the French it went forward to a maximum depth of seven miles on a front of twenty-five miles. General Ludendorff afterwards said that the ease with which the British and French drove through his lines on the 8th convinced him that the German army was a beaten army. Next day the advance was continued and on the 10th a great forward movement resulted in the capture of Montdidier and a wide strip of territory north of it. For the remainder of the month and longer the British and French steadily ate into the territory the Germans took in their March drive. By September 1 they had taken half of it, and it was reported that since the beginning of the move to recover the Marne salient they had taken 115,000 prisoners and over 1300 cannon, besides many thousands of machine guns, bomb throwers, and trench mortars. They had subjected their opponents to severe strain, with the result that the German morale was badly shaken. By the end of August evidence was abundant that the Germans were discouraged at home and in the army, and although they were fighting doggedly, they had not the spirit of troops confident of victory.

The Germans attributed the continued success of the allies to their light tanks. It was the characteristic of these machines that they could go forward as fast as the troops went, driving back the enemy riflemen into the dugouts and crushing the wire

[250]

FIGHTING IN THE MARNE SALIENT

entanglements. Thus they enabled the allies to dispense to a large extent with barrages, and this allowed the artillery to be used freely on the back areas to prevent the arrival of supports. In this way the British and French were able to advance steadily into the German lines bayoneting or making prisoners of all who were caught in front of the allied barrages.

CHAPTER XII

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

1. The Capture of St. Mihiel

AUGUST 10, 1918, General Pershing organized the First Army under his personal command. It contained 600,000 troops, and consisted of fourteen of our own divisions with the Second Corps of the Colonial French and the 17th French division, who were assigned to his command, for what reason does not appear. Seven of these divisions, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 26th, 28th, 32d, and 42d, had been actively engaged in driving the Germans from the Marne salient and could be relied upon for any kind of steady work. Other divisions were now on the ground, having gone through the preliminary parts of their training. Marshal Foch acquiesced in the desires of the Americans that these divisions be organized into a distinct force, with a distinct sector to defend and a distinct aggressive object to accomplish.

From the beginning of our operations in France the Lorraine section had been looked upon as our particular field of activity. It was in this field that the Toul sector was located, in which some of our divisions went into their first trenches. As these divisions were removed for service elsewhere newly arrived units succeeded them, going into service at Xivray, or Seicheprey, or in the sectors that adjoined these lively yet safe regions of activity. There were not many divisions in the First Army that did not know something about the topography of this region, for that reason if no other, and it was a good thing to assign it as the field of operations for the Army now or-

[252]


THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

ganized. The sector assigned to it extended at first from Port-sur-Seille, about five miles east of the Moselle, through Pont-a-Mousson, Xivray, and Apremont, and around the St. Mihiel angle to a point east of Verdun, a distance of about 85 miles. Later it was enlarged on the west to pass around Verdun on the north and through the Argonne Forest, where it terminated at Vienne-le-Château. The 2d Colonial French Corps held the lines around the St. Mihiel angle, which was the centre of the sector, and the 17th French Corps was on the western end. The American sector was established August 30, 1918.

The St. Mihiel salient was a strong position on account of the high ground that protected it on each side of the point. The ancient Lorraine town of St. Mihiel was placed in a double loop of the Meuse, on the east side of the river, and behind it rose the high hills that formed the southern edge of the Heights of the Meuse. To attack the place at this point would be a very difficult and expensive thing. To the east for four miles extended the southern edge of these Heights, terminating in an isolated hill known as Montsec, about 400 feet high, which dominated the surrounding country for at least two miles. North of St. Mihiel the line ran from two to ten miles east of the Meuse, which passes through Verdun, twenty miles away to the northwest. The Germans were entrenched on the crest of the Heights of the Meuse, which are in general from 300 to 500 feet high, and the allied line was established at the foot of the hills with the valley of the Meuse behind them. It is well for the reader who pursues this narrative beyond the events of the St. Mihiel operations to remember that the region east of Verdun and the Heights of the Meuse is known as the Plain of the Woivre. As seen from the Heights it is a level plain rolling away to the northeast. Beyond it is the rich iron basin of Briey.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Strong as the St. Mihiel position was, it had one element of weakness. Looking at the map one can see that the only way of getting out of the angle is by a road that runs through Vigneulles. From that place a road runs north, but it was so close to the allied lines at Combres that it was but a slender reliance in an emergency. The only other road passes from Vigneulles to Chambley. Now the Germans had between Xivray and Combres a great deal more heavy artillery, light guns, supplies, and troops than could be carried over this road during the short time in which the rearguard, if disaster befell the army, was holding back a strongly pressed attack. If Combres could be occupied by a sudden attack from the west and Vigneulles could be as quickly seized from the south the defenders of the angle would be in a trap and must surrender. There could hardly be less than 50,000 men in the salient at any ordinary time, and if it was made ready for attack the number would be greater. This situation was very well known to the French, but they had always been so closely engaged elsewhere that they could not spare the forces necessary to reduce the salient. General Pershing had made up his mind to attack it at the first opportunity, and he made his preparations with great celerity as soon as he found himself in command of the American sector. Leaving the 2d Corps of Colonial French opposite the point of the salient, where they could press into the town as soon as opportunity offered, he placed his striking forces on each side of that corps. The 26th Division with the 17th French division was ordered to seize three hills north of St. Mihiel, Combres, Les Esparges, and Amaranthe. East of Apremont extending as far as Port-sur-Seille were placed the following divisions in the order named: the 1st, the 42d, the 89th, the 2d, the 5th, the 90th, and 82d. Ample provisions were made for reserves. The objective on the southern leg of the salient was the region east of Vigneulles.



Reproduced by permission of the War Volumes, published by the New York Times Co. ©

THE CAPTURE OF THE ST. MIHIEL ANGLE, SEPTEMBER 12, 1918
 The Broken Line Shows the American Position at the Commencement and the Solid Line at the Conclusion of the Operation

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

Each division had its artillery brigade, but as our corps had recently been organized and were not well established as such the corps and army artillery units were not organized. No inconvenience arose from this defect, however, as the French supplied the want in generous quantities, including the necessary personnel. The heavy guns thus acquired covered the German railroad communication with Metz. The French also placed the French Independent Air Force under the command of the American general, whose own air forces were not sufficient for an offensive movement on a large scale. The date set for the attack was September 12, the fourth anniversary of the German occupation of the salient. The attack was to be a surprise and great care was taken in assembling the artillery which was concealed in the forests back of the selected positions until the night of the 11th, when it was moved quietly into position. The regiments also took their places during the night, going forward with much difficulty in the roads crowded with field artillery steadily moving to the places assigned.

The attack began at 5 A. M., after four hours of artillery fire, a "limited number of tanks" preceding the infantry lines, "manned partly by Americans and partly by the French." The infantry advanced in excellent formation, cutting the enemy's wire entanglements where the tanks had not destroyed it and suffering light losses. They found the German trenches demolished and the occupants of the dugouts willing to surrender with little resistance. By nightfall the first objectives were attained with surprising ease. The Americans had advanced to take what they considered the strongest part of the German line in France. Wise soldiers had shaken their heads when the project was suggested and spoken of the immense losses that would result. Not an officer nor private in the attacking force but expected to meet desperate resistance. The moderate

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

fire they met astonished them and one of the privates voiced the feeling of the rest when he said to Major Frederick Palmer: "It was like taking candy away from children."

At nightfall it became known to the Americans that the Germans were withdrawing from the town of St. Mihiel and were leaving by way of Vigneulles. Regiments from the 1st and 26th Divisions set off at once to intercept them at that point. Marching in the night from the south and the west they reached their objective a little before dawn—the men of the 26th first—and succeeded in bagging several thousand tired Germans who were resting in the belief that they had passed out of the zone of danger. On the second day the Americans followed the retreating enemy. They found him placed in a new line passing through Pagny, to the north of Thiaucourt and Vigneulles, and through Fresnes-en-Woevre. The total captures of Germans reached 16,000, and 443 guns were taken besides a vast quantity of supplies of many kinds.

The moral effects of the battle of St. Mihiel were good. It gave the American soldier confidence in himself as a soldier and in the army to which he belonged. It confirmed his feeling of superiority over his adversary. It made the German respect the American as an organizer of armies. He had previously had many reasons for respecting him as a fighter. It showed our friends that we had learned the art of war on the grand scale, and there could be no longer a doubt about the effectiveness of our aid in the great struggle. It was the last action in which the Americans were in any sense on trial before the rest of the world.

2. First Phase of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign

The attack at St. Mihiel looked toward Metz and Briey, and there is reason to think that the Germans themselves expected our next move would be in that quarter. Newspaper opinion
[256]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

in the United States also ran in that direction. To Marshal Foch and General Pershing another course seemed better. Metz and Briey had their places in the general plan of attack, but the Meuse-Argonne line had precedence.

The reason is very clear in the light of the general purpose of the war. The town of Sedan, on the Meuse, is 34 miles as the crow flies north of the battle-line in the Argonne region. Through it and through Mezières, 15 miles higher up the Meuse, passes a four-track railroad line, the main artery by which Germany sent supplies to that part of her troops who fought east of the great angle formerly located near Montdidier. To capture these towns and cut this line of supply was more important in a military sense than to take Metz. It would force the Germans to abandon their advanced lines in this region and fall back against the Ardennes region through which the few earth roads could give a bare sustenance. Marshal Foch's plan was to make a double attack against this railroad, the first to proceed along the Meuse against Sedan and the other to move against Mezières on the west of the first column. The first task was entrusted to General Pershing with his Americans, the second was given to the French general Gouraud, who commanded the sector from Rheims to the Argonne.

The first step in carrying out this plan was to enlarge the American sector, which at first terminated at a point east of Verdun. It was now extended around that city across the Meuse and on through the Argonne Forest to the little village of Vienne-le-Château, just east of the Aisne River. Thus, our line, from Port-sur-Seille to Vienne-le-Château, was 65 miles long. The part involved in the new campaign, from the Meuse to Vienne-le-Château, was 23 miles long. For 15 miles it was mostly in open country, but the last 8 miles was through the forest. The section through which General Gouraud was to advance, from the Aisne to the Suippes, was about the same

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY.

length as our section of advance. It was open country but it contained many small streams and some lakes with marshy banks. On the whole it was less difficult territory than that which lay before the Americans.

The Argonne Forest had long been considered impregnable by the Germans and the French. It lies between the Aire and Aisne rivers which, flowing northward, unite north of the forest near the town of Grand Pré. It is about 8 miles wide and 12 miles long, north of the original battle line. The trees were not close together, but there was dense undergrowth, so that it was impossible to see 50 feet ahead; and there were many ravines and bowlders which offered good machine-gun positions. The Germans, who knew well all the paths through the forest, had the range of every important position. They had hundreds of machine guns in it, planted in fortified nests with wire defenses in front. So safe did it seem that it had been used for a long time as a place of recuperation for exhausted divisions. Marshal Foch's plan was to flank the place on each side; but in actual attack it was found to be better to drive through the forest only a little more slowly than on the flanks.

Near the Meuse the part of the ground to be covered was the western edge of the battle-field of Verdun, embracing the fatal hill 304 and the elevation known as Mort Homme, positions for which the Germans struggled for days in 1916, as if the fate of the war depended on the issue. The ground in this region was filled with the shell craters left by the former battle which made it difficult to bring up artillery and ammunition. To the west and up to the forest the ground was more favorable, but at all points the line was protected by strong fortifications, being parts of the old German line, which had not up to this time been attacked. It is known that the enemy, considering this a safe sector, had drawn away its best defenders for service at points he thought more vital.

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

General Pershing's plans to attack in the new sector were already made when he delivered his blow at the St. Mihiel salient. The next day his heavy artillery and most of his corps and army artillery were in motion for the new sector, passing through the ancient city of Verdun. At the same time he moved to the back areas of this sector a number of his reserve divisions, forming them into corps with the old notations but new compositions. He left in the lines newly established east of St. Mihiel the divisions that had taken part in his advanced offensive in that quarter and entrusted the new offensive to divisions which, for the most part, had not seen heavy fighting.

He intended to deliver his attack as secretly as possible and concealed his divisions in the woods behind the sector of attack, still held by a thin line of French troops, while he worked hard to place his artillery in line for the attack. One of the feats was to construct a spur track of railroad and bring up his fifteen-inch guns to a concealed position for use against the railroad and highway junctions behind the enemy's position. Three corps, constituting one army, were employed, and from right to left they were as follows: the Third Corps from the Meuse to Melancourt with the 33d, 80th, and 4th divisions in line in the order mentioned; and the 3d division as corps reserve; the Fifth Corps from Melancourt to Vauquois with the 79th, 87th, and 91st divisions in line, and the 32d as corps reserve; and the First Corps from Vauquois to Vienne-le-Château with the 35th, 28th, and 77th divisions in line, and the 92d as corps reserve. The 1st, 29th, and 82d divisions were held as army reserves. Thus the line of battle contained nine divisions, while six were held in reserve. The total number of men engaged was about 600,000, and they were all troops of the United States.

September 25, after two weeks of feverish activity the artillery was in position, the parts assigned to each unit had been

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

definitely rehearsed, and the news went through the ranks that the moment of advance had arrived. During the night the French troops were withdrawn from their lines and the Americans took their places. From 2:30 to 5:30 on the 26th the most intense artillery fire fell down on the enemy's advanced trenches. When it ended the infantry went forward without great opposition throughout most of the line. By night-fall they had advanced their line outside the forest from two to three miles and taken a large number of prisoners. By the 27th the Germans had brought up some of their best divisions and counterattacked with great determination. Although many of our troops had never before been in a pitched battle they met the enemy with great courage and after fighting bitterly through the 27th and 28th drove them back with additional gains of terrain. At the end of the third day we held a line seven miles beyond our first position on the Meuse and three miles forward in the Argonne Forest. We had taken twenty towns and villages, among them the strongly fortified village of Montfaucon with the hill overlooking it; from which, report said, the Crown Prince watched the battle of Verdun. We had taken, also, more than 10,000 prisoners. The smallest advance was made in the Argonne, where the 77th division was at the extreme end of the line. Although composed of draft men from New York City, it developed an unusual ability in forest fighting. The men stuck with great persistence to the work of potting machine-gun nests, despite the rain that chilled their bodies and converted the roads into mud sluices.

When General Pershing made the attack on the 26th General Gouraud advanced on his assigned section, pushing back the enemy for three miles and capturing 10,000 prisoners. He continued his battle in excellent style, gaining steadily, and took Vouziers, October 12, an important center of communications and his first main objective.



Reproduced by permission of
The New York Times Magazine ©

MAP OF THE MEUSE-ARGONNE REGION

The line indicated on the map is the old position, popularly called the Hindenburg Line. North of it was the Freya Line, running through Brioules, Romagne, Exermont, to the Argonne Forest. The Kriemhilde Line was still farther north, with Grand Pré for the western and Dun-sur-Meuse for the eastern pivot. It passed through St. George and Landres and was broken by the Americans at a point between them.

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

By this time the Americans had begun to hear from prisoners much talk about a rear line of defense, known as the Kriemhilde Stellung, or Kriemhilde Line, which, said the reports, was so strong that it would never be taken. The truth is the Kriemhilde Line was begun in November, 1917, when the wire was strung and the trenches marked out. It ran from Grand Pré through Landres to the Meuse, which it reached a little south of Dun-sur-Meuse. East of the river it connected with the newly established German line across the base of what had been the St. Mihiel salient. When it was laid out little was done upon it beyond digging trenches, probably because the Germans did not think it likely that they would have to use it. After the American attack of the 26th, however, they began to work on it most industriously. Revetments were placed in position, the trenches were deepened, and dugouts were constructed by pioneer units that were rushed forward for the purpose. To enable this work to be done it was necessary for the German troops to fight stubbornly in front of the lines, and to deliver several vigorous counterattacks against Pershing's men. When completed the line consisted of a formidable system of trenches and wire defenses two and a half miles deep.

The importance of the Kriemhilde Line, aside from its great strength when completed, was in the fact that it was the last line of defense before the vital German line of communication. General Pershing realized that if he broke through here he could press the enemy so hard as to leave him no time to construct other lines that would be formidable. But he was a long way from the Kriemhilde Line on September 28, when he paused to bring up his artillery over roads that had to be constructed by his engineers. Before him lay a system of defenses known as the Freya Line, strongly placed on the hills and held by good troops that had been rushed up after the initial attack. From this time on the Americans had to be content with slow advances

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

purchased with hard efforts. It was bring up the artillery, put down a barrage, send the infantry forward and establish a new line. Then bring up the artillery again, place a barrage, and make another advance. How frequently the process could be repeated depended on the skill and endurance of the road makers. While this series of slow and hard fought advances lasted for more than a month and was the most significant part of the Meuse-Argonne campaign, it constitutes the second phase of the operations, and its description must be postponed until we have discussed the influence of another series of events on the general situation.

3. The Collapse in the East and in Germany

In the second, third, and part of the fourth years of the war a great many people thought that victory would be won on the eastern front, while others were as convinced that it could be won nowhere else than in the West. Serious controversies sprang up between the two schools of strategy. Now that the war is over it is hard to say which school was right. It is undoubtedly true that collapse in the East made it necessary for Germany to yield, but it would be hard to controvert a western-front advocate, if he contended that it was Foch's relentless fighting in France that made it impossible for Germany to lend Bulgaria and Austria the help they needed. If the allies had stripped themselves of troops in France to press their opponents in the East, Hindenburg could not have been hammered so hard that he had to use up his troops in the West. And so we come to the proposition that it was necessary to weaken the German army, and that it was best to attack it in the campaigns in which it would be likely to suffer most. But for all this the operations in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Balkans had an important influence on the end of the war, and thus entered into the duration of our own efforts against Germany.

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

It was in the days when Pershing was fighting in the Argonne that the campaigns in Palestine and the Balkans came to their culminations. On September 25 it was announced that General Allenby had surrounded and taken 40,000 Turks and 265 guns. Next day he captured 5000 additional prisoners, and on the next he took the same number with about 100 guns. October 1 Damascus was taken with 7000 Turks and all the Syrian coast was laid open to the British. It only remained to advance to Aleppo and connect the previous gains in the Tigris-Euphrates Valley with the recent conquests on the coast, a task which the Turks could not prevent, since their armies in this part of the world were destroyed.

At the same time came to a head the series of reverses that befel the Bulgarians, Turks, and Austrians in the Balkans. September 16 French, Serbian, British, and Greek troops broke the Bulgarian line of defense in the south at two points. The advantage was pressed and two days later the entire Bulgarian defense began to crumble. It is evident that the steady reverses of Germany in France during the preceding month had convinced the Bulgars that they were on the losing side and they had lost stomach for the war. As they fell back their rout became evident. The prospect of recovering their own land enthused the Serbian soldiers to the highest pitch and they drove fiercely into the centre of the Bulgarian retreat. Monastir was reoccupied, Veles was retaken, and the road was opened to Nisch. September 26 the British, crossing the southern boundary of Bulgaria, took the strong town of Strumnitza, giving access into the heart of Bulgaria. The government at Sofia was not able to offer resistance to the invasion and asked for an armistice on September 24. It had gone into the war for its own profit, it had long realized that German success would place Bulgaria at the mercy of the German empire, and now that it need not fear the anger of Kaiser Wilhelm or

[263]

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Kaiser Karl, it seized the excuse of actual invasion to make terms. Representatives went into the allied lines and September 30 they signed an armistice for the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war. It was purely military in its nature and pledged the nation to give up all territory it had occupied during the war, to demobilize its army, to place its railroads and shipping at the disposal of the allied powers for the transportation of troops to operate against Austria, and to allow the allies to garrison important places in Bulgaria. Political adjustments were to await the final treaty of peace.

The surrender of Bulgaria isolated Turkey and made it necessary for her to submit also. She delayed no longer than to discover that the allies would not bargain for her submission. On October 30 the terms of her capitulation were announced to the world.

Austria foresaw the desertion of her southeastern allies. Her own people were at the verge of revolution and she was anxious for peace. September 15 she appealed openly to the belligerent and neutral states for a conference to discuss terms of peace without pledging the states to accept the results of the deliberations. It was understood that Germany had been consulted and had agreed to the proposal. The suggestion received little favor in the United States and in the *Entente* nations. Through the secretary of state President Wilson announced his views in the following brief note:

“The Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.”

Rebuffed in this attempt to precipitate a discussion of terms Austria waited for a turn of fortune that would enable her to
[264]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

escape complete surrender. Her waiting was in vain, and on October 29 Count Andrassy, her foreign secretary, in a note to Secretary Lansing requested an immediate armistice.

Germany herself made no offer of armistice until her allies were falling away from her. She was in the hands of an unyielding military caste who would not, or dared not, relax their pretensions that the *Entente* powers would be forced to accept a German peace. Perhaps no group of men in history have made themselves more disliked and suspected by their opponents than the German military class during the world war. By their invasion of Belgium, in keeping with the dishonesty of the Ems despatch, of 1870, and the rape of Silesia, in 1740, the Germans of 1914–1918 made a large part of the world believe that no dependence could be put in German pledges. It will require a long course of scrupulous faith-keeping to undo what has been done in these notable illustrations of the German belief in fist-right down to this day. In 1918 every suggestion of peace by Germany was taken for an artful scheme.

When, therefore, Germany talked peace the fairest-minded men in the United States were not willing to take her word without the strongest securities. They believed they had before them a nation which did not recognize national good faith, a supple and slippery giant who in the time of necessity would create any ensnaring scheme the leaders thought necessary to enable him to escape from a difficult situation. Under the circumstances they felt that nothing short of complete defeat would make Germany a nation with which other nations could live on terms of security. It was in recognition of this view that President Wilson felt justified in declaring that the United States would not make peace until the power of the ruling German family was reduced. It mattered little that one recalled the virtues of individual Germans, there was the fact that sub-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

terfuge was a weapon used by the government, and who could say that it was not being used again?

Nevertheless the newspapers teemed with incidents pointing to the political disorganization of Germany. Hunger and the never-ending casualty list had made the people war weary. Each spring since the struggle began they had been told that the coming campaign would bring victory, and each autumn had found them facing another winter in the trenches with increased food shortage at home. The spring of 1918 had opened with fair prospects of victory. Drive after drive had sent the enemy scurrying before them in apparent defeat. Then the tide turned in July. Week after week the common soldier saw the lines forced back, and week after week he had reason to see that the Americans, whom his newspapers ridiculed as fighters, were meeting him with stout hearts and strong and skillful arms, the equal of any soldiers in the army. He observed that they were especially proficient in artillery practice and in the use of the bayonet. By the end of September he gave up hope of winning a victory, but he clung to the belief that the German army could not be beaten. He was still fighting well, although suffering sorely.

The average German, however, had begun to question the political situation at home. Was all well with the strongly bureaucratic government under which he lived? He had asked that question a thousand times in days of peace; but then the answer was found in the orderly government, abundance of work at good wages, wise social regulations, and the efficient organization of society that he saw around him. He had concluded that despite the unequal suffrage and the privileges of the officers, Germany was good enough for him. During the war he asked the question also, and when he thought of the hunger and the death list in Germany, and the flagrant profiteering, which "the best government" did not control, his doubts [266]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

grew stronger. As long as he was winning victories he accepted the sacrifices; but now, in September, 1918, he began to rebel mentally. The advocates of unrest caught his ear. The words of President Wilson would not down: The world would not feel safe in making peace with torn and bleeding Germany as long as the Hohenzollern and their sharers of privilege were at the head of the government. In this way the average man in Germany became a powerful assistant of the *Entente* allies in crushing the resistance of the Hindenburg lines.

Conscious of the growing dissatisfaction the kaiser made a speech at Essen in the second week in September, addressing through the Krupp workers the whole working class of his empire. He made a strong and dramatic appeal to the religious and patriotic feelings of his hearers. When he had them at the highest pitch of enthusiasm he exclaimed:

“Each one of us has received his appointed task from on High. You at your hammer, you at your lathe, and I on my throne. We must all, however, build on God’s assistance. Doubt is the greatest ingratitude toward the Lord, and now I ask you all simply and honestly: Have we, then, really ground for doubt? Just look at the four years of war! What immense achievements we have behind us! Half the world stood against us and our royal allies, and now we have peace with Russia, and peace with Rumania. Serbia and Montenegro are finished. Only in the West do we still fight, and is it to be thought that the good God will abandon us there at the last moment?”

He closed by asking his hearers to pledge their faith to the continuance of the war and his request was answered with a vociferous “Ja!”

For all this the spirit of unrest grew in Germany, and in the countries allied with her. Erzberger, leader of the centrists in the Reichstag, said with great truthfulness: “The longer the war lasts the more the soil of all belligerent countries is being prepared for revolution. The middle classes disappear in war

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

and become proletarianized and thus revolutionized." He added that peace could not be made until Germany's enemies became convinced they could not break through.

Outside of Germany it was hard to know how much to accept of the rumors of impending revolution that came through the obscurity of the frontier. A government controlled press, a people hitherto molded to the desires of a bureaucracy that held the principles of *realpolitik*: could one ever trust them? Yet there were the rumors, each day more positive. They showed, if accepted at their face value, that the socialists, social democrats, and centrists were about to unite to overthrow Chancellor von Hertling and to obtain a cabinet responsible to the reichstag. Then came the certain information that von Hertling had resigned on September 30 and was succeeded by Prince Maximilian of Baden, well known for his liberal views. A new cabinet was formed in which was Philip Scheidemann, leader of the socialists, who sat without a portfolio. It was supposed in Germany that this cabinet could make peace quickly. At the same time came the news that the upper house of the Prussian parliament after months of hesitation had passed a bill for manhood suffrage, already passed by the lower house, but with the amendment that persons over 50 years of age should have two votes. It was evident that the Germans made these reforms with an eye to the effect on belligerent opinion. That, however, did not necessarily imply that they were not real reforms. But a world that had lost faith in Germany's moral integrity did not know when to treat her as sincere.

4. *Second Phase of the Meuse-Argonne Campaign*

On the day the American newspapers announced the appointment of a new chancellor in Germany, General Pershing, having brought up his artillery over roads newly constructed by his engineers, opened the second phase of his attack on the

[268]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

German forces along the 23-mile front from the Meuse to the western edge of the Argonne Forest. At that time the American defenses ran from the river at the southern outskirts of Briulles in a southwestern direction, passing north of Exermont and going through the forest north of Apremont and near Binarville. East of the forest General Gouraud had carried his line forward in conformity with our line through the Argonne. The Germans had massed forces and guns in the Aire Valley, on the two sides of which were strongly fortified hills. By holding us off at this point they blocked the road to Grand Pré, at the north of the forest, and protected the rear of their line in the forest. General Pershing intended to take these hills and work his way to Grand Pré, which of itself would clear the forest. That done he could turn his attention to the Kriemhilde Line.

On October 4 General Pershing had brought up his artillery and was ready to resume his advance. At 5:30 in the morning he sent forward his whole line. At the right and center slight gains were made and the town of Gesnes was occupied. More important gains were made to the left of the center, where the 5th corps advanced two miles along the Aire River and came to the vicinity of Fléville. In the forest the line was advanced to the north of Binarville. The war correspondents described the 4th as "a day of terrific fighting." Two divisions of Prussian Guards were thrown forward to stop our advance, and both were cut to pieces, one to such an extent that it was taken from the field immediately.

On this day the American attack received welcome coöperation from the French on the left of the Argonne. General Gouraud had encountered heavy opposition in this difficult region and had called on General Pershing for aid. The 2d American division, with its brigade of marines, was sent to aid him, with the 36th division, which, as yet, had not been in

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

a battle, to serve as a supporting force. On the 4th of the month, therefore, General Gouraud renewed his assaults, with the 2d division at the center of his line. It was in front of the strongly held Blanc Mont, which commanded the region north of Somme Py, 10 miles west of the Aisne. The place was taken by assault and the defenders were driven back to a point three miles north. The effect of the penetration was to press the entire German line in this particular region back five miles beyond the position it held in the morning. On the western edge of the Argonne Forest the advance was material, thus making easier the task of the Americans east of the forest. In the days that followed the French carried forward their line as fast as the Americans; and, in fact, it would have been impossible for either side to have pressed back the Germans in its front if the other side had not accomplished the same kind of movement.

October 7, under cover of the morning mists, the Americans cut holes in the enemy's wire and seized several important hills on the western side of the Aire Valley, along the edge of the Argonne Forest. This move took off some of the pressure on the American lines in the forest, while the divisions there were able to slice off two miles at the southern limit of the enemy's possessions in that region. At the end of the day the Americans had by this means established their lines through Chatel-Cherhery, and on the 8th they worked forward to the heights west of that place. The forest line was still four miles from the clearing opposite Grand Pré, but the men of the 77th were determined to carry it northward and by a strong effort they reached Marcq on the 9th. This left only a small triangle of the wooded area in the hands of the Germans, and that was wiped out on the 10th, when they joined hands on the south bank of the Aire, opposite the town of Grand Pré with General Gouraud's French army, which had worked its way forward [270]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

on the west side of the Argonne. At the end of a week's fighting the 82d division took the place of the 28th, but the 77th would not be relieved and fought the battle through during all its fifteen days.

It was here that the incident of "the lost battalion" occurred. In the orders for the morning of October 3 each part of the line was assigned an objective. Major Charles W. Whittlesey commanded one section with 463 men from two battalions of the 308th infantry. Proceeding without reference to his liaison he reached his objective late in the afternoon to find that the troops on each side had not advanced. Before him was a hill on which the Germans stood in force. An attempt to drive them off failed, and almost immediately he realized that he was surrounded. He determined to stay on the spot and for four days—until rescued on the evening of the 7th—the men held their position suffering cruelly in the interval. On the morning of the 7th the Germans sent a messenger with a typewritten letter asking the "brave Americans" to "surrender in the name of humanity." When the letter was read to the officers and they heard the allusion to "humanity" they laughed.¹ When the Germans talked about humanity the American soldier looked for deception. The arrival of succor in a few hours confirmed their suspicion. Of the number who went forward on the 3d only 194 came out untouched.²

The victors were astonished at the strength of the Argonne and the region adjoining it. In the hills along the Aire were amply furnished quarters for officers, with bowling-alleys, theaters, clubs, and great dining-halls—built of reënforced concrete in the most substantial manner. As an advanced position before the Kriemhilde Line the place was a buttress of great strength. The Americans encountered in it two miles of wire

¹ It was widely reported that Major Whittlesey said, "Go to hell," but eye witnesses have declared that he laughed and said nothing.

² N. Y. *Times*, Nov. 15, 24:2.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

entanglements, placed at intervals. Every road and by-path was mapped and held under exact range from the artillery. A great number of concrete "pill-boxes" filled with machine guns supplemented the strongly held rock ledges and ravines that cut the forest at every step. Before 1918 it had been the scene of much unsuccessful fighting on the part of the French.

This task accomplished the army might well take a few days to recuperate. Before it was the Kriemhilde Line, by this time in an excellent state of defense, the taking of which was yet to exact many a sacrifice. The breathing spell was not over when news came that Dr. Solf, German foreign secretary, had sent a note accepting the American conditions of peace and proposing a conference to determine the terms of an armistice. On its face the note meant surrender, and it was received as such. To the Americans, pressing forward to the Sedan-Mezières line of communication, it was only half welcome. "Well, if Heine wants to quit," remarked an American private in that movement, "he can do so. But it's up to him to do the quitting."

The German was not willing to admit that he was beaten. He had in him a large amount of fight and he meant to use it as advantageously as possible. He had suggested an armistice to consider terms of ending the war. To the soldiers went orders to hold out to the end, because in so doing a better peace would be obtained. The German soldier, contrary to the opinion then prevalent outside of Germany, was in close relation with the military policy of his leaders. The notes from his government to Washington and President Wilson's replies were posted at army headquarters as soon as they were made public in Berlin. He was a trained soldier from his youth and was apt to know a great deal about the bearing of such matters on existing military problems. He accepted fully the idea that it was well to resist stoutly in order to get

[272]



THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

better terms of peace. It is certain that he fought well on the Meuse front in these last days of the war and made the Americans pay dearly for their advance against his last system of defense.

To the capture of that position General Pershing turned as soon as his troops recovered breath after taking the Argonne Forest. On October 14 began several days of bitter fighting. St. Juvin was taken on the 14th and sharp wedges were driven into the Kriemhilde position at Landres-et-St.-Georges and elsewhere. On the 16th a body of Americans waded across the Aire in the cold morning and by charging through the soft mud on the northern side seized the town of Grand Pré, but they were not able to hold it against the gunfire from the heights to the north. By capturing some hills a little to the east other troops were able to dominate and take the town of Bantheville, but here also they were forced to retire.

One of the most desperately fought actions of the campaign was carried through here at hill 288, near Landres-et-St.-Georges, before which stood the Rainbow Division. Five attempts to take it had failed. The sixth was entrusted to the 168th regiment, Iowa men, with assistance from the 165th, a New York regiment, on the flank. Two German guns, 77's, were on top of the hill and 230 machine guns were on its sides, while the defenders of the position numbered 1800. Five lines of wire were on the slope which was a thousand yards long, and the machine guns were numerous and well placed. After six hours of dogged attack, most of the time in hand to hand conflicts, the Iowans reached the top of the hill and forced the 107 unwounded defenders to surrender. It was a dearly bought victory, but it gave us an important position in the general attack.

Now followed some days of hard fighting in which the advantage swung from one side to the other. The German sol-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

diers still showed strong in their counterattacks. They were able to recover Grand Pré and Bantheville, but both towns were retaken on the 23d. Next day the Americans went through the Kriemhilde Line with a decided breach gaining a kilometer on a front of three kilometers. They met violent counterattacks and repulsed them but at high cost. In connection with these attacks the troops east of the Meuse were ordered to push forward against the Germans on their front. They obeyed so well that it was necessary to warn them not to go faster than the army on the west bank.

The work, however, was not done. Behind the Kriemhilde Line, with the nose of the American wedge sticking through at Landres-et-St.-Georges, was another line, and behind that the Germans were constructing still another. How long could the American wedge last in plowing its way through such a defense? The answer was in the general state of the German army at the time. With all his resources engaged at every critical point the time had come when Hindenburg could no longer renew at will the forces needed at any point. The American losses were heavy, but there were plenty of replacements at hand and they were sent forward as needed. Raw to the fighting, they quickly took the pace from the experienced men at their sides and did all that was required of them. The American wedge could outlast the German defense under these circumstances. Otherwise the sacrifices would have been folly.

By the end of October the German political situation was deeply undermined by popular discontent. It was only ten days before the withdrawal of the kaiser from the government and eleven from the end of armed resistance. Already the notes that led to the armistice had begun to pass from Berlin to Washington. Germany was hoiling with unrest, and the spirit of surrender had begun to show itself in the German army. It was no longer possible to say that its morale had not begun

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

to give way. October 30 General von Hindenburg reported to Berlin that his armies were beaten and advised peace on the best terms obtainable.

November 1, when this situation was clearly developed, General Pershing ordered a general advance against the German line from the Meuse to the forest of Bourgogne, a distance of fifteen miles. The attack was delivered with a more intense artillery fire than the army had ever before seen. It was received with less force than we had encountered in any of the recent engagements. "The German resistance, weak at first," said a correspondent, "stiffened in the course of the day, until there was very heavy fighting late this afternoon. The German artillery was weaker than had been expected."¹ The German defenses were broken, 3000 prisoners were taken, and some of the Americans advanced four miles on the road to Sedan. At the same time the army of General Gouraud went forward about the same distance as the American army.

Next morning the remainder of the defenses gave way and the defenders retreated as rapidly as possible. General Pershing brought up automobile trucks, loaded them with infantrymen, and sent them off in pursuit as fast as the roads would permit. The whole army moved northward with all possible speed. In the center of his line the advance was in the shape of an angle that reached Nouart at the point with a line from Buzancy and Barricourt for base. To the right and left of this angle the progress was less marked.

The next day, November 3, the Germans were falling back on all parts of their front. Their artillery made weak response to the American fire and none of their airplanes were visible. The Americans found the flanks poorly defended by weak rearguard units, who surrendered with little resistance. They carried the line forward seven miles, and it ran due west

¹ Edwin L. James, in the *New York Times*, November 3, 1918, 1:3.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

from the Meuse to the junction point with the French, who, proceeding with equal success, had now reached Rethel. During the night, however, the Germans sent up heavy reinforcements and the progress of the American column was slower the next day.

The resistance stiffened most on the east side of the Meuse where they held the line from the neighborhood of Briulles, running north with the river as far as our line on the west side, that is, about fifteen miles. This east-Meuse sector was necessary to them as a means of protecting the railroad from Sedan to Metz. On the 4th we made several attempts to cross the river in order to gain elbow room on its east bank, but the river was swollen from recent rains and it was not possible to place enough men across to hold it. The railroad, however, was now placed in serious peril at two points. Our advance had carried us to the bank opposite Stenay, and in this region we were only six miles from the railroad at the place where it bends westward near Montmédy. The range was easy for our 155's and not impossible for our 75's. We could, therefore, inflict serious damage on the railroad and make it unreliable for the great work that was demanded of it. Further east we had already begun a long range bombardment against Conflans and the adjacent territory at a distance of twelve miles. It was so effective that it put out of commission the direct road through Metz and forced the Germans to use a roundabout line which cost them considerable delay in transportation. Long range guns were now ordered up to the advanced American positions and we were thus able to reach Montmédy and Longuyon.

On the 4th Pershing threw his forces against the Germans who still held the western bank of the Meuse, to the right of the point of his northward-projecting wedge, clearing the bank and bringing up his artillery. Shelling the opposite heights in the night he was able to throw three pontoon bridges across the

[276]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

stream and to place the 3d Corps on the east bank by dawn on the 5th. Brushing back the forces ahead of them they moved on Stenay by the north and east approaches until at nightfall the place was half surrounded. Their eastern line was now within four miles of the Metz railroad. On the west bank of the river the line was carried north of the latitude of Stenay to the village of Pouilly, where it ran westward to Beaumont and on beyond Stonne. In this region it was less than fifteen miles in a straight line from Sedan, but by river the distance was twenty miles. The Germans were badly shaken, the units losing connection with their headquarters and offering little of that stout resistance that had characterized the fighting before the break through of November 1. Captured orders showed that they were making frantic efforts to hold the east bank of the Meuse. At this time they sent five fresh divisions to the front with the hope of holding back the charges of the American soldiers, who were now carried forward by the impulse of victory.

The occupied places liberated by the American troops had many marks of German savagery. Churches were defiled or destroyed, all kinds of buildings were pillaged, and handsome houses which had served for officers' quarters were reeking witnesses of deliberate pollution. The captors seemed to wish to express their disgusting hatred for the amenities of civilized warfare. The American soldiers had seen many things that made them despise foes who could carry the horrors of war to such depths of brutality, but these fresh evidences of German methods of warfare made them eager for vengeance on men who defied decency and humanity.

November 6 the Germans east of the Meuse were making preparations to shorten their line from the Moselle to the region of Pershing's operations near Sedan. By drawing it back until it was within proper distance to protect the Metz railroad they

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

would obtain several of the divisions needed to meet the attacks before Sedan. The high command was bent on holding an unbroken front until the terms of an armistice could be arranged. If no agreement of that kind could be made, it would be for them to hold this line before the railroad like a stone wall until the troops and materials of the line to the west could be withdrawn to the frontier, if, indeed, such a withdrawal could be made in the face of the heavy attacks of the allies and the United States. It was the task of the Americans to cut this line at Sedan, and they were now in position to accomplish the task expeditiously. On the 6th of the month they made a great effort on the west bank of the river, sweeping back the discouraged and tired German divisions until at the end of day's work the line ran from the Meuse at Mouzon westward through Raucourt, Chemery, and Omont, near which it joined General Gouraud's line, which was always advancing. At Raucourt it was less than eight miles from Sedan, whose buildings could be seen in the sunlight across the low hills.

On the previous day, the 5th, the 1st division was moving up the western bank of the Meuse looking for a good place to cross and begin operations on the east bank while the 42d division was moving according to orders on their left in a northwestern direction to push back the Germans before them. They both discovered the weakness of the enemy on their front and concluded they could reach Sedan. At dawn on the 6th they set out for that place, breaking through the slight resistance they encountered, and late in the day each division was in the outskirts of that part of Sedan which is south of the Meuse. Hard after them came a French division, which might have reached the city itself as soon as either of the American divisions, had the roads not been filled by the Americans in front of them. At nightfall this division, also, was before the city. The Americans drew back and gave to the Frenchmen the honor
[278]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

of first entering the city whose redemption from German hands was so intimately associated with all that was sacred in the victory of 1918. On the 8th the French reached Mezières and a day later they occupied Hirson, thus taking a section of the Metz railroad thirty miles long.

At this time the military position of the Germans was desperate and only the impending armistice could save them from great disaster. Their line had crumbled at the middle, where the French were ready to gather in the pieces, or hurl them back on the Rhine. On the eastern end the British had been delivering heavy blows forcing back the Germans day by day until their hold on the Belgian coast was broken and the line swept back until it was in front of Brussels. Had the political situation in Germany held and had the government tried to carry on the fight the German army would have been driven back through Belgium precipitously, with heavy losses of materials and men; but it is probable that winter weather would have given enough relief to enable them to form a line somewhere near their own border. From the Dutch boundary near Maestricht to Sedan is 85 miles as the crow flies. From the Dutch border north of Ghent, where the battle line was on November 8, around its whole course to Sedan was 165 miles. It is probable that enough men and materials could have been brought away from this loop to have manned the shorter line until the Americans and the allies could have broken it in the spring of 1919.

Against such a course General Pershing had made full preparations. Realizing that the French and British would take care of the region west and north of Sedan, he turned his attention to the region around Metz. It was in view of that decision that he organized on October 9 the Second Field Army, with Lieutenant-General R. L. Bullard in command, at the same time placing Lieutenant-General Hunter Liggett in immediate

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

command of the First Army. The Second Army at this time held the line east of Verdun, from Port-sur-Seille to the Meuse. The plan was to throw this army against the Briey iron fields while the First Army entirely on the right bank of the Meuse, should operate against Longwy, thus taking another link out of the Metz railroad. Following this step it was proposed to make an attack with other troops east of the Moselle toward Château-Salın, which would have isolated Metz and forced its evacuation, or its surrender. Orders for the move on Longwy had been given and the attack on Briey was actually in progress when the armistice went into operation.

East of the Meuse the German was then holding better than anywhere else in the field of operations. The divisions in this region were perhaps less exhausted by Foch's constant pressure than other divisions. They were in strong positions, with short lines of communication into Germany. To defeat them or drive them away would have been a very difficult task. Had it been undertaken, and it would have been in full swing if the fighting had lasted another week, there would have followed much of the kind of battling that was necessary to take the hills of the Aire Valley. From such costly work the armistice of November 11 saved our soldiers.

Our last operations were in this region. November 7, the day after the 42d and 1st divisions reached the southern outskirts of Sedan, General Pershing turned to the region south of Stenay. The 3d division, the 2d Colonials, and the 17th French corps were moved across the river, and for three days were engaged in severe battling for the heights of the Meuse, with the result that the enemy was forced from the hills into the plains. He had divined the intention of his opponents and was drawing back his artillery to better positions, most of his defense being by machine guns. November 10 General Pershing ordered an advance along his entire line, his purpose being, as [280]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

the war correspondent tells us, to learn what forces were before him. Everywhere the Americans met stubborn resistance but accomplished their limited objectives.

On the morning of the 11th it was known that the armistice was to become effective at 11 o'clock. The preceding night had been a period of half quiet, the artillery firing intermittently. But the army considered it a matter of honor to fight to the last, and its work went on as usual the next morning. Advancing infantry kept up the advance, the barrages were not less intense, and the long range guns kept up their pounding. As the last minutes approached there was even an increase in the intensity of the fire, the gunners seeming to desire to send the war off with a great crash. Lines of artillerymen joined hands as the lanyard of the last gun was pulled. The intense roar of the bombardment died with a gasp, and suddenly the long forgotten stillness of peace returned to No Man's Land. For a minute the men did not know what to do with their respite. Then somebody raised a shout and leapt out of his trench. Others followed the example until the front of the trenches were alive with soldiers capering and waving flags where a moment before the raising of the head meant instant death. Across the mist of No Man's Land the German soldiers had come out of their trenches also. They made signs of invitation to the Americans, but orders had been given against fraternization and there was little intercourse between the two lines. In the afternoon the Americans staked off their furthest advance and the Germans moved off in accordance with the clause of the armistice that they should retire from occupied France.

The American line on the 11th of November began at Port-sur-Seille, east of the Moselle, which it crossed at Pont-a-Mousson, and ran thence to Vandiers, thence through the Woevre to Bezonvaux in the foothills of the Meuse, thence along the foothills and through the northern edge of the Woevre forests to

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the Meuse at Mouzay, where it crossed the river, and thence to the French line south of Sedan. It was nearly a straight line, running northwest and southeast from Sedan to the Seille.

The operations of the Americans on their own sector, 71 miles long when the armistice was signed, had lasted from September 26 to November 11. They yielded us 26,000 prisoners and about 475 guns, besides a vast amount of captured stores. We had employed the following divisions: 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 26th, 28th, 29th, 32d, 33d, 35th, 37th, 42d, 77th, 78th, 79th, 80th, 82d, 89th, 90th, and 91st. Of these 21 divisions the 1st, 5th, 26th, 42d, 77th, 80th, 89th, and 90th were in line twice. War correspondents reported that the total number of men who went into the battles on our front was more than a million, including, besides the division strength, the corps and army troops and the replacements. As to our casualties, they were not reported battle by battle, but it has been stated on good authority that they reached 115,000 in the Meuse-Argonne fighting, which exceeded the estimated losses of the Germans by 15,000.¹

5. Other American Units

Besides the troops serving in the sector that was distinctly American some units served in other fields in association with French or British troops. Their fate did not take them to the field in which American effort was clearly designated as such, but they fought well in their assigned places, won the hearty commendation of their commanders in the allied armies, and sustained the reputation of the American soldier at its best.

The largest of these detached bodies was the Second

¹ Page, A. W. "The Truth about our 110 Days' Fighting," *World's Work*, June, 1919, p. 183.

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

Corps composed of the 27th and 30th divisions, one composed of New York national guard troops and the other of national guard troops from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. To the 30th division was given the nickname, "Old Hickory," in allusion to General Andrew Jackson, who lived in each of the three States mentioned. The division was sometimes, but erroneously, called the "Wild Cat" division, that sobriquet being properly worn by the 81st division, of national army troops, who also came from the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The "Old Hickory" and the "Wild Cat" divisions when first in service probably had larger proportions of native born American stock in their ranks than any other white divisions in the army.

The 27th and the 30th arrived in France in June and May, 1918, respectively. They were immediately put into active training in the area adjacent to the British lines in the Ypres region. At that time the worst of the German attacks in this part of the battle zone were past, but no one knew when the storm would break again. The first German drive into the Château-Thierry salient was coming to its close and it was followed by the long interval in which the allied powers were left to speculate on the next point of attack. It came eventually on the eastern leg of this salient, south of Rheims and across the Marne, but there had been indications that it would come in the north and some persons thought that it would fall again on the defenses of the channel ports. Under the circumstances every possible precaution was taken to defend the Ypres lines, and the two newly arrived American divisions training with the British in this area were made a part of the reserves in what was known as the Poperinghe line. The 30th division went into this position on July 4 and the 27th division on July 8.

Poperinghe is a town six miles due west of Ypres, on one of the main roads into Dunkirk, 25 miles away. When the Ger-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

mans tried in their April drive to turn Ypres by the south they were moving in the direction of Poperinghe. In this move they took Mt. Kemmel and Locre, but they were unable to proceed farther, turning their attention to the southern and eastern defense of Ypres itself. They were defeated in this attempt and the battle died away in this sector to break out late in May on the Chemin des Dames. If it came back to the north the allies would have to encounter another great blow in this region. The 2d British Army was holding the Ypres sector and it was in that army that the two American divisions were placed. They were later organized into the 2d corps under the command of Major-General G. W. Read.

The first weeks in support were spent in building second line-trenches and wiring them for defense. It was the intention of the British commander that the American-held second line should serve as a rallying point, if the first line should not be able to stand the first shock of attack. In the interval of trench building the troops were sent into the British trenches to get experience in contact with the enemy. They trained in this way by platoons, companies, and battalions.

July 15 the expected German attack was made, but on the Marne. Three days later Foch made his famous counterattack against the western leg of the Château-Thierry salient, and thenceforth the Germans were on the defensive. They soon began to withdraw the reserves they had retained in Flanders, and by the middle of August their lines around Ypres were held less strongly than in July. About this time the 27th and 30th American divisions took over the front lines facing Vierstraat Ridge, which runs off two miles from the northeastern edge of Mt. Kemmel, in front of which were British units. Trench raiding began at once and continued in the ordinary manner for two weeks. The Germans were being pressed daily in other parts of France and decided to withdraw at this point,

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

where their lines made a sharp salient along the Lys River. They began their movement on August 31, completing it in three days. The British and Americans followed and attacked the rearguard defenses, which were strongly held. Mt. Kemmel was occupied by the British with some units from the 27th. In the path of the 30th division lay the ruins of Vormerzelle, behind which were some German machine-gunners, who were surrounded and put to flight and the ruins occupied. This affair, which was the first actual combat of the 2d corps, gave the men a taste of battle. It occurred three months after the 30th division arrived in France and in a little less than that time after the arrival of the 27th. Immediately afterwards the two divisions were withdrawn from the lines and sent into intensive training.

The British were now smiting the enemy in daily drives, capturing territory and prisoners, and breaking down his spirit of resistance. It was the policy of Marshal Foch to give him no time to recuperate, and it was important to have the American troops in the smashing process as early as possible. Two weeks behind the lines were enough to prepare the two divisions for the work they had to do and by the middle of September they were moved forward into the active areas.

After some shifting the 2d corps was placed in the front line trenches as a part of the Fourth army of the British. The place of service was eight miles north of St. Quentin and twelve miles south of Cambrai, where the Hindenburg Line ran for the most part behind the Scheldt Canal, whose steep sides made an excellent line of defense. At the particular point selected the canal passes under a ridge from 30 to 150 feet high by a tunnel about three miles in length. The Germans walled up the ends of the tunnel and cut passages from it into their trenches, thus making out of it a vast dugout, capable of sheltering 13,500 men. They had filled the tunnel with anchored canal

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

boats, which served the men for sleeping quarters, and the tow-paths served for corridors. The whole place was lighted by electricity and the entrance to the underground passages were made through dugouts with concrete walls. When the lines were shelled, by even the heaviest guns, the men in the tunnel were safe, and they were so near at hand that they could return to the trenches in time to meet the infantry attack that followed the barrage. The allied officers knew the place was very strong, but they were ignorant of the extent to which it had been developed as an underground stronghold. Before it the 2d corps took position between September 23 and 25, 1918, with the 30th division on the right and the 27th on the left. British troops were on each flank, the 46th division being on the south and Australians in support.

It must be remembered that the American corps in this region was but a small part of the force that General Haig was about to throw against the Cambrai defenses. On September 27 he ordered an advance on a front of fourteen miles before Cambrai. It was delivered with great spirit and resulted in the gain of five miles along the whole front attacked, with the capture of 6000 prisoners. Next day the advance continued for two miles until Cambrai seemed nearly in the grasp of the British, whose soldiers were fighting with the greatest bravery, taking strong positions here and there, meeting and repelling counterattacks, and driving forward where they could. There was fierce fighting along the whole line, and the two American divisions were eager to get into it.

September 27 they were given an opportunity. In front of the tunnel the Germans had established outposts at places known as the Knoll, Guillemont Farm, and Quinнемont Farm. The 106th regiment of infantry, 27th division, was ordered to clear out these positions preparatory to the attack on the main position, which was to come when the line in front of Cambrai had [286]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

been carried forward to the necessary point. The 106th attacked as ordered, carried the position in front of them, and organized it. During the night the 107th and 108th regiments, same division, were sent forward to occupy the newly won trenches in preparation for further advance. To the right of them were the 119th and 120th regiments, with some men from the 117th, all of the 30th division. The other regiments in each division were held in support and reserve.

September 29 General Haig ordered an attack on a thirty-mile front from Cambrai to St. Quentin. It carried the British into the outskirts of Cambrai on the north and up to the Scheldt Canal south of that city to the celebrated canal tunnel. South of the tunnel the 46th division, the North Midland Division, crossed the canal on mats, life belts, and portable boats and carried the German trenches in desperate fighting. The North Midland men took Bellenglise, Lehautcourt, and Magny-la-Fosse, south of the tunnel, and established themselves east of the canal. Of the attack on the lines just north of the position attacked by the 46th British division General Haig said: "Farther north at the same hour (5:50 a. m.) troops from New York State, Tennessee, North and South Carolina, under command of Major-General Read, U. S. A., attacked the Hindenburg lines on a front of 5000 yards where the Scheldt Canal passes through the tunnel. With great dash the American troops passed forward against these defenses and on the right captured Bellicourt and Nauroy."

The facts behind this brief statement seem to be as follows: The 30th division, on the right of the American corps, passed through the Hindenburg Line at the southern end of the tunnel and took Bellicourt, just behind the line, and Nauroy, a little farther to the east, and held these places against heavy counter-attacks. The 27th division, on the left end of the tunnel sector, moved on Bony but encountered stiff resistance. Twenty-six

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

heavy British tanks were sent ahead of them to deal with the wire entanglement, but twenty-five of them were destroyed by mines and artillery and the other limped back to the rear in a badly damaged condition. The men of the 27th, however, went forward as ordered, cutting the wire under fire and pushing back the Germans. Later in the day the enemy made furious counterattacks and pressed back the Americans, who contested every foot of the ground bitterly, taking up positions in the trenches they had won and selling their lives dearly. Next day, September 30, they maintained their resistance against fresh troops that continued to be thrown against them and in the evening carried their lines forward a short distance.

When the Americans went forward on the 29th they were surprised to observe strong bodies of German troops fighting behind them. The intruders had risen from the tunnel, which continued to yield up its contents. The men of the 27th and 30th divisions and some Australian troops, who came to their aid, turned their attention to mopping up the tunnel, whose entrances were strongly held with machine guns. This perilous work continued through the night and until eight o'clock the next day. A few hours later strong reënforcements of English and Australian troops were sent forward through the American lines. They took Bony, drove the Germans still farther eastward, and seized the high ground south of Gouy. They thus took the pressure off the hard pressed 27th division which had suffered so severely that it was sent to the rear for recuperation. During the battle it took 17 officers and 1782 men and several hundred machine guns. The 30th division took 47 officers and 1434 men.

A newspaper dispatch tells of the brave resistance of a contingent of Americans, numbering several hundred men, who narrowly escaped death or captivity in this battle. From the

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

locality in which the incident is said to have taken place the contingent probably belonged to the 27th division. Advancing impetuously on September 29 they found themselves at night-fall some distance beyond the rest of their division, but did not fall back. The Germans discovered their situation and surrounded them early next morning. The Americans refused to surrender and entrenched as well as they could. For more than two days they fought off the attacks of the besiegers, subsisting on emergency rations in the interval. On the third they were rescued by the British, who had carried the German works at Vendhuile and penetrated the region to the eastward. The ground around the position held by the Americans was strewn with the bodies of Germans who had vainly tried to take the defenders.

Marshal Foch was now pressing the enemy at every possible point and the success near St. Quentin was only an incident in a great battle plan. October 1 saw the battle carried on toward the east, sustained by British, Australian, and French troops. Each day a slight gain was made, but it was always in the face of hard fighting. Nevertheless, St. Quentin and Cambrai were both taken and the army pressed on toward Le Cateau and Wassigny, important centers of communication. That part of the line which passed over the Scheldt tunnel moved in the direction of Busigny and Catillon. By October 4 the famous Hindenburg line was broken for a distance of five miles as the result of a combined attack of British, Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and United States troops. It is difficult to estimate the share each of these classes of troops had in the happy result. No one of them could have made and maintained an opening in the line. It was the united blows of each that made the breach, some at one place on the line and some at another and still others in beating off the counteroffensives

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

which would otherwise have closed the breach that had been made. The two American divisions that were in the operations broke the line at the points at which they struck it, and they spent themselves in maintaining their positions in the center of the vortex of counterattack.

The 30th division was withdrawn from the battle on October 1, the day the 27th was placed in a rest camp; but the 30th was ordered back into line almost immediately, and it took over trenches near Montbrehain during the night of October 4-5. After a short delay to bring up the artillery the attack was resumed on the 8th. After a terrific barrage thrown over the enemy's lines during most of the night the army advanced on a twenty-mile front, gaining to an average depth of three miles. The 30th division was in the right-center of this advance. It took Brancourt, Prémont, and a number of farms and villages, and won special mention in Field Marshal Haig's communiqué. October 9 the advance was continued with sweeping victories. In front of the Americans the Germans offered a firm resistance on the southern flank, but they were forced to yield Becquigny and Vaux Andigny in this section and Busigny, a little farther north. Now followed several days of quiet, during which the 30th division was sent to the rear for rest, the 27th taking its place. During this advance the 30th division took 45 officers and 1887 enlisted men.

The line was now on the Selle River in front of St. Souplet and British troops were in the outskirts of Le Cateau on the north and two miles in front of Bohain on the south. The Germans, shattered by the hard fighting that broke their great system of defense, were falling back in good order on the Sambre Canal and were prepared to dispute the crossing of the Selle. October 11 to 16 were quiet days along the river, Haig using them to bring up his artillery. On the last of these days the 30th division was brought forward and placed in line

[290]

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

on the right of the 27th, and next morning a forward movement was begun, the two American divisions fighting side by side for the first time since they assaulted the Hindenburg Line on September 29. They crossed the Selle in good form under a hot fire from machine guns, scrambled up the steep banks on the east side, and drove back the enemy through a series of hills which enabled him to delay the advance for three days. On the 19th, however, he stood before the Sambre Canal, and now followed a period of two weeks during which this part of the great line was quiet, while Haig crushed in the salient at Valenciennes. It was not until November 4 that the Sambre Canal was crossed and the Fourth British Army went crashing on toward its final goal, the Belgian border north of the latitude of Hirson.

In the later phases of its progress it did not have the aid of the 2d American corps, which was withdrawn October 20 for rest and to receive replacements. The Americans had not been recalled to the battle-front when the armistice was signed on November 11. As they departed Field Marshal Haig gave out the following statement in regard to their services:

“In the course of the last three weeks the 27th and 30th divisions of the 2d American Corps, operating with the Fourth British Army, have taken part with great gallantry and success in three major offensive operations, besides being engaged in a number of lesser attacks. In the course of this fighting they displayed soldierly qualities of a high order and have materially assisted in the success of our attacks.

“Having fought with the utmost dash and bravery in the great attack of September 29, in which the Hindenburg Line was broken, and having on this occasion captured the villages of Bellicourt and Nauroy, with a large number of prisoners, on October 8 the troops of the 2d American Corps again attacked in the neighborhood of Montbrehain. In three days of successful fighting they completed an advance of ten miles from Montbrehain to St. Souplet, overcoming determined resistance and capturing several strongly defended villages and woods.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Throughout the last three days the two American divisions have again attacked daily and on each occasion with complete success though the enemy's resistance was most obstinate.

Fighting their way forward from St. Souplet to the high ground west of the Sambre Canal, they have broken the enemy's resistance at all points, beating off many counterattacks and realizing an advance of nearly five miles. Over 5000 prisoners and many guns have been taken by the two American divisions in these several operations."¹

Another field of separate operations was Belgium. Late in October, 1918, Marshal Foch was preparing to pinch out the Valenciennes salient, by attacking strongly on each side. He took two divisions from General Pershing's forces near the Meuse, the 37th and 91st, and sent them by train to the aid of the French, north of the designated salient. They arrived in time to take part in the general attack in this quarter on October 31. One of them was assigned to one French corps and the other to another French corps. They had detrained at Ypres and went into the line in a section between Deynze and Avelghem, about five miles northwest of the Scheldt River, then the German main defense in this region. The 91st found its way blocked by the Spitaals Bosschen, a thick woods filled with machine-gun nests. It flanked the woods in a clever movement after two days of fighting and drove the enemy back. Following close behind it entered the town of Audenarde on November 2. The 37th division was a little to the north of the 91st. Fighting hard it succeeded in crossing the Scheldt on the same day and established its lines along the eastern bank through the width of the divisional area of operations. On the same day British and Canadian troops took Valenciennes, which necessitated a wide readjustment of the German line. When the armistice was signed the 91st was at Oostroossebeke, seven miles east of Audenarde, which was in the battle

¹ *New York Times*, Oct., 20, I, 5:4.

THE LAST TWO MONTHS OF FIGHTING

line, and the 37th was in a rest camp at Thielt, eight miles west of Deynze. General Pershing's brief report of November 20, 1918, bears testimony to the "dash and energy" and generally good service of these two divisions. The 37th division was composed of national guard units from Ohio and the 91st of selective draft men from the Far Western States and the Pacific Coast.

The military phases of our war against Germany, which came to an end on November 11, 1918, were conducted with national credit, whether we consider the stupendous work of preparation, the equally difficult work of transportation, or the actual combat operations of the army. We were particularly fortunate in the creation of a group of higher officers who proved equal to the demands of large scale strategy. Not one of them had commanded a division when we entered the war, and not one of them proved inefficient. Also, no battle was fought in this war by our army which was not fought successfully. By the side of the veterans of France and Great Britain our soldiers suffered nothing in the comparison. Without boasting we can say it was a war begun with justice and carried through with honor.

It was, also, a war of great sacrifice. By reports dated June 6, 1919,¹ the casualties were as follows:

Killed in action	32,835
Lost at sea	733
Died of wounds	13,542
Died of accident	4,654
Died of disease	23,244
	<hr/>
Total	75,008

¹ July 5, 1919, it was announced that the total casualties for army and marines reported up to that time was 302,150, dead, wounded, prisoners, and missing.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Wounded (85% returned to duty)	207,470
Missing and prisoners (not including prisoners released and re- turned)	2,985
Prisoners released and returned	4,534
<hr/>	
Total	214,989
Total killed, wounded, miss- ing, and prisoners	289,997

The battle casualties in the above list number 261,366 to which should be added the casualties of the marine corps, reported on April 4, 1919, at 5827. Considering the numbers engaged and the time of service these losses were heavy. If the fifteen divisions in the Meuse-Argonne campaign had gone on fighting at the same rate of losses they would have had a total casualty list of one million at the end of six and a half months. If we suppose their losses would be half as great during the rest of the year they would have used up a million and a half of men a year, or six millions in four years. Of course, they could not have kept up the pace four years. For the heavy losses of the soldiers of the United States their impetuosity was partly responsible. They were apt to be overbold in attack.

CHAPTER XIII

NAVAL OPERATIONS

IT is in the nature of things that the navy begins to play its part in a war at the very outset and for a while takes the most prominent part in public attention. Whether or not it continues this course depends on the kind of naval resistance the enemy offers. In our war against Germany the tasks of our navy after its first well reported exploits were such that the American public knew little of the actual service rendered, although it never doubted that the navy's work was being done effectively and constantly. The only combat operation reported was the service of 12 submarine chasers in the attack on the Austrian naval base at Durazzo. For the rest, the navy was employed in three kinds of service; hunting and destroying German submarines, patrolling and guarding the high seas, particularly the North Sea, and convoying transports and cargo ships.

The American navy has no directing body like the general staff of the army. The nearest approach to such an organ is the division of operations, at the head of which was Admiral W. S. Benson, with the title of Chief of Naval Operations. On him and on the chiefs of bureaus, especially the chief of the bureau of supplies and accounts, Vice Admiral Samuel McGowan, devolved most of the business of a general technical nature. Early in the war the command of all of our naval vessels in European waters was placed in the hands of Rear Admiral W. S. Sims, who proved well fitted for the duty assigned him. The work on this side of the ocean continued un-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

der the direction of the chief of operations and of the chiefs of bureaus. It was concerned for the most part with the construction and operation of ships, the development of naval aircraft, the operation of the transport service, the development and manufacture of ordnance, and other similar activities.

Before we entered the war the *Entente* nations had created an Allied Naval War Council with general direction of naval affairs in liaison with the Supreme War Council that met at Versailles. Vice Admiral Sims was appointed representative of the United States in the allied council. Until the war was near its end it was found advisable to avoid any semblance of establishing concentrated power as between nations. Britain's position in sea power, however, gave her the clear right to lead in that sphere. Accordingly, the allied council was practically under her direction. Its secretariat was composed of British officers and the representatives of other allied powers had the relation of liaison with the council. It is not accidental that this word has come so widely into use in a war in which so many great nations were forced to coöperate in military, naval, and civil affairs. It may prove in the long run that the most characteristic and permanent influence of this great struggle is the relation described in the word "liaison."

The naval forces of the United States during the war were divided into five service groups. First was the Atlantic Fleet, long the regular organization of our fighting ships. It was held in American waters for any emergency that might arise. The fleet was under command of Admiral H. T. Mayo. It was deprived of a portion of its best ships for service in European waters, but the vacancies were more than filled by placing in commission some of the ships that had been considered superannuated. The Atlantic Fleet saw no fighting during the war.

A second group was the coast patrol service, placed at first
[296]

NAVAL OPERATIONS

under the command of Captain, later Vice Admiral, Henry B. Wilson, and it was made up of small vessels, many of them converted yachts. It took over the patrol of the western Atlantic from Newfoundland to Brazil and thus released for service against the submarines a large number of allied ships that had hitherto been in these waters.

To procure vessels for the patrol and for similar purposes was no easy task. The naval authorities called on the owners of yachts, sea-going tugs, and other available craft to place their ships at the disposal of the government. From many of the wealthy yacht owners the response was immediate and generous. But a large part of them demanded prices that the authorities thought excessive, which led congress, at the request of the navy department, to pass a law to permit the department to commandeer such vessels. It was alleged that owners of tugs and commercial ships usually demanded the value of the ship in question, plus the income the owner expected to have from it during two years, plus a profit of these two items. The assistant-secretary of the navy illustrated the point by saying that a certain owner demanded \$112,000 for a vessel which cost less than \$30,000 to build. Some yacht owners refused to sell at any price. Much indignation was aroused when the newspapers reported that a rich citizen of Baltimore had offered his yacht to the government for service in Chesapeake Bay only.

Another group was the Pacific Fleet under Admiral W. B. Caperton, and still another was the Asiatic Fleet, under Admiral Austin M. Knight. Both fleets suffered in having their best strength of men and ships drawn away for the benefit of operations in other quarters. But the Asiatic Fleet in coöperation with the Japanese fleet at Vladivostok rendered important service in protecting allied interests. A fifth group was the ships that served in European waters, including those used in

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the convoy service. So large is this group that it will be well to consider it in a distinct section.

1. Naval Operations in European Waters.

When congress accepted the war that the German government thrust upon it the submarine menace was at its most serious stage. The British leaders well understood the situation and looked for any relief they could find. Mr. Balfour, in the United States in the second half of April, urged President Wilson to send as much help to combat the submarines as possible. Sir John Jellicoe, admiral and head of the admiralty, repeated the same warning in an interview dated April 16, 1917, urging that we should send to Europe any kind of ship we could spare, from destroyers to certain kinds of tugs.

Acting on the suggestion a small squadron of destroyers was made ready for immediate service and arrived at Queenstown, on the south coast of Ireland, on May 4. It was a picked force, manned by young officers and men who were eager to have a chance at the submarines. They were expected in Queenstown and a British escort went down the harbor to meet and greet them. The commander of the port awaited them at the dock and several hundred civilians gathered to give them welcome. As the senior officer came ashore the commander asked: "When will you be ready for business?" "We can start at once," was the reply. The Briton was incredulous and ventured to observe that they would need to make some arrangements after the long voyage across the ocean. To which the Americans replied that they had made the arrangements on the way over. Inspection showed that everything was in readiness for service except one thing: they had not understood the need for extra warm clothing in cruises that might take them into the region of Iceland, and with that deficiency remedied the squadron was assigned to immediate duty.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

The service consisted in cruising in the waters around Ireland, escorting merchant ships through the danger zone and keeping a sharp watch for submarines. They sailed at first in company with British destroyers to teach them the tricks of the submarines. In pleasant weather the service was agreeable but always exacting. In winter, or in bad weather in other seasons, it was very severe. The trips at sea usually lasted four or five days, when the ship returned to the base at Queenstown for coal and supplies. The sailors were received with great kindness by the natives, and the days ashore were spent in pleasant relaxation. They made short excursions by rail to the neighboring town of Cork, astonishing the Irish people by their habit of purchasing first class tickets at a small advance over the second class, and generally creating a buzz of excitement, after the manner of exuberant youth of American origin. In the harbor was anchored the "mother ship" of the destroyers, fitted up with a complete workshop for repairs, and with a modern bakery in which was baked the only wheat bread then made in Great Britain. This ship was an object of interest to the British naval officers, who admired the way in which the Americans had obtained the comfort of their personnel.

Next to the Irish waters the approaches to Brest had been most infested with submarines; and to them a second squadron of destroyers was sent. It arrived off the coast early in June and was followed soon afterwards by other destroyers. For these boats Brest became a base of operations. Here was established a base hospital for the navy, and near here was built a naval training school for aviation. The place was destined to become the greatest port of debarkation for American troops in France. Under the command of Rear Admiral Wilson it was noted for its naval efficiency.

As our operations widened it was necessary to establish other naval bases. An American squadron served in the Mediter-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

anean Sea, where submarines were very active in 1917. Its headquarters were at Malta and the command was given to Rear Admiral W. H. G. Bullard. Another station was established in the Azores, which are Portuguese Islands 900 miles west of Lisbon. It was made necessary by the operations of submarines in those remote waters. The station was developed into a port of succor for United States ships crossing the Atlantic and was of special value in getting the smallest ships through the perils of ocean navigation. For such craft as the submarine chasers, which are large motor-boats, the safest course was to pass with convoy to Bermuda and thence to the Azores and the coast of France.

When the United States entered the war the newspapers published in this country had much to say about the probability that American genius would discover something that would neutralize the power of the submarine. The tendency of Americans to overconfidence was not wholly responsible for this feeling. Europe was in a state of genuine alarm and caught at any hope of relief. American resourcefulness was well known and much was said of what it could do for the submarines. By appealing to it in glowing terms expectations were raised which were not to be realized during the war. The submarine is a new weapon, ran the argument, to every poison there is an antidote. Patience will discover the antidote of the submarine.

Looking back it is necessary to admit that the antidote was not discovered during the war. The best means of defense was in a well organized and vigilant system of convoy and in building ships as rapidly as possible to replace the destroyed vessels. Such was the opinion of the best observers when ruthless submarine warfare had been in progress several months, and there is no reason to change it nine months after the armistice was signed.

Of the actual weapons of defense the most effective was
[300]

NAVAL OPERATIONS

the depth bomb, probably a British invention, but developed to its best capacity by the Americans. Originally the depth charge weighed 50 pounds. Our naval officers made an ordinary bomb weighing 300 pounds and a specially designed bomb that weighed 600 pounds. The output of the manufacturing division was 28,000 of the first and 500 of the second kind, and orders had been given for 30,000 more when the armistice was signed. At first the depth charges were handled very cautiously and a destroyer carried only a few. Gradually the number carried was increased until it was not unusual to have a hundred on board one vessel. Lashed on deck they became a source of serious anxiety in rough water. The first depth charges used were dropped in the wake of the destroyer with a float and line attached, arranged to explode when the line had played out to a given extent. The American navy developed a gun for discharging the bombs either astern or over the sides of the ship, thus widening the area of attack. When a submarine was located the destroyer quickly dropped depth charges over each of the courses the submarine was expected to take under water, following a system of probabilities previously worked out with great care.

The vigilance of the destroyers and the strict adherence to the convoy system forced the submarines to rely more and more on attacks made from under water. The practice involved the use of torpedoes, expensive in themselves and limited in numbers on board the submarine. Hovering around the convoyed fleet the best the German could hope was for a ship to fall out of line through some fault of her machinery. Under the circumstances she was without immediate protection and a sharp quick blow was generally safe.

Two methods of defense were the use of smoke screens and the adoption of "dazzle" painting. Smoke did not conceal the vessel in such a way as to make it safe when the weather

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

was clear; but under conditions of low visibility it was effective. "Dazzle" painting was devised in a system of zig zag lines carefully studied by naval officials. The object was not so much to conceal the ship; for it is very difficult to make a moving object blend into its background; and for that purpose no better means could be found than to make the object take the same color as the background. The value of "dazzle" painting lay in the difficulty it made for the enemy observer using a periscope. In the short interval of observation possible it was hard for him to determine the direction in which the ship was going or its angle of incidence to his own course.

Statistics compiled by the British admiralty office and published after the war indicate that 203 German, and 7 Austrian submarines were sunk or captured by their enemies during the war. It is difficult to say what part the American navy took in these particular exploits. At the end of the fighting Germany had about 135 submarines, 25 of which were used for training. This number was smaller than the allies had estimated. The terms of the armistice demanded the surrender of 160. The Germans, however, surprised them by reporting 170 under construction in their own shipyards. Their latest type of craft had a cruising radius of from 3000 to 8000 miles and carried six-inch guns. Speaking in general terms, it is a question whether the submarine itself or the anti-submarine measures developed more during the war.

Before we entered the war much was said about the immunity of the coasts of the United States from submarine visitations. It was probably to prove that we were not safe from such visits that the German submarine U-53 visited Newport on October 7, 1916, and departed for Germany without taking supplies. The visit established the fact that a submarine could reach our waters from an European base, and it was supposed to be in the nature of a warning to us.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

When we began to send troops to France, in the summer of 1917, reports of submarines in American waters were circulated freely. They all proved false and were attributed to persons of pro-German sympathy, or to nervous people who took counsel of their fears. As the months passed and no submarines appeared in our waters the opinion prevailed that we were immune. Then, on a day in early June, 1918, came the startling information that one or more submarines were off the coasts of New Jersey and Delaware, freely destroying whatever ships they encountered, American, allied, or neutral.

The work of destruction began on May 25, when two, or by some accounts four, schooners were sunk off Cape May and the crews taken prisoners on the submarine, where they remained for eight days and received good treatment. They reported that the crew of the submarine numbered 75 men, that many of them spoke English by choice among themselves, using German only when giving or replying to orders, and that several had lived in America or sailed to American ports repeatedly before the war. The commander of the submarine was reported as a former gunner's mate in the United States navy by the name of Neustadt, but the records of the navy department showed no such name. As for the submarine itself, the reports of the prisoners and of later victims described her as 250 feet long and 30 feet beam, with a six-inch Krupp rifle on deck at each end. In one place she was reported as the U-37 and in another as the U-151.

Whatever the name and past services of her captain, he was a communicative man on matters not connected with official duties. He told his captives that he had held command on a big American liner and had many friends among the captains who sailed into New York harbor. "I commanded on big American liners before we started this fuss," he was reported as saying, "but war is war. So we will go right through with

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

this little job." To another, a captain who remonstrated against being cast adrift 125 miles from shore, he said: "That's all right, Captain. Have no fear. The water is warm, the weather fine, and there are plenty of ships passing to pick you up. Good luck!" The crews imprisoned in May were released after eight days and set adrift in the boats of newly captured ships. One of the prisoners, a captain of a schooner, said that there was an extra captain and an excessively large crew on the submarine, his inference being that it was expected to take a suitable ship, man her, and send her forth as a raider.

June 2 the submarine began to move southward, sinking ships almost daily. One of her victims was the liner *Carolina*, from Porto Rico to New York with a full passenger list. Set adrift in the evening 342 persons in all, they encountered a severe thunder squall in which 12 persons were drowned. June 5 the submarine was off the Virginia coast and cruised, it seems, until the 16th, when her whole bag consisted of 20 ships, half of them sailing ships and half steam ships. Eight of the victims were under Norwegian registry. One, a Norwegian steamer returning from South America, had on board 80 tons of copper in ingots, which the submarine transferred to her hold, lying alongside nearly a whole day for the purpose. To the Norwegian captain, who spent two hours very pleasantly on the deck of the submarine, the German commander said that he was two months out of German waters and that he expected to stay away six months longer. It was the general report that the submarine took nothing out of the captured ships except the copper already mentioned, which indicated that she was well supplied with food and fuel.

Her arrival in America caused great excitement. Submarine nets were placed by the navy before the more important Atlantic ports, and destroyers and other patrol ships were sent up and down the coast looking for the intruder. A reward of

NAVAL OPERATIONS

\$1000 was offered for proof that a submarine base was established on the coast. Some persons believed that a supply ship was in Virginia waters in disguise, while others held the view that a base was established in Mexican waters. The captain of the submarine laughed at the speculations of the newspapers and the efforts of the navy. He left American waters about the 16th and two days later sunk the British transport *Dwinsk* 550 miles east of New York. July 19 the country was given an unpleasant reminder of his visit in the sinking of the armored cruiser *San Diego* off Fire Island by a mine the submarine was believed to have placed.

July 21 a second raid began on our coast when a U-boat appeared off Cape Cod and burned a tug and sank the four barges she was drawing. Next day a fishing boat was sunk off Gloucester, Massachusetts. Then followed a series of attacks extending over a month in which about forty-five ships of various kinds were sunk. Several of the victims were tankers and several more were steamships. More than half were fishing vessels, of which ten were destroyed in one day off the Massachusetts coast. The operations were conducted by two, or perhaps three, submarines, one cruising north of Cape Cod, one off the Virginia capes, and the third, if there was a third, working off the New Jersey coast. From descriptions given by the victims the navy department concluded that the visitors were of the improved type of cruiser submarines, about 300 feet long, armed with two guns, and having a cruising radius of 17,000 miles. One of their achievements was the destruction of the lightship on the Diamond Shoals, near Cape Hatteras, and another was the destruction of a cable from New York to a country south of that port. Late in the operations the submarine armed a captured steam trawler, the *Triumph*, which was reported to have sunk five fishing ships in one day. Stories brought in by participants made it probable that two of these

[305]

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

submarines were sunk by armed merchant steamers, one on August 16 and another on August 17.

In both of these raids the submarines showed no intention of attacking the transports then carrying American troops to France in great numbers. They were probably sent over to strike terror in the heart of the people, but they failed to accomplish this purpose. The only appreciable effect on American morale was to stimulate a desire for revenge, which was shown in the increased rate of enlistments in navy and army. The damage inflicted fell on private individuals, most of them poor men who could not afford the loss. No military ends were obtained in either raid, which, as acts of war, were practically useless to the Germans and only annoying to the people of the United States.

The failure of the navy to intercept any of the submarines concerned in these operations was due, probably, to the unwillingness of the authorities to draw naval vessels away from duty in the convoy service. It is true that a large number of submarine chasers and some destroyers were sent out to watch for the lurking evil, but they were not numerous enough to guard the extensive coast line that was involved.

Only two fighting naval ships were sunk in submarine encounter. One was the converted yacht *Alcedo*, sunk off the coast of France November 5. The other was the new and well equipped destroyer, the *Jacob Jones*, which was surprised by a submarine 500 miles off the British coast and sunk on December 6, 1917. It was the only regular American warship destroyed in battle during the war. Three transports, the *Antilles*, the *President Lincoln*, and the *Covington*, were sunk while on return voyages. July 19, 1918, the cruiser *San Diego* was sunk by a mine that had probably been placed by a torpedo. The coast guard ship *Tampa*, doing escort duty in the Bristol channel, England, got ahead of her convoy and was blown up [306]

NAVAL OPERATIONS

with the loss of all officers and men. Vessels following her heard the report of the explosion and hastened to the spot, where they could see only bits of wreckage. Not one of the men aboard was found, and the exact manner of the destruction of the ship is not known. More mysterious was the loss of the navy collier *Cyclops*, 19,000 tons, proceeding north from a South American port with 57 passengers and 233 officers and crew. March 4, 1918, she was reported at Barbadoes, where she put in for bunker coal; but after leaving that place she disappeared utterly. Her fate is one of the mysteries of recent marine history.

Other naval activities included such things as keeping open the routes by which allied ships received their supply of fuel oil, most of which was derived from the oil fields of Texas and Mexico. If the submarines had interrupted this supply the result would have been serious for all the allied shipping, as well as for motor transportation on land. To safeguard the oil ships the American Patrol Force was established with headquarters at Key West to keep the submarines out of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Its services were very important. North of Key West the oil ships were under the protection of the coast patrol, and under the regular convoy system in their transatlantic voyages. To get them safely around the north coast of Scotland where they could deliver their cargoes at North Sea ports, accessible to the oil using ships of the British and American navies, was a serious problem. It was solved by constructing a pipe line across the breadth of Scotland. The work of construction was performed by American naval experts.

In the North Sea served the allied grand fleet under the chief command of Admiral Sir David Beatty. Its sixth battle squadron was the Battleship Division Nine of our Atlantic Fleet, under the command of Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman. The squad-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

ron went abroad in December, 1917, and did not return until after the armistice was signed. It was given a place of honor in the Grand Fleet, being assigned to one of the two "fast wings," so that in an action it would either lead the van or protect the rear. The strategy of Admiral Beatty was to get the German fleet out of its harbor and fight a pitched battle, and many efforts were made to induce it to come out. None of them succeeded. Had an engagement occurred the ships of the United States would have proved an important element of the fighting force. Division Nine was present at the surrender of the German fleet on November 21, 1918, at Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands. Three other battleships went to Europe in the summer of 1918 under the command of Rear Admiral T. S. Rodgers and served in protecting convoy with their base at Beerhaven, Ireland.

Another important service of the navy was the part it contributed to the maintenance of the mine barrage in the North Sea. In April, 1917, immediately after we entered the war, the bureau of ordnance of the navy department began to work on a plan for closing the North Sea with a mine barrage extending from the Orkney Islands to the coast of Norway. The great difficulty in the way was that no mine then used was equal to the requirement of such a barrage, unless it were used in such numbers as to make the project impracticable. The line from Scotland to Norway is 230 miles long. The plan of the ordnance bureau provided for the distribution of mines along this entire course and they were to protect the waters to a depth of 250 feet. The proposal was submitted to the British admiralty office by Admiral Mayo, and an investigation followed, the result of which was that the British and American navies undertook to establish the barrage as suggested.

Our government now began to manufacture mines on a larger scale than ever before. A tract of land containing 1100 acres
[308]

NAVAL OPERATIONS

was acquired near Yorktown, Virginia, on which a mine-loading plant was established. By the end of the war 100,000 mines had been manufactured, 85,000 of which had been shipped abroad. More than 50,000 of these mines were laid in European waters. American naval ships laid 80% of the North Sea barrage. A second barrage was placed across the Straits of Dover. It was reported that at least 10 submarines were destroyed at these barrages; and it seems certain that they were a valuable means of restricting the submarine depredations.

The part taken in the war by the navy of the United States was not a spectacular part. It was overshadowed by the far greater performance of the British navy. It was, nevertheless, a steady, faithful, and honest piece of scientific work, performed by conscientious and able officials. In efficiency it lacked nothing in comparison with the achievement of any navy in the war.

CHAPTER XIV

PRELIMINARIES TO THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

1. *Early Suggestions from Germany.*

THE German people went into the war believing it would end quickly in victory and that the expenses would be paid by indemnities. They had been taught this doctrine for many years by the advocates of militarism. As the war progressed it became evident that not even victory of the fullest kind would enable Germany to lay indemnities that would repay her outlay, and sentiment began to form for the annexation of territory as a further means of recouping the state for its expenditures. The ruling military class was the more insistent for indemnities and annexation because they did not dare face the taxpayers with demands for revenues large enough to wipe out the war debt. Germany was victorious, they insisted, her enemies would soon have to admit it, and then the people would see that all things would come out well. Despite these assurances there was always doubt about her enemies suing for peace and there was great dissatisfaction with the suffering the war entailed. In fact, German autocracy was responsible for the war and defeat would bring a strict accounting. It behooved the autocrats to make a German peace as soon as possible.

November 9, 1916, the imperial chancellor made a speech before the main committee of the *Reichstag* restating the arguments by which he wished to show that the war was forced upon Germany by her enemies who wished to destroy her prosperity. Under cover of this patriotic display he sent a note to the

[310]

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

Entente allies on the 12th suggesting that the war be brought to an end on grounds of humanity. As though he feared the German people would take the note as a sign of yielding he filled it with phrases that none but a defeated opponent could have ignored. It proclaimed the righteousness of the German war, the victory of the German arms, and the infliction of complete defeat if the offer was declined. To have accepted his suggestion would have meant the acceptance of a peace dictated by Germany. Probably few of the German leaders were surprised when the note was rejected with scorn.

Meanwhile, constitutional reform grew in Germany. Six months later a *Reichstag* committee, sitting *ad interim*, declared for making the ministry responsible to the *Reichstag* and for bringing the army and navy and the kaiser's appointments under parliamentary responsibility. Thus challenged the privileged class rose in strong protest, the chancellor stood by the reformers, and the kaiser, forced to take one road or the other, went over definitely to the militarists, and his chancellor resigned. Thus, constitutional reform in Germany seemed stifled during the war. Two acts of a contrary tendency did not disprove this assertion. July 19, 1917, the centrists, socialists, and radicals in the *Reichstag* carried resolutions declaring the war was not waged for annexations of territory, nor to perpetuate feelings of enmity through economic blockades. Much was hoped from these resolutions. The chancellor did not oppose them; but once passed they were allowed to be forgotten by emperor and reformers. The other ray of hope was a movement for equal suffrage in the Prussian Diet. It had the support of the kaiser and von Hertling, the chancellor of the empire; but the Prussian Junkers opposed it so fiercely that it remained unaccepted until the very end of the war. The will of the rulers to ignore these two measures of reform did much to undermine the people's support of the government, and to

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

promote the political revolt that eventually played a leading part in the peace making.

The resolutions of July 19 were chiefly the work of the Catholic party. It was, therefore, natural for the pope on August 1 to address notes "to the rulers of the belligerent peoples" urging peace on the following terms: 1. Right to be substituted for force, armaments to be reduced, and arbitration to be accepted as the means of settling future disputes; 2. The principle of the freedom of the seas to be accepted; 3. Claims for reparation to be abandoned on both sides; 4. The future of Alsace-Lorraine and the lands claimed by Italy to be referred to the parties interested, in the hope that the will of the inhabitants would be followed; and 5. The future of the Balkan states, Armenia, and Poland to be determined in accordance with the spirit of equity.

The reply of Germany was in the tone of a precious sinner who sets out to conciliate his father confessor. She dutifully acknowledged the interest of the pope in restoring peace to the world, repeated the well worn assertion that the kaiser had long been the bulwark of peace in Europe, protested that up to the last minute he had tried to settle the quarrel of Austria and Serbia in 1914 by peaceful means, and declared that he and his allies had been the first to suggest peace since the war began. Hitherto the kaiser had been the embodiment of the theory of force. His minister now confessed agreement with His Holiness in the view "that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right." In fact, he was willing to go one better; for he said: "We are also convinced that the sick body of human society can only be healed by fortifying its moral strength of right. From this would follow, according to His Holiness' view, the simultaneous diminution of the armed forces of all States and the institution

[312]

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

of obligatory arbitration for international disputes." He agreed to support specific measures of this nature if they were "compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people."

The note, however, was not all sanctimonious piffle. "Germany," it said, "owing to her geographical situation and economic requirements, has to rely on peaceful intercourse with her neighbors and with distant countries. No people, therefore, has more reason than the German people to wish that instead of universal hatred and battle, a conciliatory fraternal spirit should prevail between nations." Here was recognition that Germany suffered from the hatred her methods of warfare and her cynical indifference to treaties had produced. The tone in which the note deplored her past conduct suggests that the writer wished the world to think that the nation repented its harshness. But the concessions were marred by the jaunty assumption that the nations would readily forgive Germany and take her bloody hands in good faith. However, the note lacked the air of triumph which made its predecessor of December 12 an offense to the *Entente* allies. It contained no reference to the pope's fourth and fifth points.

The reply of the United States to the papal note was signed by Secretary Lansing. It was an able statement of our purposes and a skillful appeal to the sober judgment of Germans. The pope's proposal for a return to the *status quo ante* with disarmament, general condonation of wrongs, and renunciation of territorial claims to the good will of the nations concerned was rejected as insufficient. "The object of this war," said the secretary, "is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaties or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling.” Here was a plain statement of the case against Germany, and it was from such a source that it was likely to be read by the German people.

There was more like it. “We cannot take the words of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples in the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers.” The press in Germany poured scorn on this note, but the future was to show how well it sunk into the minds of the people.

The year 1917 closed with military and political affairs favorable to the Germans. The battles in France had not been German defeats and Italy had been given a severe blow

[314]

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

in the October offensive, while Russia was coming slowly under German influence. The popular discontent was quieted, the hands of the military party were strengthened, and the demands for peace receded. Under the circumstances the resolutions of July 19 seemed to be forgotten by Germany.

December 15 she signed an armistice with the Lenine government at Brest-Litovsk. The Bolsheviks went through the form of calling on all belligerents to accept a general treaty, and the publication of their appeal, with a growing restlessness in labor circles in Great Britain, was probably the cause of the first specific announcement of terms that came from the British government. Speaking before the British Trade Union Conference January 5, 1918, Mr. Lloyd George, prime minister, announced some of the most obvious British terms, among them the complete restoration and independence of Belgium, the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine, the internationalization of the Dardanelles, the separation of Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine from Turkey, and the settlement of the question of the German colonies in accordance with the wishes of their inhabitants. He said, also, that the sanctity of treaties must be reëstablished, the right of self-determination must be recognized in the settlement of territorial problems, and there must be "some international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war." This statement was Britain's answer to the proposed general peace.

January 8 President Wilson addressed a joint session of congress on the conditions of peace, reënforsing what Mr. Lloyd George had said and amplifying some of his utterances. Since the United States were not formally allied with the *Entente* group, it was advisable for them to meet the issue separately. In this address, which was approved by congress and people, the president set forth his demands in fourteen points as follows:

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

"I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

"II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

"III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

"IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

"V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

"VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

“VIII. All French territory should be freed and invaded portions restored; and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

“IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

“X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

“XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

“XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under national guarantees.

“XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

“XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.”

President Wilson's Fourteen Points were eventually to play a great part in the diplomacy of the war. They were received by Germany and Austria-Hungary with pleasant words, but the replies omitted so much that was embraced in the Fourteen

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Points that President Wilson rightly reported to congress that they were not accepted as a basis of peace negotiations. In commenting on the replies of Germany and Austria, February 11, 1918, President Wilson announced four principles concerning the territorial phases of peace-making. He demanded that each case be settled in accordance with "justice of that particular case" and "that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game." He declared that territorial settlements must be made "in the interest and for the benefit of the people concerned" and that "all well-defined national aspirations" must be satisfied if possible.

Other speeches of President Wilson announced his views of peace, especially his speeches at Baltimore on April 6—when the allied cause was at its lowest ebb through the success of the German drive of March 21—at the tomb of Washington, July 4, and at New York, September 7. In the first he called the country to greater efforts and declared that "force to the uttermost" was our attitude toward the crisis. The declaration encouraged our European friends, who were deeply depressed. In the Mount Vernon address he restated our war aims in four points of a rather general nature. In the New York speech he recognized that the progress of the war widened the objects for which we fought and made a new problem of peace in order to assure just and permanent international relations. The new ideas in this address were, for the most part, concerned with the project of a league of nations, which the evident defeat of Germany made more probable daily.

The suggestions for peace made by the central powers up to September, 1918, were probably made chiefly with the intention of dividing the allies. It was hoped that one of them would be so weary of war that she would take steps toward peace and thus force the others to yield. In view of what hap-

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

pened later it is evident, also, that the German government was pressed hard by German public opinion and wished to make it appear that it was doing all in its power to make peace. President Wilson, as spokesman for the strongest state arrayed against Germany, had predominating influence among Germany's enemies. It was clear to all that the United States had no expectation of annexing territory. The Fourteen Points were received as an expression of disinterested desire for world peace. It was through the establishment of permanent justice and through that alone that we could hope to have a permanent advantage from the defeat of German ambition.

2. *The Armistice.*

Long before the war ended *Entente* opinion held that Austria-Hungary would be the first of the central allies to offer to withdraw from the war. In fact, it seemed probable that Germany, wishing to preserve before her own people an unyielding opposition to surrender, would be pleased to have her greatest ally take the initiative in this unpopular process. She might escape some of the odium of surrender by saying she accepted defeat because she was deserted by her allies. It was not surprising to the world, therefore, that Austria-Hungary, with the support of Germany, on September 14, 1918, took the first step in the process of surrender when she issued a note formally asking the belligerents to send delegates to a conference for free and unbinding consultation, in order to see if some basis of agreement could not be found.

The note was received with scorn by the *Entente* group and by the United States. At this time the German army was meeting daily reverses in France, and the British campaign in Syria was progressing favorably. It was evident, however, that the German people still believed themselves unbeaten. If the war ended then they would remember it as a German triumph, which

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

was undesirable. It was one of the necessary things for future peace that the result of the struggle should make it evident to any fair minded man, in Germany or out, that the German military program had not done what was expected of it. The German people would deal with militarism themselves, if they could be convinced that it was a failure. Germany must be beaten until she knew it. As long as she was in a position to claim that she was unbeaten the war must go on.

It was in the realization of this fact that President Wilson sent his reply to Austria. "The Government of the United States," he said, "feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeated and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain." This explicit declaration was followed by a refusal equally clear from the British and French governments.

The day the Austrian proposal appeared in the newspapers, September 15, the allied troops on the Saloniki front broke the Bulgarian lines and began the drive that put Bulgaria out of the war. September 29 she signed an armistice, equivalent to complete submission. Bulgaria had not been at war with the United States. Her minister had remained in Washington, and it was believed that the influence of the American government, transmitted through him to Sofia, had brought Bulgaria to open negotiations.

The collapse of Bulgaria left Constantinople exposed to the attacks of the allies whenever they saw fit to march against her. For the present they were busy elsewhere, but the time for an attack was left to their discretion. Meanwhile, the British army under General Allenby steadily moved through Syria and reached Aleppo on October 26, thus isolating Mesopotamia

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

and leaving it to the mercy of General Marshall's army. The Turkish power was thereby reduced to Asia Minor and a small area north of the Bosphorus, and its armies were demoralized. The government at Constantinople saw its fate and did not wait for an attack on the capital. October 31 it accepted an armistice whose terms amounted to unconditional surrender. These events culminated after Germany had begun to seek an armistice, but they were long foreseen and their inevitableness had a strong influence on the surrender of the kaiser.

The autumn of 1918 brought Austria-Hungary the crisis of a fatal internal revolution. In the preceding May some of the Czechs of Bohemia had raised the flag of revolt and continued to defy Austrian authority despite the severest retaliatory measures. The Slavs of Herzegovina and Bosnia were also moving toward revolution. In August a great Slavic meeting at Laibach agreed that all the Slavs in the empire should act together for independence. Late in October the Czechs proclaimed the Czecho-Slovak republic and November 3 the Slavs on the eastern shore of the Adriatic proclaimed the republic of Jugo-Slavia. At the same time the kingdom of Poland, revived by Germany with the intention of keeping it as a dependency of that empire, took a free position and called to its bosom the Poles who had been for more than a hundred years incorporated in Austria and Prussia.

The Austro-Hungarian empire was thus reduced to military impotency. General Foch took advantage of the situation and late in October ordered the combined Italian and British forces in Italy to attack the Austrian army on the Piave. In ten days they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Austrians, capturing more than 100,000 prisoners and 2200 guns. November 3 the government at Vienna signed an armistice which left it no vestige of military power.

Thus, in thirty-five days, September 29 to November 3, Ger-

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

many lost the aid of her three allies, and her own dire fate was knocking at the door. Defeat was inevitable merely on military grounds, as we have already seen; but it was made doubly certain by the collapse of civil government in the empire itself. Early in 1918 the kaiser was entirely with the Junker party. The long discussed reform of suffrage in Prussia made no progress and his ministers of states were strongly autocratic. The military successes of March to May strengthened this tendency. In fact, as the war went for Germany the kaiser leaned toward strong government. In June it was not clear that Hindenburg's tremendous blows were going to win a victorious peace, and the kaiser began to waver. His indecision was promoted by the election of Ebert, a socialist, to the presidency of the Main Committee of the *Reichstag*, an indication that the socialist party was in a dominant position in the German parliament. The forces of moderation now took heart. In order to prepare the country for a lowering of its peace demands, von Kühlmann, foreign secretary, was put up to make a moderate speech. He declared that Great Britain did not precipitate the war and said that peace would not come through victory in the field. The speech brought a storm of protest from the Junkers, before which press and government yielded. The kaiser, who was believed to have ordered von Kühlmann to make the speech, sent him a sharp reproof, now that it was seen to be unpopular. From it His Majesty had learned that the bureaucrats were still strong with the people and a bureaucrat he would be. Admiral von Hintze, an out and out Junker, took the post of foreign secretary, replacing the discredited von Kühlmann.

In July the tide of battle turned against the Germans, but they were assured by the government that the check was only temporary. As July ran into August and August passed into its decline the tide did not turn back again. Defeat after defeat was inflicted on the Germans. The confidence of the peo-

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

ple now gave way. Throughout the war reports of bread riots had come out of Germany. Probably they were true in general, but they were not significant of effective discontent. With the advent of defeat the reports multiplied and the disturbances reported became more serious. Now and then a newspaper was said to have uttered the most outspoken criticism. Resentment was especially directed against Chancellor von Hertling, who was opposed to the admission of socialists to the government. Finally, on September 30, the day after Bulgaria signed an armistice, he was forced to resign. He was replaced by Prince Maximilian of Bavaria, a known liberal who had declared that Germany could not win by the sword. Two socialists now entered the cabinet and Erzberger, leader of the centrists, also took his seat in that body.

Meanwhile, the American people and the inhabitants of the allied nations were coming to realize that the end of the war was in sight. The realization of the situation made it more and more evident that they should make up their minds about the terms of peace. Here, as in former crises, President Wilson raised a cry that caught the ears of the world and set a high standard of purpose for the peoples who longed for permanent world peace. Speaking in New York on September 27, 1918, he said:

“Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples’ war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us and we responded, fiercely and of course.”

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

As to the issues now apparent he summarized them as follows:

“Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?”

“Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?”

“Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?”

“Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?”

“Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?”

Commenting on his own questions he declared that no compromise could be made with the central powers. The treaties they had made at Brest-Litvosk, with Russia, and at Bucharest, with Rumania, showed in what spirit they were still proceeding. The German people themselves must understand that we could not “accept the word of those who forced the war upon us.”

The speaker then turned to the League of Nations. He had referred to it in several of his previous utterances, but the imminence of victory made it necessary to outline the ideas he would place in it with greater precision than he had yet stated them. Without going into details he mentioned the following principles for which, he said with confidence, the people of the United States would be willing to stand:

“First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

“Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

“Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understanding within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

“Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of the Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

“Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.”

In these words President Wilson sought to gather up the hopes of those people who wished that the sacrifices of the war might result in a league of peace. His speech, which received the approval of the allied governments and peoples, made the league of nations one of the immediate objects of peace.

Prince Maximilian became the imperial German chancellor on October 4. On the same day through the Swiss government he asked President Wilson “to take steps for the restoration of peace,” to invite the allied governments to send delegates to negotiate, and in order to avoid further bloodshed to conclude an armistice “on land, on water, and in the air.” He accepted as a basis of peace President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and his subsequent statements, especially the address of September 27. At the same time Austria made a similar request and ten days later Turkey took the same step.

Two conceivable courses were now open to the president. He could treat the note of Maximilian as a sincere request for peace on the basis which he, the president, with the assent of the allies, had declared acceptable. Or he could repudiate his declaration and reply that no terms but unconditional surrender would be accepted. Some men would have had him adopt the latter course. His own conviction was in favor of the former;

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

but he was not willing to follow it out until he was convinced of the utter sincerity of the new German government. His reply contained two questions and one condition. Did the chancellor definitely accept the fourteen points and subsequent statements with the understanding that negotiations applied only to details? and: Was the chancellor "speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war"? He added that he would propose an armistice only on condition that the German armies should retire from French and Belgian soil.

When the chancellor's note was received the Germans seemed about to suffer that visible and overwhelming defeat of arms which most of us felt would be good for their souls. Should they be allowed to escape by throwing up their hands while their own people considered themselves unbeaten? Would not an armistice only allow them to extricate their armies from a perilous position and continue their resistance at the border? On the other hand, the fierce fighting now in progress was exceedingly sanguinary. Probably 10,000 men fell daily in the American and allied armies; and a prudent statesman must take this matter into account. If Germany was sincere in wishing to make peace on President Wilson's announced terms, it would be an unhappy blunder to refuse her offer that we might, after some weeks of further fighting, surround and capture some large portion of her army.

Senator Lodge, republican leader in the senate, made the following comment upon the president's second question:

"I am keenly disappointed that the President should at this stage enter into a discussion with the Imperial German Government, as he has done in the note signed by Mr. Lansing. In his first and second paragraphs he asks for further information and invites further discussion. It is true that in the last paragraph he inquires whether Prince Maximilian represents merely the constituted authorities of

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

the German Empire. Prince Maximilian is the Chancellor of the German Empire, appointed by the Kaiser. I do not understand what he can possibly represent except the constituted authorities, which represent the German Empire and people, unless a revolution has occurred of which the world has as yet no knowledge. To us he stands as the representative of Germany and of the Kaiser."

Probably the senator misjudged the significance of the president's question. Germany was known to be on the verge of the revolution, which, in fact, soon burst forth. By keeping before the Germans the unwillingness of the world to treat with the old régime the president helped to promote that revolution. We must keep this fact in mind as we read the story of the negotiations which brought the German authorities into the open and forced them to accept terms amounting to acknowledged defeat, something they probably did not intend to do when they began to exchange notes. As they proceeded, in the full view of their own people, they did not dare go backward. The Bulgarian minister, fresh from the conclusion of the Bulgarian armistice, said: "I consider President Wilson's ideas as great a power in bringing about the defeat of the Central Powers as the force of arms."¹ The minister was in a position to know much about the diplomacy of the war.

A second note from Germany was dispatched October 12. It conceded the immediate evacuation of occupied territory and answered the president's first question in the affirmative. The note added that the existing German government was "formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the *Reichstag*," and declared that the chancellor through this majority spoke in the name of the German people. Now followed other notes in which the president was able to force the Germans into the most explicit avowal of the fundamental change of government in Germany. If the United States government, he

¹ *New York Times*, October 6, 1918, VIII, 1:1.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

said, "must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid."

To this sally the reply was: "The peace negotiations are being conducted by a government of the people, in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the authority to make decisions. The military powers are also subject to this authority." On the strength of this assurance President Wilson felt justified in laying the correspondence before the allied governments who agreed to enter into peace negotiations on the basis of the Fourteen Points and subsequent statements, reserving to themselves complete freedom in interpretation of the clause on the freedom of the seas and explicitly asserting that by restoration of the invaded territories they understood the meaning to be compensation by Germany "for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." With the receipt of this note the Germans were directed to apply to Marshal Foch for the terms of an armistice.

The story now shifts to the western front, where the great tragedy is drawing to its close. The cannon are pounding more intensely, the battalions are charging more fiercely than ever before in the war; for it is the last stake the two sides play for. The negotiations have consumed a month and the Germans are well driven out of France by the fire of allied and American guns. Those who wished time to finish the death stroke have almost had their wish. The Germans are not yet thrown into rout, but they are badly shattered in morale. Perhaps it is enough to negative their claim that they were not defeated, although in respect to their military achievements men

[328]

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

ever will claim much. At any rate, the end is at hand, and there are few men in the trenches who are not glad of it.

The terms of the armistice were well digested by a council at Versailles. No attempt has been made to conceal the intention to make them severe enough to reduce Germany to future impotency. If any doubt remains in the minds of her friends, or of herself, it may be dispelled by observing that the terms allowed to her allies amounted to absolute surrender. She could hardly expect lighter treatment.

President Wilson's note of the 5th was handed to the Swiss minister in Washington in the night of the same day and was sent to the cable office immediately. It should be in Berlin within twenty-four hours, and the reply should be received in another twenty-four. Those who lived through those autumn days will hardly forget the breathless expectancy of the period of delay. No one doubted the outcome, but it was like walking in a dream to realize that this war which had made the world a scene of madness for more than four years was going to end at last. One gasped and waited and merely existed.

At 12:30 A. M., November 7, came out of the void a wireless message to Marshal Foch from the German government. It announced the appointment of agents to receive the terms of an armistice which they were informed by the American president that Marshal Foch would deliver. The marshal was asked to name by wireless message the place at which the German agents would be received. He replied promptly at 1:25 A. M. directing the German agents to present themselves at the French outposts on the road from Guise to La Capelle, which crossed the battle-line about twelve miles east of Guise. A wireless reply announced compliance with these directions and declared that the agents would depart from Spa, German headquarters, at noon, November 7, and reach the outposts at 5 P. M. In the battle zone, however, the roads were so bad that a company of

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

road-menders had to be employed and the progress was so slow that it was not until late at night that the party passed the barrier. They were taken blindfolded to a house where they spent the night. Early next morning they were whisked off to Foch's headquarters at Senlis, seventy-five miles southwest of Guise.

The Germans began the interview by demanding formally an armistice. The text of the terms already prepared by the council at Versailles was read and delivered to them, with the information that it must be answered in seventy-two hours, that is, by 11 A. M., November 11. They asked for an immediate cessation of arms but the request was denied. Then the envoys withdrew to their quarters. The interview had been brief, but it was conducted with the nicest possible military etiquette. A copy of the terms offered was sent by the envoys to German headquarters with request for instructions. The progress of this courier bearing the message was delayed by a German barrage so that he did not reach Spa until Sunday, November 10, at 10 A. M. The German government at that particular moment was in the throes of great agony, deserted by the last element of strength. It could do nothing but drink to the dregs the cup of humiliation it had brewed, which Marshal Foch grimly held to its lips. A courier with instructions for signing the fatal document was dispatched through the lines, and the names of the envoys were attached at Senlis 5 A. M. on November 11. By the terms of the agreement the armistice went into force six hours after the signing, that is at 11 A. M. In these sadly humiliating deeds did Germany eat the bitter fruit from the seed she sowed on the fatal August 1, 1914.

Bitter indeed was the fate of the state that had then plunged the world into war. Austria, Germany's willing partner in the crimes of July, 1914, had been forced to surrender on November 3. The two empires were prostrate at the feet of avenged justice.

PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS

The disaster of the national governments, however, was not so great as the disaster of the militarists, who had directed the governments. October 26 General Ludendorff, who had controlled army and civil government in Germany, was forced to resign and the *Reichstag* by a large majority declared the army under control of the civil government.

Would the decree be enforced? A great many people outside of Germany asked the question. Here again was seen the result of the distrust Germany had aroused when she set out to break agreements. She had made people believe her capable of any kind of subterfuge. A large portion of her opponents, perhaps a majority, seeing the German revolution unfolding itself daily, believed it was only a scheme designed to deceive those who declared that no agreement could be made with the Junker autocracy. They half believed that all this outward show of revolution had been cooked up by an overskilled group of masters of chicanery and that it would vanish in due time, leaving the old masters in full control of Germany.

Men of this class distrusted President Wilson's negotiations with the Germans. They would not believe that any real changes were in progress behind the German frontier. Senator Lodge was probably the highest representative of this class. Commenting on the president's note to Germany, October 23, he said:

"There is no German Government in existence with which I would discuss anything. I deplore at this stage, when we are advancing steadily to a complete victory, any discussion or exchange of notes with the German Government. The only thing now is to demand unconditional surrender. I would leave that to Marshal Foch and the Generals of the armies. When they report that the German Army has surrendered and ceased to exist as an army in being, then, and not until then, let the Allies and the United States meet and agree what terms they will impose on Germany to insure the safety of civilization and mankind."

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Only three days later Ludendorff resigned and the army was taken definitely under the authority of the *Reichstag*, and only one day later Germany sent an abject note accepting unconditional terms.

It seems certain that Prince Maximilian's leadership was forced on the militarists by the popular desire for peace. His first official act was to send his first peace note. President Wilson inquired if he accepted all the conditions. When it was known in Berlin that the Prince had sent a complaisant reply, the people, taking it for the end of the negotiations, began a great peace demonstration in the streets. As time passed and peace was not announced their anger turned against their government. It was one of the chief causes of the outburst of popular feeling which made it necessary for the kaiser to abdicate. President Wilson's course in sending the notes was probably adopted through the desire to end the war as early as possible in the interest of humanity; but it served well to make it impossible for the Germans to refuse unconditional surrender as the last alternative. Had he rejected the first request for an armistice with a reference of the subject to the military authorities, he would have belied his own previously announced policies and at the same time he would have given the German military party the opportunity to appeal to the nation for a last-ditch defense. Looking back over his policy, it seems that President Wilson took a consistent and well considered course and that it had happy results. It did not destroy the American position as the champion of high moral ideas.

CHAPTER XV

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

1. *Dispatching the Peace Commission*

THROUGH the fog of words surrounding the participation of the United States in the peace negotiations we can begin to see how much the old state of isolation is lost, apparently forever. While the nation was fighting we thought only of beating Germany. Then came the armistice, and it was necessary to make a peace, a world peace. Most Americans knew that it was necessary to make the fruits of victory secure, and most of them believed that to establish democracy in Germany was a means to that end. President Wilson, as we have seen, had said much about a league of nations, and his suggestions had been received without notable objection, though it was evident that the idea of a league had not been digested by public opinion. Probably there were few public men in the country who wished a league so much that they could be expected to go to Paris and work for it with continuous efforts.

Aside from the league of nations, it was evident that our strongest men were needed to represent the United States in the peace conference. The cynical spirit in which the Germans had conducted the war and the many cruelties they had committed in Belgium, in occupied France, and on the sea had deprived them of the benefits of that spirit of generosity which civilized nations are apt to feel toward a completely conquered foe. In fact, there was good evidence that the German people did not think they were completely beaten. Up to August,

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

1918, they had considered themselves the conquerors. It was the eighth of this month when General Ludendorff, by his own admission, realized that his armies were doomed. It was natural for his countrymen to realize it later than their chieftain. To most of them it seemed that the people, tired of war, had risen against their leaders, agreed to abide by the Fourteen Points put forward by President Wilson and accepted by the other allied belligerents, and on this basis cast away their power of further resistance. In the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy it was well understood that the armistice itself was a token of defeat. But the German people, recalling four years of success, were not likely to see it in that light. They retained a proud spirit, and it was a well defined principle of the *Entente* allies that Germany must be beaten until she knew it. Under these circumstances, a strong feeling existed in Europe that the terms of peace ought to be made severe. There was a danger that they would be so hard that they would transcend the accepted basis of the armistice. If the Fourteen Points were at stake, who would see that they were carried out, if not the United States, whose president had formulated them?

But still more serious problems appeared on the horizon. It was one thing for governments to promise, it was another thing to get the people to execute. In France the sense of wrong and helplessness as a result of German violence was deep. Across the Rhine industry was undamaged. It had only to light the factory fires again and go to work. In the best developed part of industrial France utter ruin stared one in the face. It would take years to rebuild factories, to say nothing of homes. In the struggle of the future, therefore, the advantage would be with the German, the author of French ruin. And it is not surprising that the French people thought their government should make the wrongdoers pay to the utmost farthing. M. Clem-

[334]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

enceau would be a skillful politician if he could keep himself at the head of a government that left Germany to a considerable extent intact. The same situation existed in Great Britain, but less intensively, while in Italy the people, carried away by the overwhelming nature of the last offensive they made against their foes, were keenly determined to annex every nearby region in which Italians were any considerable proportion of the inhabitants. One of the Americans at Paris later observed to a friend that if the new born principles of the Italians were applied on our side of the Atlantic we should have to surrender some of our best cities to Italian sovereignty.

The president and his intimate advisers understood this situation thoroughly. The leaders of the liberals in Europe understood it, and they believed that it was essential that he should be at the peace conference. He had established a remarkable prestige in every European nation, first because he had held up the standards of international justice, and second because he represented a liberal nation that had no other interest in the peace than to found it on the enduring principles of live and let live. From people in Europe who understood President Wilson's relation to the situation and had confidence in his ability to carry through the league project and harmonize the clashing national interests came urgent requests that he attend the conference. It was evident that the European prime ministers would be present, it was important that the United States be represented by their most impressive political figure.

When the newspapers contained a hint that the president would head the American delegation there was a murmur of dissent. "His place is at home," said the man in the street. That is where he had always been, and the man in the street did not understand how much the situation of the world was altered. The president's political opponents did not fail to improve the opportunity to heighten the criticism. But here, as in all

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

things connected with the league and peace making, he gave up the practice of wise expediency which characterized the early part of his presidency and disregarded public opinion. Nor did he give a full explanation of his reasons; for in explaining them he would doubtless have offended persons with whom he was to have delicate relations in Paris. In his address to congress, December 2, he merely said that he was asked by the nations who had accepted the Fourteen Points to come and explain them and he had decided to go. "The peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon," he said, "are of transcendent importance, both to us and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence of them." He sailed for Brest on December 4. With him went, besides a large number of trained experts and secretaries, Secretary Lansing and Mr. Henry White who, with Col. E. M. House and General Tasker H. Bliss, already in Paris, were the other American delegates to the Peace Conference.

The selection of these delegates has been criticized in the passion of the moment, when every act of the president in connection with the negotiations has been subjected to the most minute analysis. It has been said that they only reflected the ideas of the president, thus making him the sole negotiator. It remains for the publication of the record of proceedings in Paris to show how much truth lies in this assertion. All the gentlemen appointed were highly esteemed and had rendered good service in their several stations. The selection seemed to promise harmony and, despite differences of opinion on certain points of policy, there was no unseemly bickering in the delegation. The selection of Mr. White was most opposed, not so much on account of himself as on account of the person who might otherwise have been appointed. He was the one republican on the delegation. The objectors declared that his republicanism was not active enough, and they would have [336]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

preferred Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Root. The reply to this suggestion is that harmony could hardly be expected with either of these aggressive men for the republican member of the delegation.

Another criticism was that no member of the senate was appointed, which recalled the discussion that arose when in 1898 President McKinley appointed three senators on the commission that made the treaty with Spain. Was it wise, asked men then, to appoint senators to make a treaty which had to be submitted to the judgment of the senate for approval? and was it not as though the act of formulation, reserved by the constitution to the executive, was placed in the hands of the power that ratified? Many men saw in the course pursued by President McKinley a dangerous precedent, likely to heighten unduly the power of the senate in treaty making. President Wilson did not reveal his views on the point in any other way than by actions; but throughout his course in connection with the negotiations he showed that he took the original view of the treaty making power.

Had the previous relations of the president and the senate been cordial his decision on the delegation might have been carried off with little serious trouble; but it was made when much feeling already existed. The group of senators who had wished to have a joint-committee to supervise the conduct of the war, who had found so much to criticize in the war department, and who had finally tried to have a war cabinet created now came into prominence as opposed to the president's method of peace negotiations. The situation was made more difficult for him by virtue of the fact that the next congress would be republican in both houses, and it was practically certain that Senator Lodge, who had generally found himself in whatever group was attacking the president, would be chairman of the senate foreign relations committee. Rarely has a man been more scathingly

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

denounced by his party opponents than he who sailed away on that fourth day of December to receive in Europe the greatest ovation an American ever received at home or abroad.

The feeling of the senate was expressed in a resolution of Senator Cummins to appoint a commission of eight senators, four democrats and four republicans, to go to Paris as representatives of the senate, in order to keep that body informed of what was going on. The senator did not point out how the commission, once in Paris, would find out what was going on. Without access to the meetings of the Conference it would have been dependent on the regular delegates for information, or upon the gossip of the hotel lobbies. Its position would have been undignified, it would have provoked ill feeling, and by giving notice that it had to be consulted if the treaty was ratified it would have discredited the regular peace delegation. Senator Cummins's resolution was not pressed to a vote. That it could have been suggested shows into what an erratic frame of mind grave senators had been carried by the passions of the moment.

The tide of criticism did not cease to flow; but by this time it was clear that it originated with the party opposed to the president. The democrats generally kept quiet, or defended him. Senator Sherman offered a resolution declaring the presidency vacant. Senator Knox offered another demanding an early peace, with the postponement for separate consideration of the project of a league of nations. Representative James R. Mann, floor leader in the house, was one of the few persons who counseled reservation of judgment. He said:

"I cannot help what individuals may do in the House, but the Republican members of the House as a body will certainly make no concerted move to embarrass or hamper the President in any way while he is engaged abroad on a mission that affects so vitally the interests of the American people. I believe he should have the support of Congress
[338]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

in so far as those interests are involved and that factional strife ought not to be permitted to interfere with his mission or to give the rest of the world the impression that the American people are divided on issues involving the peace of the world."

Mr. Mann's statement was little observed by his fellow party men, but it is one of the refreshingly sober utterances of the day when men of judgment waited in vain for the excitement to reach its climax and recede.

The historian of the future will be able to say in how much President Wilson was responsible for the course of the opposition to him. It is now impossible to pass judgment on such a point. It is, however, fair to say that he has never shown himself proficient in the art of cajoling his opponents. On the contrary, there is something of a snap in his words, when he deigns to make reply, as he does at rare intervals. This faculty is one of the characteristics of a man who has played a great part in the world. It does not, however, relieve his opponents from the moral obligation to play their parts fairly.

2. The First Days in Europe

December 13, on Friday, the peace ship landed her passengers at Brest. Friends of the president announced that Friday and the number thirteen were bringers of good luck to him, whatever they brought to others. They also pointed out that while the day was heavily overcast in the morning, the clouds broke away suddenly and the party landed in a flood of sunlight, which, they remembered, was like the first of his inaugural days. They concluded that the omens were with him.

Arriving in Paris next day he had reason to agree with them. It was one of the unusual sunny days the capital has in December. Two millions of people, it was estimated, came out

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

to shout their "Welcomes!" to the man whom they considered the savior of France because at the critical moment he had thrown the army of the United States into the breach. All classes and all political parties united in making the greeting hearty and enthusiastic. The newspapers reported that the demonstration surpassed that of "armistice night." "Now, Jacques," said a Parisian market woman with a miniature poilu in her arms, "wave to President Wilson who is bringing your daddy home safe for Christmas." Her words expressed the feelings of all Paris. Two weeks later the president was in England, where the same popular expression of joy greeted him. In a visit to Northern England he made a speech at Manchester, the home of the great middle-class influence in the kingdom, and won much applause by his appeals for a new order of international justice.

The first days in Europe were given to conferences to determine the sentiment there in regard to a proposed league of nations. A small group of Frenchmen, led by the Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, a senator, and former Premier Léon Bourgeois, was working for a league and interviewed Premier Clemenceau on the subject. He said that the principle of a league would undoubtedly be placed in the preliminaries of any treaty made and suggested that its advocates prepare a complete plan for the information of the coming Conference.

At this time President Wilson had not formulated such a plan. His idea was quite general and was probably correctly expressed in his speech before the University of Paris on December 21, in which he said:

"My conception of the League of Nations is just this—that it shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout the world, and that whenever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them, and men everywhere will ask: 'What are the purposes that you hold in your
[340]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

hearts against the fortunes of the world?' Just a little exposure will settle most questions. If the Central Powers had dared to discuss the purposes of this war for a single fortnight, it never would have happened, and if, as should be, they were forced to discuss it for a year, the war would have been inconceivable."

Compared with the covenant that was finally prepared, this was an indefinite kind of a league. It differed from the plan attributed at the time to Léon Bourgeois, which provided for the maintenance of a force that could execute the decisions of the league.

In England President Wilson found many men of prominent position who favored a league. It had been championed by such personages as Mr. Asquith, Lord Bryce, Mr. Balfour, and Lord Robert Cecil. To these men the arrival of the president was a matter of great moment, but certain utterances he had previously made about the Freedom of the Seas had raised serious doubts in the popular mind. During his visit to the country he conferred freely with Lloyd George, the prime minister, who had avowed his support of a league, and with other leaders. He announced that he and the prime minister were in accord on this subject. From that time nothing further was heard about the Freedom of Seas. In fact, it might well be dropped into the background; for if a vital league of nations existed, no nation would need a great navy and, needing none, it would hardly continue to build expensive battleships.

Apart from the question of organizing a league of nations, President Wilson soon found that European opinion was strong for making Germany pay heavily for the damages she had inflicted on the *Entente* powers. Reparation was the keynote of his Fourteen Points, but in France especially opinion ran to actual punishment. The people had an idea that he did not know how much they had suffered and there was a universal wish that he should be taken to the devastated country to see the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

extent of the German barbarism for himself. Such a visit he refused to make, whether for lack of time or because he did not trust his sympathies, was not explained. It was an omission which the French people did not easily forgive.

In Great Britain the same feeling was strong, and Lloyd George had been forced to bow before it. In a general parliamentary election held early in December he had promised the voters that he would see that Germany was made to pay to the limit of her ability. Just what bearing President Wilson's statement that he agreed with the prime minister completely had upon the question of getting money out of Germany was not revealed. But later on it became evident that reparation by Germany really implied payment to her capacity. The difference, therefore, between indemnity and reparation became merely academic and could be ignored.

But the background of the situation was uncertain. It seemed that the official group in London entertained the hope that a long desired thing was now to be consummated, a return of the American kin beyond the seas, not directly into the British fold, but into a close coöperation with the mother country by which the balance of power of the world would be insured. In Paris, also, there was a strong sentiment in favor of a reconstructed balance of power, it being assumed that the United States would act in the new arrangement. So strong was this feeling there that Premier Clemenceau, on December 29, was forced to declare himself in favor of such a system in order to obtain a vote of confidence in the chambers. To this trend of opinion President Wilson gave a definite check the very next day in his speech at Manchester, where he said that the United States would "join no combination of power which is not a combination of all of us."

These preliminary visits, conferences, and speeches tended to draw together the leaders of the three great nations, who,
[342]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

after all, were going to be the most potent factors in the peace making. They served also to fix the eyes of the world on some of the problems that had to be solved. In January President Wilson accepted the invitation of the king of Italy to visit his country. In Rome, Florence, and Milan, as well as along the route, he was received with the same outburst of popular applause as in Paris, London, and Manchester. It does not seem that this visit had any bearing, however, on the coming negotiations. Italy, it has been remarked, was the only nation that went to the Peace Conference with its program absolutely made out. By vigorous appeals the nationalists had decided what they must have, and their government had put itself into a position from which it was difficult to recede.

3. Organizing the Peace Conference

It is impossible at this time to write an authentic history of the proceedings of the Peace Conference of 1919. The best I can hope to do is to follow the story, as reported in the newspapers of the day, of the ebb and flow of speculation that surrounded the Conference, believing that the main features of the debate behind closed doors were echoed authentically in the outside world. Certain it is that many of the problems of the negotiators were shared by the public, although it is not possible to say precisely how the delegates themselves settled them. This course is the more satisfactory to me because my space will not permit more than a consideration of the external aspects of the larger problems. It remains for later writers to tell the world the inner story of this greatest of all the world's international conferences.

President Wilson arrived in Paris from Rome on January 7, 1919. Premier Clemenceau was then on a vacation in the country but was expected daily. Prime Minister Lloyd George was in England detained by public business but was expected in

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

a few days. The only efforts looking toward the work of the Conference that went on in the interval was the preparation by members of the British, French, and American delegations of preliminary sketches of a league of nations. On the 12th, however, which was Sunday, the gentlemen named were all in Paris and a meeting of the Supreme Council was held. The reader will remember that during the war an Interallied Supreme War Council had met to give general direction to the military policy of the allies. This body continued to meet after General Foch took supreme command in the field, although its functions were eclipsed by the authority of the generalissimo. As the directing head of the peace negotiations it was now about to enter into a new stage of power, not before dreamed of.

As late as January 11, a week before the Peace Conference held its first meeting, the newspaper reporters spoke of the sessions of the Conference as those of an ordinary deliberating body. Rumor said there would be four meetings a week, that the various premiers would preside in rotation, and that the public would know what the American plan of a league was when it came to be debated in the Conference sessions. There was a great deal of discussion of the policy of open sessions, the Americans standing for it, in order that the people might have a full view of what was going on. It was not long before the world realized that the sessions of the Conferences were only perfunctory sittings of a large body of delegates to ratify what had been done by much smaller bodies, and that impenetrable secrecy shrouded the deliberations of these small bodies. The Supreme Council of Ten, attended by the prime ministers and President Wilson, each with his foreign secretary, and by two delegates from Japan, was until March 24 the directing, and, to a large extent, the deciding authority in all that was done.

Thus the Supreme War Council underwent a singular change.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

Its membership shifted with the business to be transacted. When it was a Conference matter the premiers and foreign secretaries attended; but when it was a military or economic matter, military and economic experts came in and the premiers were either absent or unconcerned in the proceedings. Later on the body was split into two distinct parts, one to act as the executive committee of the Peace Conference and the other to attend to interallied military business. This double character was well illustrated in the meeting on January 13, when the renewal of the armistice was under consideration. To the meeting came Marshal Foch and a number of military men and economists. When they had settled the terms of the renewed armistice they filed out of the room and the prime ministers and foreign secretaries, some of whom had arrived late, continued the session, discussing matters relating to the Peace Conference.

This Supreme Council was never a creature of the Peace Conference: in fact, it could be said to have created the Conference. For it was the council that called the Conference, fixed the time of its first meeting, and determined the number of delegates each nation was to send, allowing the five great states five each and the small states three, two, or one each.¹ In time it happened that there was an even greater degree of concentration of power; for it was natural for each premier to dominate his foreign secretary. Five men, therefore, had the destiny of the world in their hands, subject to the powerful restraint of public opinion. Of these five a majority, three, could make

¹ Besides the five delegates of each of the great powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States, three each were allowed to Brazil, Serbia, and Belgium, two each to Australia, Canada, South Africa, India, China, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and one each to Siam, New Zealand, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, and Montenegro. Each delegation was to vote as a unit and the delegates from each state might be selected by the panel system, allowing special persons to sit for special business. (*New York Times*, January, 16, 18, 1919.)

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the decision. When the British and French premiers and the president of the United States agreed upon a matter it was accepted. And as the United States are larger, wealthier, and less scathed by war than France and the United Kingdom combined, the will of the man who spoke for them was the weightiest will in the conference. Every act of the Conference testifies to the great consideration that was given by the other nations to his desires and demands. The United States waited a long time before they decided to take a hand in world politics, but when they came into them they came with a tremendous rush. It was reported, however, that the decisions were always finally unanimous, however much opinions differed at first.

The Peace Conference was formally convened in the Salle de la Paix of the ministry of foreign affairs in Paris, Quai d'Orsay, on January 18, 1919, at three o'clock in the afternoon. The ceremonies were impressive. Each delegation was received with fanfares of trumpets, and officials escorted them into the large hall in which the great green table had been arranged. The president of the French Republic, as the representative of the nation taking the part of host, called the Conference to order and delivered words of welcome, after which he withdrew. Then rose President Wilson and nominated M. Clemenceau for presiding officer of the Conference. He was followed by Lloyd George, who seconded the nomination in behalf of Great Britain. The election was unanimous and M. Clemenceau made a brief speech, a plea for unity. "The league of nations is here," he said. "It is yourselves. It is for you to make it live, and to make it live we must have it really in our hearts." He added: "The program of this Conference has been laid down by President Wilson. It is no longer the peace of a more or less vast territory, no longer the peace of continents: it is the peace of nations that is to be made."

M. Clemenceau then turned to the work of the Conference.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

Three great subjects, he said, were to be considered: reparations, responsibility for the war, and international relations of labor. He invited each nation to submit proposals in regard to each subject. He closed by announcing that "the league of nations will be placed at the head of the order of the day of the next full session."

By this time the atmosphere had cleared considerably and it was possible to see the important divisions that were going to demand attention. Mr. Ralph Pulitzer, editor of the *New York World*, who was in Paris, made an interesting analysis of the situation. He said with great justness:

"On the eve of the Peace Conference the allied governments are suffering all the vicissitudes of victory. The solidarity of a common danger has departed. The joint instinct of self-preservation has given place to conflicting aims of self-aggrandizement. The vanities, cupidities, and pugnacities which masquerade as 'national aspirations' are seething beneath the serenity of the Quai d'Orsay. If the Peace Conference is allowed to remain a conference between governments instead of between peoples it is apt to degenerate into a saturnalia of statesmanship which will crown a war to end war with a peace to end peace.

"Three forces are laboring for such a sinister peace: (1) the bourbonism of politicians, instinctive or opportunist, playing for advancement on the chauvinism of the people; (2) the materialism of industrial and commercial circles appealing to the business classes; (3) the militarism of professional soldiers appealing to pride or fear of imperialism and Jingoism."

Mr. Pulitzer added that there were three forces which would work against such a peace: (1) the great desire of the world for permanent peace; (2) the liberal minded persons in all nations who were disgusted with "balance of power, strategic frontiers, punitive indemnities, and economic isolation" as means of preserving peace and who were hoping for a league of nations; and (3) "President Wilson, whose moral initiative and material disinterestedness make him the accepted leader

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

and mouthpiece of the inarticulate masses and the rallying point of liberal minds of all countries.”

The warning proved well founded. On one hand was a group of old men trained in an old system of politics and believing that the world can never mend its step. Behind them were passionate men like the Italian Gabriele d’Annunzio lashing nationality into fury. Throughout all was the poison of suspicion and distrust in good motives. Out of such conditions the American commissioners had to endeavor to distill a treaty that would meet the demands of just men in the United States and throughout the world.

4. Drafting the League Covenant

The second plenary meeting of the Peace Conference was held on January 25, a week after the first meeting. As soon as the session opened President Wilson addressed it on the subject of the league of nations. He made a strong plea for such an instrument for the prevention of war, saying:

“We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those foundations were the private choice of a small coterie of civil rulers and military staffs. Those foundations were the aggression of great powers upon the small. Those foundations were the holding together of empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of men to wield their will and use mankind as pawns in a game. And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace.”

Mr. Lloyd George followed the speaker with a statement that the people of the British Empire were heartily behind the movement for a league of nations, and if its leaders had not been able to devote to it as much time as they would have liked during the past five years, it was because they had been too busy with other matters. With some restraint he added: “I do [348]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

not know if we shall succeed in our enterprise, but it is already a success that we have undertaken it." He was followed by M. Léon Bourgeois, who said that the French people would do all they could "to put us on the road which has been pointed out by President Wilson." Supporting speeches were also made by Italian, Polish, and Chinese delegates.

Following the discussion the Conference voted unanimously that a league of nations ought to be created "to promote international obligations and to provide safeguards against war." It was resolved that the league should be an integral part of the treaty and open to "every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects," that the league should have a permanent secretary to carry on its business and meet periodically through its representatives, and that a committee of fifteen, two members from each of the five great states and five from the small states, should be appointed to "work out the details of the constitution and the functions of the league" and to draft resolutions "in regard to breaches of the laws of war" for the consideration of the Peace Conference. On the committee thus created served President Wilson and Secretary Lansing for the United States, Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts for Great Britain, and M. Léon Bourgeois and Professor Ferdinand Larnaude for France.¹

What went on in the sessions of this committee has not been made public. It is known that a detailed plan for a league was presented by General Smuts, and later published. It is believed, also, that Lord Cecil offered a plan. An American plan was presented, probably written by President Wilson. It seems certain, also, that the point of view of the French members of the committee was a strong league, with authority to make its

¹The other members were: Premier Orlando and Viterio Scialoja for Italy; Viscount Chinda and K. Ochiai for Japan; and for the small nations: Paul Hy-mans, of Belgium; Epitacio Pessoa, of Brazil; Wellington Koo, of China; Milenko Vesnich, of Serbia, and Janme Batalkha Reis, of Portugal.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

mandates obeyed. The exposed position of France convinced her statesmen that the league, if it were created, should be able to give her quick and sure aid if Germany tried to upset the treaty of peace.

The committee on the league of nations, President Wilson chairman, now took up the work assigned to it. By February 2 it had formulated two plans which were under consideration. One admitted the small states to a large share of power while the other left most of the authority to the great states, on whom would fall the burden of sustaining the league.

As the discussion proceeded it became more and more evident that the question of creating the league was intimately connected with every other important question that came before the Conference. For example, the territorial claims of various states represented age long disputes. They had to be settled in such ways that the league could administer them and enforce them without feeling that the decisions violated the principles of justice on which the league rested. The same was true with reference to reparations, the disposition of the Saar coal region, and other similar matters. But more than all else it was recognized that a league was needed to provide a means of directing the future control of the German colonies.

The work of the committee of the league drew near its close about the tenth of February. The French members, supported by Czechoslovakia, desired to have an international military force that would make the decisions of the league respected. But President Wilson opposed the suggestion, probably because he thought such a provision would defeat the league in the United States. Great Britain supported him in this position. In the last days of the discussions Japan brought discord into the deliberations by asking that a provision be inserted guaranteeing racial equality within the league. This request brought up the question of restrictions on immigration and was opposed

[350]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

by the United States in view of the long established opposition of the people of the Pacific Coast to Chinese and Japanese immigration. In the meeting of the committee on February 13, when the completed draft of the covenant was adopted, the first of these two propositions was defeated with only two votes in the affirmative and the second was dropped without debate.

Next day, February 14, the draft was presented to the Conference in plenary session, by President Wilson, who announced that it had the approval of the representatives of all the fourteen belligerent states. It was published immediately in the newspapers.

Those persons who during the preceding years had thought and spoken about a league to enforce peace had formulated their ideas in two classes. One was for a court of international justice with no authority to enforce its decisions by force, its main reliance being on public opinion. The other was for a stronger league with enforcing and lawmaking power. When President Wilson went to Paris it seemed that the best that could be hoped for was a league of the first type. Most advocates of a league accepted the conviction regretfully, but thought such a league would prove a nucleus around which the ideals of the coming generation would center and thus lead to a more efficient check upon militarism.

Examination of the covenant now laid before the world showed that it exceeded their hopes. In the early days of the Peace Conference the reports from Paris indicated that the Americans there were proposing a league of the weaker type. How, then, did it happen that the result was beyond their expectation? No definite answer can be given, but the indications are that the changed attitude was largely due to M. Léon Bourgeois and the state of opinion in France. If the world could have gone forward under the old system of balance of power, France would probably have preferred that. Since the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Conference was determined to have a new system, however, it served the interests of France to see that it was made as efficient as possible. M. Bourgeois, long an advocate of a strong league, did not cease to press his views in the committee. He did not get all he wished, but the result suggests that he had much influence.

The important features of the plan were as follows: Instead of having a high court of arbitration with an appeal to moral feelings, provision was made for a bicameral government capable of performing many non-judicial functions. It was to contain a "body of delegates" composed of one member from each constituent state, with very restricted power of action. There was to be, also, an executive council of nine members, one from each of the five large states and four chosen one each from the small states in rotation. To the executive council was given authority to recommend the quota of naval and military forces that each state was to contribute in carrying on the objects of the league. It should also fix the extent of armaments and decide how many troops each state could maintain in time of peace. There was to be a court of arbitration, a permanent secretariat, and a stated place of meeting. The states signing the league covenant pledged themselves not to go to war without submitting their disputes to arbitration or to the judgment of the executive council. If a state disregarded this pledge it would be held to have committed an act of war against all the other states in the league and they would take economic and financial measures against it and join in making it obey the covenant.

Each signatory state promised to guarantee the territorial and political integrity of other states against external aggression. It was agreed that states not in the league might be admitted on the approval of two-thirds of the constituent states and after guarantee of good faith had been given. The re-

[352]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

duction of military and naval armaments was provided for as far as possible. Colonies taken away from the mother states and not given to other nations were to be under the tutelage of the advanced states as mandatories of the league. All treaties of individual states were to be invalid unless registered with the league. Amendments to the covenant of the league were to be effective when ratified by all the powers represented in the executive council and by three-fourths of the powers represented in the body of delegates. The question of freedom of the seas, which had been anticipated with such alarm, was not mentioned. If Great Britain were to use her great navy in defiance of the league of nations she would have no friend among nations, and against such a combination of force as the rest of the world could bring to bear against her she would prove very weak.

February 15, the day after the covenant was submitted to the Conference, President Wilson sailed from Brest for the United States. Before embarking he sent through his private secretary, Mr. Tumulty, to the senate and house foreign relations committees a statement of the result of his work for the league, and said: "There is a good and sufficient reason for the phraseology and substance of each article. I request that I be permitted to go over with you, article by article, the constitution before this part of the work of the conference is made the subject of debate of Congress. With this in view, I request that you dine with me at the White House as soon after I arrive in the United States as my engagements permit."

Most of the members of the committees on foreign affairs accepted the president's invitation in the spirit in which it was extended, but some of them let it be known that they were displeased. Senator Borah in particular declared that he would not dine with the president. He had long been an avowed opponent of any league of nations whatever. In an interview

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

he was quoted as saying that the covenant transferred sovereignty from the United States to the league and that Article X of the covenant, guaranteeing the integrity of other nations, was unworthy of our free government.

Nor would the extreme opponents of the league heed the request that discussion be postponed until the president had an opportunity to explain the covenant article by article. So many delicate adjustments had to be made in the conferences in Paris that it was not unreasonable in him to wish to give the senators an idea of the difficulties confronting each feature of the instrument. Setting aside these considerations, however, Senator Poindexter, republican, of Washington, opened debate on the league of nations on February 19, saying that the covenant required the surrender of sovereignty and involved the destruction of the Monroe Doctrine. Senator Borah, of Idaho, republican, and Senator Reed, of Missouri, for some time a dissatisfied democrat, also made speeches against the league. There was some discussion in the house, where Representative Fess, of Ohio, republican, pointed out that the covenant allowed Great Britain six votes by giving five to her larger colonies. The democrats replied that Cuba, Hayti, Panama, and Liberia, each of whom had a vote in the body of delegates, were practically under the tutelage of the United States, to say nothing of the weaker Central American powers. The haste of these gentlemen to open their attacks was perhaps due as much to a fear that the president would build up a strong support for the covenant if not attacked early as to a feeling that he treated the senate with disdain in asking it to await his coming before it began discussion. His arrival in Washington was followed by the interview he had requested, but it was evident that the course of opposition had become so bitter that the opponents to the covenant would not be converted by the arguments of the president.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

By this time it was seen that the republicans in the senate were drifting into opposition to the league. It also seemed that the old Roosevelt wing of the party, led by Senator Borah, was in the lead in this opposition. How willingly the other wing followed is hard to say. Senator Lodge, republican leader in the senate and looked to as the party's leader in this particular situation, made a speech on the subject on February 28, which left the public in doubt as to the attitude he would take eventually. He professed friendship for the league idea and proceeded to show why he did not like the particular kind of league that was described in the covenant. He made it clear that he would not vote for the covenant as submitted and pointed out methods in which he thought it should be amended, but he left the public in doubt about his course if the amendments were made.

It was openly charged that the attitude of the republicans was taken with a view to the presidential election of 1920. They had been seven years out of power, the enactment of Wilson's anti-trust measures in 1913-1914 had taken away a long standing party bone to gnaw, it was not wise to bring the tariff forward as a chief issue, and the administration was bright with the honor of a successful war. How was this state of affairs to be thrown into the ancient turmoil of party contention? Seeking an issue, it was charged, the republican leaders took up the league of nations, believing that if they but attacked with enough vigor the people would overthrow it as an onslaught on Americanism.

There was much to support the charge, although many people found it hard to believe that the senate of the United States would attack the treaty merely to make a party issue. Just before congress adjourned Senators Lodge and Knox got up a "round robin" statement signed by thirty-seven senators pledging themselves not to vote for the league covenant in its existing

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

form. No democratic senator was allowed to sign, although one or two wished to sign. Immediately afterwards Mr. Hay, chairman of the republican national committee, in a speech in St. Paul, gave the keynote of the coming republican campaign as "no indefinite internationalization as a substitute for fervent American nationalism."

Congress expired by limitation of the constitution on March 4. Several important bills had been defeated by a filibuster, the purpose being to force the president to call an early extra session. March 5 he sailed from New York to resume his place at the Peace Conference. The evening before he left he made a speech in the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, in which he reiterated his purpose to see that the United States continued to stand by the rest of the world in the great crisis that was upon it. He said plainly that the opponents of the league in this country did not realize the situation before them. "I cannot imagine," he declared, "how these gentlemen can live and not live in the atmosphere of the world. I cannot imagine how they can live and not be in contact with the events of their times, and I particularly cannot imagine how they can be Americans and set up a doctrine of careful selfishness, thought out to the last detail." He assured his hearers that overwhelming evidence had been offered him during the visit to this country that the people demanded the league. On the platform with him and speaking with great effect was Ex-President Taft, who was in the midst of an active and effective campaign for the league of nations.

The draft of the covenant had been published to see how it would be received in the countries affected by it. Little objection was made anywhere but in the United States. Invitations sent to neutral countries asking for criticisms showed that the league would be accepted by them, the only changes they suggested being in the nature of greater influence for the small

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

states. In the United States, however, the opponents kept up their attacks. A debate between Senator Lodge, who opposed the covenant, and President A. Lawrence Lowell, of Harvard, who defended it, had a material effect in clearing the situation; but as the question became more and more associated with politics, there was a tendency for the discussion to become political, one result being that some of the defenders of the league became less active, probably because they did not wish to impair their party standing by entering a partisan contest. Mr. Taft's services in the early stages of the debate were valuable to the defenders of the league and were openly acknowledged by President Wilson in his speech in the Metropolitan Opera House. Mr. Taft also summed up the criticisms that seemed to him most vital and embodied them in some suggested amendments which were sent to Paris. Mr. Charles E. Hughes, republican candidate for the presidency in 1916, also formulated a series of amendments, and the same thing was done by Mr. Elihu Root. All these suggestions were carefully considered by the committee to which the Peace Conference had entrusted the subject of a league of nations. The suggestion that caused most discussion was the one which undertook to reserve the Monroe Doctrine from the jurisdiction of the league. When it came up Japan took occasion to renew her demand for the recognition of race equality. It forced the American delegates to deny equality to Japan when they were insisting on a favored position for themselves, a position which the other members of the committee found very unequal. It was only the insistence of President Wilson that got the reservation accepted, and his success was perhaps facilitated by recognizing the Japanese claim to Shantung.

Late in March the committee completed the amendments to the covenant and placed them in the hands of a sub-committee to be put into final form. April 3 it was announced that the

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

work of the revision would probably be completed the next day. Then came a pause. April 6 President Wilson cabled for his ship and for three weeks the Peace Conference seemed on the point of dissolution. What compromises were made in those weeks we do not know, but it is hardly probable that the situation did not affect the league covenant. It was not until April 27 that the complete covenant was given to the public. The next day it was submitted to a plenary meeting of the Conference and adopted unanimously. Japan renewed her request for amendment, but withdrew it before the vote was taken. It was understood that the amendment, with the French suggestion for a military force to execute the decisions of the league, would be referred to the council after the league was established.

It was reported in Paris that Stephen Lauzanne told Baron Makino of the Japanese delegation that he was sorry the Japanese did not press their amendment and declared that France favored it and that it would have had a majority in the Conference. Makino was said to have replied: "I know it, but there would have been a minority also, which is always bad in principle. It would have been particularly bad in this case because in that minority would have been such great friendly nations as America and England, with whom we have particularly confidential relations, and which are precisely the nations which would have to apply the principles we demand."

5. The International Problems of the Peace Conference

When the Conference assembled some persons thought that the United States would take little part in problems that concerned Europe primarily, as reparations, territorial adjustments, and the disposition of the colonies of Germany. At best they would act as umpire when the European powers were unable to agree. This understanding seemed to prevail in the Confer-

[358]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

ence when President Wilson became chairman of the committee on the league and for several weeks gave his chief attention to that subject. Secretary Lansing became chairman of the committee on the responsibility for the war, a subject which also had little to do with the vital problems of readjustments. The Fourteen Points had been accepted by all the states and it was not courteous to assume that they would not be carried out; but if they fell by the wayside, who but the American delegates would restore them to the program?

The committee on the league made relatively rapid progress with its task, which was complete in draft on February 13. Then the president was called back to Washington by the approaching close of the congress. He returned to Paris on March 14 to find that the other matters were at a standstill. It was impossible for him to remain apart from the full course of the negotiations, and it soon happened that he was not only in it but the center of it. In such affairs the European powers were proceeding in the old ruts of diplomatic self-interest, and he found it necessary to take a strong hand in order to save a semblance of the Fourteen Points.

One of the questions that were up was the territorial adjustment of Poland. By one of the Fourteen Points the Kingdom of Poland ought to be given access to the sea. Danzig was the only port that would serve this purpose. President Wilson desired that the city be given to Poland, while Mr. Lloyd George thought it should remain German; for otherwise Germany would try to reconquer it and peace would be endangered.

A more difficult question was the disposition of the Saar Valley, west of the Rhine, in which are large coal fields. This region was awarded to France in the short lived peace of May 30, 1814, but went to Prussia in the peace of November 20, 1815. France is rich in iron but poor in coal and was extremely anxious to recover the Saar deposits. Her demand at

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Versailles was the boundary of 1814 by annexation. She also wished her military frontier fixed at the Rhine, with economic privileges in the intervening region. Marshal Foch demanded a long period of military occupation of the west bank.

The Saar Valley is thoroughly German and President Wilson opposed handing it over to France. The proposed military occupation of the west bank might have led to the spread of French influence, with the result that a future plebiscite would have turned the region over to France. To create such a situation would have planted the seed of future trouble between her and Germany. To this proposition, also, President Wilson was opposed. His attitude was deeply resented in France but he held out and obtained a compromise. France was given the Saar coal fields in fee simple in reparation for her damaged mines at Lens; but the political administration of the valley was left to the league of nations with the provision that a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years should determine its ultimate disposition. It was also provided that the west bank of the Rhine and a strip fifty kilometers wide on the east side should be demilitarized. In this area Germany was forbidden to erect or maintain fortresses, hold maneuvers, arrange for mobilization, or make other military preparations.

The Italian dispute arose over the contention of Italy that she must have control of the Adriatic Sea, on the eastern shore of which is Fiume, the natural outlet of the new state of Jugoslavia. A plurality, but not a majority, of the population are of Italian stock. Before Italy entered the war in 1915 she made a treaty at London in which it was agreed that she should recover Triest and Istria, but it was also agreed that Fiume should go to Croatia, which at the end of the war was merged into the new state of Jugoslavia. Italy now raised a new claim. Alleging that the collapse of Austria-Hungary had created new conditions she demanded Fiume on the basis that the

[360]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

population was Italian, appealing to the principle of nationality which was within the Fourteen Points. By another principle in this instrument Jugoslovakia should have had Fiume as her natural outlet to the sea. As has been said, Italian agitators did much to arouse Italian opinion in favor of the claim, and when Orlando and Sonnino appeared in Paris they acted as the servants of a public opinion which perhaps they could no longer have controlled, if they had been so disposed.

The Japanese contention arose in regard to the Shantung Peninsula, on which was the fortified place of Kiao-chau, which Germany held at the beginning of the war by a ninety-nine years' lease and which Japan held in 1919 by virtue of having driven out the German garrison. China was one of the nations at war with Germany and appeared at Paris in the hope that Shantung would be handed back to her. Japan claimed that the peninsula should go to her in reward for the effort she had made and that China had no case, because she was pro-German in the beginning of the war. China's pro-Germanism, however, was chiefly on account of her fear of Japan and she had always protested the German occupation of Kiao-chau. In accordance with the principles of international justice, which the president championed, it was undoubtedly right for her to recover the peninsula and for the Peace Conference, or China, to find some other way to recoup Japan for her efforts.

These four claims were held in the background during the early discussions at Paris. President Wilson paid but little attention to them during the first month, being engaged fully in the work of the committee on the league. The next month he had been absent from Paris, and for the first ten days after his return he gave most of his time to revising the league covenant. During all this period there was no approach to a solution. March 24 it was announced that he and the premiers had taken action to control the work of the council and that more progress

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

could be expected in the future. When complaint was made that work on the league had impeded the work on the treaty proper, it was announced that the work on the league had been done invariably at night and did not prevent the regular meetings of the council.

The last week in March the deadlock became most evident. At this time the most obvious obstacles to progress were Fiume and the position of France on the Saar valley. Wilson opposed them and Italy and Japan seem to have hung in the background, with no attempt to settle the matters by a majority vote. In fact, the future of France would depend so closely on the good will of Great Britain and the United States that it was folly for her to fly openly in the face of their decisions. Wilson was committed to the Fourteen Points a little more firmly than the others, who had only indorsed them, and who, under the pretension of interpreting them, were willing to give them a wide application. But each premier, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, stood in awe of his parliament. Each had made a bid for the good will of the masses in his particular country, promising to obtain indemnities from Germany, or to punish Germans for their crimes, or to obtain territory. Whatever their personal feelings they could not yield easily.

During the last week in March and the first week in April all of these four problems were under grave consideration. So serious was the situation that President Wilson said he had as well go home. The Italians had made a similar remark several times before this, but they were not taken seriously, inasmuch as they stood before the conference as petitioners. April 6 the president by cable ordered that his ship be sent to France, which seemed another matter. Report freely ran that the Peace Conference was about to break up. Summarizing the situation Mr. Charles H. Grasty said:

[362]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

“Roundly stated, the present situation is that Clemenceau, while at times showing a disposition to yield, has maintained his original contention for a Rhine buffer state¹ and kindred provisions, coupled with an agreement for British and American coöperation in military measures for the protecting of France’s position. Lloyd George has contended for concessions that would save his face in English politics, while Orlando has been waiting his turn to make a fight for the whole east coast of the Adriatic.

“While the deadlock thus produced has continued the delay has been utilized to reshape the League covenant in such a way as to leave the American opposition without standing ground. This report, as well as that of all the other committees, will go in Monday. In the meantime the President has met his confrères of the Big Four from day to day, and, while holding his main ground, has yielded to them in every point not compromising the essentials to which he has been consistently pledged.

“For the secrecy which has drawn such widespread criticism President Wilson has not been responsible. He would probably have preferred complete publicity, in the absence of which his position has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. But he has had a certain sense of comradeship with his associates and has recognized the fact that European conditions imposed upon them necessities that did not affect him as President of the United States. With day-to-day publicity and the spreading broadcast of all the details of the discussion, the European governments would have been falling right and left.

“It should be remembered always how supremely difficult the present situation is. Though victorious, the allies of the *Entente* are all exhausted. In this state they have been confronted with the opportunity of dealing in the hour of his defeat with an enemy whose brutal might had almost destroyed them. The American position has been such as to enable America to deal with the business of making peace with an eye to the ultimate good of the world. We have wanted nothing but a peace that would stand. Each of the European allies wanted its particular point of view written into the peace.

“President Wilson has taken the shock of all these demands. He has stood his ground. With patience and amiability, and without a trace of arbitrariness, he has maintained himself against the persistence which

¹ Not as annexed territory, however, but as a region under French military control.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

only European diplomats know how to bring to bear. The President has examined and re-examined the whole situation day after day for the purpose of making every concession consistent with a sound peace. At every stage he has felt himself honorably bound by the armistice agreement, and in this position he has been supported by his conviction that European interests and world interests would be best subserved by carrying out that agreement. To make a scrap of paper of it was unthinkable, both for America and her allies."¹

Mr. Grasty said that the situation would either clear up in a few days by an agreement among the allies or a policy of publicity would be adopted. The first of the two courses was, in fact, adopted. April 8 the French situation began to clear, when a satisfactory basis was reached for reparations, it being decided that Germany should pay for all the damage done, the exact means of determining how much it was being left unsettled for the time. At the same time it was decided that Danzig should be internationalized, by which it became useful to both Germany and Poland. Paderewski, who had made a pilgrimage to Paris to obtain the city in full title for Poland, was greatly chagrined; but the adjustment was considered the best that could be made under the circumstances. Later it was agreed that an international "corridor" should be created by which Poland should have free access to the port. A few days later it was ascertained that in order to make France feel secure against German retaliation Great Britain and the United States had agreed to come to her aid at once if she was unrighteously attacked in violation of the treaty.

April 14 President Wilson announced that affairs were in such a state that the Big Four could now turn to the Adriatic question. He had an interview with Premier Orlando, who stood squarely for the acquisition of Fiume, as he had stood continually since his arrival in Paris. The Fiume question, it

¹ *New York Times*, April 8, 1919.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

will be observed, was like the Danzig question, and in each case President Wilson insisted on the principle that the port should go to the country holding the hinterland. It is probable that he would have made the same compromise in each case, the adoption of the principle of internationalization, but such a course was vetoed outright by Orlando, who would have nothing but the complete possession of Fiume by Italy. In the week that followed the deadlock became complete. One day Wilson did not attend the meeting of the council, and next day the Italians remained away, and rumors of their probable return to Rome were circulated.

April 23 President Wilson issued a statement on the Adriatic question. It was that kind of appeal to public opinion that Mr. Grasty had said would make cabinets fall. If it was expected to have such an effect in Italy the result was a disappointment; for the people there, already worked up to the highest pitch of excitement by the leaders of the nationality movement, howled with rage against Wilson, whom they had acclaimed the hero of humanity less than four months before. He was accused of meddling with the internal affairs of another and friendly state, and in the United States Senator Lodge, republican leader, wrote a caustic letter criticizing him on that ground. But Mr. Wilson's statement was not directed toward the Italian people specifically. It was an appeal to that publicity which so many people had declared was essential in settling the disputes of the diplomats. It gave emphasis to the fact that Fiume was not accorded to Italy by the pact of London. It argued that now that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was broken up and the component parts about to be taken into the league of nations along with Italy and her friends there was no need for Italy to have Fiume as a protection against her ancient enemy, while there was every reason that it should be left to Jugoslavia for the free use of the interior states. The

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

plea itself was in excellent spirit, but its reception showed that the people of a nation were no more likely than their leaders to act justly and liberally in the exigency that confronted the world. It was sad evidence of the failure of "open diplomacy" in such a crisis.

The British and French premiers saw the statement of the American president before it was made public and approved its publication. There is no doubt that the Italians with their uncompromising demands for Fiume had got on the nerves of many of the negotiators. When they went away to Rome to be received as national heroes little concern was felt over their departure; and the business of the Conference went on as usual. A few days later Clemenceau and Lloyd George sent them a courteous note asking them to return to Paris.¹ A day or two later the Big Three, as rumor has it, came together with the determination of sending them a dispatch saying that since Italy had withdrawn from the Peace Conference England and France would consider the pact of London no longer binding. Before the dispatch could be sent, a communication arrived from Rome saying that Orlando and Sonnino were just starting for Paris. They came back without any assurance about Fiume. By common consent the settlement of the question was deferred.

While the Italian deadlock was at its highest stage of intensity the Shantung question was taken up. For the Japanese it was an opportune time to consider it; for it was not to be expected that the other negotiators would be very stiff with Japan while Italy was out and threatening to stay out. The previous history of the question was as follows:

When the war began there existed a British-Japanese alliance by which each nation agreed to support the other in the East. In accordance with the agreement Japan declared war on Germany in August, 1914, and proceeded to take Kiao-chau, which,

¹ *New York Times*, May 5, 1919, 1: 4: May 7, 1919, 1: 4.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

with an adjacent area of about 200 square miles, was held by Germany from China under a ninety-nine year lease beginning in 1898. She also obtained the right to operate and police the Tsingtau Railroad by which she was able to control the heart of the province of Shantung, with a population of nearly 40,000,000. By ousting Germany from this position Japan took her place. China appeared at Paris asking that Shantung and the towns of Kiao-chau and Tsingtau be restored to her, and she was willing to pay Japan liberally for the expenses of taking them. The policy of the United States for twenty years has been to preserve China from dismemberment by Japan and the great European Powers, and China had a right to expect that they would take her side in the present controversy. Strictly speaking, the lease to Germany was not transferable, and Japan could not claim that conquest gave her *per se* all the rights Germany had in the province. It is true that she had forced China to confirm her pretensions in the treaty of 1915, but China denied the efficacy of this treaty as made under duress. Japan looked forward, therefore, with anxiety to the meeting of the Conference to enable her to transmute her right of possession into a more or less permanent right of ownership.

The means she employed to obtain her object were shrewdly characteristic of her diplomacy. They came to light early in the negotiations at Paris quite accidentally. The Council of Ten were discussing the system of mandatories, and President Wilson suggested that the German islands in the Pacific should be disposed of under the system. Says the correspondent: "It was an awkward moment. Mr. Lloyd George remarked that an agreement of a different character had already been reached with reference to the islands. Mr. Wilson asked what it was. Mr. Lloyd George turned to Baron Makino [representing Japan] for an explanation, whereupon Mr. Wilson was informed that Japan had received a promise from England, France, Italy, and

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

Russia two years before that she must have outright all the German islands north of the equator and that she had agreed that Australia should have all to the south. It was common knowledge that such a distribution had been long contemplated but nobody outside of the foreign offices of the governments directly involved knew that there were definite signed agreements concerning the deal. After learning so much Mr. Wilson asked if there were any other secret arrangements which had not been produced at the Conference.”¹

It was then the following story came to the official knowledge of the president and his secretary of state: Japan had tried to prevent China from coming into the war, saying that she did not wish to have the 400,000,000 Chinese waken to national unity through participation in the great war. But early in 1917 she came to realize that she could no longer keep China out of the war. In February, 1917, she opened a correspondence with the British government and received assurance from Mr. Balfour, foreign secretary, that his government, as requested by Japan, would support the Japanese claim to Shantung and Kiao-chau at the treaty of peace and would concede Japan's right to the captured German colonies north of the equator in return for Japan's concession to Australia of similar colonies south of it. There is no evidence to show, as sometimes charged, that Japan intended to make a separate treaty with Germany if her advance was repulsed by Great Britain, but it may well be that the fear that she would take such a step made the British assent easy to get. Her diplomatic position at the time was very strong. She had a good army and navy, hard-pressed Germany would make any kind of conditions that were desired, and Great Britain, France, and Russia had possessions in the East they could not defend. To refuse her the assurance that she would

¹ The reporter is in error in saying that the agreement was not known before the conference.

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

profit by what she had done against Germany would have given her ground for saying she was not treated fairly. It was not prudent at the time for the allies of the West to run the risk of offending her. Having obtained Mr. Balfour's assurance, she turned to France, where she was equally successful, and the acquiescence of Italy and Russia followed as matters of course.

Perhaps she had another motive. When she approached Great Britain our participation in the war was most probable. As the traditional supporters of China against Japanese aggression we could hardly fail to defend the Chinese claim to Shantung. Also, we were most likely to obtain China's admission to the war, which meant her presence at the peace table when the struggle ended. In anticipation of such events and conditions Japan would feel that her interests demanded that she make sure of her position while there was time. If this was her purpose it was shrewdly conceived and executed. No way existed for President Wilson to defeat the scheme, and, consummated, it tied his hands completely.

When he took up the matter with Baron Makino there was the solid support of all the Big Four against him. The only concession Japan would make was that eventually Shantung should go to China. But when? Our honor is pledged in our assurance that we shall give it up, was the reply. But would Japan not put her promise in writing? No. That would be to question her honor. China caused it to be known that she would pay Japan for the expense of operations against Germany in China and accept rendition in two years, probably in a longer period, if it were only definitely stated. But Japan would not budge.

What was her motive? Was she merely playing the old game of subterfuge so dear to the heart of the old type diplomatist? She had played it before, and so had many other

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

nations played it. Or was she merely taking a vivid way of asserting her honor before the nations of the world, and especially in the face of the United States? It was on the ground of national honor that she demanded racial equality. What other nation at Paris would not have done as much? To satisfy a strong local prejudice in the United States her contention was denied. In the Shantung matter she had the whip hand. It may be that she was determined to force the acceptance of the treaty on the basis of that honor which was denied in the other controversy, where she did not have the whip hand.

On his return to the United States President Wilson said that he believed that Japan would keep faith, which indicates that he holds to the second of the above mentioned motives. He was consoled by the thought that by agreeing to the Shantung clause he induced Japan to come into the league of nations. It will be for the league to see that she keeps faith with China. Although her promise was not made in writing, it was made before credible witnesses, who probably kept minutes of their meeting, although China could obtain no copy of the minutes.

Thus ended the president's attempt to harmonize his benevolent Fourteen Points, which all the parties to the peace making had accepted as conditions of peace, with the mass of conflicting interests, some of them bolstered up by treaties, that survived from the *ante-bellum* rivalries. If he could have swept away all these interests and begun *de novo*, the result would have been different. As it was, he had to compromise on the Danzig question, he had to allow France the Saar coal area in fee simple under government of the league of nations for fifteen years and a plebiscite to determine its ultimate political condition, he had to allow Japan the Shantung peninsula with a promise of delivery to China which depended on the sense of honor of the Japanese government, and he had to defer a set-

[370]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

tlement with Italy of the Fiume question. In return he obtained the incorporation of the league of nations in the peace treaty. If the league proves all that is expected of it by its defenders, it is probably worth the sacrifices at which it was purchased. What it is worth, however, depends on the future. For it is one thing to get it, and another to get it enforced in the spirit in which it was projected.

May 7, 1919, the fourth anniversary of the sinking of the *Lusitania*, was the day for handing the terms of peace to the Germans. It had taken the Conference four months to determine what should be demanded of the nation that had brought the war on the world. To the Trianon Hotel, in Versailles, came the German delegates, headed by the tall and sensitive Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau. To him Premier Clemenceau, president of the Peace Conference, handed the draft of the treaty and said:

“Gentlemen, Plenipotentiaries of the German Empire, it is neither the time nor the place for superfluous words. You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of all the small and great powers united to fight together in the war that has been so cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our account. You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace. We shall present you now a book which contains our conditions. You will have every facility to examine these conditions, and the time necessary for it. Everything will be done with the courtesy that is the privilege of civilized nations.

“To give you my thought completely, you will find us ready to give you any explanation you want, but we must say at the same time that this second treaty of Versailles has cost us too much not to take on our side all the necessary precautions and guaranties that the peace shall be a lasting one.”

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau said in reply:

“We are under no illusion as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our want of power. We know that the power of the German

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

army is broken. We know the power of the hatred which we encounter here and we have heard the passionate demand that the conquerors make us pay as the vanquished and punish those who are worthy of being punished. It is demanded of us that we shall confess ourselves the only ones guilty of the war. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie. We are far from declining any responsibility that this great war of the world has come to pass, and that it was made in any way in which it was made [*sic*]. The attitude of the former German Government at the Hague Peace Conference, its actions and omissions in the tragic twelve days of July, have certainly contributed to the disaster. But we energetically deny that Germany and her people, who were convinced that they were making a war of defense, were alone guilty . . .

“Public opinion in all the countries of our adversaries is resounding with the crimes which Germany is said to have committed in the war. Here, also, we are ready to confess wrong that may have been done.”

The speaker's insistence that the people of Germany were not responsible for the war was in strange contrast with an argument familiar enough in the autumn of 1914, when generously disposed neutrals were apt to insist that the people of Germany did not support the war. Hundreds of German leaders, from Maximilian Harden to the professors of German universities, issued statements decrying the assertion and declaring that the people of Germany were heart and soul in the war, and that it was a slander to say that there was any difference between them and their leaders.

After charging that the blockade had killed hundreds of thousands of Germans since November 11, and was deliberate murder, Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau appealed to the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. He declared that Germany expected a peace of justice, not a peace of violence. That said, he and his colleagues left the great hall of the hotel, carrying with them the document which witnessed the failure of their country's challenge to the world's peace. Four years had

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

brought its retribution. As Clemenceau said, the day had come to settle the account. For broken faith, for destruction by cannon and bomb, for the work of the submarines, atonement must be made.

When the curtain rose again the scene was the great hall of the palace at Versailles, where the German Empire was proclaimed in 1871.¹ Brockdorff-Rantzau was not there. He and his colleagues had resigned rather than sign the treaty, and two others had been found to perform the act of humiliation. They were Hermann Mueller, now foreign secretary, and Johannes Bell, secretary for the Colonies. The two Germans and the representatives of the nations at war with Germany—with the exception of the Chinese, who refused to sign—asssembled in the celebrated Hall of Mirrors at 3 o'clock on June 28, the fifth anniversary of the fatal murder at Sarejevo. When all were present Clemenceau explained briefly the proceedings of the meeting. Then the two Germans rose from their seats, approached the leather covered table on which the copies of the treaty and protocol were laid, and affixed their signatures. Next signed President Wilson and the other representatives of the United States, followed by the British, French, Italian, and Japanese delegations. After them came the representatives of the smaller powers. When all was over Clemenceau asked the persons present to keep their seats while the Germans left the room. And thus in complete silence Germany's representatives went away from the place where her greatest glory had been crowned forty-eight years earlier, and where in later days she had fond hopes of giving it greater splendor. Herr Mueller

¹ Meantime, the Germans had protested against the severity of the terms and some modifications had been made. The most important were to hold a plebiscite to determine to whom Upper Silesia should go, to allow Germany for three years an army of 200,000 instead of 100,000 men, as first determined; to assure Germany that she would be received into the league of nations if she fulfilled her obligations.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

and Herr Bell had this added humiliation of being led out of the hall by a different door than that which the other delegates used. After making their supreme act of abasement they expected to be treated as the others, and protested against the slight put upon them. But the authorities were inexorable. This slight token of the deep disdain in which their country was held showed how wide a chasm would have to be bridged by good deeds before real union could exist between Germany and the nations she had wronged.

During the remainder of the day and throughout the following night Paris gave itself up to rejoicing. It was hardly over before President Wilson left the city and sailed the next day at Brest for the United States. The newspaper reporters testified to the good will which French officials and people showed him in these last days of his stay among them. When he was holding out against the full claims of France to the Saar Valley he became very unpopular, but when that crisis was passed the thoughtful people came back to his side. His earnest desire to make a peace in which should be no seed of future strife was understood and appreciated. Most of all he was esteemed by those who had contested most severely his efforts at the peace table. In the farewell greetings of Clemenceau and Lloyd George was a tone of personal sorrow. He had met them in equal battle, he had contended for principles they could but respect, and although he was going home to meet the severest test of a hostile political inquiry, they felt that he would meet it like a statesman.

The President went to Europe with two things in mind: He would adjust the turmoil of the world on the basis of the Fourteen Points, and he would safeguard the future in obtaining the adoption of a league of nations to establish permanent peace. He found the people and leaders willing to allow him to try the experiment of the league, although they were not

[374]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

convinced that the experiment would prove successful. But neither the people nor their leaders were willing to settle accounts on the basis of the Fourteen Points. It was a sore disappointment when he found that he had to yield in this respect. It was a sore disappointment to many of his supporters in the United States, and they insisted that he should have come home, washing his hands of the whole business. To have come home, as, indeed, he threatened, would have been to throw Europe into anarchy. Competent observers of the situation believed, as he believed, that if the United States had withdrawn every government in Western Europe would have been overthrown. Rather than have this result, which would have promoted the spread of Bolshevism, he felt it his duty to stay on the ground, striving to obtain as much of ideal justice as he could. It is fair to add that he believed he obtained the acceptance of the essence of the Fourteen Points. In reviewing the situation Mr. Frank H. Simonds, returning from Paris, said:

“Facing the dilemma, the President stayed and made such fight as he could for his program. Clemenceau told a labor delegation just before I left Paris that he did not believe any one could have made a better fight and—odd circumstance—Clemenceau, who began by sneering openly at the President, has ended by feeling for him a considerable measure of respect and liking. I have heard more than one Frenchman of real weight say that in the end France would be glad that the President had come to the Peace Conference, because his had been a usefully moderating influence.”¹

When he arrived in New York on July 8, 1919, President Wilson was confronted by two hostile divisions of public opinion. One was voiced by an active but numerically small group of persons who felt that he should not have abandoned the Fourteen Points in any sense. They asserted in their genuine feeling of chagrin that he should have come home when

¹ *Boston Herald*, June 29, 1919.

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

he threatened to come. They thought that the realization that he was coming would have forced Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando and Makino to give up their policies. They found the Shantung adjustment altogether abominable, and they concluded by declaring Wilson a traitor to the ideals he had espoused. Many of them were not very deeply opposed to the theories of the Bolsheviks, although it would be unfair to say that they approved the horrors which scores of credible witnesses said had been practiced in the lands where Bolshevism had sway. Their influence on American opinion was not great, and their opposition did not play a large part in the campaign for the ratification of the work of the Peace Conference. It is chiefly significant because it was founded on grounds just opposite to the criticism that came from the other group. It denounced the President for not doing enough, while the others alleged that he had done too much.

The second division of opinion had American nationality for its keynote. It made but little objection to the terms of the treaty that applied to Europe and Africa, but its chief opposition was concentrated on the league of nations covenant. In his speech on February 28 Senator Lodge had said that the covenant would not be adopted unless it was amended. When he got up the "round robin" warning to the Peace Conference it was signed by 37 republican senators, and it was announced that no democrats would be allowed to sign. Add to this Mr. Hay's declaration that nationality would be the issue in the next presidential election and it will be seen how much the matter had become a party question. It is true that the covenant was revised after President Wilson returned to Paris, but Senator Lodge asserted that the revised form was worse than the original, and there was no evidence that his party colleagues differed with him. When President Wilson re-

[376]

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, 1919

turned from Paris in July, therefore, he had to face a strong republican opposition to the covenant.

When he laid the treaty before the senate on July 10 he made one of the most impressive speeches of his career as president. The chamber was crowded to its utmost capacity and thousands were refused tickets of admission. His words were received with every evidence of enthusiasm by the galleries and all the persons on the floor except the republicans, only one of whom, Senator McCumber, applauded. It was evident that the long course of personal attack that had been made upon him by political opponents had put them in such a frame of mind that they were not prepared to show him any favor. Either the sense of consistency or a genuine feeling of dislike made it impossible for them to accord the common expression of courtesy that ordinarily greets an unusual speech in "the most dignified assembly in the world."

Long before this incident occurred the forces of opposition to the covenant had been organized. Congress met in extra session on May 19. The republicans controlled the senate and organized the foreign relations committee in such a way that a majority was composed of men who were certain to vote with the chairman, Senator Lodge, in opposition to the covenant as submitted.

The presentation of the treaty of peace to the senate brought our war with Germany within a hand's breadth of its close. In ordinary circumstances only brief discussion would have been necessary to ratify or reject the treaty. In this case, however, the matter is too closely bound up with the political life of the day to allow its quick solution. As the political element comes into prominence the task of the historian becomes difficult. He cannot describe the complex of motives at work until he knows what the result is. He cannot form a valuable judgment of

OUR WAR WITH GERMANY

the matter until he has seen it in perspective. And these facts warn me to bring this narrative to a close at this place, when my story passes out of the field of war history into the domain of political history. The future historian will know what to say about the men and measures that are now associated with the debate for and against ratification.

The war itself finds its most characteristic note in the test it afforded to the national will of the people of the United States. Our national self-control was tested by the events which came up in reference to our neutrality obligations. Our unified loyalty was tested in the demands made by Americanism on various race elements of our population connected intimately with the several belligerents in Europe. Another test was in the necessity of organizing our political life so that it could realize the national strength in its utmost capacity. Still another was to call out and arm the manhood of the country in an army that represented the possibilities of our fighting ability. Finally it was for the United States to take in the Peace Conference a part comparable with their greatness and world-broad ideals. In all these ways the nation met the test with credit and in some respects with brilliant success.

THE END

INDEX

- Aerschot, 14.
- Aircraft, army airplanes, 1914, 73; in European armies, 125; in American army, 127-129; Liberty Motor, 128; airplanes ordered in France, 129; training airmen, 130; statistics of production, 187; training school in France, 201.
- Aircraft Production, investigation of, 177-188.
- Aircraft Production Board, 128.
- Airplanes. See Aircraft.
- Albert, Dr. Heinrich F., on political influence of German-Americans, 89.
- Alcedo, the, sunk by submarine, 305.
- Alexander, J. W., Congressman, his shipping bill, 1914, 80.
- Allenby, General, his campaign in Syria, 262; influence of his campaign in peace negotiations, 319.
- Allied Naval War Council 295.
- American Embargo Conference, attempt to influence congress, 86.
- American Expeditionary Force. See Army.
- American Independence Union, the, 84.
- Amiens, German attempt to take, 220.
- Ancona, the, 54.
- Annunzio, Gabriele d', 347.
- Antilles, the, sunk by submarine, 305.
- Ansetger, Louisville, attitude toward ruthless submarine policy, 96.
- Apremont, action at, 216.
- Arabic, the, 53.
- Archibald, James F. J., 86.
- Argonne, the American battle of, 255-258; strength of the position, 257, 270; fighting in the, 259-261, 268-271.
- Armistice, the, goes into operation on American front, 280; conditions at the front, 328; arrangements made, 328; completed, 328-330.
- Army American, the *ante-bellum* strength of, 71; General Staff created, 72; on the Mexican border, 71; National Guard, 72; Volunteer Act of 1914, 73; airplanes in 1914, 73; artillery in 1914, 73; machine guns in 1914, 74; popular opinion of, 74; comparative cost, 74; improvement of agitated, 75; national defense act of 1916, 77; condition of on verge of war, 108; progress under act of 1916, 116; act of May 18, 1917, 117; draft fixed, 118; arrival of first soldiers in France, 119; enrollment for, 119; the first draft held, 119; National Army, the, 120; organizing the new, 114-121; training officers for, 120; artillery of, 124; aircraft of, 124, 127; munitions for, 125; rifles for, 126; machine guns for, 127; projects for supplying airplanes, 127-129; growth of in 1917, 164; difficulties of the situation, 164; ordnance and supplies for, 164-168; artillery for, 166, 170; supply of rifles, 166; of machine guns, 167; quartermaster's supplies for, 168; A. E. F. dispatched, 189; act of May 18, 1917, 190; size of, 190; numbers transported to Europe month by month, 191; transports from Great Britain, 192; from other countries, 192; transport service of, 192, 194; training of in France, 199, 201; organization of in France, 199, 201; strength of in Europe, 200; French assistance for, 202; plans of general staff for training, 211; the training period in France, 211-217; training sectors, 213; night raids, 214; enters the battle on allied front, 223-228; first Americans sent to the battle front, 225; 11th regiment of engineers before St. Quentin, 226; first field organized, 251; casualties in the Meuse-Argonne campaign, 281; casualties in the war, 292. See Divisions.
- Artillery, in the world war, 124; American manufacture of, 125.
- Asquith, Herbert, and a league of nations, 340.
- Austria-Hungary, submarine of sinks the *Ancona*, 54; war declared against, 112; proposed a discussion of terms, 263; President Wilson's reply to, 263; her peace note of Sept. 14, 1918, 318; President Wilson's reply to, 319; and revolt of Slavic parts of the empire, 330; collapse of defense in Italy, 320; accepts armistice, 320. See Dumba, Dr.
- Badonvilliers, action at, 215.
- Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War, investigation of his department, 164-173; qualifications of, 169; before the senate military committee, 170; President Wilson on, 171; information on airplane shipments, 178; Borglum charges against, 188; on shortage of supplies, 189.
- Balfour, A. J., Foreign Secretary, his statement on peace aims, 67; in the United States, 115.
- Barchfield, Andrew J., 85.
- Bartholdt, Richard, 82, 85.
- Barthelme, Georg, 101.
- Baruch, Bernard M., and Council of National Defense, 131.
- Belgium, appeals to President Wilson, 9; effect of atrocities, 13, 14; early campaign in, 205, 206.
- Belleau Wood, the marines in battle of, 233-236.
- Benson, Admiral W. S., 294.
- Bernstorff, Count von, protests on "mushroom bullets," 10; his relation with propagandists, 11; on fortified cities, 15; on blockade, 26; demands von Igel's papers, 88; on *Lusitania* incident, 44; tries to allay excitement, 50, 53; and the *Arabic* case, 53; wishes Wilson

INDEX

- for peace-maker, 64; tries to avoid war, 91; presents ruthless submarine decree, 92; passports delivered, 94; his departure, 97.
- "Black list," the British, 28.
- Blanc Mont, battle of, 269.
- Bliss, General Tasker H., delegate to Peace Conference, 335.
- Blockade, British practice of, 23-29; German "war zone" and, 24; Decree of March 13, 1915, 24-26; American view of, 25-29; Germany tries to couple it with *Sussex* promise, 58.
- Borah, Senator, speaks against league of nations, 353.
- Bordeaux, port of debarkation, 195, 196.
- Borglum, Gutson, his aircraft report, 178, 181-183.
- Bourgeois, Léon, and a league of nations, 339; endorses league of nations, 348; on league committee, 348; desires strong league, 350.
- Boyd, Captain Karl, and violations of neutrality, 34; recall demanded, 37; activities of, 89.
- Brandenburg*, violates neutrality, 9.
- Brest, port of debarkation, 195, 196.
- Brest-Litovsk, armistice at, 314.
- British Army. See Great Britain.
- Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count von, 370-372.
- Browning Machine Gun, 127.
- Bryan, William J., secretary of state, reply to Senator Stone, 11, 32; signs *Lusitania* note, 48; his assurance to Dr. Dumba, 50; resignation of, 51; as a pacifist, 51; relations with President Wilson, 62; and the peace feelers of 1914, 63; attitude toward ruthless submarine policy, 96.
- Bryce, Lord, and a league of nations, 340.
- Buenz, Dr. Karl, 33.
- Bulgaria, war not declared against, 113; collapse of, 262, 263, 319; signs armistice, 319.
- Bullard, General Robert L., 227; commander of 2d Army, 278.
- Bullard, Rear Admiral W. H. G., 299.
- Burleson, Albert S., Postmaster-General, and the Overman Bill, 174.
- Byng, General Sir Julian, 219.
- Cantigny, Battle of, 227.
- Capps, Rear Admiral W. L., 156.
- Carden, Sir Lionel, 12.
- Carolina*, the, sunk by German submarine, 303.
- Carter, W. S., director of labor under railroad control, 151.
- Cecil, Lord Robert, and a league of nations, 340; on committee of league, 348; his plan for a league, 348.
- Chamberlain, G. E., Senator, and national defense, 77; attitude toward situation in war department, 171; bill for minister of munitions, 171; on a war cabinet, 171; on aircraft production, 181-184. "Chamberlain Bill," 77.
- Château-Thierry, salient formed at, 230; American soldiers in battle at, 231-236; Germans driven back from, 243.
- China, and the Shantung question, 360, 365-369; refuses to sign treaty, 372.
- Clapp, Moses E., Senator, and La Follette filibuster, 105.
- Clark, Champ, Speaker, on compulsory military service, 117; on armed merchantmen, 161; reflected speaker, 162.
- Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 159.
- Clemenceau, Georges, Premier, and a league of nations, 339; and reparation by Germany, 341; and Council of Ten, 343; president of Peace Conference, 345; asks Italian delegates to return, 365; hands terms to Germans, 370.
- Coal. See Fuel.
- Conn, Howard E., and aircraft production, 128; and council of national defense, 131; and aircraft production, 177; superseded, 183; letter on aircraft situation, 188.
- Commerce, effect of war on, 3; revival of in 1914-5, 5; munitions, 6; South American, 6; restrictions on during the war, 18-23; see Blockade.
- Compeigne, Forest of, Germans try to take the, 236.
- Constant, Baron d'Estournelles de, and a league of nations, 339.
- Continuous Voyage, rules of, 18-23; and the "Packers' Cases," 27; relation to submarine controversy, 40; Germany tries to couple it with *Sussex* promise, 58.
- Contraband, rules of, 19, 21, 23.
- Contracts, Government, method of letting them, 133.
- Cost Plus System, 134.
- Cotton, and the Declaration of London, 19; effect of war on price, 22.
- Corington, the, sunk by submarine, 305.
- Council, Interallied War, and the Peace Conference, 343.
- Council of National Defense, and aircraft production, 128; organization and work, 131-137; duties of, 134; boards and subcommittees of, 134-137; state and city councils, 137.
- Council of Ten, functions of, 343, 344.
- Council, Supreme War. See Interallied War Council.
- Crozier, Major-General, on the ordnance division, 166-168.
- Cummins, A. B., Senator, and La Follette filibuster, 105; resolution for senate representation at Paris, 337.
- Cushing*, the, 47, 49, 50.
- Cyclops*, the, mysterious loss of, 306.
- Czecho-Slovakia, early movement for, 320.
- Ozernin, Count, note on peace, 1917, 175.
- Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of the Navy, on the naval act of 1916, 78; Secretary of the Navy, 122.
- Deeds, Edward A., charges by Borglum, 183; his position in aircraft production, 184; charges against, 186.
- Defense, National, opinion aroused on, 60; development of, 71-79; state of army, 1914, 71-75; state of navy, 1914, 75; and National Security League, 75; Act of 1916, 77; consequences of unpreparedness, 91; measures taken on verge of war, 108; organizing the new army, 114-121. See Army.
- Denman, William, chairman of shipping board, 154; and wooden ships, 156; resignation of, 156.
- Denmark and rules of continuous voyage, 18.
- Dent, S. H., Congressman, on compulsory military service, 117.
- Depth Bombs, use of, 299.
- Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard, activities in United States, 15; 31; leaves the United States, 52.

INDEX

- Destroyers, sent to Europe, 297.
- Dickman, General, his decision to advance at Jaulgonne, 241.
- Division, 1st, arrival in France, 212; training in Lorraine, 212; first shot fired, 212; order to battle front, 226; in battle of Cantigny, 227; in the offensive of July 18, 1918, 243, 245, 251; in battle of St. Mihiel, 253, 255; in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258; race for Sedan, 277.
- Division, 2d, arrival in France, 213; ordered to Château-Thierry sector, 231; in the offensive of July 18, 1918, 243, 245, 251; in battle of St. Mihiel, 253; lent to Gen. Gouraud, 268.
- Division, 3d, in battle of Château-Thierry, 231; in the battle south of the Marne, 239-243; in the advance to the Vesle, 247, 251; in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258; on the east side of the Meuse, 279.
- Division, 4th, on the Marne, 243; in the advance to the Vesle, 247, 249; in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 5th, in the battle of St. Mihiel, 253.
- Division, the 26th, arrival in France, 213; in the battle of Seicheprey, 216; in the offensive of July 18, 1918, 243, 246, 251; in battle of St. Mihiel, 253, 255.
- Division, 27th, arrival in France, 282; in training near Ypres, 283; take part in the recovery of Mt. Kemmel, 284; before tunnel sector near St. Quentin, 284-288; in the advance beyond Montbrehain, 289; on the Selle River, 289; commended by Gen. Haig, 290.
- Division, 28th, on the Vesle, 249, 251; in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 29th, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 30th, arrival in France, 282; in training near Ypres, 283; occupy Vormerzille, 284; before the tunnel sector near St. Quentin, 284-288; in the advance beyond Montbrehain, 289; on the Selle River, 289; commended by Gen. Haig, 290.
- Division, 32d, in battle of Meunière Woods, 248, 251; in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 33d, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 35th, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 36th, lent to Gen. Gouraud, 268.
- Division, 37th, service in Flanders, 291.
- Division, 42d (Rainbow), arrival in France, 213; at Prunay, 241; in the advance to the Vesle, 243, 246, 247; in battle of Sergy, 248, 251; in battle of St. Mihiel, 253; in race for Sedan, 277.
- Division, 77th, on the Vesle, 249; in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258; fighting in the Argonne Forest, 259, 269.
- Division, 79th, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 80th, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 81st, called "Wild Cat division," 282.
- Division, 82d, in battle of St. Mihiel, 253; in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 87th, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- Division, 89th, in battle of St. Mihiel, 253.
- Division, 90th, in battle of St. Mihiel, 253.
- Division, 91st, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258; service in Flanders, 291.
- Division, 92d, in Meuse-Argonne campaign, 258.
- "Division, the Old Hickory." See 80th division.
- "Division, the Wild Cat." See 81st division.
- Dumba, Dr. Constantine, letter of to Baron Burian, 36; recalled, 37; Secretary Bryan's assurance to, 50.
- Dutch Trade. See Holland.
- Dwinsk*, the, sunk by submarine, 304.
- Eastern Front, policy of defending, 261.
- Éitel Friedrich*, *Prins*, the, 42.
- Emergency Fleet Corporation. See Shipping.
- England. See Great Britain.
- Engineers, 11th Regiment of, fighting before St. Quentin, 226.
- Ersberger, on approaching revolution, 266.
- Falaba*, the, 42, 47, 49.
- Federal Reserve Bank put into operation, 3.
- Federal Trade Commission, creation of, 159.
- Fere-en-Tardenois, battle at, 247, 248.
- Fess, Representative S. D., sees British influence in league of nations, 353.
- Fleet, the Atlantic, 295; the coast patrol service, 295; the Pacific, 296.
- Flood, Henry D., Congressman, 103, 104.
- Flood Bill, the, 103, 104.
- "Five Brothers," the, 159.
- Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, given united command of allied troops in France, 221; opens long expected offensive, 242, 246.
- Food, control of, 137-143; acts to control, 138-142, 144.
- Ford, Henry, his "peace ship," 65.
- Fourteen Points, text of, 315; additional points, 317.
- France, aid from in regard to artillery and aircraft, 202; demands in Peace Conference, 333, 340; on the Saar Valley, 358; adjusts question of Saar Valley, 363.
- Freedom of the Seas, President Wilson on, Jan. 22, 1917, 69.
- Freya Line, the, 261.
- Frye*, *William P.*, the, 42.
- Fuel, control of, 143-147.
- Gardner, A. P., and national defense, 75.
- Garfield, President Harry A., chairman of the national fair price committee, 143; appointed fuel administrator, 144; lays embargo on coal, 145.
- Garrison, Lindley M., Secretary of War, on the national defense act of 1916, 77.
- Gazette*, Cologne, Barthelme's letters in, 101.
- George, Lloyd, and unity of military command in France, 220; appeals to the people of the United States, 223; on British peace terms, 314; and a league of nations, 340; and reparation by Germany, 341; endorses league of nations, 347; asks Italian delegates to return, 365; on the Shantung affair, 366.
- Gerard, James W., Ambassador, and German peace feeler of 1914, 64; recalled from Berlin, 94; his departure, 98-100.
- German-Americans, their influence, 81; and political agitators, 32; their votes in 1916, 83-85; development of as political factor, 88-85; organization of, 83;

INDEX

- not generally disloyal, 85; German language in the schools, 85; actual influence in the election, 88; press of on ruthless submarine policy, 96.
- German Army, fighting force of, weakening, 271, 274.
- Germany, protest on wireless stations, 8; American feeling toward, 8, 12; obtains supplies for cruisers, 9, 83; propaganda, 12-17; attitude toward American tourists, 14; atrocities in Belgium, 14; and the Declaration of London, 18; takes our food supplies, 23; propaganda of in the United States, 30-39; and the submarine controversy, 39-59; war zone proclaimed, 40; her point of view, 41; sentiment of on the *Lusitania* incident, 45; reply to first *Lusitania* note, 48-50; influence of admiralty, 51; reply to second *Lusitania* note, 51; offers reparation for the *Nebraskan*, 51; moderates course of submarines, 53; moderates submarine policy, 53; case of the *Sussex*, 56-58; promises civilized warfare on the sea, 57-59; reservation on blockade and continuous voyage, 58; influence of her submarine policy on American feeling, 59; peace feelers of, 1914, 63; peace offer of 1916, 65; reasons for going to war with the United States, 91; significance of her victory, 95; attempt to force Gerard to modify treaties, 98; her opinion of American honor, 98, 100; effect of submarine policy, a blockade, 102; tries to bring Mexico into the war, 105; state of war with, declared, 107-112; summary of her campaigns on the western front, 205-211; the spring offensive, 1918, 217-223; establishes the Château-Thierry salient, 229; and Austria's peace proposition, 263; distrusted in every move, 264; beginning of revolutionary spirit in, 265; kaiser's attempt to revive loyalty of German workers, 266; barbarous methods of making war, 276; her views of peace, 309; peace offer of 1916, 309; *Reichstag* resolutions for ministerial responsibility, 310; reply to papal peace note, 311; American reply to, 312; her peace policy, 317; and Austrian peace note of Sept. 14, 1918, 318; moving toward a peace by surrender, 321; Prince Maximilian's request for peace, 324; second note, 326; at the Peace Conference, 332; and reparation, 340; and the Saar Valley, 358; receives terms of the Allies, 370-372; signs treaty, 372.
- Goethals, General G. W., manager of Emergency Fleet Corporation, 156; resignation of, 156; appointed quartermaster-general, 173.
- Golz, Major von der, confession of, 88.
- Gompers, Samuel G., and pro-German propagandists, 36; and labor committee of the council of national defense, 135.
- Gore, Thomas P., Senator, on the food bill, 139; resolutions of, 56.
- Gore Resolutions, 56.
- Gough, General Sir Hubert, 219.
- Gouraud, General, cooperates with American troops in Meuse-Argonne, 256, 259, 268, 275.
- Grand Pré, as American objective, 256, 268, 269, 273.
- Grasty, Charles H., on the crisis in the Peace Conference, 361.
- Great Britain, and trade restrictions, 18-23; and Declaration of London, 19; and the use of mines, 20; and sea power, 24; and German "war zone," 24; blockade decree of March 13, 1915, 24-26; and the "Packers' Cases," 28; and the "blacklist," 28; and the submarine controversy, 40; mission from, 115; loans to, 115; gives aid to American army, 202; army attacked by Germans on Cambrai front, 218-220; on La Bassée-Ypres front, 221-223; demands in Peace Conference, 333, 341; her hopes for cooperation with the United States, 341.
- Grey, Viscount, on American trade, 1914, 21-23.
- Gronna, Asle J., Senator, attitude toward war policies, 95; and the La Follette filibuster, 105; against declaration of war, 161.
- Guilicht*, the, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50.
- Hague Convention, and the use of mines, 20.
- Haig, General Sir Douglas, appeal to his army, 222; his drive of August 8, 1918, 250.
- Harrison, Fairfax, chairman of railroads war board, 148.
- Hay, James, Congressman, and the army act of 1914, 78, 77.
- "Hay Bill," 77, 81.
- Hasebrouck, German attempt to reach, 221.
- Herald*, Boston, exposes Bartheime intrigue, 101.
- Hertling, Count von, note on peace, 175; resigns the chancellorship, 267.
- Hill 288, Iowans take, 278.
- Hindenburg Line, the, constructed, 210.
- Hitchcock, G. M., Senator, and the Overman Bill, 174.
- Holland, and rules of continuous voyage, 18; ships of taken over, 192.
- Hoover, Herbert C., early career of, 138; and Belgian relief, 138; in control of American food, 138-140; named national food commissioner, 142; investigation of proposed, 172.
- Houatonic*, the, sunk by submarine, 102.
- House, Col. E. M., and unity of military command, 220; delegate to Peace Conference, 335.
- Huerta, General, President Wilson's attitude toward, 160.
- Hughes, Charles E., presidential candidate in 1916, 83; and the German-American voters, 87; investigates aircraft situation, 184-187; suggests amendments to league covenant, 358.
- Hurley, Edward N., chairman of shipping board, 156 investigation of, 172; his reply to Senator Lodge, 180; arranges for British ships to transport American troops, 224.
- Husting, Paul O., Senator, and the German-Americans, 86.
- Igel, Wolf von, office raided, 38.
- Insurance, War Risk, act for, 4.
- International Law, disregarded by both sides, 18; and submarines, 39.
- Industrial Resources, organized for war, 79-82; influenced by action in Europe, 80; shipping, 80; nitrate factories, 81; board of mobilization of industries, 81.
- Irish-Americans, associated with pro-Germans, 82, 84.

INDEX

- Italy, demands in Peace Conference, 334; the question of Fiume before the Peace Conference, 359; crisis in Italian question, 363-365.
- Jacob Jones*, the, sunk by a submarine, 305.
- James, Ollie M., Senator, on President Wilson, 175.
- Japan, ships furnished by, 192; asks for racial equality in the league of nations, 349, 356, 357; the Shantung question, 360, 365-369.
- Joffre, Marshal, visit to the United States, 115; asks for military aid, 118.
- Jordan, David Starr, 65.
- Jugo-Slovakia, early movement for, 320.
- Kahn, Julius, Congressman, on compulsory military service, 117.
- Kenly, Brigadier-General, head of military aeronautics, 183, 187.
- Kenyon, William S., Senator, and La Follette filibuster, 105.
- Kirby, William F., Senator, attitude toward war policies, 95; and La Follette filibuster, 106.
- Kitchin, Claude, on compulsory military service, 117; Congressman, vote on declaration of war, 161.
- Knight, Admiral Austin M., 296.
- Knox, Senator, Philander C., resolution of demanding early peace, 337.
- Koenig, Paul, 88.
- Kriemhilde Line, the, 260, 270, 271; penetrated, 272.
- Kühlmann, Secretary von, his moderate speech, 321.
- Labor, labor committee of council of national defense, 135; reasons for increasing wages of under railroad control, 151; general tendency of during the war, 153.
- Labor's National Peace Council, 86.
- Laconia*, the, sunk by submarine, 108.
- La Follette, Robert, Senator, attitude on war policy, 95; filibuster of, 104, 105.
- Landres-et-St. Georges, battle at, 272.
- Lane, Franklin K., Secretary of the Interior, Chairman of Railroad Wage Commission, 152.
- Lane, Harry, Senator, and La Follette filibuster, 106; against a declaration of war, 161.
- Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State, on British blockade, 26; on the "Packers' Cases," 27; notes on the *Arabic* and the *Ancona*, 54; tries to obviate the arming of merchantmen, 55; notes on the *Sussex* case, 57-59 on reservations in German *Sussex* note, 90; reply to pope's peace note, 312; delegate to Peace Conference, 335.
- La Pallice, port of debarkation, 195.
- League of Nations, Secretary Balfour on, 67; recommended by President Wilson, Jan. 22, 1918, 67; President Wilson on, Sept. 27, 1918, 323; and the selection of peace delegates, 332, 334; attitude of Europe towards, 339; endorsed by Peace Conference, 345; drafting the covenant of, 347-357; committee on appointed, 348; plans of, 348; opinion of committee, 348-350; covenant of submitted, 351; its contents, 351; Senate criticisms of, 352-355; revised covenant completed, 356, 357.
- Lever, A. F., Congressman, his bill to control food, 139-142.
- Lenroot, I. L., Congressman, on partisanship in congress, 1917, 162.
- Lewis, Colonel Isaac, his machine gun, 168.
- Liberty Motor, invention of, 128.
- Liggett, Lieut.-Gen. Hunter, commander of First Army, 278.
- Line, American, at end of war, 280.
- Loans, to foreign nations, 115.
- Lobeck, George O., 35.
- Lodge, Henry Cabot, Senator, opposes president's policy, 103; moves investigation of sugar and fuel situations, 165; denounces the shipping situation, 179; reply of chairman Hurley, 180; criticizes president's note to Prince Maximilian, 325; demands unconditional surrender, 330; attitude toward the president, 336; announces opposition to league of nations, 354; originates "round robin" against league, 354; debate with President Lowell, 356; criticizes president's Adriatic statement, 364; objects to revised covenant, 375.
- London, Declaration of, 1908, 18.
- "Lost Battalion, the," 270.
- Lovett, Judge R. S., and council of national defense, 135.
- Lowell, President A. Lawrence, debate on league of nations, 356.
- Lusitania*, case, 27; the destruction of, 43; as a diplomatic incident, 44-53; not an armed ship, 51; and interest in national defense, 76, 78; President Wilson's course on, 79, 102, 103.
- McAdoo, William G., director-general of railroads, 150-153.
- Machine Guns, army's supply of, 1914, 74; for American army, 127.
- McGowan, Rear Admiral Samuel, 294.
- McLemore Resolutions, 56.
- McKinley, President William W., and the treaty with Spain, 336.
- Makino, Baron. See Japan.
- Mann, James R., attitude toward president's war policy, 103; defeated for speaker, 162; opinion of on attitude toward the president, 337.
- Marines, U. S., numbers sent to France, 191n.; in battle near Château-Thierry, 232-236.
- Marne, battle of, 205; Germans reach in 1918, 230; the Germans cross the, 238-244.
- Marshall, H. Snowden, appointed to investigate aircraft situation, 178.
- Martin, Franklin H., and council of national defense, 131, 135.
- Martin, Thomas S., Senator, and the Overman Bill, 174.
- Mayo, Admiral H. T., 295, 307.
- Maximilian of Bavaria, Prince, Chancellor of the empire, 322; asks for peace, 324.
- Medical committee of the council of national defense, 135.
- Merchant marine. See Shipping.
- Meunière Woods, battle in, 248.
- Meuse, the campaign on the, 255-261, 267-280; casualties in, 281.
- Mexico, trouble on the border of, 72; and the Zimmerman note, 105, 110; President Wilson's relations with, 160.
- Minister of munitions, bill for, 171.
- Missions, Foreign, to the United States, 114-116.

INDEX

- Mix, Kenyon W., Jr., 183.
 Monroe Doctrine, President Wilson on, Jan. 22, 1917, 70.
 Montfaucon, capture of, 259.
 Montmédy, under fire of American guns, 275.
Morgen Gazette, Philadelphia, attitude toward ruthless submarine policy, 96.
 Munition Plants, destruction of, 35; Dr. Dumba's plans, 36.
 "Mushroom Bullets," 10.
- National German-American Alliance, 84; attitude toward ruthless submarine policy, 96.
 National Guard. See Army.
 National Resources, organizing the, 131-157.
 National Security League, 75.
 Navy, American, state of, 1914, 75; improvement of agitated, 75; act of 1916, 78; condition of on verge of war, 108; takes up war service, 121-124; under the act of 1916, 121; Josephus Daniels as secretary of, 122; development under act of 1916, 122; destroyers dispatched to Europe, 123; operations in the war, 294-308; in the attack on Durazzo, 294; divided into five service groups, 295; purchase of vessels for, 296; convoy service, 297-301; U. S. destroyers in European waters, 297-301; the depth bomb, 299; "dazzle" painting, 300; smoke screen, 300; statistics of submarines destroyed, 301; German submarines in American waters, 301-305; vessels of lost, 305; the American Patrol Force, 306; U. S. battleship division with British fleet, 306, 307; mine barrages in North Sea and British Channel, 307.
Nebraska, the, 51.
 Neutrality, Enforcement of, 7-12; proclamation of, 7; popular attitude, 8; Germany violates in the United States, 9; status of neutrals, 17-23.
 Norris, George W., Senator, and La Follette filibuster, 105; against declaration of war, 161.
- Overman, Lee S., Senator, his relation to the Overman Bill, 173-176.
 Overman Bill, history of, 173-176.
 O'Gorman, James A., Senator, and La Follette filibuster, 106.
Orduna, the, 52.
 Orlando, Premier of Italy, leaves the Peace Conference, 363-365.
- "Packers' Cases," the, 27.
 Page, Walter Hines, 64.
 Papen, Captain Franz von, recall of demanded, 37; activity of, 89.
 Passports, fraudulent, 34.
 Peabody, F. S., chairman of committee on coal, 144.
 Peace, attempts to make, 1914, 62-64; private efforts, 64; Henry Ford's design, 65; German offer of 1916, 65; reply of the *Entente* powers, 66; Mr. Balfour's statement, 67; early suggestions from Germany, 309-318; German offer of 1916, 309; pope's note urging peace by compromise, 311; Germany's reply, 311; American reply, 312; terms at suggestion of Russia, 314; Lloyd George on, 314.
- Peace Conference, American delegates to, 332-335; delegates to, 335; organization of, 342-345; and the Council of Ten, 343; list of delegates, 344 and 344n.1; first meeting, 345; spirit of, 345-347; and the league of nations, 347-357; and international problems, 357-369.
 Peace Congress, International, organized, 65.
 Peace notes, Dr. Solf's, 271.
 Pershing, General John J., appointed to command in France, 119; and airplane models, 178; selects French ports of debarkation, 195; remodels service of supply in France, 196; acknowledges French assistance, 202; appointed commander of army in France, 212; offers American army to General Foch, 221, 224.
 Poincaré, President, opens Peace Conference, 345.
 Poindexter, Senator, speaks against league of nations, 353.
 Poland, before the Peace Conference, 358, 363.
 Pope, the peace note of the, 311.
 Porter, Stephen G., 85.
President Lincoln, the, sunk by submarine, 305.
 Price Fixing, 132.
 Prohibition, provided for in the food bill, 140.
 Propaganda, the German, 30-39.
 Pultzer, Ralph, on work before the Peace Conference, 346.
- Railroads, relation to coal distribution, 144; operation of in war, 147-153; railroads war board, 148-150; government control over, 150-153; Railroad Wage Commission, 151.
 Rainbow Division. See Forty-Second Division.
 Rawlinson, General Sir Henry, 219; commends 11th Engineers, 226.
 Read, Maj.-Gen. G. W., 283.
 Reed, James A., Senator, investigating the war department, 165; against the league of nations, 353.
 Revenues, Emergency act of 1914, 5
 Rifles, for American Army, 126, 166.
 Rintelen, Franz von, 36.
 Rodgers, Rear Admiral T. S., 307.
 Rodman, Rear Admiral Hugh, 306.
 Roosevelt, Theodore, a political factor in 1916, 82; proposed division, 118; his policy while president, 158; his method of political battle, 159; on the *Lusitania* case, 160; his strong position when president, 162; his proposed division, 211; as possible delegate to Peace Conference, 336.
 Root, Elihu, as Secretary of War, 71; on the necessity of war, 107; as possible delegate to Peace Conference, 336; suggests amendments to league covenant, 356.
 Rosenwald, Julius, and council of national defense, 131.
 Russia, effects of revolution in, 112, 190, 191; influence of revolution on peace proposals, 313.
 Rustem, A. Bey, 11.
 Ryan, John D., appointed director of aircraft production, 183; services of, 187; assistant secretary of war, 188.

INDEX

- Saar Valley, question of, 358.
 St. Mihiel, the American battle of, 251-255.
 St. Nazaire, port of debarkation, 195.
 St. Quentin, battle before, 219.
 Saloniki, offensive from, 262.
San Diego, the, sunk by submarine, 304, 305.
 Scheidemann, Philip, in German cabinet, 267.
 Schoen, Baron von, 11.
 Schwab, Charles M., head of Emergency Fleet Corporation, 180.
 Sector, American, created, 251; enlarged, 256.
 Sedan, American objective, 256, 275, 276; reached by American troops, 277.
 Seicheprey, battle of, 216.
 Sergy, battle at, 247.
 Service of Supply (S. O. S.), 194-199; ports in France, 194; docks built, 196; railroads in France, 196, 198; bases of supply, 197; cargo ships, 198.
 Sherman, Lawrence Y., Senator, on the food bill, 140; resolution of declaring presidency vacant, 337.
 Shipping, interrupted by war, 4; first ship purchase bill, 4; act to extend American registry, 4; German status of in neutral ports, 4; Government operation of, attempted legislation of 1914-1915, 80; act of 1916, 81; reported seizure of the German, 98; proposal to arm merchant ships, 103, 104; president gives the order, 106; in war time, 153-157; act of 1916, 154; the United States Shipping Board, 154, 157; Emergency Fleet Corporation, 154; German and Austrian ships seized, 154; Construction of, 155; proposal to arm merchantmen, 161.
 Shot, the first, fired by the sixth field artillery, 212.
 Sibert, Major-General W. L., 212.
 Simonds, Frank H., on President Wilson's work in Paris, 374.
 Sims, William S., Admiral, sent to Europe, 123.
 Sims, Rear Admiral W. S., sent to Europe, 294.
 Smuts, General, on committee of league of nations, 348; plan of a league, 348.
 Somme, battle of the, 208.
 Sonnino, Baron, and the Fiume question, 363-365.
 South America, trade with, 6.
 Squier, Brigadier-General George O., and aircraft production, 177, 183.
 Stenay, operations against, 275.
 Stettinius, Edward R., 188.
 Stock Exchanges, closed by war, 2.
 Stone, William J., Senator, letter to Secretary Bryan, 11, 32; attitude on war policies, 95; and La Follette filibuster, 106; on declaration of war, 161.
 Straus, Oscar, tries to promote peace, 63.
 Submarines, controversy over, 39-59 in international law, 39; Germany announces her purpose, 40; ships sunk, 42; *Lusitania* case, 43-53; the *Nebraskan*, 51; the *Ordana*, 52; moderated use of, 53; destruction of the *Sussex*, 56; the German promise of civilized warfare, 57; Ruthless Warfare, 90-94; the decree presented to the American government, 92; its terms, 92; service of U. S. destroyers against, 297-299; the depth bombs, 299; antidote for, 299; statistics of German lost, 301; use in American waters, 301-305.
 Summerall, Major-General, at Berry-le-Sec, 245.
Sussex, the case of the, 56-59, 87, 102, 103; promises of Germany in *re*, 90, 94.
 Syria, British campaign in, 261.
 Taft, William H., President, his attitude toward big corporations, 158; defends league of nations, 355; suggests amendments, 356.
Tampa, the, destroyed by explosion, 305.
 Ten, Council of. See Council of Ten.
 Thrasher, Leon G., 42.
Times, New York, editorial on probable conduct of the war, 13; on the *Gulflight* incident, 45; on the *Lusitania*, 46; on German reply to first *Lusitania* note, 49; editor of on ruthless submarine policy, 95.
 Toul, sector of, 251.
 Tourists, return from Europe, 2; German treatment of, 14.
 Trade. See Commerce.
 Transportation. See Railroads and Shipping.
Triumph, the, armed by a German submarine, 304.
 Tumulty, Joseph Patrick, Secretary, and Gutson Borglum, 181.
 Tunnel Sector near St. Quentin, 284-288.
 Turkey, war not declared against, 113; collapse of, 262, 263; accepts armistice, 320.
 United States, and Declaration of London, 18; at Hague Convention, 21; trade with northern neutrals, 21; resents British blockade, 25-28; resents "blacklist," 28; take notice of German submarine threat, 40; attitude toward British trade restrictions, 41; awakening to need of defense, 60; drawn into world politics, 62; as peacemaker of Europe, 62, 64; diplomatic representatives of belligerents, 63n.1; consequences of unpreparedness in, 91; astonished by ruthless submarine decree, 92; declares war against Germany, 112; against Austria, 112; relations with Turkey and Bulgaria, 113.
 United States Shipping Board. See Shipping.
 Vardeman, James K., Senator, attitude toward war policies, 95; and La Follette filibuster, 106; against declaration of war, 161.
 Verdun, battle of, 208.
 Versailles, Treaty of, 1919, 332-377.
 Viviani, M., visit to the United States, 115.
 Vreeland Act, extended, 3.
 Wadsworth, James W., Senator, on lack of army supplies, 165; on the situation in the war department, 170.
 War with Germany, a state of declared, 107-112 our reason for going to, 111.
 War Cabinet, bill for introduced, 171, 173.
 War Department, investigations of, 164-173; and the Overman Bill, 173-176.
 War Trade Board, and army transport service, 192.
 War Zone, proclaimed by Germany, 40.
 Wheat, price fixed, 142.
 White, Henry, delegate to Peace Conference, 335.

INDEX

- Whittlesey, Major Charles W., 270.
- Wilhelm II, of Germany, appeals to President Wilson on dum dums, 10; speech to Krupp workers, 266.
- Wilmans, the, case of, 23, 40.
- Willard, Daniel, and council of national defense, 131, 148.
- Wilson, Vice Admiral Henry B., 296, 298.
- Wilson, President, and ship purchase, 5; Neutrality proclamations, 7; appealed to by belligerents, 9; reply to the kaiser, 10; on the blockade controversy, 26; on the case of the *Guiflight*, 43; early views on war and peace, 46; on *Lusitania* case, 46; at Philadelphia, May 10, 1915, 47; "too proud to fight," 47; first *Lusitania* note, 47-49; second *Lusitania* note, 50; third *Lusitania* note, 52; notes on the *Arabic* and *Ancona*, 54; on the *Suez* case, 57; his political ideals, 61; relations with Secretary Bryan, 62; offers to act for peace, 63; relation with private peace efforts, 65; and German peace offer of 1916, 66; his address on peace, Dec. 18, 1916, 66; address on League of Nations, Jan. 22, 1917, 62, 71; "peace without victory," 69, 70; his peace principles, 71; and the National Security League, 76; increased interest in defense after *Lusitania* case, 76; on the naval act of 1916, 78; charged with indecision, 78; renominated, 82; opposed by pro-Germans, 87; defies pro-Germans, 88; "peace without victory," 91; attitude toward ruthless submarine policy, 94; addresses congress, February 3, 1917, 94, 101; repudiates Barthelme, 102; asks for authority to arm merchantmen, 103; on the La Follette filibuster, 106; calls congress in extra session, 106, 107; address to congress, April 2, 1917, 108-111; his motive in going to war, 111; on the proposed Roosevelt division, 118; appoints business men to positions of official service, 133; on the attempt to appoint a committee on the conduct of the war, 141; on fuel embargo, 146; on operation of railroads by government, 150; his anti-trust program, 158; his method of fighting, 159; his Mexican policy, 160; on armed merchantmen, 161; his strong position in government, 162; on a committee on conduct of the war, 163; on the efficiency of secretary of war, 171; originates the Overman Bill, 173; Senator James on, 175; and Gutzon Borglum, 178, 181-184; appoints H. Snowden Marshall, 178; and unity of military command in France, 220; speech at Baltimore, April 6, 1918, 225; his Fourteen Points, 314-317; his additional points, 317; replies to Austrian peace note of Sept. 14, 1918, 319; on the American peace policy, 322-323; his reply to Prince Maximilian, 324; criticized by Senator Lodge, 326; Bulgarian minister on, 326; reply to second German peace note, 326; turns matter over to military experts, 327; his policy in peace, 331 as a delegate to Peace Conference, 332-335; attitude toward opponents, 338; arrival in Paris, 338; sounds sentiment on the league of nations, 339; in England, 340; and reparation by Germany, 341; his speech at Manchester, 341; in Italy, 342; at first meeting of Peace Conference, 345; moves endorsement of a league of nations, 347; chairman of committee on league, 348; original ideas of a league, 350; returns to United States, 352; invites foreign committees of congress to conference, 352; returns to Europe, 355; parting speech on league of nations, 355; and the international problems of the Peace Conference, 358-370; on Poland, 358; on the Saar Valley question, 359; on the Japanese question of Shantung, 361; talks of going home, 361; Charles H. Grasty on, 361-363; and the Adriatic question, 363-365; and the Shantung question, 365-369; leaves Paris, 372; his Fourteen Points in Peace Conference, 373; Frank H. Simonds on, 374; lays treaty before the senate, 376.
- Wireless Telegraphy in the war, 8.
- Wood, General Leonard, and officers' training camps, 121; on army needs, 179.
- Works, John D., Senator, attitude toward war policies, 95, 105.
- World War, economic shock in United States, 1-7.
- Zimmerman, Dr. Alfred, his Mexican note, 105, 110.



Bassett, J.S.
Our war with Germany.

270287

D570
B519
10.2

NAME	DATE	NAME	DATE
J.P. [unclear]	MAR 24 1921	T. Buchanan	11/20/24
[unclear]	APR 13 1921	[unclear]	MAR 2 1922
[unclear]	MAY 14 1921	Calvin C. Fehint	5/28/30
[unclear]	9-5-21	[unclear]	12/14/32
[unclear]	5-26-21	[unclear]	MAY 13 1932
[unclear]	3/26/21	Phyllis Goodley	MAR 18 1933
[unclear]	4/5/21	Henry R. Rought	[unclear]
[unclear]	28 1921	[unclear]	JUL 31 1933
[unclear]	[unclear]	Chas. Hunter	MAR 27 1934

270287

